[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Over the past two decades, the Kingdom of Morocco has undertaken dramatic shifts in the religious sector, from the expansion of the religious bureaucracy to the establishment of new institutions for research, public messaging, and education. These efforts have been, in no small part, aimed at mitigating the influence of the violent extremist organizations that have radicalized thousands of Moroccans. Though the religious sector programs are just one piece of a larger national strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE), they provide a valuable case study for international policymakers and civil society practitioners who hope to strengthen the contributions of religious actors in CVE.<\/p>\n
This report unpacks local perspectives on the capacity and significance of the Moroccan religious sector in CVE, with a particular focus on the inclusion of influential religious actors who are not are part of the official religious establishment, such as Salafi leaders. Religious fundamentalists who oppose violent extremism \u2013 including many Salafis \u2013 can play a pivotal role in either fueling or preventing radicalization, and thus represent a critical consideration in any strategy to engage the religious sector in CVE. However, very little research, globally or in Morocco, has been devoted to determining how best to engage constructively with these actors, while significant attention has been given to promoting \u201cmoderate\u201d religious voices.<\/p>\n
To address this need, the International Center for Religion & Diplomacy (ICRD), in partnership with the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), conducted a mixed-methods study of the perspectives of Moroccan Salafis, Islamists, and other religious actors. The study represents one piece of ICRD\u2019s ongoing, multi-country series to develop actionable lessons for effectively engaging Salafi and other fundamentalist groups in the practice of CVE.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Respondents in this study expressed mixed assessments of the Moroccan state\u2019s approach to CVE, with particular concern being raised that the state has not approached the issue holistically enough to address the structural grievances that fuel radicalization. Overall impressions of the contributions of the religious sector were more positive \u2013 religious actors were generally perceived to be capable and active in countering extremism.<\/p>\n
That impression, however, is complicated upon deeper inspection. In the eyes of the Salafi and Islamist respondents, official religious actors \u2013 those who hold state-sponsored positions \u2013 are less locally influential than independent or even foreign religious actors. In their speech and activity, official religious actors are seen as restrained, irrelevant, and archaic, which limits their ability to impact those with extremist sympathies.<\/p>\n
Given this potential limitation, it is important to ensure that CVE efforts are inclusive of those religious actors who exercise influence among the populations at greatest risk of radicalization, which includes Salafi figures. While the state has taken some notable steps to engage with independent Salafi leaders, the Salafi respondents tended to view the state as an antagonist.<\/p>\n
The relationship between Salafi communities and other potential CVE stakeholders is similarly tense. Salafi respondents expressed suspicion about the values and capacities of non-religious civil society organizations (CSOs), though there were some indicators of marginal improvement in the contact between the Salafis and CSOs. Concerns over differences in religious identity were coupled with unease at the involvement of the international community in CVE, with respondents strongly preferring support from Muslim-majority countries over that from the West.<\/p>\n
In light of these findings, ICRD offers the following observations to improve engagement with religious actors on issues of CVE:<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The Role of Inclusion in Countering Violent Extremism<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":78,"featured_media":6911,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[96,178,123],"tags":[300,364,131,365,366],"coauthors":[1783],"class_list":["post-6910","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-religious-policies","category-report","category-research","tag-cve","tag-icrd","tag-morocco","tag-religious-actors","tag-salafi-religious-actors"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6910","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/78"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6910"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6910\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/6911"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6910"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6910"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6910"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcoauthors&post=6910"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}