Morocco is positioning itself as a reliable mediator in the Libya conflict to bolster its international image as a regional stability provider, to check rival Algeria\u2019s aspiration to become a regional hegemon and to improve its bilateral relations with Libya.<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n<\/blockquote>\n <\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\nIntroduction<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nStarting on November 30, representatives of Libya\u2019s House of Representatives (HoR) and State Supreme Council participated in a two-day meeting<\/a> in Tangier mainly dealing with the question of sovereign appointments. This closely followed the November 23-28 Tangier talks that brought together over 120 Libyan parliamentarians from the Tripoli and Tobruk branches of the divided HoR to discuss the next steps in Libya\u2019s political process. The Tangier talks are the fourth<\/a> such talks organized by Morocco in 2020, and come after many<\/a> similar events since the 2011 uprisings.<\/p>\nThe increased frequency of Morocco-brokered meetings for Libyan officials raises a question: Why is the Moroccan regime interested in Libya\u2019s political future when the kingdom neither shares a border nor a strong bilateral relationship<\/a>with the conflict-stricken country?<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Recent developments<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nThe aims<\/a> of the Tangier meeting between the HoR and the State Supreme Council included focusing on the unification of state institutions and on reaching a consensus on the mechanism of designating high-level positions in a representative manner. As for the November 23-28 Tangier talks, which were well received<\/a> by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL<\/a>), the goal was to unify different groups within the HoR and help them reach a consensus<\/a> on a date for a future meeting between Libya\u2019s rival factions (as decided during the UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum<\/a>). These talks resulted in the HoR members agreeing to hold a parliamentary session in Ghadames<\/a>, a major step for Libya\u2019s peace process.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Morocco\u2019s Libya policy<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nWhat is Morocco\u2019s role in all of this? The kingdom has described its position on the Libyan conflict as one of active neutrality<\/a>– one that seeks to facilitate a political solution to the crisis while promoting Libya\u2019s sovereignty and discouraging foreign interference<\/a> (see Figure 1). In fact, Morocco\u2019s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Bourita, recently<\/a>commented that the kingdom \u201cprefers to support inter-Libyan dialogues rather than those around Libya, the first being fundamental and the second complementary.\u201d At the same time, Bourita has reiterated Morocco\u2019s recognition<\/a> of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) as Libya\u2019s sole authority and continues to promote the terms agreed upon in the 2015 Skhirat Agreement<\/a> (which Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar rejected<\/a> earlier this year).<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Figure 1: Nations supporting the GNA and LNA<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/Picture-libya-.png\")
<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Morocco\u2019s interests<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nBy positioning itself as a key mediator in Libya\u2019s political process, the Moroccan monarchy- which determines<\/a> the kingdom\u2019s foreign policy- hopes to advance its international standing by increasing its value to key allies as a regional security provider<\/a>, to check rival Algeria\u2019s influence in North Africa, and to improve its bilateral relations with Libya in the post-Gaddafi era.<\/p>\nMorocco has managed to position itself as both an impartial mediator seeking to facilitate peace between Libya\u2019s warring factions, and as a regional ally that aligns itself with the UN and the EU by recognizing only the GNA as Libya\u2019s official authority. In fact, the 2015 Skhirat agreement<\/a> which resulted in the international recognition of the GNA as Libya\u2019s sole legitimate authority was signed in Morocco. The recent negotiations organized by the kingdom may be seen as a continuation of Morocco\u2019s role in facilitating inter-Libyan dialogue. As a result, the Moroccan regime portrays itself to the international community as a neutral actor that does not seek to promote<\/a> its own political and economic interests during ongoing negotiations.<\/p>\nHowever, Morocco\u2019s role in Libya\u2019s peace process does promote the kingdom\u2019s interests indirectly by making it a more valuable partner to its Western allies. This may explain why Morocco was slighted by its exclusion from the January 2020 Berlin Conference<\/a> on Libya and why it continues to highlight the importance of the 2015 Skhirat<\/a> agreement as the basis for any political solution; the agreement was signed in Morocco and was the culmination of a round of UN-backed negotiations that had started in 2014.<\/p>\nHolding a \u201cprivileged<\/a>\u201d role in the Libya peace process also allows Morocco to increase its influence in North Africa and to check rival<\/a> Algeria\u2019s aspiration to become a regional hegemon. Already, the kingdom took advantage of the vacuum left behind by post-2011 regional instability and security issues due to the crises in Libya and Mali<\/a> to position itself as a stable ally, diplomatic partner, and security exporter<\/a>. This was bolstered by Morocco\u2019s increased influence in sub-Saharan Africa after its historic return to the African Union in 2017 and its economic and diplomatic re-orientation<\/a> towards the region since then.<\/p>\nFinally, assuming an active and positive role in the Libyan peace process gives Morocco the opportunity to improve its bilateral relations with Libya. The Moroccan monarchy maintained a strained relationship with Muammar Gaddafi, who was later found<\/a> to have contributed to one of the failed coup d\u2019\u00e9tats against the late King Hassan II. Gaddafi was critical of Hassan II for his close ties to the United States and other western powers and for providing safe haven to Libyan dissidents<\/a>, while Hassan II blamed Gaddafi for funding the Polisario Front<\/a> and for his public criticism of monarchical institutions<\/a> in the Middle East and North Africa. The difficulties between the regimes constrained their countries\u2019 economic relationship, and Morocco stands to gain a lot from developing economic ties<\/a> with Libya, especially in terms of trade<\/a> and energy.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Outlook: The bigger picture<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nMorocco\u2019s involvement in the Libya peace process will continue to be driven by realpolitik; the kingdom will strive to amplify its role as a neutral mediator to shore up international and regional support and to open the door for future economic ties with Libya. Despite pressures or enticement from some Gulf allies<\/a>, Morocco will not switch sides to Haftar as it stands to gain more by continuing to recognize the GNA as Libya\u2019s only official authority. However, while the pro-peace involvement of regional actors such as Morocco may lead to some rapprochement between the GNA and eastern forces, it is unlikely to resolve the impasse unless actors like the United States, the UAE, and France officially support the UN\u2019s position or adopt a genuinely neutral policy.[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Morocco is positioning itself as a reliable mediator in the Libya conflict to bolster its international image as a regional stability provider, to check rival Algeria\u2019s aspiration to become a regional hegemon and to improve its bilateral relations with Libya<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":8296,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[93,123],"tags":[],"coauthors":[1729],"class_list":["post-8290","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foreign-policy","category-research"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8290","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=8290"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8290\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/8296"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=8290"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=8290"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=8290"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcoauthors&post=8290"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
Introduction<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nStarting on November 30, representatives of Libya\u2019s House of Representatives (HoR) and State Supreme Council participated in a two-day meeting<\/a> in Tangier mainly dealing with the question of sovereign appointments. This closely followed the November 23-28 Tangier talks that brought together over 120 Libyan parliamentarians from the Tripoli and Tobruk branches of the divided HoR to discuss the next steps in Libya\u2019s political process. The Tangier talks are the fourth<\/a> such talks organized by Morocco in 2020, and come after many<\/a> similar events since the 2011 uprisings.<\/p>\nThe increased frequency of Morocco-brokered meetings for Libyan officials raises a question: Why is the Moroccan regime interested in Libya\u2019s political future when the kingdom neither shares a border nor a strong bilateral relationship<\/a>with the conflict-stricken country?<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Recent developments<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nThe aims<\/a> of the Tangier meeting between the HoR and the State Supreme Council included focusing on the unification of state institutions and on reaching a consensus on the mechanism of designating high-level positions in a representative manner. As for the November 23-28 Tangier talks, which were well received<\/a> by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL<\/a>), the goal was to unify different groups within the HoR and help them reach a consensus<\/a> on a date for a future meeting between Libya\u2019s rival factions (as decided during the UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum<\/a>). These talks resulted in the HoR members agreeing to hold a parliamentary session in Ghadames<\/a>, a major step for Libya\u2019s peace process.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Morocco\u2019s Libya policy<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nWhat is Morocco\u2019s role in all of this? The kingdom has described its position on the Libyan conflict as one of active neutrality<\/a>– one that seeks to facilitate a political solution to the crisis while promoting Libya\u2019s sovereignty and discouraging foreign interference<\/a> (see Figure 1). In fact, Morocco\u2019s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Bourita, recently<\/a>commented that the kingdom \u201cprefers to support inter-Libyan dialogues rather than those around Libya, the first being fundamental and the second complementary.\u201d At the same time, Bourita has reiterated Morocco\u2019s recognition<\/a> of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) as Libya\u2019s sole authority and continues to promote the terms agreed upon in the 2015 Skhirat Agreement<\/a> (which Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar rejected<\/a> earlier this year).<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Figure 1: Nations supporting the GNA and LNA<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Morocco\u2019s interests<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nBy positioning itself as a key mediator in Libya\u2019s political process, the Moroccan monarchy- which determines<\/a> the kingdom\u2019s foreign policy- hopes to advance its international standing by increasing its value to key allies as a regional security provider<\/a>, to check rival Algeria\u2019s influence in North Africa, and to improve its bilateral relations with Libya in the post-Gaddafi era.<\/p>\nMorocco has managed to position itself as both an impartial mediator seeking to facilitate peace between Libya\u2019s warring factions, and as a regional ally that aligns itself with the UN and the EU by recognizing only the GNA as Libya\u2019s official authority. In fact, the 2015 Skhirat agreement<\/a> which resulted in the international recognition of the GNA as Libya\u2019s sole legitimate authority was signed in Morocco. The recent negotiations organized by the kingdom may be seen as a continuation of Morocco\u2019s role in facilitating inter-Libyan dialogue. As a result, the Moroccan regime portrays itself to the international community as a neutral actor that does not seek to promote<\/a> its own political and economic interests during ongoing negotiations.<\/p>\nHowever, Morocco\u2019s role in Libya\u2019s peace process does promote the kingdom\u2019s interests indirectly by making it a more valuable partner to its Western allies. This may explain why Morocco was slighted by its exclusion from the January 2020 Berlin Conference<\/a> on Libya and why it continues to highlight the importance of the 2015 Skhirat<\/a> agreement as the basis for any political solution; the agreement was signed in Morocco and was the culmination of a round of UN-backed negotiations that had started in 2014.<\/p>\nHolding a \u201cprivileged<\/a>\u201d role in the Libya peace process also allows Morocco to increase its influence in North Africa and to check rival<\/a> Algeria\u2019s aspiration to become a regional hegemon. Already, the kingdom took advantage of the vacuum left behind by post-2011 regional instability and security issues due to the crises in Libya and Mali<\/a> to position itself as a stable ally, diplomatic partner, and security exporter<\/a>. This was bolstered by Morocco\u2019s increased influence in sub-Saharan Africa after its historic return to the African Union in 2017 and its economic and diplomatic re-orientation<\/a> towards the region since then.<\/p>\nFinally, assuming an active and positive role in the Libyan peace process gives Morocco the opportunity to improve its bilateral relations with Libya. The Moroccan monarchy maintained a strained relationship with Muammar Gaddafi, who was later found<\/a> to have contributed to one of the failed coup d\u2019\u00e9tats against the late King Hassan II. Gaddafi was critical of Hassan II for his close ties to the United States and other western powers and for providing safe haven to Libyan dissidents<\/a>, while Hassan II blamed Gaddafi for funding the Polisario Front<\/a> and for his public criticism of monarchical institutions<\/a> in the Middle East and North Africa. The difficulties between the regimes constrained their countries\u2019 economic relationship, and Morocco stands to gain a lot from developing economic ties<\/a> with Libya, especially in terms of trade<\/a> and energy.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
Outlook: The bigger picture<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\nMorocco\u2019s involvement in the Libya peace process will continue to be driven by realpolitik; the kingdom will strive to amplify its role as a neutral mediator to shore up international and regional support and to open the door for future economic ties with Libya. Despite pressures or enticement from some Gulf allies<\/a>, Morocco will not switch sides to Haftar as it stands to gain more by continuing to recognize the GNA as Libya\u2019s only official authority. However, while the pro-peace involvement of regional actors such as Morocco may lead to some rapprochement between the GNA and eastern forces, it is unlikely to resolve the impasse unless actors like the United States, the UAE, and France officially support the UN\u2019s position or adopt a genuinely neutral policy.[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Morocco is positioning itself as a reliable mediator in the Libya conflict to bolster its international image as a regional stability provider, to check rival Algeria\u2019s aspiration to become a regional hegemon and to improve its bilateral relations with Libya<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":8296,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[93,123],"tags":[],"coauthors":[1729],"class_list":["post-8290","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foreign-policy","category-research"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8290","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=8290"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8290\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/8296"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=8290"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=8290"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=8290"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcoauthors&post=8290"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
The increased frequency of Morocco-brokered meetings for Libyan officials raises a question: Why is the Moroccan regime interested in Libya\u2019s political future when the kingdom neither shares a border nor a strong bilateral relationship<\/a>with the conflict-stricken country?<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The aims<\/a> of the Tangier meeting between the HoR and the State Supreme Council included focusing on the unification of state institutions and on reaching a consensus on the mechanism of designating high-level positions in a representative manner. As for the November 23-28 Tangier talks, which were well received<\/a> by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL<\/a>), the goal was to unify different groups within the HoR and help them reach a consensus<\/a> on a date for a future meeting between Libya\u2019s rival factions (as decided during the UN-backed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum<\/a>). These talks resulted in the HoR members agreeing to hold a parliamentary session in Ghadames<\/a>, a major step for Libya\u2019s peace process.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n What is Morocco\u2019s role in all of this? The kingdom has described its position on the Libyan conflict as one of active neutrality<\/a>– one that seeks to facilitate a political solution to the crisis while promoting Libya\u2019s sovereignty and discouraging foreign interference<\/a> (see Figure 1). In fact, Morocco\u2019s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Bourita, recently<\/a>commented that the kingdom \u201cprefers to support inter-Libyan dialogues rather than those around Libya, the first being fundamental and the second complementary.\u201d At the same time, Bourita has reiterated Morocco\u2019s recognition<\/a> of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) as Libya\u2019s sole authority and continues to promote the terms agreed upon in the 2015 Skhirat Agreement<\/a> (which Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar rejected<\/a> earlier this year).<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Figure 1: Nations supporting the GNA and LNA<\/p>\n <\/p>\n By positioning itself as a key mediator in Libya\u2019s political process, the Moroccan monarchy- which determines<\/a> the kingdom\u2019s foreign policy- hopes to advance its international standing by increasing its value to key allies as a regional security provider<\/a>, to check rival Algeria\u2019s influence in North Africa, and to improve its bilateral relations with Libya in the post-Gaddafi era.<\/p>\n Morocco has managed to position itself as both an impartial mediator seeking to facilitate peace between Libya\u2019s warring factions, and as a regional ally that aligns itself with the UN and the EU by recognizing only the GNA as Libya\u2019s official authority. In fact, the 2015 Skhirat agreement<\/a> which resulted in the international recognition of the GNA as Libya\u2019s sole legitimate authority was signed in Morocco. The recent negotiations organized by the kingdom may be seen as a continuation of Morocco\u2019s role in facilitating inter-Libyan dialogue. As a result, the Moroccan regime portrays itself to the international community as a neutral actor that does not seek to promote<\/a> its own political and economic interests during ongoing negotiations.<\/p>\n However, Morocco\u2019s role in Libya\u2019s peace process does promote the kingdom\u2019s interests indirectly by making it a more valuable partner to its Western allies. This may explain why Morocco was slighted by its exclusion from the January 2020 Berlin Conference<\/a> on Libya and why it continues to highlight the importance of the 2015 Skhirat<\/a> agreement as the basis for any political solution; the agreement was signed in Morocco and was the culmination of a round of UN-backed negotiations that had started in 2014.<\/p>\n Holding a \u201cprivileged<\/a>\u201d role in the Libya peace process also allows Morocco to increase its influence in North Africa and to check rival<\/a> Algeria\u2019s aspiration to become a regional hegemon. Already, the kingdom took advantage of the vacuum left behind by post-2011 regional instability and security issues due to the crises in Libya and Mali<\/a> to position itself as a stable ally, diplomatic partner, and security exporter<\/a>. This was bolstered by Morocco\u2019s increased influence in sub-Saharan Africa after its historic return to the African Union in 2017 and its economic and diplomatic re-orientation<\/a> towards the region since then.<\/p>\n Finally, assuming an active and positive role in the Libyan peace process gives Morocco the opportunity to improve its bilateral relations with Libya. The Moroccan monarchy maintained a strained relationship with Muammar Gaddafi, who was later found<\/a> to have contributed to one of the failed coup d\u2019\u00e9tats against the late King Hassan II. Gaddafi was critical of Hassan II for his close ties to the United States and other western powers and for providing safe haven to Libyan dissidents<\/a>, while Hassan II blamed Gaddafi for funding the Polisario Front<\/a> and for his public criticism of monarchical institutions<\/a> in the Middle East and North Africa. The difficulties between the regimes constrained their countries\u2019 economic relationship, and Morocco stands to gain a lot from developing economic ties<\/a> with Libya, especially in terms of trade<\/a> and energy.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Morocco\u2019s involvement in the Libya peace process will continue to be driven by realpolitik; the kingdom will strive to amplify its role as a neutral mediator to shore up international and regional support and to open the door for future economic ties with Libya. Despite pressures or enticement from some Gulf allies<\/a>, Morocco will not switch sides to Haftar as it stands to gain more by continuing to recognize the GNA as Libya\u2019s only official authority. However, while the pro-peace involvement of regional actors such as Morocco may lead to some rapprochement between the GNA and eastern forces, it is unlikely to resolve the impasse unless actors like the United States, the UAE, and France officially support the UN\u2019s position or adopt a genuinely neutral policy.[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Morocco is positioning itself as a reliable mediator in the Libya conflict to bolster its international image as a regional stability provider, to check rival Algeria\u2019s aspiration to become a regional hegemon and to improve its bilateral relations with Libya<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":8296,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[93,123],"tags":[],"coauthors":[1729],"class_list":["post-8290","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foreign-policy","category-research"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8290","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=8290"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8290\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/8296"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=8290"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=8290"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=8290"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mipa.institute\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcoauthors&post=8290"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Recent developments<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\n
Morocco\u2019s Libya policy<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\n
<\/p>\nMorocco\u2019s interests<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\n
Outlook: The bigger picture<\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\n