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\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n In January 2020, King Mohammed VI chaired a work meeting in Marrakech[1]<\/a> that resulted in a program adopted by the government of Morocco called \u201cNational priority programme to supply drinking water and irrigation 2020-2027\u201d (programme national prioritaire d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’irrigation 2020-2027) <\/em>with an investment of 115 billions of Dirhams (approximatively $ 12 billion). Among its objectives, it included (1) a rise in water supply by building new dams (2) a better management of water demand and water valuation particularly in agriculture, (3) enhancing the supply of drinking water in rural areas, (4) using recycled wastewater for greens spaces irrigation and (5) sensitizing and heightening awareness on the importance of preserving water resources and rationalizing its use.[2]<\/a>Moreover, following the Royal guidelines as regards the program for water saving in agriculture, an overall budget of 14,7 billion of Dirhams (approximately $ 1,44 billion) was allocated to the supply of irrigation water, covering 510\u00a0000 hectares and benefiting 160\u00a0000 people.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n Such programs were set as a yet another response to the water scarcity problem Morocco is facing right now, which is likely to face a major water shortfall in the near future caused by \u201cthe expansion in demand of water\u201d[4]<\/a> and \u201cthe reduction in precipitation induced by climate change.\u201d[5]<\/a> However, water scarcity in Morocco is not linked to the increasing demand for water resources by households or the industrial sector (including the tourism industry), as both consume around 20% of the resources mobilized. In fact, Morocco\u2019s water scarcity is deeply linked to the way water is used in irrigation, consuming around 80% of Morocco\u2019s water annually.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n The agricultural strategy, that is based on a \u201cstore and save\u201d water approach for irrigation, was implemented in a manner that makes farmers more dependent to rainfall and more vulnerable to drought. The increasing use of technology may have some benefits, but crucial issues persist. Notably, Morocco is prioritizing irrigation for exports and, for a water stressed country, exports of its agricultural products implies the export of a part of the much-needed water. Moreover, the current irrigation policy may have deepened social inequalities. On one hand, it mostly benefited big farmers, as the main beneficiaries of water policies are the entrepreneurs, the business farmers focusing on export-oriented production. On the other hand, the traditional Moroccan farmer that relies on rainfall and aquifers has not benefited that much from the modernization of the agricultural section and have sometimes created even more problem that it was initially, such as in Zagora watermelon cultivation projects.<\/p>\n This paper aims at to demonstrate that Morocco\u2019s current irrigation policies make Moroccan society vulnerable to climate change. First, the paper argues that the country, through its hydraulic and agricultural strategy is actually more and more dependent on rainfall, which seems counterintuitive given the environmental context. Second, Morocco is actually exporting much needed water by favoring export-oriented agricultural strategies instead of national food security. Finally, this paper highlights how current water policies widen social inequalities, especially affecting traditional farmers, albeit invisible, as water access is complicated for family farmers thereby creating more social inequalities and poverty.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Is Morocco really facing water scarcity?<\/strong><\/p>\n Water scarcity is defined as \u201cthe lack of access to adequate quantities of water for human and environmental uses,\u201d[7]<\/a> the term being used globally to qualify the state of water resources on pressure. In order to measure its levels, the most common indicator is the \u201cwater stress index\u201d conceived by Falkenmark et al. (1989) by calculating the total water resources available to the population of a country[8]<\/a>: if the amount of fresh water in a country is below 1700 m3<\/sup> per person per year, the country is said to be experiencing water stress ; below 1000 m3<\/sup> per person per year it is said to be experiencing water scarcity and below 500 m3<\/sup>, absolute water scarcity. Henceforth, the Economic Social and Environmental Council (CESE) sounded the alarm, on September 26th <\/sup>2019, by announcing that Morocco\u2019s water resources were depleted severely as they are currently estimated at less than 650 m3<\/sup> per person per year, compared to 2500 m3<\/sup> in 1960 and should fall below 500 m3<\/sup> by 2030. CESE also announced that climate change could cause the disappearance of 80% of the available water resources in Morocco within the next 25 years.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n Another ratio developed by the World Resources Institute through its Aqueduct project,[10]<\/a> helps better understand the critical situation the country is in. The baseline water stress ratio estimates the degree to which freshwater is available as it calculates the total annual freshwater withdrawal for the year relative to expected annual renewable freshwater supply based on 1950 \u2013 1990 climatic norms. It provides an assessment of the demand for freshwater from households, industry and irrigated agriculture relative to freshwater availability in a typical year[11]<\/a>. In their latest publication[12]<\/a>, Morocco ranked 22d worldwide, suffering from a high baseline water stress. In other words, with a score of 3.89 out of 5, the demand for freshwater approaches up to 80% of the annual renewable supply, leading to greater socioeconomic competition for water and a higher risk of supply disruptions. Projections elaborated in 2015 by the same institute announced a baseline water stress score of 4,68 by 2040, making Morocco at the 18th<\/sup> place. All in all, it is Morocco\u2019s water security that is questioned and presented as the main challenge: how to make sure that water is \u201ceffectively, sustainably and equitably managed\u201d?[13]<\/a><\/p>\n Since Morocco\u2019s independence, the political display of water and irrigation public policies has driven the image of a country working towards water and food security. However, one cannot ignore the succession of emergency plans that continue to be launched to mitigate the catastrophic consequences of droughts. Why then, as they seek to address the structural consequences of climate change, public authorities persist in calling for emergency short-term plans? Does the postponement of the design of new water policies taking into account structural drought represent a refusal to acknowledge the modest results of past and current policies with respect to water security?<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Policy of \u201cStore and Save\u201d water for irrigation: a questionable implementation<\/strong><\/p>\n Water policies in Morocco follow the objective of increasing water supply through two levers of action: on one hand through the mobilization of more water, historically through dam building and more recently through desalination and treated wastewater reuse and on the other hand through saving water with the introduction of drip irrigation. This rationale of \u201cstore and save\u201d water has however shown its limits in the way it was implemented.<\/p>\n Since its independence, Morocco prioritized the expansion of irrigated areas, which relied on a\u00a0 dams\u2019 policy (Politique des barrages)<\/em> which started officially in 1967 after a World Bank mission a few years before. The idea was to push for large-scale irrigation, in order to fight droughts, raise agricultural production and achieve national food security. Building one dam a year and working to reach a million hectares of irrigated perimeters by the year 2000 became the nation\u2019s mantra.[14]<\/a> Forty years later, the country counts 144 large-scale dams and 255 hill dams,[15]<\/sup><\/a> between 1,500,000 and 1,700,000 hectares[16]<\/a> of irrigated perimeters and yet it still suffers from water scarcity. Moroccans\u2019 daily life is still rhythmed by alarm bells of \u201cwater security elevated risks,\u201d \u201cState emergency in water management,\u201d \u201canti-drought emergency plans,\u201d \u201cwater stress\u201d and lately of \u201cwater supply emergency plan.\u201d Thus, it is clear that building an important number of hydraulic devices for water storage and irrigation does not automatically prevent Morocco from water shortage. The misunderstanding lies in the way we see dams as the unalterable solution to water scarcity.<\/p>\n In the context of climate change and structural drought, a dam cannot be the go-to solution anymore. Morocco\u2019s circumstances have changed: gone are the predictable succession of rainy and dry seasons on which Morocco built its water and agricultural policies. Now drought is structural, spanning many years and rain comes often heavily in short bursts which provokes material and environmental destruction, thus difficult to store appropriately. As stated before, a dam allows to store water (mostly rainwater and melted snow) in order to use it all year long and not only during rainy season for irrigation and drinkability.\u00a0 The fundamental purpose of a dam is to stave off the effects of seasonality and passing droughts. However, when drought becomes structural, dams become practically useless due to the lack of rainfall. The filling level of dams provides important insights in evaluating water availability. For example, 40% of the main large dams surveyed on June 3rd<\/sup>, 2020 by the General Direction of Water attached to the Ministry of Equipment, Transports, Logistics and Water have a filling level below 50%.[17]<\/a> Finally, building dams does not mean automatically fighting water scarcity: irrigated perimeters still need to be built, dams need to be maintained and preserved from sedimentation in order to keep their full volume capacity, hydraulic networks need to be built and maintained too. Unfortunately, it was often reported that many dams needed to be reelevated, that the establishment of irrigation projects were delayed or ill-equipped, or that hydraulic networks were leaking.[18]<\/a> Such inefficiencies in policy implementation makes a conjunction of moments where water is wasted after storage despite the important investments allocated to such projects.<\/p>\n The issue of efficiency and water wastage constitutes one of the main concerns of water for irrigation policies on the international and national level. By integrating the National Irrigation Water Saving Program (Programme National d\u2019Economie d\u2019Eau en Irrigation<\/em>)[19]<\/a> as part of the Green Morocco Plan (Plan Maroc Vert) <\/em>in 2008, public authorities have shown their willingness to promote drip irrigation, a technology presented as a water saving device that would help farmers \u201cincrease the value of water along the value chain\u00a0 i.e more production and more added value per cubic meter of water and in a sustainable way.\u201d[20]<\/a> To implement such a program, public authorities have allocated a budget of 37 billions of Dirhams[21]<\/a> (around $ 3.5 millions) and have offered a subsidized financing package covering from 80% up to 100 % of the drip equipment costs.[22]<\/a> According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the objective was to save up to 826 millions of cubic meters (m3<\/sup>) of water \u00a0per year (514 millions of m3<\/sup> from large scale public irrigation projects and 312 millions of m3<\/sup> from private irrigated areas using groundwater) by converting 550\u00a0000 hectares of surface irrigated perimeters.[23]<\/a> By 2017, 542\u00a0000 hectares were equipped with drip irrigation technology due to the heavy campaign led by local authorities.[24]<\/a> Interestingly, as years passed, the saving water discourse has taken a back seat in favor of productivity and the famous \u201cmore crop per drop\u201d injunction.<\/p>\n Between productivity and saving water, public authorities seem to favor productivity. Indeed, the Moroccan experience showed that in the end, the narrative of modernization and intensification of farming practices remains dominant. It\u2019s been observed that farmers have mainly adopted the technology as it was a mean to attain a certain social status (image of a modern farmer) and economic gain.[25]<\/a> As a matter of fact, drip irrigation was the occasion for farmers to convert their plot into higher valued plants such as onions or potatoes which demand more water, or extend their perimeter by investing into another plot where to install drip irrigation and dig consequently more wells. Moreover, practices of over-irrigation in order to achieve optimal yield were also often observed, putting more pressure on water demands. Interestingly, it is impossible to evaluate the \u201cwater saved\u201d through this technology as there are few water meters installed in the perimeters and there are no official instructions given to farmers to limit their water consumption. As such, Morocco went from a policy that publicizes \u201csaving water\u201d into a policy that equips in drip irrigation and encourages intensification of agriculture.<\/p>\n In both the \u201cstore and save\u201d water strategies, what stands out is the way technology takes over and diverts from the initial aim of the designed policy. It is important that Morocco centers its water policies on the practices (being farmers\u2019 or public agents\u2019) and on the evolution of the environmental context, and not exclusively on the technology, as technology is as effective as what we make of it depending on the context we use it. There are no automatic benefits by just installing a dam or drip irrigation. There are other factors that should be taken into consideration, such a climate change, and authorities should engage more with farmers\u2019 practices through drawing contracts of limited water consumption and constantly monitoring water consumption for irrigation.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Irrigation for exportation: Exporting the much-needed water? <\/strong><\/p>\n Since its independence Morocco\u2019s water for irrigation policies were supposed to pave the way for food security and rural development. To do so, priority was given to agricultural intensification, through the implementation of irrigated perimeters. However, a large part of the production coming from such perimeters is dedicated to exportation and not to the national market. To better understand the issue at stake, 80% of the usable water resources (surface water and aquifers)[26]<\/a> are used to irrigate 15% of Morocco\u2019s \u201cutilized agricultural land\u201d (surface agricole utile<\/em>)[27]<\/a> which contributes up to 75% of the country\u2019s agricultural exports.[28]<\/a> Hence, the continuous emergency plans against drought and water shortage. The truth is that the country still relies heavily on rainfall for its food security, as observed with the impact of this year\u2019s drought on cereals production[29]<\/a> (mostly situated in rainfed areas), and is still heavily dependent on importation.[30]<\/a> The prioritization of storing water for business development and the Green Morocco Plan (le Plan Maroc Vert)<\/em> has only amplified this trend.<\/p>\n In 2008, the Green Morocco Plan came as a response to the country\u2019s ambition to develop a modern, high-added value, high productivity agricultural sector. The policy, designed by a private foreign consultancy firm (McKinsey Company), has been showcased as the engine towards the transformation of Moroccan agriculture into a competitive sector \u201cfor economic growth and poverty reduction.\u201d[31]<\/a> To that end, the policy was divided in two pillars: Pillar 1, which focused on the capitalistic side of the agricultural sector and Pillar 2, targeting small farmers located in semi-arid and disadvantaged regions. However, the budget allocated to each pillar highlights the importance given to agricultural exportations as 75 billion dirhams ($7,5 billion) are to be invested for over 10 years on projects related to Pillar 1.[32]<\/a> In comparison, investments for Pillar 2 were fixed at 20 billion dirhams ($2 billion). Apart from the inequality in allocation, the announced investments remain quite ambitious.<\/p>\n Water and agricultural policies are supposed to propose an encompassing model of both rural and economic development. However, it seems that public authorities gave more emphasis to the latter. It\u2019s been observed that despite the announcement of an inclusive agricultural plan taking into consideration the duality of the sector, the focus stayed on the development of an exportation-oriented agriculture through the establishment of plant chains on high return (and for some, high water consumption) crops such as vegetables, fruits and olive oil necessitating permanent water for irrigation access.[33]<\/a> Ten years later, agricultural growth is globally picking up.[34]<\/a> Reports show that the average annual growth rate of olive trees production is 7,4%, vegetables 1,2% and citruses 6,3%. In terms of exportations, the average annual growth rate registered for fruits (dry, fresh or frozen) is of 13,5%, vegetables (fresh or frozen) is of 8,5% and fresh tomatoes is of 5,6%.[35]<\/a> Meanwhile, the cereal sector \u2013 which Moroccans depend on for food security \u2013 remains unstable and highly dependent on rainfall.[36]<\/a><\/p>\n Morocco has built a paradoxically unequal agricultural water model: the water stored through multiple and expensive hydraulic systems is mostly exported in the form of citruses, other fruits and vegetables (business first) while small farmers have to deal with the consequences of lack of rainfall and depleted aquifers. Moreover, such irrigation policies do not even serve the objective of food security as 90% of the cereal cultivated areas are rainfed.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Current water policies for irrigation have deepened social inequalities <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n In fact, the promotional effects of past and present water and agricultural policies with its catching numbers (budget, dimensions etc.) not only failed to guarantee food security but also produced winners and losers. So far, the first beneficiaries of water policies are the big entrepreneurs, the business farmers focusing on export-oriented production. One category of farmers is absent in the design of policies, the family farmer,[37]<\/a> the traditional Moroccan farmer that relies on rainfall and aquifers to care for his cattle and its plot of land.<\/p>\n By striving to modernize the agriculture sector, Moroccan policymakers designed public policies adapted only to those who have the means to follow them in their ambition, at the expense of family farmers. Experiences in Zagora[38]<\/a> and El Guerdane[39]<\/a> show how conflicts emerge because of the inequalities in water access that were caused by Green Morocco projects. For instance, in Zagora, watermelon cultivation projects approved by the Green Moroccan Plan and where drip equipment were subsided has dried up a region that already suffers from water scarcity[40]<\/a>. Not only the production of high-water consuming crops in a region at the doors of the Sahara is questionable, but also the usual mishandling of drip irrigation and the lack of rain push entrepreneurs to dig deeper into aquifers to get more water. Generally, family farmers do not have the means to take up the costs of digging deeper wells when they dry up. Aquifers are shared by both categories of farmers, when some take more, it means that others have less; leaving a population thirsty for water.[41]<\/a>Hence, the numerous \u201cprotests of thirst\u201d that have taken place in the last few years in the Zagora region have shown that sentiments of anger, humiliation and injustice are palpable.[42]<\/a><\/p>\n Similarly, the mere fact of building a dam and transferring water for the project of El Guerdane in the Souss region disturbed or stopped the access of water for a certain population who used the water of the Oued (valley)[43]<\/a>. Building a dam diverted the course of the water depriving some farmers from it. From there on, the dam allowed the creation of new irrigated perimeters but deprived some farmers of their water. To put it bluntly, entrepreneurial farming is depleting the aquifers all within the legal and procedural framework of the Green Moroccan Plan and leaving family farmers struggling. Such inequality in water access and its social consequences are not addressed in the structures of the policies implemented so far. And seeing public authorities approving projects that financially benefit one specific social category while endangering the safety of another, by cutting off their water, creates a legitimate social anger and a real distrust of public authorities.\u00a0 And that\u2019s why, in times of dire crises, long drought for example causing cattle dying, drinking water cuts, social anger etc.., authorities resort to emergency plans.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Conclusion <\/strong><\/p>\n Morocco\u2019s water management is still rhythmed by water emergency plans for two main reasons. First, its \u201cstore and save\u201d policies seem to be more focused on technical features than on water management and changes in farmers practices. Second, its water for irrigation policies seem to overlook family farmers whose livelihood still relies on rainfed land and cattle. This category of population invisible in ordinary times, becomes apparent in times of crisis, leading to social unrest, which eventually pushes public authorities to action.<\/p>\n The past and current water for irrigation policies have been unbalanced. Rural and economic development should go hand in hand through an inclusive approach, but so far, in a structural drought and climate change context, public authorities have favored water exportation at the detriment of family farmers. The policies implemented only accentuate the state of water scarcity which strikes the vulnerable first.<\/p>\n More importantly, a situation of scarcity is not set. Climate change results in less rainfall which limits Morocco\u2019s water storage capacity. But it is important to also understand that water scarcity is constructed on water demand, the way it is managed and the political, social and economic choices that are made. Hence, Morocco needs a new water for irrigation policy that gets back to basics. Aside from being a driver for economic growth, agriculture should also be a driver for social development. The focus should be on improving food and water security and introducing a more equal access to water, leaving no one behind. To do so, the following recommendations can be made:<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Footnotes<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n [1]<\/a> \u201cLe Roi Mohammed VI: 115 MMDH pour le programme d’eau potable et d’irrigation\u201d, M\u00e9dias24<\/em>, January 7th, 2020 <https:\/\/www.medias24.com\/le-roi-mohammed-vi-115-mmdh-pour-le-programme-d-eau-potable-et-d-irrigation-6659.html<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n [2]<\/a> See for reference the following articles: \u201cLancement du Programme prioritaire national d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’irrigation\u00a0\u00bb, Lib\u00e9ration<\/em>, January 15th, 2020 <https:\/\/www.libe.ma\/Lancement-du-Programme-prioritaire-national-d-approvisionnement-en-eau-potable-et-d-irrigation_a114762.html<\/a>> ; \u00ab\u00a0Le Roi Mohammed VI: 115 MMDH pour le programme d’eau potable et d’irrigation\u201d, M\u00e9dias24<\/em>, January 7th, 2020 <https:\/\/www.medias24.com\/le-roi-mohammed-vi-115-mmdh-pour-le-programme-d-eau-potable-et-d-irrigation-6659.html<\/a>> ; \u201cMohammed VI lance un programme \u00e0 115 milliards de dirhams pour l’eau potable et l’irrigation\u201d, Telquel<\/em>, January 7th<\/sup>, 2020 <https:\/\/telquel.ma\/2020\/01\/08\/mohammed-vi-lance-un-programme-a-115-milliards-de-dirhams-pour-leau-potable-et-lirrigation_1663942<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n [3]<\/a> \u201cLancement du Programme prioritaire national d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’irrigation\u00a0\u00bb, Lib\u00e9ration<\/em>, January 15th, 2020 <https:\/\/www.libe.ma\/Lancement-du-Programme-prioritaire-national-d-approvisionnement-en-eau-potable-et-d-irrigation_a114762.html<\/a>> ; Momar Diao, \u00ab\u00a0Economie d\u2019eau dans l\u2019agriculture : Les composantes du plan septennal d\u00e9voil\u00e9es\u00a0\u00bb, Finances News Hebdo<\/em>, January 20th, 2020 <https:\/\/fnh.ma\/article\/developpement-durable\/economie-d-eau-dans-l-agriculture-les-composantes-du-plan-septennal-devoilees<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. \u201cWater Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key Water Challenges.\u201d World Bank, Washington, DC.<\/small><\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Ibid<\/small><\/p>\n [6]<\/a> See Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. \u201cWater Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key Water Challenges.\u201d World Bank, Washington, DC. Citing FAO (2018), it states that Morocco allocates between 75% and 87% of its water resources to irrigation. For simplification, we will use the estimate of 80% in our argumentation.<\/small><\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Chris White, \u201cUnderstanding water scarcity: Definitions and measurements\u00a0\u00bb, Global Water Forum<\/em>, May 7th, 2012<<\/strong>https:\/\/globalwaterforum.org\/2012\/05\/07\/understanding-water-scarcity-definitions-and-measurements\/<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n [8]<\/a> Falkenmark, M., J. Lundquist and C. Widstrand (1989), \u201cMacro-scale Water Scarcity Requires Micro-scale Approaches: Aspects of Vulnerability in Semi-arid Development\u201d, Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 258-267 cited in Chris White, \u201cUnderstanding water scarcity: Definitions and measurements\u00a0\u00bb, Global Water Forum<\/em>, May 7th, 2012 <<\/strong>https:\/\/globalwaterforum.org\/2012\/05\/07\/understanding-water-scarcity-definitions-and-measurements\/<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Ma\u00efne Alloui, \u201cLe CESE alerte sur la menace de stress hydrique\u201d, Telquel<\/em>, January 9th<\/sup>, 2020 <https:\/\/telquel.ma\/2020\/01\/09\/le-cese-alerte-sur-la-menace-de-stress-hydrique_1652765<\/a>> ; The Economic, Social and Environmental Council : \u201cLe droit \u00e0 l\u2019eau et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 hydrique, gravement menac\u00e9s par un usage intensif : Le CESE tire la sonnette d\u2019alarme et appelle \u00e0 entreprendre des mesures urgentes\u00a0\u00bb (Translation\u00a0: \u00ab\u00a0The right to water and water security under serious threat from intensive use: The EESC sounds the alarm and calls for urgent measures to be taken\u00a0\u00bb)\u00a0; \u00ab\u00a0Document\/ S\u00e9curit\u00e9 hydrique: Le CESE tire encore la sonnette d’alarme\u00a0\u00bb, L\u2019Economiste<\/em>, September 26th, 2019<\/small><\/p>\n [10]<\/a> The new aqueduct water risk atlas: what\u2019s new & why does it matter to you? Technical Note, World Resources Institute, August 2019<\/small><\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Ibid<\/small><\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Rutger Willem Hofste, Paul Reig and Leah Schleifer, \u201c17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World’s Population, Face Extremely High Water Stress\u00a0\u00bb World Resources Institute, August 6th, 2019<\/small><\/p>\n \u00a0<https:\/\/www.wri.org\/blog\/2019\/08\/17-countries-home-one-quarter-world-population-face-extremely-high-water-stress<\/a>>; Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas, World Resources institute, August 2019 <https:\/\/www.wri.org\/resources\/data-sets\/aqueduct-30-country-rankings<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Beyond scarcity. Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa. MENA development report. World Bank Group. 2018. Washington, DC<\/small><\/p>\n [14]<\/a> King Hassan II\u2019s speeches in Tangiers, September 18th, 1967\u00a0and in Oued El Makhazine, March 14th, 1974\u00a0as reported by Yassine Benargane. \u00ab\u00a0Le 18 septembre 1967, le roi Hassan II lan\u00e7ait le grand projet d’irrigation d’1 million d’hectares\u00a0\u00bb, Yabiladi<\/em>, January 18th, 2017 <https:\/\/www.yabiladi.com\/articles\/details\/57533\/septembre-1967-hassan-lancait-grand.html<\/a>> and Jean-Jacques Perren\u00e8s. 1993. L\u2019eau et les hommes au Maghreb. Contribution \u00e0 une politique de l\u2019eau en M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e. <\/em>Editions Karthala. Paris.<\/small><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> \u00ab\u00a0Amara: le Maroc compte 144 grands barrages et 13 autres en cours de construction\u00a0\u00bb, H24<\/em>, November 6th, 2018 <https:\/\/www.h24info.ma\/economie\/amara-le-maroc-compte-144-grands-barrages-et-13-autres-en-cours-de-construction\/<\/a> >\u00a0; ALM. \u00ab\u00a0Barrages : 40 ouvrages construits et 35 en cours\u00a0\u00bb. Aujourd\u2019hui le Maroc<\/em>. July 31st, 2019. <http:\/\/aujourdhui.ma\/economie\/barrages-40-ouvrages-construits-et-35-en-cours<\/a>\u00a0 ; List of built dams in Morocco from the Water General Direction attached to the Ministry of Equipment, Transports, Logistics and Water <http:\/\/81.192.10.228\/patrimoine\/barrages\/barrages-existants\/<\/a>\u00a0 ><\/small><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. \u201cWater Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key Water Challenges.\u201d World Bank, Washington, DC.<\/small><\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Daily situation of the main large dams <http:\/\/81.192.10.228\/patrimoine\/barrages\/situation-journaliere-des-principaux-grands-barrages\/<\/a> ><\/small><\/p>\n [18]<\/a> \u00ab\u00a0Un milliard d\u2019eau perdu par an\u00a0\u00bb L\u2019Economiste.<\/em> April 28th, 2004 <https:\/\/www.leconomiste.com\/article\/un-milliard-de-m3-d-eau-perdu-par<\/a> ><\/small><\/p>\n [19]<\/a> The program is actually the revamped version of \u00ab\u00a0le Programme National de Subvention \u00e0 l’Irrigation Localis\u00e9e\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0launched in 2002 in the objective to implement drip irrigation in 114\u00a0000 ha. See Tanouti & Molle, 2017<\/small><\/p>\n [20]<\/a> Mhamed Belghiti. 2008. \u00ab\u00a0Programme National d\u2019Economie et de Valorisation de l\u2019eau en irrigation\u00a0\u00bb. Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Agriculture et de la p\u00eache maritime<\/small><\/p>\n [21]<\/a> Ibid.<\/small><\/p>\n [22]<\/a> For details on the conditions see\u00a0: Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Agriculture et de la p\u00eache maritime. 2019. Fonds de D\u00e9velopement Agricole.Les aides financi\u00e8res de l\u2019\u00c9tat pour la promotion des investissements agricoles.<\/small><\/p>\n [23]<\/a> See Fran\u00e7ois Molle, Oumaima Tanouti. 2017. La micro-irrigation et les ressources en eau au Maroc : un co\u00fbteux malentendu. Alternatives rurales.<\/em> Maroc\u00a0; Fran\u00e7ois Molle. 2017. Conflicting policies: agricultural intensification vs. water conservation in Morocco. G-EAU Working Paper\/Rapport de RechercheNo.1. Montpellier, France\u00a0; Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Mener le goutte \u00e0 goutte \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9conomie d\u2019eau : ambition r\u00e9aliste ou poursuite d\u2019une chim\u00e8re ? Alternatives rurales. <\/em>Maroc.\u00a0; Saskia van der Kooij, Marcel Kuper et al. 2017. Re-allocating yet-to be saved water in irrigation modernisation projects\u00a0: the case of the Bittit irrigation system, Morocco. In Drip irrigation for agriculture. Untold stories of efficiency, innovation and development<\/em>. Eds. Jean V\u00e9not et al. Chapter 4. Routledge. New York, London.<\/small><\/p>\n [24]<\/a> Agence pour le D\u00e9velopppement Agricole. Principales r\u00e9alisations du Plan Maroc Vert <https:\/\/www.ada.gov.ma\/fr\/principales-realisations-du-plan-maroc-vert<\/a> ><\/small><\/p>\n Jean-Modeste Kouame. Irrigation\u00a0: Magriser \u00e0 la conqu\u00eate du march\u00e9 subsaharien. L\u2019\u00e9conomiste. <\/em>January 28th, 2019. <https:\/\/www.leconomiste.com\/article\/1039903-irrigation-magriser-la-conquete-du-marche-subsaharien<\/a> ><\/small><\/p>\n [25]<\/a> See\u00a0Maya Benouniche\u2019s work on the topic\u00a0: Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Mener le goutte \u00e0 goutte \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9conomie d\u2019eau : ambition r\u00e9aliste ou poursuite d\u2019une chim\u00e8re ? Alternatives rurales. <\/em>Maroc\u00a0; Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Making the user visible: analysing irrigation practices and farmers\u2019 logic to explain actual drip irrigation performance. Irrigation Science.\u00a0; <\/em>Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Bricolage as innovation: opening the black box of drip irrigation systems. Irrigation and Drainage. 63: 651\u2013658. See also the work of Fran\u00e7ois Molle and Oumaima Tanouti referred previously.<\/small><\/p>\n [26]<\/a> For further details see\u00a0: Abou Bekr Seddik EL Gueddari. Economie d\u2019eau d\u2019irrigation au Maroc. Ministry of Agriculture. Rural Engineering administration\u00a0; Abou Bekr Seddik El Gueddari. 2004. Economie d\u2019eau en irrigation au Maroc : acquis et perspectives d\u2019avenir<\/em>. Revue Hommes, Terre et Eaux. N\u00b0 130. Septembre 2004<\/small><\/p>\n [27]<\/a> Ministry of agriculture irrigation webpage\u00a0: http:\/\/www.agriculture.gov.ma\/pages\/lirrigation-au-maroc<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n [28]<\/a> Ibid.<\/small><\/p>\n [29]<\/a> Abdelaziz Ghouibi. \u201cCampagne c\u00e9r\u00e9ali\u00e8re : 30 millions e quintaux \u00e0 r\u00e9colter\u201d. L\u2019Economiste. April 24th<\/sup>, 2020. <https:\/\/www.leconomiste.com\/article\/1061007-campagne-cerealiere-30-millions-de-quintaux-recolter<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n [30]<\/a> \u201cLa part du bl\u00e9 dans les importations se maintiendrait \u00e0 une Moyenne de 63% \u00e0 l\u2019horizon 2025\u201d. EcoActu. December 29th<\/sup>, 2019 <https:\/\/www.ecoactu.ma\/la-part-du-ble-dans-les-importations-se-maintiendrait-a-une-moyenne-de-63-a-lhorizon-2025\/<\/a>>\u00a0; \u201cLes retomb\u00e9es de la d\u00e9pendance alimentaire du Maroc sur son secteur agricole\u201d. AgriMaroc. December 28th<\/sup>, 2019 <https:\/\/www.agrimaroc.ma\/dependance-alimentaire-agricole-maroc\/<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n [31]<\/a> Pr\u00e9sentation G\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Plan Maroc vert. 2009. Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Agriculture et des P\u00eaches Maritimes<\/small><\/p>\n [32]<\/a> Ibid.<\/small><\/p>\n [33]<\/a> Akesbi, Najib. 2012. Une nouvelle strat\u00e9gie pour l\u2019agriculture marocaine:Le \u00abPlan Maroc Vert\u00bb. New Medit n\u00b02\/2012\u00a0; Nicolas Faysse (2015) The rationale of the Green Morocco Plan: missing links between goals and implementation, The Journal of North African Studies, 20:4, 622-634<\/small><\/p>\n [34]<\/a> The purpose of the paper is not to analyze the Green Morocco Plan results and its efficiency. The objective is to focus on the water allocation and its consequences on Moroccan citizens<\/small><\/p>\n [35]<\/a> For more details on the evaluation of Green Morocco Plan see\u00a0: Aziz Louali, Le secteur agricole marocain\u00a0: tendances structurelles, enjeux et perspectives de d\u00e9veloppement<\/em>. DEPF \u2013 Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019\u00e9conomie et des finances \u2013 Juillet 2019<\/small><\/p>\n [36]<\/a> For more details see page 14 of Aziz Louali, Le secteur agricole marocain\u00a0: tendances structurelles, enjeux et perspectives de d\u00e9veloppement<\/em>. DEPF \u2013 Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019\u00e9conomie et des finances \u2013 Juillet 2019<\/small><\/p>\n [37]<\/a> Nicolas Faysse (2015) The rationale of the Green Morocco Plan: missing links between goals and implementation, The Journal of North African Studies, 20:4, 622-634\u00a0; Mostafa Errahj et al. 2017. Etude sur l\u2019agriculture familiale \u00e0 petite \u00e9chelle au Proche-Orient et Afrique du Nord. Pays focus: Maroc. FAO, CIRAD, CIHEAM-IAMM ; see also Najib Akesbi analysis of the Green Morocco Plan<\/small><\/p>\n [38]<\/a> Hassan Bentaleb. \u201cLa past\u00e8que d\u00e9shydratante\u201d. Lib\u00e9ration. February 28th<\/sup>, 2019 < https:\/\/www.libe.ma\/La-pasteque-deshydratante_a106406.html<\/a>><\/small><\/p>\n\n
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