{"id":13361,"date":"2026-10-20T12:09:34","date_gmt":"2026-10-20T12:09:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/?p=13361"},"modified":"2026-10-20T23:04:20","modified_gmt":"2026-10-20T23:04:20","slug":"moroccos-strategic-positioning-how-a-middle-power-adapts-to-a-changing-world","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/?p=13361&lang=en","title":{"rendered":"Morocco’s Strategic Positioning: How a Middle Power Adapts to a Changing World"},"content":{"rendered":"
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In an increasingly competitive international system, how can Morocco reposition itself to advance its vital national interests, expand its strategic options, and strengthen its international and regional standing while preserving its traditional alliances?<\/span><\/h4>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT<\/b><\/span><\/b><\/h5>\n<\/div>\n
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For most of the post\u2013Cold War period, Morocco cautiously navigated a U.S.-dominated international system. Today, that environment is changing. The rise of China, the growing influence of new regional powers, the return of geopolitical rivalry in some regions, and the relative decline of U.S. primacy have created new opportunities\u2014and new risks\u2014for middle powers. In this uncertain international environment, Morocco is acting pragmatically and cautiously.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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King Mohammed VI ascended to the Moroccan throne on July 23, 1999, nearly a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall and at a time when the U.S.-led unipolar international system was at its height. This system afforded relatively limited room for strategic maneuver to Morocco and other small and middle powers. Two years into his reign, the 9\/11 attacks fundamentally transformed the global security landscape. The US-led “Global War on Terror”[1]<\/sup><\/a> has put considerable pressure on Muslim-majority countries, especially in light of President George W. Bush’s now-famous statement: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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This highly unipolar international environment, combined with pressing domestic economic and social challenges, encouraged Moroccan decision-makers to adopt a relatively cautious international posture during the early years of Mohammed VI\u2019<\/span>s reign. Foreign-policy priorities shifted away from international activism\u2014including on regional issues such as the Palestinian question[3]<\/sup><\/a>, where Moroccan diplomacy had previously played a prominent role<\/span>\u2014and toward domestic political reform and socioeconomic development[4]<\/sup><\/a>. Nevertheless, the international campaign against terrorism spilled over into Morocco\u2019<\/span>s domestic politics, particularly following the Casablanca attacks of May 2003[5]<\/sup><\/a>, complicating the expectations surrounding the country\u2019<\/span>s new political era.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Within a few years, however, the gradual emergence of new centers of economic and political power began to challenge U.S. predominance. The 2011 Arab uprisings further altered the regional environment[6]<\/sup><\/a>, while China\u2019<\/span>s growing international role, Russia\u2019<\/span>s resurgence, and the increasing activism of regional and middle powers created new opportunities for Rabat. Morocco responded by broadening its external partnerships while maintaining close ties with established Western allies. This approach included expanding engagement with China and Russia, closer relations with the Gulf states, and a renewed commitment to Africa, including Morocco joining the African Union in January 2017[7]<\/sup><\/a>, more than three decades after it withdrew from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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This strategy has been particularly consequential for Morocco\u2019<\/span>s efforts to advance its position on the Western Sahara[8]<\/sup><\/a>dispute.<\/span> The United States\u2019 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020[9]<\/sup><\/a> marked a significant diplomatic breakthrough for Rabat. This was followed by shifts in the positions of several European powers with longstanding relations with Morocco, most notably Spain[10]<\/sup><\/a> and France[11]<\/sup><\/a>, which have expressed support for Morocco\u2019<\/span>s autonomy initiative as the basis for resolving the dispute. More recently, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797[12]<\/sup><\/a>, adopted on October 31, 2025, has been interpreted by Morocco as a significant diplomatic achievement[13]<\/sup><\/a>, particularly because it places renewed emphasis on Morocco\u2019<\/span>s autonomy proposal as the basis for negotiations over the territory\u2019<\/span>s future.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Taken together, these developments mark an important evolution in Morocco\u2019<\/span>s foreign-policy strategy. Rabat has moved toward a more diversified and flexible form of strategic positioning while maintaining its traditional Western partnerships and avoiding a fundamental challenge to the existing regional and international system. The following analysis examines this evolution through the interconnected concepts of strategic positioning, pragmatic hedging, and strategic autonomy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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FLEXIBLE POSITIONING<\/b><\/span><\/b><\/h5>\n<\/div>\n
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From the early 2010s onward, Morocco increasingly diversified its strategic partnerships beyond its traditional Western partners, deepening political, economic, and security ties with emerging powers, including China, Russia, India, and Turkey. This process accelerated during the mid-2010s and became particularly visible with King Mohammed VI\u2019<\/span>s visits to Russia in March 2016[14]<\/sup><\/a> and China in May 2016[15]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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At the same time, Morocco has adopted a more assertive approach[16]<\/sup><\/a> toward its traditional Western partners. Rabat increasingly expects its partners to accommodate what it considers its core national interests, particularly on the Sahara issue. This has occasionally generated significant diplomatic tensions, but it also reflects a broader transformation in Morocco\u2019<\/span>s relations with its traditional allies: close partnership is no longer regarded as sufficient in itself; rather, Morocco increasingly seeks greater reciprocity and recognition of its strategic priorities. This assertiveness should therefore be understood not as a rejection of Morocco\u2019<\/span>s traditional alliances, but as an effort to recalibrate them within a more diversified foreign-policy strategy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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In parallel, Morocco has substantially expanded its presence in Africa.[17]<\/sup><\/a> The renewed African dimension of Moroccan foreign policy gained particular momentum during the 2010s, leading to Morocco\u2019<\/span>s joining the African Union in January 2017. Since then, Rabat has strengthened its political, economic, security, and cultural engagement across the continent and sought to establish itself as an influential African actor. Morocco has also increased its diplomatic involvement in regional conflicts, particularly in Libya,[18]<\/sup><\/a> where it hosted several rounds of negotiations among Libyan parties, including the 2015 Skhirat talks that led to the Libyan Political Agreement[19]<\/sup><\/a>, as well as engaging diplomatically across parts of West Africa and the Sahel[20]<\/sup><\/a>. This engagement has been accompanied by major investments, alongside strategic initiatives such as the Atlantic Initiative[21]<\/sup><\/a>, announced in November 2023 to facilitate Atlantic access for landlocked Sahel countries, and Morocco\u2019<\/span>s participation in the U.S.-led Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation[22]<\/sup><\/a>, launched in September 2023.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Together, these developments\u2014 diversifying partnerships, becoming more assertive towards traditional allies, and expanding regional engagement\u2014mark Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s shift from a predominantly Western-oriented foreign policy toward more flexible strategic positioning.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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PRAGMATIC HEDGING<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/b><\/h5>\n<\/div>\n
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Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s strategic hedging does not imply equidistance among competing powers. Rather, Rabat seeks to expand its strategic options while preserving the relationships that remain essential to its security and economic interests. Its approach is selective and interest-driven: Morocco deepens cooperation with emerging powers where doing so advances its economic, diplomatic, or security interests, while carefully managing the potential costs to its relations with the United States and Europe. The cases of China, the war in Ukraine, Western Sahara, Europe, and Gaza illustrate how this strategy operates across different arenas of international politics.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s relations with China offer one of the clearest examples of diversification without strategic realignment. The relationship deepened significantly after the establishment of a strategic partnership in May 2016[23]<\/sup><\/a>, following King Mohammed VI\u2019<\/span>s visit to Beijing. It subsequently developed through several important economic and institutional milestones, including the agreement on the Mohammed VI Tangier Tech City in March 2017[24]<\/sup><\/a>, Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s official accession to China\u2019<\/span>s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in May 2017, and the signing of an agreement implementing the Belt and Road framework in 2022[25]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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In September 2025, the two countries also agreed to establish a framework for strategic dialogue,[26]<\/sup><\/a> while in 2026 China expressed interest in negotiating a free-trade agreement with Morocco[27]<\/sup><\/a>. Rabat, however, has continued to calibrate the pace and depth of Sino-Moroccan relations, particularly in light of their potential implications for its strategic relationship with the United States. This selective approach is consistent with Morocco\u2019<\/span>s broader hedging strategy: China represents an additional strategic and economic option rather than an alternative geopolitical alignment.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The war in Ukraine provides a different illustration of the same logic. Following Russia\u2019<\/span>s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Morocco emphasized respect for Ukraine\u2019<\/span>s territorial integrity and sovereignty, while also stressing the principles of non-interference and the peaceful settlement of disputes.[28]<\/sup><\/a> At the same time, Rabat avoided aligning exclusively with either Moscow or the Western coalition. Morocco was absent from the March 2, 2022, UN General Assembly vote on the resolution condemning Russia\u2019<\/span>s aggression,<\/span>[29]<\/sup><\/a> allowing it to avoid a direct confrontation with Moscow while preserving its relations with Western partners. Several considerations help explain this cautious approach. First, the Western Sahara dispute remained central. Russia\u2019<\/span>s permanent membership of the UN Security Council made maintaining constructive relations with Moscow relevant to Morocco\u2019<\/span>s broader effort to secure international support for its position on the territory. Second, Russia\u2019<\/span>s expanding political and security presence in the Sahel[30]<\/sup><\/a> may have implications for Morocco\u2019s strategy in the region[31]<\/sup><\/a>. As Moscow\u2019<\/span>s influence increased across parts of the region, Rabat had an interest in avoiding unnecessary confrontation while strengthening its own position in Africa. Finally, Morocco was managing this relationship while navigating tensions with Germany and Spain in 2021\u20132022 and growing uncertainty in its relations with France. At the same time, the durability of U.S. policy toward Western Sahara following the end of Donald Trump\u2019<\/span>s first presidency term (2016-2020) was not entirely certain, particularly during the first months of the Biden administration, when Washington appeared hesitant to explicitly reaffirm or advance the decision taken by Trump[32]<\/sup><\/a>. Under these circumstances, maintaining diplomatic flexibility offered Morocco greater room for maneuver than choosing unequivocally between competing geopolitical camps. Morocco\u2019<\/span>s position on Ukraine therefore reflected pragmatic hedging rather than a return to nonalignment.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s relations with Europe reveal another dimension of its strategic positioning: the effort to convert a traditionally asymmetric relationship into one of greater reciprocal interdependence.<\/span>[33]<\/sup><\/a> Europe remains indispensable to Morocco[34]<\/sup><\/a> in trade, investment, migration, border security, and counterterrorism, but European states also depend on Morocco for cooperation on these issues. This mutual dependence has given Rabat greater leverage in its relations with European partners[35]<\/sup><\/a> and strengthened its ability to press for greater reciprocity, particularly on the Western Sahara issue.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The war in Gaza has also<\/span> tested Morocco\u2019<\/span>s hedging strategy by requiring it to balance its relations with the United States and Israel with its longstanding support for Palestinian statehood. Rather than choosing between these competing imperatives, Rabat has maintained a measured position[36]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> that preserves its diplomatic flexibility. Its participation in the U.S.-led Board of Peace[37]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> and commitment to the International Stabilization Force for Gaza[38]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>, while continuing to support a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, illustrate this approach. Therefore, Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s participation is better understood not as an ambition to become a diplomatic broker in the Middle East, but as an exercise in pragmatic strategic positioning. By engaging with a U.S.-led initiative while maintaining its established position on Palestinian statehood, Rabat preserves its relationship with Washington and protects its broader strategic interests, particularly regarding Western Sahara.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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AUTONOMY WITHOUT REVISIONISM<\/b><\/span><\/b><\/h5>\n<\/div>\n
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Morocco under King Mohammed VI can be characterized as a \u201c<\/span>status quo-oriented<\/span>\u201d state[39]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> that has pursued greater strategic autonomy[40]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>. Although Morocco\u2019<\/span>s foreign-policy strategies have evolved considerably, its broader orientation since independence\u2014and particularly since the 1963 Sand War[41]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>\u2014has remained focused on maintaining its position within the existing regional and international system.<\/s><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The status quo character of Moroccan foreign policy is particularly evident in the Maghreb.[42]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Morocco and Algeria possess broadly comparable capabilities, and neither has sufficient power to establish uncontested regional hegemony.[43]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>Any attempt to fundamentally alter the regional balance would therefore impose significant costs on both sides. Their rivalry consequently produces a paradox: the two countries compete for regional influence while also sharing an interest in preserving the existing balance of power. The security dilemma between them is central to this dynamic. Morocco seeks to modernize its military capabilities to protect its national interests and maintain a regional balance of power, while managing the risk that its military buildup could intensify Algeria\u2019<\/span>s threat perceptions and fuel a broader arms competition. An uncontrolled arms race[44]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>, from Rabat\u2019<\/span>s perspective, could undermine the fragile stability of the regional subsystem.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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At the international level, strategic autonomy for Morocco does not mean complete independence from external powers.Given Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s limited material capabilities and its extensive economic, political, and security interdependence with major powers, achieving complete strategic autonomy is unrealistic. Instead, Rabat seeks to retain its freedom of strategic choice by managing the contradictions inherent in its relationships with competing powers.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The rise of multipolarity has expanded the scope for such a strategy. Morocco pursued a limited form of strategic autonomy during the Cold War[45]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>, but a more dispersed distribution of power in recent years has substantially increased the opportunities available to it. Therefore, Morocco has sought to diversify its partnerships in ways that reduce dependence and expand its strategic options, rather than balancing against or distancing itself from major powers. This is particularly evident in high politics and strategic economic partnerships, where Rabat places a premium on flexibility while maximizing the benefits of competing external relationships.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s strategic positioning, therefore, should not be understood as a transition from a status quo policy to a revisionist one. Strategic autonomy is instead the means through which a status quo middle power seeks to maintain and strengthen its position within an evolving international system. Diversifying partnerships, developing economic and defense capabilities, maintaining relations with competing actors, and preserving the regional balance of power all serve this broader objective.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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WESTERN SAHARA AS A DRIVER<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/b><\/h5>\n<\/div>\n
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The Western Sahara dispute[46]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> remains at the center of Morocco\u2019<\/span>s foreign-policy agenda and is essential to understanding its contemporary strategic positioning. The dispute is inseparable from the broader dynamics of the Maghreb regional subsystem, characterized by persistent mistrust and regional rivalry<\/span> between Morocco and Algeria. For Rabat, Western Sahara is not simply a territorial dispute; it is an existential issue[47]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>. Consequently, the positions adopted by external partners on the issue can have a significant impact on bilateral relations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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This helps explain Morocco\u2019<\/span>s growing willingness to pay<\/span> diplomatic costs when partners adopt positions perceived by Rabat as unfavorable to its interests. This pattern was evident in tensions with the United States[48]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> in 2013, Sweden[49]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>in 2015, Germany[50]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> and Spain[51]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> in 2021, France[52]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> in 2022\u20132023, and Tunisia<\/span>[53]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> since 2022. Similar, although generally shorter-lived, tensions have also occurred with some Arab partners, further demonstrating the extent to which the Western Sahara issue can affect Morocco\u2019<\/span>s relations beyond the traditional Western sphere.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Western Sahara dispute provides the deeper structural context for much of this hedging. It is both a constraint and a driver of Morocco\u2019<\/span>s strategic positioning: while it limits diplomatic flexibility by making certain relationships sensitive to partners\u2019 <\/span>positions on the issue, it also encourages diversification and the search for political support across multiple regions. As a core national interest, the Western Sahara issue shapes Morocco\u2019<\/span>s external relations, leading decision-makers to make careful strategic calculations about partnerships and diplomatic choices.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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LIMITS OF POSITIONING<\/b><\/span><\/b><\/h5>\n<\/div>\n
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Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s strategic positioning has expanded its strategic flexibility, but it has not eliminated the structural constraints imposed by geography, regional rivalry, and limited material capabilities. The central challenge is the gap between Morocco\u2019<\/span>s growing ambitions and its available economic, military, and political resources.[54]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> As Rabat deepens its engagement across Africa, mobilizes significant diplomatic resources to obtain more than thirty positions in international bodies[55]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>, and seeks to increase its diplomatic influence, it must ensure that its commitments remain commensurate with its capabilities. Large-scale investments, extensive diplomatic commitments, or involvement in regional conflicts can generate costs that exceed their strategic returns. The challenge, therefore, is not simply to expand Morocco\u2019<\/span>s international presence, but to ensure that its external activism remains strategically sustainable.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s room for maneuver is also shaped by its regional environment.[56]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Its foreign policy operates within two interconnected regional subsystems. The Maghreb regional subsystem can be characterized as essentially bipolar[57]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>, with the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria at its core. Given their broadly comparable capabilities and the significant costs that any attempt to alter the regional status quo would impose on both, the two states have strong incentives to preserve the existing balance of power.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Western Mediterranean constitutes a second regional subsystem, centered on Morocco\u2019<\/span>s complex and highly interdependent relationship with Spain[58]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>. This relationship combines persistent territorial disputes with economic, security, and migration interdependence, while also reflecting the legacies of their shared history and colonial past. The 2002 Perejil Island crisis[59]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> and the continuing disputes over Ceuta and Melilla illustrate the structural tensions underlying the relationship. Migration[60]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> has added another layer of strategic interdependence, at times becoming intertwined with broader diplomatic and geopolitical disagreements. The crises surrounding Ceuta in 2021[61]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> and 2026[62]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>, for example, were interpreted by some analysts as reflecting Morocco\u2019<\/span>s use of migration pressures as leverage[63]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> amid disagreements with Spain over Western Sahara and Madrid\u2019<\/span>s regional policies, particularly its relations with Algeria. The Ceuta crisis in July 2026 acquired a broader security dimension when the European Parliament, in a resolution adopted on 17 September 2026, condemned the mass irregular crossings into Ceuta from Morocco and characterized the instrumentalization of irregular migration as <\/span>\u201c<\/span><\/span>a a tool of hybrid warfare against the territorial integrity of a Member State\u201d<\/span>[64]<\/sup><\/span><\/a>. These events illustrate both the bargaining leverage that interdependence in the field of migration can provide and its limits:: while migration pressures can strengthen Rabat\u2019<\/span>s negotiating position, their use can also impose diplomatic costs and strain relations with a strategically important European partner.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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These regional constraints place a ceiling on Morocco\u2019<\/span>s ability to translate increased diplomatic engagement into broader geopolitical influence. The Western Sahara dispute, tensions with Algeria, and the complex relationship with Spain continue to absorb significant diplomatic and strategic resources, limiting Rabat\u2019<\/span>s freedom of action. Economic diversification and Morocco\u2019<\/span>s expanding role in Africa can mitigate some of these constraints, but not eliminate them. Hedging also depends on credibility: as Rabat expands its partnerships, it must convince both traditional allies and emerging partners that diversification complements rather than replaces its long-term commitments. However, excessive ambiguity could create uncertainty and weaken confidence in Morocco\u2019<\/span>s strategic intentions.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s experience nonetheless demonstrates the value of strategic positioning for a middle power operating in an increasingly multipolar system. By maintaining close relations with established Western partners while expanding cooperation with emerging powers, Rabat has sought to avoid both excessive alignment and rigid balancing. The strategy, however, is neither cost-free nor unlimited. Morocco\u2019<\/span>s strategic positioning is sustainable to the extent that its diplomatic activism remains selective and its larger economic and strategic engagements remain commensurate with its capacity to deliver on them. Its long-term success will therefore depend on aligning ambition with capability, managing the constraints of its regional environment, and converting partnership diversification into sustainable strategic autonomy without compromising the relationships on which its security and prosperity continue to depend.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Footnotes<\/span><\/small><\/cite><\/h5>\n
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[1]<\/sup><\/a> George W. Bush Presidential Library, \u201c<\/span>Global War on Terror,\u201d National Archives, accessed August 30, 2026, https:\/\/www.georgewbushlibrary.gov\/research\/topic-guides\/global-war-terror<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[2]<\/sup><\/a> George W. Bush, \u201c<\/span>Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,\u201d September 20, 2001, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, https:\/\/georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov\/news\/releases\/2001\/09\/text\/20010920-6.html<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[3]<\/sup><\/a> Irene Fernandez-Molina, “Morocco and the Middle East under Mohammed VI.” HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series<\/i>12 (2014), https:\/\/durham-repository.worktribe.com\/output\/1699734\/morocco-and-the-middle-east-under-mohammed-vi<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[4]<\/sup><\/a> Yasmina Abouzzohour, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Progress and Missed Opportunities: Morocco Enters Its Third Decade under King Mohammed VI,\u201d Brookings<\/i>, July 29, 2020, https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/progress-and-missed-opportunities-morocco-enters-its-third-decade-under-king-mohammed-vi\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[5]<\/sup><\/a> Abdeslam Maghraoui, \u201c<\/span>Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s Reforms after the Casablanca Bombings,\u201d Sada<\/i>, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 26, 2008, https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/sada\/2008\/08\/moroccos-reforms-after-the-casablanca-bombings<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[6]<\/sup><\/a> Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Helle Malmvig, and Eduard Soler i Lecha, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Interregnum: The Regional Order in the Middle East and North Africa after 2011,\u201d MENARA Final Reports<\/i>, no. 1 (February 2019), SSRN, https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3367815<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[7]<\/sup><\/a> Miguel Hernando de Larramendi and Beatriz Tom<\/span>\u00e9-Alonso, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>The Return of Morocco to the African Union,\u201d IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2017<\/i> (Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2017), 229\u2013232, https:\/\/www.iemed.org\/publication\/the-return-of-morocco-to-the-african-union\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[8]<\/sup><\/a> The term \u201c<\/span>Western Sahara\u201d is used in this article as the geographical designation most widely used in international literature and by international institutions. Its use does not imply any political position or prejudice Morocco\u2019<\/span>s claim to sovereignty over the territory. In Moroccan literature, the terms \u201c<\/span>Moroccan Sahara<\/span>\u201d and, more simply, \u201c<\/span>the Sahara\u201d are generally preferred.<\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[9]<\/sup><\/a> Donald J. Trump, \u201c<\/span>Proclamation on Recognizing the Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Morocco over the Western Sahara,\u201d December 10, 2020, The White House, https:\/\/trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov\/presidential-actions\/proclamation-recognizing-sovereignty-kingdom-morocco-western-sahara\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[10]<\/sup><\/a> Javier A. Gonz<\/span>\u00e1lez Vega,\u00a0 “Diplomatic Manoeuvres in the Dark: How Spain changed its Position on the Western Sahara Issue,\u201d Spanish Yearbook of International Law<\/i> 26 (2022): 261-270, https:\/\/www.sybil.es\/sybil\/article\/view\/21<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[11]<\/sup><\/a> Intissar Fakir, \u201c<\/span>French Embrace of Moroccan Autonomy Plan Underscores Broader Shift on Western Sahara Dispute,\u201d Middle East Institute<\/i>, August 8, 2024, https:\/\/mei.edu\/publication\/french-embrace-moroccan-autonomy-plan-underscores-broader-shift-western-sahara-dispute\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[12]<\/sup><\/a> United Nations Security Council, \u201c<\/span>Resolution 2797 (2025),\u201d S\/RES\/2797 (2025), October 31, 2025, https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/s\/res\/2797(2025)<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[13]<\/sup><\/a> Said Saddiki and Mohammed Masbah, \u201c<\/span>The Sahara Conflict after UNSCR 2797: Between Opportunity and Challenges,\u201d Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), December 14, 2025, https:\/\/mipa.institute\/?p=12865&lang=en<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[14]<\/sup><\/a> President of Russia, \u201c<\/span>Meeting with King of Morocco Mohammed VI,\u201d March 15, 2016. http:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/51516<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[15]<\/sup><\/a> Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \u201c<\/span>Xi Jinping Holds Talks with King Mohammed VI,\u201d May 11, 2016, https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/gjhdq_665435\/2913_665441\/2858_663706\/2860_663710\/202406\/t20240611_11417311.html<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[16]<\/sup><\/a> Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \u201cHM the King Mohammed VI: The Sahara Issue Is the Lens through which Morocco Looks at the World,\u201d August 22, 2022, https:\/\/in.diplomatie.ma\/en\/hm-king-mohammed-vi-sahara-issue-lens-through-which-morocco-looks-world<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[17]<\/sup><\/a> Said Saddiki, “Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s Foreign Policy Treads on the Shifting Sands of Africa,\u201d Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis,<\/i> May 13, 2018,<\/i>https:\/\/mipa.institute\/?p=5620&lang=en<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[18]<\/sup><\/a> Faiza Koubi, \u201c<\/span>Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s Relentless Diplomacy in the Libyan Crisis,\u201d International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)<\/i>, September 17, 2020, https:\/\/www.ifimes.org\/en\/researches\/moroccos-relentless-diplomacy-in-the-libyan-crisis\/4658<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[19]<\/sup><\/a> PA-X Peace Agreements Database, \u201c<\/span>Libyan Political Agreement (Sukhairat Agreement),\u201d December 17, 2015, https:\/\/www.peaceagreements.org\/agreements\/wgg\/1370\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[20]<\/sup><\/a> Beatriz de Le\u00f3<\/span>n Cobo, Nicholas Hopton, and Burcu Ozcelik, \u201c<\/span>Morocco as a Strategic Partner in Supporting the Sahel Region\u2019<\/span>s Security,\u201d Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)<\/i>, February 13, 2025, https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/morocco-strategic-partner-supporting-sahel-regions-security<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[21]<\/sup><\/a> Abderrafie Zaanoun, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s Atlantic Initiative and Potential Challenges to Regional Leadership,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/i>, October 10, 2024, https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/sada\/2024\/10\/moroccos-atlantic-initiative-and-potential-challenges-to-regional-leadership<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[22]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Department of State, \u201c<\/span>Atlantic Cooperation,\u201d https:\/\/2021-2025.state.gov\/bureau-of-oceans-and-international-environmental-and-scientific-affairs\/atlantic-cooperation\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[23]<\/sup><\/a> Mordechai Chaziza, “China Partnership Diplomacy with Morocco and the New Silk Road Strategy,\u201d The Maghreb Review<\/i> 49, no. 2 (2024): 99-119, DOI: 10.1353\/tmr.2024.a924759<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[24]<\/sup><\/a> Reuters, \u201c<\/span>Morocco signs preliminary financing agreement for $10 billion tech city,\u201d March 20, 2017, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/business\/morocco-signs-preliminary-financing-agreement-for-10-billion-tech-city-idUSKBN16R2MB\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[25]<\/sup><\/a> Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \u201c<\/span>Morocco and China Sign Joint Belt and Road Implementation Plan,\u201d January 5, 2022, \u201d https:\/\/diplomatie.ma\/en\/morocco-and-china-sign-joint-belt-and-road-implementation-plan<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[26]<\/sup><\/a> Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \u201c<\/span>Morocco, China Establish Strategic Dialogue between Their Foreign Ministries,\u201d December 19, 2025, https:\/\/diplomatie.ma\/en\/morocco-china-establish-strategic-dialogue-between-their-foreign-ministries<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[27]<\/sup><\/a> Souhail Karam and Peter Martin, \u201c<\/span>Morocco Weighs China Free Trade Agreement, Minister Says,\u201d Bloomberg News, June 12, 2026, https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2026-06-12\/morocco-weighs-china-free-trade-agreement-minister-says<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[28]<\/sup><\/a> SNRT News, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Ukraine-Russie: Le Maroc suit avec inqui\u00e9tude l\u2019\u00e9volution de la situation,\u201d February 26, 2022, <\/span>https:\/\/snrtnews.com\/fr\/article\/ukraine-russie-le-maroc-suit-avec-inquietude-levolution-de-la-situation-34390<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[29]<\/sup><\/a> Hespress English, \u201c<\/span>Morocco Absent from UN Resolution on Ukraine-Russia Conflict,\u201d November 17, 2022, https:\/\/en.hespress.com\/53183-morocco-absent-from-un-resolution-on-ukraine-russia-conflict.html<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[30]<\/sup><\/a> Frederic Wehrey, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>A Mixed Balance Sheet: Russia\u2019<\/span>s Uneven Influence in the Maghreb,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/i>, October 3, 2024, https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2024\/10\/russias-uneven-influence-maghreb<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[31]<\/sup><\/a> de Le<\/span>\u00f3<\/span>n Cobo, Hopton, and Ozcelik, \u201c<\/span>Morocco as a Strategic Partner.<\/span>\u201d<\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[32]<\/sup><\/a> Joseph Stepansky, \u201c<\/span>Why the Biden Administration Is Reviewing Trump\u2019<\/span>s Western Sahara Decision,\u201d Al Jazeera<\/span><\/i>,<\/i> June 13, 2021, https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2021\/6\/13\/why-biden-administration-and-western-sahara<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[33]<\/sup><\/a> Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \u201c<\/span>Morocco is firmly determined to move forward hand in hand with the European Union,\u201d January 29, 2026, https:\/\/diplomatie.ma\/en\/morocco-firmly-determined-move-forward-together-eu-towards-deeper-more-strategic-resilient-partnership-fm<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[34]<\/sup><\/a> European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, \u201c<\/span>EU Trade Relations with Morocco,\u201d https:\/\/policy.trade.ec.europa.eu\/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region\/countries-and-regions\/morocco_en<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[35]<\/sup><\/a> Lorena Gazzotti, <\/span>\u201cTerrain of Contestation: Complicating the Role of Aid in Border Diplomacy between Europe and Morocco,\u201d <\/i>International Political Sociology 16, no. 4 (December 2022), olac021, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/ips\/olac021<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[36]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Said Saddiki, \u201cMorocco and the War in Gaza: The Dilemma of Principles and Interests,\u201d EuroMeSCo<\/span><\/i><\/span>, November 2023, https:\/\/www.euromesco.net\/publication\/morocco-and-the-war-in-gaza-the-dilemma-of-principles-and-interests\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[37]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \u201c<\/span>HM the King Responds Positively to President Donald Trump\u2019<\/span>s Invitation to Join Peace Board as Founding Member,\u201d January 20, 2026, https:\/\/www.maroc.ma\/en\/news\/hm-king-responds-positively-president-donald-trumps-invitation-join-peace-board-founding-member<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[38]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Ahmad Bentaher and Rania Abushamala, \u201cMorocco signs agreement with Board of Peace to join Gaza international force,\u201d Anadolu Agency, July 15, 2026.\u00a0 https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/en\/middle-east\/morocco-signs-agreement-with-board-of-peace-to-join-gaza-international-force\/3999532<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[39]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> For a more detailed discussion of the notion of a status quo state, see Petar Popovi\u0107, \u201c<\/span>Redefining the Status Quo State: Collective Support, Order-Maintenance, and Self-Restraint,\u201d International Politics<\/i><\/span> (2024): 1\u201319, DOI: 10.1057\/s41311-024-00635-z<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[40]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> For a more detailed discussion of \u201c<\/span>strategic autonomy,\u201d see Hoang Le Thai Vu, Lan Di Ngo, and Thanh Tien Nguyen, \u201c<\/span>A Spectrum of Autonomy: Towards a Theoretical Framework of Strategic Autonomy,\u201d International Journal<\/i><\/span> 79, no. 2 (2024): 230\u201349, DOI: 10.1177\/00207020241256000<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[41]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> The Sand War was a brief armed conflict between Morocco and Algeria in 1963, shortly after both countries gained independence. It stemmed primarily from competing territorial claims along their shared border inherited from the colonial period, particularly Morocco\u2019<\/span>s claims to historically Moroccan territories that had been incorporated into Algeria during colonial rule. The conflict contributed to the persistence of mistrust in Moroccan\u2013Algerian relations.<\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[42]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Djallil Lounnas and Nizar Messari, \u201c<\/span>Algeria<\/span>\u2013Morocco Relations and Their Impact on the Maghrebi Regional System,\u201d MENARA Working Papers<\/i><\/span>, CIDOB<\/span>, no. 20 (October 2018), https:\/\/www.cidob.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2025-03\/MENARA_Working paper_20_18.pdf<\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[43]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Said Saddiki, \u201c<\/span>Will Algerian Foreign Policy Change Towards Its Neighbors in the Next Decade?\u201d Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), March 2020, https:\/\/mipa.institute\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/Said-Saddiki-Article-ENGLISH.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[44]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Will Harvey-Powell, \u201c<\/span>The Maghreb Rivalry: A Defence-Spending Perspective,\u201d International Institute for Strategic Studies<\/i><\/span>, July 27, 2026, https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/military-balance\/2026\/07\/the-maghreb-rivalry-a-defence-spending-perspective\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[45]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Michael Willis and Nizar Messari, \u201cAnalyzing Moroccan Foreign Policy and Relations with Europe,\u201d The Review of International Affairs<\/i><\/span> 3, no. 2 (2003), 152\u2013172. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/1475355032000240658<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[46]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Said Saddiki, \u201c<\/span>The Western Sahara Dispute: A Moroccan Perspective,\u201d Bolet\u00ed<\/i><\/span>n de Estudios Africanos<\/span><\/i><\/span>, no. 4 (January\u2013February 2012): 20\u201324, https:\/\/estudiosafricanos.wordpress.com\/2012\/11\/01\/the-western-sahara-dispute-a-moroccan-perspective\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[47]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, \u201c<\/span>HM the King Delivers Speech to the Nation on the 39th Anniversary of the Green March,\u201d November 6, 2014, https:\/\/maroc.ma\/en\/royal-speeches-and-messages\/royal-speeches\/hm-king-delivers-speech-nation-39th-anniversary-green-march<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[48]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> USA Today, \u201c<\/span>Morocco Cancels War Games with US over Rights,\u201d April 16, 2013, https:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/2013\/04\/16\/morocco-cancels-war-games-with-us-over-rights\/2089089\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[49]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Reuters, \u201c<\/span>Morocco blocks Ikea store in row over Swedish support for breakaway republic,\u201d The Guardian<\/i><\/span>, September 29, 2015, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2015\/sep\/29\/moroccan-authorities-block-ikea-store-opening-in-row-over-swedish-support-for-independent-republic-in-western-sahara<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[50]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Jennifer Holleis and Hicham Driouich, \u201c<\/span>Tensions Rise between Morocco, Germany,\u201d Deutsche Welle<\/i><\/span>, May 8, 2021, https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/tensions-rise-between-morocco-and-germany\/a-57466437<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[51]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Reuters, \u201c<\/span>Western Sahara Leader\u2019<\/span>s Treatment in Spain Angers Morocco,\u201d May 18, 2021, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/western-sahara-leaders-treatment-spain-angers-morocco-2021-05-18\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[52]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Bobin, \u201cEntre le Maroc et la France, le grand d\u00e9samour,\u201d Le Monde,<\/i><\/span> November 18, 2022, <\/span><\/small><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/international\/article\/2022\/11\/18\/entre-le-maroc-et-la-france-le-grand-desamour_6150568_3210.html?srsltid=AfmBOoraSST2112Gcam0r_L8mizOTAjgDIuBspnBo45NPSaLBrB48_t9<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[53]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Reuters, \u201c<\/span>Morocco Recalls Tunisia Ambassador over Western Sahara,\u201d August 27, 2022, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/africa\/morocco-recalls-tunisia-ambassador-over-western-sahara-2022-08-26\/<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[54]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Saddiki, \u201c<\/span>Morocco<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s Foreign Policy Treads on the Shifting Sands of Africa.\u201d<\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[55]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \u201c<\/span>In 2024, the Kingdom of Morocco achieved a 100% success rate in candidacy for vacant positions in international and regional organizations,\u201d December 19,\u00a0 2024, https:\/\/diplomatie.ma\/en\/remarkable-success-moroccos-2024-candidacies-reflects-very-high-royal-visions-foresight-pragmatic-supportive-active-multilateral-governance<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[56]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Anouar Boukhars, “Reassessing the power of regional security providers: the case of Algeria and Morocco,\u201d Middle Eastern Studies<\/i><\/span> 55, no. 2 (2019): 242-260, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/00263206.2018.1538968<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[57]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Lounnas and Messari, \u201c<\/span>Algeria<\/span>\u2013Morocco Relations and Their Impact on the Maghrebi Regional System.\u201d<\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[58]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> David Stenner<\/span>, “Mediterranean <\/span>Crossroads: Spanish-Moroccan Relations in Past and Present<\/span>,\u201d The Journal of North African Studies<\/i><\/span> 24, no. 1 (2019): 7-16, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/13629387.2018.1459089<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[59]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Giles Tremlett, \u201c<\/span>Spanish Troops Recapture Parsley Island,\u201d The Guardian<\/i><\/span>, July 18, 2002, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2002\/jul\/18\/spain.gilestremlett<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[60]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Said Saddiki, \u201c<\/span>Knocking at the Walls of Ceuta and Melilla: Irregular Migration and the Political\u2013Security Nexus,\u201d Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA)<\/i><\/span>, June 14, 2022, https:\/\/mipa.institute\/?p=9362&lang=en<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[61]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Ashifa Kassam, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>More than 6,000 Migrants Reach Spain\u2019<\/span>s North African Enclave Ceuta,\u201d The Guardian<\/i><\/span>, May 18, 2021, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2021\/may\/17\/record-1000-migrants-reach-spains-north-african-enclave-ceuta-in-a-day<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[62]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Alejandro Martin Rodriguez and Sarah Yerkes, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>The Migration Wave That Embarrassed Morocco and Rattled Europe,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/i><\/span>, August 6, 2026,<\/small><\/p>\n

https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/emissary\/2026\/08\/ceuta-morocco-europe-migration-fallout<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[63]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> Blanca Garc<\/span>\u00e9s Mascare<\/span>\u00f1as, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Ceuta: The Weaponisation of Migration,\u201d CIDOB Opinion<\/i><\/span> 669, May 2021, https:\/\/www.cidob.org\/en\/publications\/ceuta-weaponisation-migration<\/a><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[64]<\/sup><\/span><\/a> European Parliament, \u201c<\/span>The recent hybrid attacks and instrumentalisation of migrants in Ceuta and the need for a coordinated response to protect EU\u2019<\/span>s external borders,\u201d Resolution, 17 September 2026, P10_TA(2026)0317.https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/doceo\/document\/TA-10-2026-0317_EN.html<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span><\/small><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In an increasingly competitive international system, how can Morocco reposition itself to advance its vital national interests, expand its strategic options, and strengthen its international and regional standing while preserving its traditional alliances?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":81,"featured_media":13368,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[93,2153,123],"tags":[2346,2344,131],"coauthors":[1725],"class_list":["post-13361","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foreign-policy","category-highlight","category-research","tag-foreign-policy","tag-international-system","tag-morocco"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13361","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/81"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=13361"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13361\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13371,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13361\/revisions\/13371"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/13368"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=13361"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=13361"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=13361"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcoauthors&post=13361"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}