{"id":13356,"date":"2026-10-20T10:33:33","date_gmt":"2026-10-20T10:33:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/?p=13356"},"modified":"2026-10-20T10:33:33","modified_gmt":"2026-10-20T10:33:33","slug":"how-did-the-justice-and-development-party-recover-electorally","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/?p=13356&lang=en","title":{"rendered":"How Did the Justice and Development Party Recover Electorally?"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

Political and organisational factors combined to restore the Justice and Development Party\u2019s electoral standing, increasing its representation in Morocco\u2019s lower house of parliament from 13 to 54 seats in the latest elections and exceeding all expert forecasts.<\/span><\/h4>\n<\/blockquote>\n

 <\/p>\n

Executive Summary<\/span><\/h5>\n

This paper examines the factors that enabled the Justice and Development Party (PJD) to regain its electoral standing, focusing on two main dimensions. The first concerns the geostrategic shifts following Al-Aqsa Flood and the political context they created, which allowed the party to overcome some of the repercussions of the organisational crisis triggered by Saadeddine El Othmani\u2019s signing of the Joint Declaration between the Kingdom of Morocco, the United States of America and Israel. The second concerns factors internal to the party, foremost among them Abdelilah Benkirane\u2019s return as secretary-general and his adoption of a communication strategy centred on direct engagement with citizens. This took the form of a series of visits to several provinces across the Kingdom before the official election campaign began, effectively turning his political activities into an early electoral campaign.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Introduction<\/span><\/h5>\n

The Justice and Development Party won 54 seats in the House of Representatives in the elections of 23 September 2026, more than quadrupling the 13 seats it had secured in the previous elections. This restored the party\u2019s political prominence after its setback on 8 September 2021. That defeat had marked a departure from the party\u2019s gradual electoral rise since its participation in the elections of 14 November 1997, when it was integrated into the political process in preparation for the consensual alternation of government, following decades of conflict between the Palace and opposition parties rooted in the national movement.<\/p>\n

[1] Several factors contributed to the 2021 setback.[2] Some concerned the party\u2019s record in government,[3] particularly its handling of issues involving identity and values and the associated legislative reforms. Foremost among these were the adoption of Framework Law No. 51.17 on the education, training and scientific research system in 2019,[4] which generated controversy over the use of French to teach scientific and technical subjects, and Law No. 13.21 on the lawful uses of cannabis in 2021.[5]<\/p>\n

Other factors included the repercussions of signing the Joint Declaration between the Kingdom of Morocco, the United States of America and Israel on 22 December 2020, alongside changes to electoral legislation, particularly the method used to calculate the electoral quotient.[6] Together, these factors affected sections of the party\u2019s electorate and its ideologically aligned support base, which did not vote for it in 2021.<\/p>\n

Against this background, the paper asks: how did the interaction of political and organisational factors contribute to the PJD\u2019s electoral recovery in the elections of 23 September 2026? What role did party mobilisation and the monitoring of polling stations on election day play in this process?<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Pathways to Political Recovery: From the repercussions of normalization to capitalizing on the opposition’s position.<\/span><\/h5>\n

Two key factors help explain the PJD\u2019s political recovery. The first was its management of the repercussions of signing the Joint Declaration and its renewed emphasis on the Palestinian cause following Al-Aqsa Flood. The second was the performance of its parliamentary group, whose opposition discourse and scrutiny of government policies strengthened the party\u2019s presence and influence in the political arena.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Flood That Washed Away the Stigma of Normalisation<\/span><\/h5>\n

The Palestinian cause has remained central to the PJD\u2019s discourse. The party helped raise public awareness of the Palestinian people\u2019s historic and legitimate rights and sought to articulate its positions through organisations associated with it, including civic associations and student and women\u2019s organisations.<\/p>\n

However, the signing of the Joint Declaration[7] between the Kingdom of Morocco, the United States of America[8] and Israel by Saadeddine El Othmani, who was then both head of government and party secretary-general, profoundly shocked the party\u2019s members and supporters. Described in political debate as a normalisation agreement, the declaration carried political costs that weakened the party\u2019s capacity to mobilise. The PJD faced intense criticism holding it responsible for normalisation, and the contradiction between its opposition to normalisation and its secretary-general\u2019s signature placed it in a difficult position. This prompted efforts to justify the decision by distinguishing El Othmani\u2019s party position from his responsibilities as head of government. Benkirane undertook this task, explaining that the state had its own considerations and constraints in safeguarding its supreme interests.<\/p>\n

The visit of a Hamas delegation to Morocco in June 2021 took place as the party sought to manage the repercussions of the signing, amid volatile and challenging international and regional conditions. The position of the Movement for Unity and Reform can also be understood as an attempt to avoid deepening this rift. After 22 December 2020, it issued no official statement[9] addressing the signing in isolation from its context or blaming El Othmani for having signed.<\/p>\n

Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, with its significant geostrategic implications, played a decisive role in returning the Palestinian cause to the forefront of the party\u2019s political mobilisation. This was reflected in its public positions, its continued participation in events supporting Al-Aqsa Flood, and its condemnation of the horrific acts of genocide committed by the Israeli war machine.[10] The PJD thus regained the initiative in defending the Palestinian cause,[11]reaffirming its centrality to the party\u2019s discourse and political conduct. Al-Aqsa Flood appeared to breathe new life into its exhausted organisation.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, an examination of the party\u2019s discourse on Palestine and its implications for Moroccan affairs suggests a considerable degree of political pragmatism. The PJD readily condemns Israeli crimes in terms that invoke religious considerations, but shows greater restraint when their implications for Morocco\u2019s official relations are at issue. One example was its reluctance to comment on reports that Morocco and Israel were upgrading their diplomatic representation. In a statement issued on 17 September 2026, the party urged supporters to \u201crefrain from engaging with domestic and international reporting on this issue, focus on the task at hand, and continue the election campaign\u201d.[12]<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Beyond Seat Numbers: Parliamentary Opposition and Rebuilding Influence<\/span><\/h5>\n

The PJD\u2019s return to opposition in the House of Representatives following its setback on 8 September 2021 provided another avenue for restoring its political appeal and organisational strength after a demanding decade in government. It continued to scrutinise government policies and raise contentious governance issues and pressing social concerns. After almost a quarter-century of parliamentary activity, the party had returned to its starting point: 14 seats during the 1997\u20132002 legislative term,[13] compared with 13 in 2021.<\/p>\n

Its parliamentary trajectory can be divided into three main phases. During the first, from 1997 to 2011,[14] the party raised a range of moral and values-based issues, including alcohol consumption, the licensing of bars, and gambling advertisements in public media.[15] Religious issues featured prominently in its interventions in parliamentary debate.[16] This discourse gradually became less pronounced after the events of 16 May 2003, when the party\u2019s political and ideological opponents accused it of bearing moral responsibility for those events, an allegation it consistently denied.[17]<\/p>\n

During the second phase, from 2011 to 2021, the party relied on a parliamentary bloc of 102 members between 2011 and 2016, and 127 between 2016 and 2021. Its parliamentary discourse placed less emphasis on identity and values, focusing instead on providing political backing for the policies of the PJD-led government, particularly on fuel, pensions, education and employment.<\/p>\n

Nonetheless, members of this Islamist party\u2019s parliamentary bloc retained considerable latitude to criticise government policies and express dissenting views, under the principle that \u201ccomment is free, but voting with the party is obligatory\u201d. This principle highlights the tension between elected members\u2019 freedom to voice disagreement and their obligation to uphold party discipline, as well as the complexities of balancing the two in parliamentary practice. One view holds that a member who has secured the party\u2019s endorsement as a candidate is obliged, once elected, to comply with its decisions. Another confines that obligation to voting, whether to support government policies embodied in legislation or to oppose parliamentary procedures that could bring the government to account.[18]<\/p>\n

In the third phase, from 2021 to 2026, the party\u2019s return to opposition enabled it to draw on the tools of public policy analysis in developing its arguments, particularly during the monthly questioning of the head of government and debates on annual finance bills. Its parliamentary group raised what it considered to be conflicts of interest involving government members, including the head of government, in relation to the fuel sector, the Casablanca desalination contract,[19] and exemptions from duties granted to livestock importers.<\/p>\n

The group also addressed problems in implementing government social policies, particularly in social protection, education and health. Its criticism extended to contentious human rights issues, including the use of gunfire in the \u201cLqliaa incident\u201d, which the head of its parliamentary group raised in parliament.[20]<\/p>\n

This parliamentary record provided material for the party\u2019s campaign ahead of the elections of 23 September 2026. The PJD drew on these issues to criticise government policies, focusing particularly on the National Rally of Independents (RNI).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Leadership Charisma and Organisational Mobilisation in Electoral Recovery<\/span><\/h5>\n

Alongside the geostrategic context and political factors, party secretary-general and former head of government Abdelilah Benkirane played a central role in re-energising the party\u2019s grassroots. He drew on his standing within the organisation, his communication style and his presence on the ground. This mobilisation complemented the organisational readiness demonstrated by the party on election day through its polling-station monitoring strategy.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Leadership as a Driver of Renewed Mobilisation<\/span><\/h5>\n

Benkirane\u2019s personality[21] reflects both an aspiration to leadership and an ambition to secure an enduring political legacy. This ambition has shaped his trajectory within the PJD, which has had only three secretaries-general since changing its name in 1998:[22] Abdelkrim El Khatib, Saadeddine El Othmani and Abdelilah Benkirane. Benkirane has led the party for periods totalling approximately fourteen years.[23] This has given him an intimate knowledge of its structures and members and reinforced his image, among large sections of the membership, as the leader capable of preserving the organisation\u2019s cohesion and preventing its fragmentation. This experience made him appear best placed to lead its recovery, particularly after the departure of senior figures, most notably Mustapha Ramid, who possessed some of the same leadership qualities.<\/p>\n

Understanding Benkirane\u2019s position within the PJD, however, requires more than an assessment of his political acumen and organisational experience. It also calls for closer scrutiny of his relationship with party members. He makes little attempt to conceal his tendency towards political paternalism, combining the authority of his organisational position with charismatic influence. This leaves limited space for dissenting voices or alternative political visions. When such voices emerge, they soon retreat, or those expressing them ultimately leave the party.[24]<\/p>\n

This ambivalent relationship has parallels in other Islamist movements,[25] including Al Adl wal Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality) during the lifetime of its founder, Abdessalam Yassine. From this perspective, the intellectual output of its members remained constrained by \u201cthe leader\u2019s charisma\u201d,[26] amounting to little more than \u201cmarginal notes on Yassine\u2019s corpus\u201d.[27]<\/p>\n

In managing the period following the elections of 8 September 2021, Benkirane adopted a permanent campaign strategy marked by his distinctive communication style. He combined social media activity with visits to numerous provinces across the Kingdom before the official campaign began. The continual invocation of political opponents and a persistent sense of threat are central to this strategy, shaping his discourse and arguments through extended storytelling and sustained political confrontation. Accordingly, Benkirane devotes a substantial share of his public meetings to discussing opponents and recounting his disputes with them. He also revisits earlier exchanges with royal advisers, lending his speeches an element of suspense and renewing media interest in him.<\/p>\n

While this leadership and communication presence helped restore the party\u2019s organisational strength, it also raises questions about leadership renewal. Benkirane\u2019s distinctive imprint and his role as a rescuer during successive party crises invite scrutiny of the organisation\u2019s ability to translate its leader\u2019s political capital into lasting institutional capacity. The challenge therefore extends beyond overcoming an electoral setback to establishing the conditions for recovery and renewal, without making the resolution of every crisis dependent on Benkirane\u2019s intervention.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Monitoring Polling Stations to Safeguard Results<\/span><\/h5>\n

Against this background, the PJD prepared for the elections of 23 September 2026 with greater distance from the signing of the normalisation agreement. It drew on its parliamentary group\u2019s oversight record and on organisational momentum in which its secretary-general had played a prominent role. This readiness was reflected in the party\u2019s fielding of candidates across all local and regional electoral constituencies and its nomination of leading cadres and senior figures. These included former government officials, the head of its parliamentary group, and list leaders who had served more than one term in the House of Representatives.<\/p>\n

These preparations extended to election day, when the party implemented its polling-station monitoring strategy.[28]According to Jamaa El Moatassim, chair of the Central Election Campaign Management Committee,[29] the party mobilised 26,000 monitors, against a total of 40,694 polling stations established by the Ministry of the Interior. Official electoral information, however, does not show how polling stations were distributed between urban and rural areas. Nor do the available data on party monitors establish their geographical distribution or the extent to which they were concentrated in particular areas. It is also unclear whether their mobilisation was limited to election day[30] or included monitoring violations during the campaign, or what organisational ties linked them to the party.<\/p>\n

On election day, a party monitor\u2019s primary task is to observe voting, vote sorting and counting, and to report any developments to the party\u2019s election management team so that it can take whatever immediate action it deems appropriate. Monitors are also responsible for obtaining the official polling-station records drawn up after voting closes. This is a crucial element[31] of safeguarding results,[32] rather than a minor procedural detail. These records constitute the legal record of election day and are relied upon by the competent bodies when examining challenges involving fraudulent practices or breaches of electoral integrity.<\/p>\n

In this context, Benkirane applied political pressure on election day, 23 September 2026. In repeated statements, he said that he had contacted the minister of the interior twice after receiving reports that some polling-station chairs were refusing to provide the party\u2019s representatives with copies of the official records.[33] He added that the minister had assured him that strict instructions had been issued to hand them over.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/span><\/h5>\n

The PJD\u2019s electoral recovery illustrates how political and organisational factors interacted to restore its electoral standing. The changes following Al-Aqsa Flood and the party\u2019s record in parliamentary opposition combined with its leadership\u2019s efforts to strengthen organisational readiness and implement a polling-station monitoring strategy. This process culminated in the party winning 54 seats in the elections of 23 September 2026.<\/p>\n

Meeting on 26 September 2026, just one day after the final results were announced and before the King appointed Fatima Zahra El Mansouri as head of government,[34] the party\u2019s National Council moved swiftly to confirm that it would remain in opposition. The PJD now seeks to translate its recovery into further electoral gains in next year\u2019s municipal and regional elections.<\/p>\n

<\/h1>\n

References<\/span><\/h5>\n

[1] For further discussion, see: Mohamed Tozy, Monarchie et Islam politique au Maroc (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2nd ed., 1999); Mohamed Darif, Monarchie marocaine et acteurs religieux (Casablanca: Afrique Orient, 2010); Mohammed El Ayadi, Les deux visages du roi: Le monarque et le Commandeur des croyants (\u00c9ditions La Crois\u00e9e des Chemins, 2015); Mohamed Darif, Moroccan Islamists: Political Calculations in Islamic Activism, 1969\u20131999 (Casablanca: Publications of the Moroccan Journal of Political Sociology, 1999); Nathan J. Brown, Participation, Not Domination: Islamist Movements and Politics in the Arab World, translated by Saad Mehio (New York and Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center and Arab Network for Research and Publishing, 1st ed., 2012); and Abdelilah Setti, The Social and Intellectual Origins of the Moroccan Islamist Movement: The Transition from Radicalism to Moderation (Doha: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 1st ed., 2021).<\/small><\/p>\n

[2] For further details, see Abderrahman Allal, \u2018A Party from the Ashes: An Attempt to Explain the Justice and Development Party\u2019s Results in the Elections of 8 September 2021\u2019, Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, 30 October 2021, https:\/\/mipa.institute\/?p=8790&lang=ar.<\/small><\/p>\n

[3] Some observers attach less weight to this factor, noting that the party won 125 seats in the elections of 7 October 2016 while holding responsibilities in both central government and subnational administration. They interpret that result as a popular endorsement of its government policies.<\/small><\/p>\n

[4] Framework Law No. 51.17 on the education, training and scientific research system, promulgated by Dahir No. 1.19.113 of 7 Dhu al-Hijjah 1440 (9 August 2019), Official Gazette, No. 6805, 17 Dhu al-Hijjah 1440 (19 August 2019).<\/small><\/p>\n

[5] Law No. 13.21 on the lawful uses of cannabis, promulgated by Dahir No. 1.21.59 of 3 Dhu al-Hijjah 1442 (14 July 2021), Official Gazette, No. 7006, 11 Dhu al-Hijjah 1442 (22 July 2021).<\/small><\/p>\n

[6] In 2021, Article 84 of Organic Law No. 27.11 on the House of Representatives was amended to read: \u2018Seats shall be allocated to lists using an electoral quotient obtained by dividing the number of registered voters in the constituency concerned by the number of seats allocated to it. The remaining seats shall be distributed under the largest-remainder rule, by allocating them to the lists whose figures are closest to that quotient.\u2019 The Constitutional Court found this compatible with the Constitution. In Decision No. 118.21, it stated: \u2018It is not within the Constitutional Court\u2019s remit to review the legislature\u2019s discretion in choosing the legislative measures it considers appropriate, to weigh alternative legislative choices, or to propose a legislative alternative capable of achieving the same constitutional objectives, provided that the provisions of the Constitution are not infringed.\u2019 See Organic Law No. 04.21 amending and supplementing Organic Law No. 27.11 on the House of Representatives, promulgated by Dahir No. 1.21.39 of 8 Ramadan 1442 (21 April 2021), Official Gazette, No. 6987, 5 Shawwal 1442 (17 May 2021), p. 3405; and Constitutional Court, Decision No. 118.21 of 24 Sha\u2018ban 1442 (7 April 2021), Official Gazette, No. 6977, 29 Sha\u2018ban 1442 (12 April 2021), p. 2282.<\/small><\/p>\n

[7] \u2018Joint Declaration between the Kingdom of Morocco, the United States and the State of Israel\u2019, 22 December 2020, United Nations Peacemaker, https:\/\/peacemaker.un.org\/en\/node\/9969.<\/small><\/p>\n

[8] On 10 December 2020, King Mohammed VI held a telephone conversation with US President Donald Trump. They discussed the US president\u2019s issuance of a presidential proclamation, with binding legal and political force and immediate effect, recognising, for the first time in US history, the Kingdom of Morocco\u2019s full sovereignty over the entire Moroccan Sahara. It was agreed to facilitate direct flights carrying Jews of Moroccan origin and Israeli tourists to and from Morocco; resume official bilateral contacts and diplomatic relations as soon as possible; and develop innovative economic and technological relations. To this end, the two countries would work towards reopening liaison offices, as had existed for many years until 2002. See the Royal Cabinet communiqu\u00e9 of 10 December 2020, published on the official website of the government authority responsible for foreign affairs.<\/small><\/p>\n

[9] Following the Royal Cabinet communiqu\u00e9 of 10 December 2020, the Executive Bureau of the Movement for Unity and Reform issued a statement the next day, 11 December 2020, describing the measures referred to above as \u2018a regrettable development and an unacceptable step, inconsistent with Morocco\u2019s steadfast and honourable position of support\u2019.<\/small><\/p>\n

[10] See Genocide, or the Crime of Crimes: Proceedings of Israel\u2019s Trial in The Hague, introduction by Azmi Bishara, translated by a team from the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Beirut, July 2025).<\/small><\/p>\n

[11] One example is the participation of party secretary-general Abdelilah Benkirane in the funeral of Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas\u2019s Political Bureau, in Doha on 2 August 2024.<\/small><\/p>\n

[12] Statement of the PJD General Secretariat, 17 September 2026, party website.<\/small><\/p>\n

[13] According to the official results of the elections of 14 November 1997, the PJD won nine seats. Its representation subsequently increased to 14 after it secured five additional seats in by-elections.<\/small><\/p>\n

[14] During this period, the party served three parliamentary terms in opposition, with 14 seats in 1997\u20132002, 42 seats in 2002, and 45 in 2007.<\/small><\/p>\n

[15] See Abderrahman Allal, Moroccan Islamists and Human Rights: Transformations in Discourse and Practice (Rabat: Dar Abi Raqraq for Printing and Publishing, 1st ed., 2024).<\/small><\/p>\n

[16] Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, Between Religion and Politics: Islamists in Arab Parliaments (Carnegie Middle East Center and Arab Network for Research and Publishing, 1st ed., 2011), pp. 134\u2013135.<\/small><\/p>\n

[17] For the different dimensions of this debate, see Allal, Moroccan Islamists and Human Rights, cited above.<\/small><\/p>\n

[18] Moroccan parliamentary practice does not make it possible to identify how individual members of either chamber vote, even though voting is personal and cannot be delegated under the first paragraph of Article 60 of the 2011 Constitution. Results are published in aggregate form, reflecting the positions of the components of each chamber without identifying individual members\u2019 votes, whether they belong to parliamentary blocs or smaller groups or are unaffiliated. This prevents individual positions on issues and legislation subject to public votes from being tracked. For further details, see Yahya Haloui and Abderrahman Allal, Parliamentary Voting: A Case Study of the Moroccan House of Representatives during the First Half of the Tenth Legislative Term (Rabat: Simsim\u2013Participation Citoyenne, 1st ed., 2020).<\/small><\/p>\n

[19] Head of Government Aziz Akhannouch defended the terms of the contract during the monthly question session on general policy held on 16 December 2024. Abdellah Bouanou, head of the PJD parliamentary group, chaired a party press conference on 19 December 2024 on \u2018Conflicts of Interest in the Seawater Desalination Contract in the Casablanca\u2013Settat Region\u2019, setting out arguments concerning conflicts of interest in the contract. See: Kingdom of Morocco, Official Parliamentary Gazette, Bulletin of Proceedings of the House of Representatives, minutes of the 216th sitting, monthly session for oral questions to the head of government on general policy, 16 December 2024, fourth year, No. 186, 26 Jumada al-Akhirah 1446 (27 December 2024), p. 14415; and \u2018With Evidence: Bouanou Reveals Conflicts of Interest in the Casablanca Desalination Contract and Akhannouch\u2019s Use of the Office of Head of Government for His Private Interests\u2019, PJD website, 19 December 2024.<\/small><\/p>\n

[20] Intervention by Abdellah Bouanou, head of the PJD parliamentary group, during the monthly session for oral questions to the head of government, Monday, 8 June 2026, minutes of the 324th sitting, p. 33.<\/small><\/p>\n

[21] See Younes Meskine, \u2018Why Does Benkirane Remain Frightening?\u2019, Sawt Al Maghrib, 6 May 2026; and Younes Meskine, \u2018Benkirane Has Won\u2026 Against Us!\u2019, Sawt Al Maghrib, 13 September 2026.<\/small><\/p>\n

[22] At its extraordinary meeting in 1998, the National Council of the Popular Democratic and Constitutional Movement decided to change the party\u2019s name to the Justice and Development Party. See PJD, Proceedings of the National Council, 15 Jumada al-Thani 1420\u201326 September 1999, PJD Publications (2) (Rabat: Top Press, 1st ed., 1999), p. 17.<\/small><\/p>\n

[23] The formation of the PJD was linked to Islamist leaders joining the Popular Democratic and Constitutional Movement, founded by Abdelkrim El Khatib in 1967. El Khatib remained at its head until 2004, when he relinquished active leadership while retaining the title of founding president. The fifth National Congress in 2004 elected Saadeddine El Othmani secretary-general. He held the position for four years before the sixth National Congress in 2008 elected Abdelilah Benkirane as the party\u2019s third secretary-general. The seventh National Congress in 2012 renewed Benkirane\u2019s mandate for a second term. The eighth National Congress re-elected El Othmani in 2017. Benkirane returned to the post following his election at the extraordinary National Congress in 2021, and his mandate was renewed at the ninth National Congress in April 2025.<\/small><\/p>\n

[24] As in the cases of Aziz Rebbah and Abdelkader Amara.<\/small><\/p>\n

[25] This phenomenon merits consideration across several Islamist movements. Hassan al-Banna, for example, founded the Muslim Brotherhood and began laying its theoretical foundations in 1928. Sayyid Qutb subsequently developed this work and charted the movement\u2019s course, but only emerged as a Muslim Brotherhood theorist after al-Banna\u2019s killing in 1949. Within Al Adl wal Ihsane, no group of intellectuals emerged from the membership to produce the movement\u2019s literature, with the possible exception of Mohamed Bachiri. His occasional expression of views that departed from the movement\u2019s line led to his departure.<\/small><\/p>\n

[26] Mohamed Darif, Morocco\u2019s Religious Field (Casablanca: Publications of the Moroccan Journal of Political Sociology, 1st ed., 2017), p. 103.<\/small><\/p>\n

[27] Ibid.<\/small><\/p>\n

[28] Mohammed Masbah writes that in 2011 the PJD adopted \u2018a strategy called \u201cprotecting the results\u201d. It was strengthened first by reinforcing vigilance committees operating nationally and locally to monitor violations and communicate with the Ministry of the Interior almost daily and as incidents occurred. The number of polling-station monitors was also tripled compared with 2007, reaching 30,000 out of 40,000, equivalent to coverage of three-quarters of polling stations. Particular care was taken to obtain the official records from every polling station covered. It is therefore unsurprising that the challenges lodged concerned polling stations that had not been covered.\u2019 See Mohammed Masbah, \u2018Between the Elections of 2007 and 2011: What Changed?\u2019, Hespress, 12 December 2011, https:\/\/www.hespress.com\/\u0628\u064a\u0646-\u0627\u0646\u062a\u062e\u0627\u0628\u0627\u062a-2007-\u0648-2011-\u0645\u0627-\u0627\u0644\u0630\u064a-\u062a\u063a\u064a\u0631\u061f-69442.html.<\/small><\/p>\n

[29] Address by Jamaa El Moatassim at the General Secretariat meeting following the announcement of the preliminary results of the 2026 elections, PJD TV YouTube channel, 24 September 2026.<\/small><\/p>\n

[30] The sixth paragraph of Article 74 of Law No. 27.11 on the House of Representatives, as amended and supplemented, provides: \u2018The head of each list or each candidate shall be entitled to have, at every polling station, a representative who is a qualified voter, to continuously monitor the voting, vote sorting and counting conducted by the polling-station committee. The representative shall also be entitled to request that any observations concerning those operations be entered in the polling-station record. The name of the representative, or their substitute where applicable, must be communicated by noon on the day before polling to the local administrative authority, which shall inform the chair of the polling station.\u2019 Organic Law No. 27.11 on the House of Representatives, as amended and supplemented by Article 1 of Organic Law No. 53.25, promulgated by Dahir No. 1.25.70 of 26 Rajab 1447 (16 January 2026), Official Gazette, No. 7478, 9 Sha\u2018ban 1447 (29 January 2026).<\/small><\/p>\n

[31] Regarding the 2007 elections, Mustapha El Khalfi writes: \u2018The conclusions of the party\u2019s internal assessment of its electoral performance revealed that it had lost more than ten seats because of political and administrative collusion against it in some areas. This collusion exploited the party\u2019s inability to cover all polling stations, which numbered more than 38,000.\u2019 Mustapha El Khalfi, \u2018The Justice and Development Party between Co-optation and Containment\u2019, Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 August 2008.<\/small><\/p>\n

[32] Regarding the elections of 23 September 2026, Jamaa El Moatassim, chair of the PJD Central Election Campaign Management Committee, stated: \u2018Some of our lost seats were due to the absence of our monitors, and consequently we have no information about what happened in those polling stations.\u2019 See El Moatassim\u2019s address to the General Secretariat following the announcement of the preliminary results of the 2026 elections, cited above.<\/small><\/p>\n

[33] For comparison, the PJD General Secretariat\u2019s statement of 9 September 2021 noted: \u2018This culminated in arbitrary and unlawful refusals to provide the party\u2019s representatives with official records at a large number of polling stations, and the expulsion of some representatives, even though those records are the only means of establishing the actual results obtained.\u2019<\/small><\/p>\n

[34] See Dahir No. 1.26.76 of 19 Rabi\u2018 al-Thani 1448 (1 October 2026), appointing Fatima Zahra El Mansouri as head of government, Official Gazette, No. 7548, 19 Rabi\u2018 al-Thani 1448 (1 October 2026).<\/small><\/p>\n

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Political and organisational factors combined to restore the Justice and Development Party\u2019s electoral standing, increasing its representation in Morocco\u2019s lower house of parliament from 13 to 54 seats in the latest elections and exceeding all expert forecasts.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":13326,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[91,2153,123],"tags":[507,2315,174,2341,514],"coauthors":[1732],"class_list":["post-13356","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-democratic-transition","category-highlight","category-research","tag-elections","tag-moroccan-elections","tag-pjd","tag-september-2026","tag--ar"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13356","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=13356"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13356\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13357,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13356\/revisions\/13357"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/13326"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=13356"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=13356"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=13356"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcoauthors&post=13356"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}