MOROCCAN INSITUTE
FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
ACCURACY – DEPTH – TIMELY – IMPACT

Trust in Institutions Index 2020

The Parliament and Beyond

Regenerating trust by exploring
the roots of its shortage

Director and Main Editor : Mohammed Masbah
Authors : Rachid Aourraz - Francesco Colin

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The Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis is a nonprofit public policy institution headquartered in Rabat, Morocco. The institute aims to conduct in-depth research on various public policy issues by proposing new ideas to solve the problems facing society in terms of democracy and development.

The main activity of the Institute is to produce a systematic, in-depth, accurate and objective analysis of policy related issues. The results and analyses are published by the institute in the form of policy summaries, research articles and reports.

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Foreword

Since 2011, Morocco has gone through constant changes with unpredictable outcomes. These changes affect citizens perception of their political institutions and the general direction of the country.

While most of the studies have paid attention to the structure of power and institutional framework, the role of "ordinary" people has been neglected for a long time. Citizens were perceived as passive agents who lack intention and will. Yet, the 2011 revolutions in the Arab World have questioned these assumptions. Citizens are not passive, but rather active agents of change.

Within this context, MIPA institute believes that it is important to shed the light on "ordinary" people's perceptions and attitudes in order to build strong foundation for political and social participation and strengthen the confidence in institutions. In this regard, it is fundamental to understand the relationship between citizens and their political institutions. This relationship is defined by social and political trust, as the level of trust people have for their institutions denotes the quality of political engagement and affects the outcomes of policies.

In an ideal world, the relationship between citizens and their institutions is characterized by a high level of trust, based on a strong knowledge of the role and function of the institutions. In turn, such knowledge enhances the trust in institutions and leads citizens toward greater political participation through formal political channels which create in return greater social cohesion. Nevertheless, this ideal situation has never existed in the real world. It is probably the opposite, as the current citizen–state relation remains strained and contaminated with suspicion and distrust.

This unpleasant situation explains the relevance of this report. The latter is the fruit of a year–long hard work of MIPA's team aimed at providing systematic and in–depth study of trust in Morocco, through

the combination of different quantitative and qualitative research approaches. It investigates in detail social trust, political trust and trust in the Parliament.

The key findings of Morocco's Trust in Institutions Index demonstrate that the relationship between citizens and their institutions, especially the elected institutions, is characterized by suspicion and low levels of trust. Most citizens have little knowledge about their institutions and have difficulties in understanding their roles, functions and utility. This weak knowledge is coupled with poor quality of public services, such as healthcare and education, and inadequate job opportunities: these constitute the most important priorities that citizens believe the government should address in the next five to ten years. In fact, the poor delivery of public services increases the sense of prevalence of corruption, and hence strengthens citizens' eagerness in seeking other (informal) alternatives to get better public services, such as bribes or Wasta (cronies or political connections), and this consequently led to the disengagement of citizens from formal political channels of political expression and recurrence toward the new forms of political contestations, such as the economic boycott and street protests.

MIPA strives in its mission to produce relevant and in–depth analysis of policy issues which can lead to innovative ways to solving issues relating to democracy. This is why MIPA decided to embark on an annual report on trust in social and political institutions as a way to measure the capacity as well as the willingness of citizens to engage in public life and to create a more inclusive policy.

The report is useful for both researchers and policymakers. Researchers can use the data and the analyses provided in this report to enhance the academic literature, while policymakers can use its findings to enhance the quality of political institutions and the quality of policy outcomes.

Dr. Mohammed Masbah
Director
Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis

Acknowledgment

Executive Summary

Social Trust

- Family is the most trusted social institution. The Moroccans surveyed feel that family (nuclear and extended) as well as close friends are the most trustworthy people within their entourage: 95.2 % of Moroccans surveyed saying they trust family.

- As the social circle expands to include colleagues, neighbors and people you may encounter on a daily basis (for business transactions for example), the levels of trust tend to decrease: 42.9 % of respondents said they do not trust other Moroccans; furthermore, respondents felt that the general levels of trust in society have overall declined in the last few decades.

- The least trusted part of society is strangers or people whom they have met the first time (only 19.4% of respondents said they trust people they've met for the first time). Moroccans are also highly distrustful of people from other religions (73.2% declaring they either don't trust, or don't trust at all people from other religions), as well as of people from other nationalities (71.5 % said they were distrustful). Similarly, the Moroccans surveyed could be considered conservative regarding their perceptions of homosexuality and atheism (78.5% and 67.6%, respectively, said they wouldn't accept having a friend from these categories,).

- People from the in-group, with the same religious faith or nationality, or those with ties of kinship with the respondents, highly increase the likelihood of trust in them; while difference is seen in a bad light, where respondents don't feel specifically trustful of strangers, foreigners or people practicing a different religion.

Political Trust

- According to the study, around 31% of Moroccans claimed they followed politics or political affairs in general. The 69% of Moroccans surveyed claimed that they do not follow politics or do not follow politics at all.

- The Moroccans surveyed expressed a low level of satisfaction in the economy (55.5% expressed their dissatisfaction), the general direction of the country (69.7% dissatisfied) or in the efforts of the government in fighting corruption (74.1% dissatisfied); these numbers revealed the largely pessimistic outlook that Moroccans had in regards to the future of the country, the economic situation and their confidence (as well as hope) for the ability of government to curb corruption within the country.

- In regard to the priorities that the respondents want to see the government achieving in the next 5 to 10 years, better access to education, health and more job opportunities for youth are the most important. Around 32% of Moroccans surveyed believe that providing better education for their children is the first priority the government should take, followed by more job prospects for youth by almost 20% and then better health delivery by 18%.

- Moroccans did enjoy a relatively varied degree of participation in political actions, with 35.5% of them saying they have participated in a protest in the last year, as well as a staggering 58.3% of respondents saying they have participated in the economic boycott. The surveyed respondents also participated in electoral politics with a rate of 37.6% of them declaring having voted in the last election.

- In terms of trust in political institutions, Moroccans had overall very low levels of trust in institutions that govern them, especially the youngest respondents of the survey, such as 32.7% of trust in parliament, 22.6% for political parties, and 23.4% for the government.

- However, they had really high contrasting levels of trust in non-elected institutions such as the police (78.1%) and the military (83.3%), which in the study enjoyed the highest levels of trust or confidence expressed by the surveyed citizens.

- In the middle were the non-elected institutions such as civil society organizations (52.5% of respondents expressed confidence in NGO's) and the justice system (41.3%) which were still relatively more trusted than elected political institutions.

- It was also denoted in the study, that two important non-elected institutions were distrusted extremely, the education sector (around 50% of respondents distrusted the public educational system) and healthcare system (74.4% of respondents distrusted the public healthcare system).

- When asked about their confidence or trust in their politicians or parliamentarians that represented them, Moroccans expressed their lack of trust as a result or as a direct correlation to the quality of services in the sector of education and health.

Trust in the Parliament

- The study revealed that most participants ignored the workings of parliament or the different roles it has as an institution, and about 90% of all respondents could not name either of the Presidents of the two houses of the Parliament.

- It was revealed from the qualitative interviews that citizens felt that parliamentarians' role was confined to the Monday plenary sessions, and that their protest and discussions were confined to the institution. Often enough, they were labeled as 'theatrics', and citizens did not see the correlation or the ostensible link between their concerns, and the MP representing them in parliament. They also expressed inability or unwillingness, and in some cases lack of guidance on how to reach out to a MP for a national or local concern.

Introduction

Why should we study trust? Simply put, trust is the glue of society. It is one of the first things we learn at birth, and it underscores our relationships with others: our actions are grounded on trust. In daily life, trust exists everywhere, from trusting the taxi driver to get you to the right destination safely, to trusting the barber to use his sharp razor around your neck, or simply walking safely in the street without fear of being assaulted. Without trust, society cannot hold itself up. Families would lack the connection that binds them together, and institutions would lack the power and legitimacy to govern. This network of interactions is the foundation on which society is built, and governments are legitimatized only by a collective trust in them. In fact, a government can use excessive power and violence to govern for the short term but for the long–term it needs to garner people's trust, otherwise, it cannot sustain itself.

As trust is everywhere, people tend to take it for granted. It is so entrenched in our society that recognizing and appreciating its value can prove difficult. However, breaking down components of trust, quantifying them, and analyzing them can foster a clearer understanding about our societies that we would not recognize otherwise. And because trust is the glue that holds society together, studying it helps us identify the cracks in its foundation and provides pathways to restoring it. The study of trust allows us to explain social and political connections and disconnections in society and – more importantly – suggest the steps to take in order to fix them.

Understanding social and political trust has benefits not only for research but also for the policy realm. Firstly, it helps researchers and decision makers to understand the complex relation between trust in institutions on one hand and government performance, perceptions of corruption, (in)formal political participation on the other. Secondly, it provides insights on the underpinnings of democratic deficits and

difficulties that elected institutions, such as the Parliament and political parties, face. Finally, studying political trust and distrust helps to identify the gaps and factors leading to distrust and lays down the road to reverse the vicious circle of poor–performance, perception of corruption and political disengagement.[1]

In this regard, the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis dedicated this annual report to study social and political trust in Morocco, with the aim to contribute to the academic and policy debates on social and political trust, and to propose alternative policies and feasible recommendations to help restore confidence in public institutions.

Morocco provides a good case study for social and political trust. It is characterized by a low institutional trust, while it maintains a relatively strong social bonds and highly level of trust in personalized trust, such as the family and kinship. The results of this study reveal that family is the most trusted social institution. As the social circle expands – colleagues, neighbors and people you may encounter on a daily basis – the levels of trust tend to decrease. The least trusted part of society is strangers or people whom are met the first time, in addition to people from other

1   Eri Bertsou, 'Rethinking Political Distrust', European Political Science Review, 11.2 (2019), 213–30 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773919000080>.and it is often used to explain current political phenomena. In contrast to most schol–arship that focuses solely on the concept of trust and leaves distrust untheo–rized, this article makes a contribution by analysing political distrust. It argues that citizen distrust of government and political institutions poses a threat for democratic politics and clarifies the relationship between the distrust observed in established democracies and classical 'liberal distrust', which is considered beneficial for democracy. Further, it addresses the relationship between trust and distrust, identifying a series of functional asymmetries between the two concepts, with important implications for theoretical and empirical work in po–litical science. The article suggests that a conceptualization of political distrust based on evaluations of incompetence, unethical conduct and incongruent in–terests can provide a fruitful ground for future research that aims to understand the causes, consequences, and potential remedies for political distrust.»,»au–thor»:[{«dropping–particle»:»»,»family»:»Bertsou»,»given»:»Eri»,»non–drop–ping–particle»:»»,»parse–names»:false,»suffix»:»»}],»container–title»:»Eu–ropean   Political   Science   Review»,»id»:»ITEM–1»,»issue»:»2»,»issued»:{«dat e–parts»:[[«2019»,»5»,»17»]]},»page»:»213–230»,»title»:»Rethinking   polit–ical   distrust»,»type»:»article–journal»,»volume»:»11»},»uris»:[«http://www. mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=640fa754–437f–45ec–bc72–8fdb57c–8d844»]}],»mendeley»:{«formattedCitation»:»Eri Bertsou, 'Rethinking Politi–cal Distrust', <i>European Political Science Review</i>, 11.2 (2019

religions, nationalities or sexual orientations. It should also be noted that there is a growing feeling, especially among older generations, that the general levels of trust in society have overall declined in the last few decades.

While trust in close social groups is high, trust in political institutions remains generally low. Moroccans are skeptical about the government performance and its ability to provide good services, especially in education and health. They are also unsatisfied about the performance of the economy and are highly disappointed by the government's efforts in fighting corruption. Most likely, this is also related to the increased interest in informal political participation in recent years, such as the economic and electoral boycott and protests. While political parties and elected institutions are seen as underperforming, useless, and lacking trustworthiness, the only trusted institutions are the monarchy and the security apparatus.

Likewise, the Parliament is one of the least trusted institutions. Members of Parliament interviewed in this study interpreted this situation by the role of social media in showcasing a negative image of the Parliament and reduced their credibility in the eyes of the public. The deficiency of institutional communication by the Parliament makes citizens unaware of the actual efforts of MPs in discussing laws and regulations. In turn, this played into the perception that MPs were rent seekers. In the absence of resources such as skilled staff and lack of office space within the Parliament, MPs cannot properly conduct their work as legislators. Finally, the electoral law combined with archaic party structures produced a parliamentary elite that is not necessarily based on meritocracy or competence, but rather on political loyalty and cronyism.

How to explain political distrust?

The nexus between government performance, quality of public services, and perceptions of corruption in the government bureaucracy

is central to understanding the low levels of trust in political institutions. Furthermore, these are the key elements to explain the resort to informal channels for political engagement. In 2015, the World Bank released a report on the relation between trust, voice, and incentives. One of the main findings is that poor performance of public institutions in the MENA regions led citizens to perceive government as corrupt and ineffective and hence reinforced their disengagement and increased the perceptions of distrust.[2] Morocco is a country with high level of (both perceived and real) corruption, which is one of the factors that cause citizens' distrust in the political institutions – hence providing the ground for political contestation.

Consequently, the plummeting trust in public institutions leaves citizens with few options to engage in the formal channels to fulfill their needs, thus reinforcing informal social networks (**Wasta**) and corruption. The World Bank team concludes that without dependable institutions and citizens' trust in them, there is little formal citizen engagement, institutions remain stagnant, and service delivery is poor[3].

In this regard, this report proposes an ideal–model that links political trust to government performance and communication strategies, perceptions of corruption, the quality of public services and the trustworthiness of individual political actors.[4] Such ideal–model serves as a mean to explain and simplify the complex realities, and hence cannot explain all the cases. Nevertheless, they are useful tools to provide sense to the complex reality. In this regard, the model this report proposes can be simplified as the following.

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2   Hana Brixi, Ellen Lust, and Michael Woolcock, Trust, Voice, and Incentives : Learn–ing from Local Success Stories in Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington, DC, 2015) <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/han–dle/10986/21607>.

3   Ibid.

4   This model has been inspired by the World Bank report cited above.

Cycle of political trust

Quality of political instiutions (govt. performance)

Quatity of public services

Perception of corruption

Citizens'trust

Political engagement

Source: MIPA's own elaboration

This annual report is divided into three sections that contain the analyses of the field research related to social and political trust in Morocco.

The first section will discuss Social Trust, including trust in family, neighbors and others. It will first discuss the importance and relevance of social trust, the role of personal experience and socialization in simmering the perceptions of social trust. It will also examine and explain the sources of trust, specifically looking at family, and at the role of religion and moral values. Finally, it will describe and analyze the different levels of social trust in the different categories of interpersonal relations, such as the family, friends and neighbors, and trust in others and in strangers.

The second section will study Political Trust, and especially the difference between trust in elected and non–elected Institutions. It will explain how and why the trust is low in the elected executive branch (the Government) and in political parties, as well as in institutions dedicated

to public service delivery, such as education and healthcare. It will also look at the high level of trust in the security apparatus. Special attention will be dedicated to institutions that mediate between citizens and the state — civil society organizations (CSOs) and labor unions.

While the first and second sections will research the evolution of social and political trust over the years, the final section will look in–depth at a specific institution. This year, MIPA decided to work on the Parliament, which will be the subject of discussion in the final section of this report, namely the Trust in the Parliament. A particular interest will be devoted to components that affect trust in the Moroccan Parliament. Concretely, it will look at the trustworthiness, capabilities, performance and communication of the Parliament as an institution and members of Parliament as actors of this institution. Crosscutting issues, such as social contract, confusions about the roles of MPs, will be discussed as well.

At the end of the report, we provided a literature review that aims at providing a broad overview of the current research on trust — empirical investigations, global and regional analyses, and their theoretical implications. While it is by no means a substitute for the studies themselves, the review will discuss their common trends and findings as well as identify the missing elements that need to be addressed.

Unpacking the findings on social and political trust in Morocco will shed light on those social and political institutions that are trusted the most, and those that lack the same confidence, thus exposing the strengths and malfunctioning of the main institutions in Moroccan society. Furthermore, the analysis of the trust in the Parliament will provide a clarification on the key issues that revolve around the lack of trust in this central institution for the functioning of democratic life. Grounded on original empirical data, MIPA's study of trust has the objective of both contributing to the discussion on trust in Morocco and suggesting the first key steps to renovate trust in institutions.

Methodology

This report is the fruit of rich and dense data collected from fieldwork throughout 2019. It is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative research techniques.

The quantitative analysis was based on a sample of 1,000 people in October 2019, targeting Moroccans aged 18 and over. The representative nature of the sample was ensured by the quota method (sex, age, and geographical area) according to the structure of the Moroccan population designed by the High Commission for Planning (RGHP 2014). The questions of the survey constituted about 84 variables via CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews).[5]

Concerning the sample of the survey, half of the participants were women and the other half were men. The under–29 age group represents about 31%, while the over–50 age group represents about 28.7%. In terms of geographic distribution, the Atlantic coast regions accounted for 37%, the centre regions for 18.6%, the north regions for 16.7%, and the south regions for 27.6%. 35% of those surveyed live in rural areas, while 65% of them live in urban areas. In terms of average wages, households with an income of less than 8,000 dirhams per month make up the largest share of the sample: 57% of the respondents (32 people had a salary of less than 3,000 dirhams, and 25 people had a salary between 3,000 and 8,000 dirhams). As for their education levels, 14% of respondents had an elementary education level, and 13% of respondents were illiterate. Survey data will be made publicly available on MIPA's website to increase transparency, as well as to provide other researchers with the possibility to make use of the potential of the data collected for this research.

In terms of qualitative analysis, the report relies upon the 'grounded theory' approach, which is a methodology based on the construction of analytical frameworks through a dense and structured set of field data.[6]

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5   For more information about the questionnaire, please refer to the appendix of the report.
6   Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss, Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strate–

In this regard, the in-depth interview technique was used with semi-structured questions with 23 participants from the cities of Casablanca, Rabat and Marrakech during the period between mid-September to late October 2019. It included a diverse sample that considers gender equality and socio-economic diversity. The interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes per participant. In addition, in-depth individual interviews were conducted with seven MPs and a staff member from the House of Councillors. Moreover, three focus groups were organized with about 16 participants in total: one for businessmen, another for labour unions, and the third for local elected officials and political activists. The duration of each focus group was about 2 hours. The names of the interviewees have been concealed in order to ensure the anonymity and the protection of the privacy of the research participants.

After collecting the data, the team worked on the analysis of the report, which has been done in five phases: in the first phase, the research team transcribed all the interviews in the original language, and made a quality control check to make sure of the accuracy of transcription. This phase was followed by the coding of each of the interviews by identifying the main themes and sub-themes. After the identification of the main and sub-themes, the researchers wrote memos in the form of short notes that resumed the main concepts. Then they worked on formulating the main categories for the analysis by developing the memos into a more coherent analysis, which constituted the backbone of the report. In this phase, we integrated the different codes and memos and merged the themes and notes that have been repeated in different interviews and focus groups and tried to focus them into key themes. Fourthly, the team worked to analyse the quantitative and qualitative data by putting the similar themes and memos in the main sections of the report. In this phase, we also worked to harmonize the text with the existing literature on social and political trust, by including quotations from participants, making sure of the quality of analysis by triangulating the quantitative and qualitative data, and the existing

gies for Qualitative Research (Routledge, 1967).

literature. Finally, we worked on generating a coherent interpretation of social and political trust in the Moroccan context.

Generally speaking, the authors followed a thorough approach and methodology in order to ensure the highest standards of impartiality and balance in their analyses. In this regard, we have taken several steps. First, the quantitative data was collected by a professional company specialized in public opinion research. Their expertise ensured the collection of data from a representative sample representing Moroccan society. Secondly, the collection of the qualitative data has been done with respect for the ethics of research, by explicitly explaining to the interviewees the purpose of the research and getting their approval to record the interviews. Participants in the qualitative research were selected from different backgrounds to ensure a diversity of opinion. Then all interviews have been transcribed, coded and then compiled according to the different themes. Researchers of this report worked as a team to ensure the impartiality of the analysis proposed.

Yet, as in any scientific inquiry, this project has its own limitations. Despite all the efforts aimed at impartiality, the authors are citizens who have their own opinions, passion, and biases. Moreover, academic scholarship has thoroughly scrutinized the claims (as well as the very idea) of absolute neutrality in research, often concluding that complete non–interference does not exist.[7] Furthermore, the project has faced some challenges related to the human and financial resources. For instance, we were unable to conduct interviews in the rural areas and different regions or categories, because we did not have enough researchers to help in this project due to the lack of sufficient financial resources. So far, the authors believe that the quality of the data collected and the steps followed in the analysis render those challenges minimal and make this report of high quality.

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7   Linda Alcoff, 'The Problem of Speaking for Others', Cultural Critique, 1991, 5—32, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1354221>.

Chapter I : Social Trust

Results snapshot:

- Social trust decreases steadily moving away from the narrow circle (nuclear family) to other social units, like other members of the family (uncles and aunts), then friends, co-workers, and neighbors, until it virtually vanishes with strangers.

- Substantial differences arise in trusting neighbors depending on the average household income, thereby suggesting that albeit broader practices of solidarity, the poor living conditions of popular neighborhoods negatively affect the feeling of safety and therefore the trust in neighbors.

- Trust relationships are socially constructed based on rational choice. They are the result of a balance between the degree of caution and the estimation of the trust that can be granted.

- Research participants reported unanimously the perception that social trust has substantially decreased over time.

- Social media became an important source of social trust and distrust, playing both a positive role in educating individuals and facilitating communication, but also substantially increasing the exposure to distressing events and thereby nurturing preoccupations and fear when dealing with others.

Introduction

This section is dedicated to the exploration of the different facets of social trust. Based on quantitative and qualitative data, it analyzes both the sources and the levels of social trust.

Personal experience seems a defining element of social trust, despite the growing influence of social media, as the closer the person is, the higher the level of trust gets. The nuclear family is the most trusted social institution, and trust tends to decrease as the relationship becomes less personalized, culminating in very low levels of trust for strangers.

Moreover, religion plays an important role in defining trust. As it is seen as having a substantial influence on individual behavior, the decline in perceived religiosity over time is a major cause of the decline of trust in others. If sometimes individual behaviors seem to contradict one's opinion on trust, MIPA's research has found some common traits in respect to social trust in Morocco.

Social trust: its importance and components

The notion of social trust differs from one person to another. However, there were several agreed elements in defining trust, often linking it with the concept of reassurance and reliance on others in a moral or material way.

Participants in this research projects agreed that trust is an essential component of society, regardless of their levels of trust and of the way in which each of them justifies the importance of social trust. There was a wide agreement on the fact that trust is the bedrock of relationships, and that it is the base that ensures the progress of society.

Generally speaking, social trust in Morocco has three key features: relativity, selectivity, and progression. Relativity relates to the idea that the trust of Moroccans is neither absolute nor "blind" (as in

unconditional). Rather, trust is a rationally balanced perception, grounded on great caution, keeping a sort of safety distance, and always being alert to those unexpected elements that may cause the end of a trust relationship. Trust has often been expressed through the principle of "trusting until betrayed", also reaffirming the importance of having good intentions and expectations ("niya": in Moroccan Arabic) at the beginning of a trust relationship. Selectivity, on the other hand, indicates that the trust is granted to individual cases, rather than general. This element also reaffirms the great importance of personal relationships in the development of social trust. Finally, progression denotes the fact that trust is built through successive moments and through lived experience. Increasing levels of trust are granted over times in which trust is granted and not betrayed. Therefore, the progression of trust depends on both subjective and objective circumstances.

Yet, it has been noticed that issues related to trust invoked some ambivalence in the positions of the research participants. This ambivalence has been clear in the cases of some participants who have expressed the importance of social trust in building relationships, feeling secure and being able to coexist in society, but at the same time have expressed their mistrust in others. There has also been the case of a research participant who showed absolute and indiscriminate absence of trust — towards his/her close family, towards social and political institutions. This person believed that nowadays interpersonal relationships are purely based on self–interests. Moreover, a number of interviewees, who do not fully or partially trust others, admitted having engaged in negative practices. For instance, some of them admitted they evade taxes, and there was the case of a participant who does not trust political institutions because of the pervasive corruption, but in the same time admitted having been paid to vote for a certain party. We can also mention the contradiction of describing politicians as opportunists or selfish people, whereas the respondents themselves expressed, in other questions and sometimes indirectly, that they are only concerned about themselves and their nuclear families.

Trust and social change

Unanimously, research participants have reported that trust in Moroccan society has decreased over time. None of the respondents has indicated that the level of trust has stabilized or increased, nor did they show a neutral position. While it is not possible to verify whether the level of social trust has increased or decreased over time, this perception is worth noting, as it provides the general mood in society vis-à-vis the development of social trust.

The reasons for the decline in social trust in time are explained by the participants in terms of the economic, social and cultural transformations that Moroccan society went through since the nineties. The economic transformations have contributed to the establishment of "individualism", where people became more self-interested. The economic transformations have also contributed to increasing class disparity, which in turn affected the value system by phenomena such as poverty, crime and drugs, thereby making people more cautious within their environments. As one participant said:

> Society has changed since the 1980s (I was born in 1970s). I remember that we used to dress the same, there was no difference between the rich and the poor. We belonged to the middle class but we no longer do, and those who have wealth are making headway.[8]

For older generations, there is nostalgia for the customs of the past. "Time has changed", as one of the respondents said.[9] Here, respondents refer to the change in the nature of authority that prevailed in the traditional cultural and political system of the past. Thus, older respondents tended to reject the current cultural system to such an extent that the decline in authority was sometimes criticized at the expense of individual freedoms. For many people, a system based on individual freedoms is "chaotic" and has affected the education of the present generation.

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8   Interview with, H., small entrepreneur, Casablanca, October 2019.
9   Extract from focus group discussion, October 2019.

Indeed, there is a correlation between the cultural transformations in society and the decline in trust. One of the most important manifestations of these transformations is the decline in the religiosity pattern, as older individuals of the sample compared the current situation with the one in which they grew up (or in which their families lived). For instance, the shift from the extended family to the nuclear family is seen as one of the most prominent of these cultural transformations, as well as the weak relationships with neighbors, and the impossibility of leaving doors open like in past times, which was possible thanks to a wide sense of security in the neighborhoods.

While there is a relationship between time and trust, the relationship between place and trust is more complex. The survey data show few differences between urban and rural areas in regards of trust, yet the qualitative research shows different results. In fact, the qualitative research shows a difference in perceptions between trust in rural areas and trust in urban areas, as well as between large cities and smaller cities. In other words, the smaller the geographical space, the more the social and political trust increases. This is due to the demographic factor that stands out when the population is smaller in rural areas, smaller cities and even in popular neighborhoods within major cities, which generates a relational connection among people, and highlights their attachment to local norms and societal traditions.

There is another observation regarding the geographical scope, and it relates to the degree of the sense of security. There was a paradox even in major cities such as Marrakesh and Casablanca, as the respondents in Marrakech expressed their great sense of security because of the presence of policemen in the city streets, contrary to the respondents in Casablanca who expressed their fear by describing the city as "the wild".

In the same context, for a person to feel that they are a member of society, they must interact with others positively. For this reason, the sense of security in public areas in the neighborhood as well as at home is a reflection of the level of social trust. However 57.2% did not feel safe

in the neighborhood in which they live. This rate is proportional to the amount of decline mentioned in a previous international report, except that the latter focused on the "night" while our report was more general.[10] Survey data collected by MIPA supports the correlation between the perceived security in the neighborhood and trust:

Graph1: Trust in Merchants depending on the feeling of safety in the neighbourhood

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
10 Pamela Abbott and Roger Sapsford, WP6 The Arab Transformations Project. After the Arab Uprisings: Political, Social and Economic Attitudes in the MENA Region in 2014, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.31133.31209>.

Graph2: Trust in most people depending on the feeling of safety in the neighbourhood

It appears clear that feeling safe in one's own neighborhood has a substantial impact not only on the trust in neighbors, but also (and perhaps especially) on the trust in most people.

One of the most important factors that made the respondents feel unsafe in Casablanca is probably the fact that the city is ruled by competitiveness. This has affected the degree of class disparities and hence the security. The significance of trust has been repeatedly linked to utilitarianism and materialism, as respondents are likely to think that commercial dealings and seeking profit and economic gains have also affected the personal relationships of people in many ways.

Sources of social trust

There interviewees and the participants in the focus groups generally referred to six basic sources for the concept of social trust: personal experiences, social media, family upbringing, the surrounding environment, religion, and culture and traditions. In order to facilitate the analysis, these have been regrouped into four main areas:

Personal experiences

The immediate relations and daily interactions are one of the main drivers of social trust. Frequently, the decisive factor in granting or withdrawing trust is the personal experiences and experiences of the close ones. Indeed, personal experiences are both a factor for a determination of trust, since positive or negative experiences habitually result in trust and distrust, and a factor that may entail a shift in the attribution of trust, as a positive experience may restore trust when it was lacking and, of course, a negative experience will likely result in a corresponding loss of trust.

> "The distrust is related to experiences in life. [...] Fraud and betrayal are the most important factors of distrust towards individuals."[11]

In all instances, interviewees reported that the reasons for their trust and/or distrust were due to personal experiences. This may be due to a series of positive (or negative) experiences that resulted in the constructed perception that people are trustworthy or not, as it may affect their overall judgment of trust (or distrust) towards someone or something. As mentioned by one of the interviewees when asked why he trusted his entourage:

> "I trust them because of how they treat me."[12]

At the same time, a particularly negative or positive experience may entail a complete change of attitude towards someone or something. For example, one of the interviewees reported that even the close family can be distrusted after a negative experience with them. Indeed, it appears clear that if a series of positive experiences is necessary to build trust, it can be seriously discredited by even a single negative experience.

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11   Interview with F., industry worker, Casablanca, October 2019.
12   Interview with L., Rabat, October 2019.

"There are some people in whom you completely trust, and then they betray you. In my experience, as a former merchant, there was someone I know who was also a merchant who had business with people from Casablanca and Marrakech, he used to send them money in exchange for the merchandise. It worked for a while, but then the other guy turned his back on him after having collected enough money. He trusted him but the other one cheated".[13]

Socialization

Socialization is one of the most basic factors that caused variations in the levels of social trust among individuals. This includes family upbringing, the surrounding environment and, more in general, elements related to education. For instance, the interviewees that were raised in a good family environment, with positive relations and solidarity with neighbors, reported high levels of trust. An interviewee said that she was raised since her childhood to trust, as evidence of this she said that in her parents' house, they never locked down their belongings:

"when I was living with my mother, we never locked down our stuff, this is in contrast with my in-laws who lock down everything out of fear of being robbed. I lock the house from outside, but never inside the house"[14]

Some of the interviewees who reported great trust in their children also expressed that this trust is in fact due to self-confidence in how to raise them – thereby stressing the importance of the educational feature. Nonetheless, people that showed high levels of trust deplored the fact that they had to change their stance towards social trust in later stages of their lives.

Positive domestic situations, favorable surroundings and other features of individuals' education are central to establishing trust relations. Moreover, it has been pointed out that ignorance, lack of

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13   Interview with M. Marrakech, October 2019.
14   Interview with A., Casablanca, October 2019.

awareness, and decline in the education sector have undermined some of the reasons for interpersonal trust through their influence on social values.

Religion and social values

Religion is an essential source of social trust in Morocco, as one's faith is understood as a major guide of morality on one hand, and on the other hand religious bonds are often the basis on which the relational fabric is built. When individuals were asked whom they trusted the most, almost all of the participants answered 'naturally' that they trusted "God" and themselves before anyone, any group or entity.

There was unanimous agreement on the important relationship between religion and trust. First of all, the decline in trust has been interpreted as a consequence of the decline in religion being a guide of behavior. Moreover, some participants pointed to the exploitation of religion to achieve personal gains, which also contributes to deteriorating levels of trust in society.

Throughout the interviews, one of the crucial and recurrent elements that entails a decline of trust in society is the fact that people "do not fear God anymore", referring to the absence of integrity and moral values rather than an expression of a particular religious pattern. This illustrates the importance of religion in Moroccan society, not necessarily as a dogmatic practice, but especially as a cultural component that governs social behavior. Hence the attribute of "God's fearsome", which in conservative Moroccan culture refers to trustworthy people, who do their jobs efficiently and do not cheat, because they "fear God". As there is a relationship between religious and moral values, there is a relationship between these two and social trust. Specifically, many of the interviewees saw that the main reason for the decline in trust lies in the lack of respect for religious values, and thus in the lack of self–governing principles. As it has been reported in the last edition of the Arab Barometer, there is a tangible generational gap in the association

with religiosity, as only 24% of the respondents aged between 18–29 would consider themselves religious, while this segment reaches the 85% of the respondents between 50–59 and the 68% of the individuals aged above 60 years old.[15]

The use of religion to achieve personal gains has frequently been witnessed by MIPA's research participants, and it has been described as "hypocrisy". For instance, the focus group of business people reported that it has become a "fashion" that merchants grow their beards as a form of showcasing one's religiosity, in order to gain trust for their business, since there is the perception that Moroccans tend to trust more those who are religious and/or "fear God". As one participant explicitly said:

> "we got used to the fact that religion is based on trust, when you meet someone with a beard, you automatically trust him. He uses religion to achieve his objective".[16]

Similarly, some of the participants of the same focus group reported how female thieves often wear veils to cover their faces in order to hide stolen goods. This exploitation of religious feelings to achieve personal gains and/or facilitate an illicit conduct contributes to the establishment of a negative stereotype about religious people.

Social media

Moreover, social media stands out as it is acquiring a new role as a source of social trust. Participants expressed that they rely not only on personal experiences to define social trust, but also on experiences shared by others, especially on social media. Specifically, it has been noted that social media foster the visibility of misconducts and therefore negatively affect social trust. For instance, social media

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15 Arab Barometer V, Country Report Morocco, Published: June 27, 2019. P: 13. https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Morocco_Report_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer_2019.pdf

16 Participant in focus group with business community, Casablanca, October 2019.

has allowed for an increased awareness of crimes, frauds, political corruption as well as other daily violations – ultimately increasing fear, caution and reducing social trust overall. Participants considered that these events have always been a part of the current events, but that there were fewer means to find out about them. In this sense, social media represents a double–edged sword, as it plays a positive role in educating individuals and facilitating communication between people, yet it is also a vehicle that fosters preoccupations and caution as the rule when dealing with others.

Levels of social trust

This section will explore the levels of trust. Generally speaking, social trust tends to decrease whenever the narrow circle (nuclear family) is expanded to reach other social units, like other members of the family (uncles and aunts), then friends, co–workers, and neighbors, until social trust virtually disappears with strangers. In this section, we will break down these different units to understand the key issues in the trust – or lack thereof – of Moroccans.

The family

The family, and the nuclear family in particular, has the highest percentage of societal trust. Specifically, 96% of the respondents of MIPA's survey said they trust their close family – with a staggering 86% who completely trust their families. Generally speaking, interviewees reported quite similar levels of trust in all the members of the nuclear family (the mother, the father, the siblings, and the children), with some exceptions of slightly lower trust for the partner. The extended family (which includes cousins, uncles and aunts) is slightly less trusted than the nuclear family, but still reports very high level of trust. Out of the 78% of the respondents that trust the extended family, only 41% trusts it completely, implying that the trust in the extended family is not as absolute as the trust in the close family.

Lower levels of trust for the extended family are mostly due to previous experiences of the respondents, in which they were let down by a cousin. However, even within the nuclear family, trust is not attributed evenly. For instance, the respondents did not hesitate to express their trust in their mothers, while their fathers were sometimes overlooked or referred to only at a later stage of the interview. Some other respondents expressed their mistrust in their children due to a specific misconduct they have done at a certain age, or even their mistrust in their siblings, justified by the concern for an unequal treatment, for example, the fear of seeing their inheritance getting stolen after the parents' passing.

Predominantly, the trust in mothers and fathers was characterized by being absolute. When the respondents were asked about the reasons for this, they said that it is not innate as one would expect. Rather, it is based on a rational foundation, which is that parents are seen as a refuge from the shocks of life. Indeed, the respondents have often been supported by their parents, whether financially or morally, when they have gone through difficult times in which other people have abandoned or let them down. Once again, the role of personal experiences in building trust emerges in its centrality.

Levels of trust in the partner are also very high, but not as absolute as the ones for the parents. The data collected in MIPA's survey shows, perhaps unsurprisingly, that trust in the close family decreases substantially among divorced respondents — of which only 83% trusts the nuclear family, in respect of the 97% of trust of single respondents and 98% of married respondents. Interestingly enough, the pool of survey respondents that trust the extended family the most are the divorced ones, of which 84% said they either trust partially or completely the extended family, while only 68% of the widowed respondents said they trust the extended family.

Friends and co-workers

Increasing the distance from the closest familiar relationships, friends are less trusted compared to the extended family, but still reaching high levels of trust — as 75% of survey respondents said that they either trust completely or somehow their friends. Interviewees also reported that childhood friends are more trusted than other friends, corroborating the assumption that longer bonds of trust are valued more than recent friendships. MIPA's survey also highlighted that there appears to be a correlation between age and trust in friends, as the graph below shows:

Graph3 Trust in friends depending on the age

It seems that levels of complete trust slightly decrease with age, showing that over time the absolute trust in friends is mitigated as people become more cautious about their friends. There seems to be a similar trend in trust in general, with the exception of the respondents aged between 40–49, that shows similar levels of trust to the youth — with respectively 78% and 80% of respondents who trust their friends.

Among the respondents of MIPA's survey, people seemed more open to the idea of having either a friend from another religion or a refugee, rather than having an atheist or a homosexual friend. The staggering difference of 41 points between the openness of having a friend from

another religion (72% of respondents) and an atheist friend (31% of respondents) may reflect the understanding of religion as the moral guide of one's behavior in society. Therefore, it becomes less of a problem that a person believes in another religion in respect of being atheist – and being perceived as lacking a moral compass. Furthermore, Moroccans showed very low levels of acceptance towards homosexuals, as 79% of respondents said that they do not, or absolutely do not, accept having a homosexual friend. No relevant differences have been noted in the acceptance towards a homosexual friend depending on whether respondents came from rural areas (14%) or urban areas (15%), and only limited differences have been noted depending on the sex of respondents, as 18% of female respondents said that they would accept a homosexual friend against 12% of male respondents. The youngest segment of the respondents is quite more tolerant towards having a homosexual friend in comparison to the other segments, as 21% of the respondents aged between 18–29 would accept having a homosexual friend, against only 10% of the respondents aged between 40–49 and 13% of the respondents aged between 30–39 and above 50 years old.

Graph4: Do you accept to have a friend if...?

Yes withouth problem
- Atheist: 9,60%
- From another religion: 43,40%
- Refugee (either from Syria or Sub-Saharian Africa): 24,50%
- Homosexual: 4,30%

Yes probably
- Atheist: 21,10%
- From another religion: 28,90%
- Refugee (either from Syria or Sub-Saharian Africa): 37,00%
- Homosexual: 10,70%

No
- Atheist: 26,10%
- From another religion: 12,30%
- Refugee (either from Syria or Sub-Saharian Africa): 17,90%
- Homosexual: 18,40%

Absolutely not
- Atheist: 41,50%
- From another religion: 14,90%
- Refugee (either from Syria or Sub-Saharian Africa): 18,90%
- Homosexual: 60,10%

Legend:
- Homosexual
- Refugee (either from Syria or Sub-Saharian Africa)
- From another religion
- Atheist

Neighbors

In Morocco's traditional society, neighbors have been perceived as an extension of the family. Religious scripts provide special status to neighbors. They played important roles in socialization and we have already seen above how the trust in neighbors can be regarded as a general barometer of social trust. However, the findings of this research reveal that neighbors are not trusted as it is thought. In fact, less than the majority of survey respondents (47%) either trusted partially or completely their neighbors.

The participants of the qualitative research agreed that trust in the neighbors is no longer as it used to be before. For instance, it has been noted that it is no longer possible to let children stay with a neighbor to baby–sit them in the absence of their guardians. Plus, the weakening of trust in neighbors has often been related to the notion of **"lhadya"**, as it is expressed in Moroccan dialect, which means meddling in others' lives. This points to the fact that Moroccan society is moving more and more towards an individualistic society, where the focus is on the nuclear family, rather than the larger networks, such as neighbors.

During the interviews, there was the common assumption that former practices of solidarity and mutual support among neighbors still exist in smaller cities and popular neighborhoods. However, MIPA's survey data add interesting elements to this debate and provides a more concrete picture.

First, the difference of trust in neighbors of respondents residing in rural or urban areas is insignificant, (1–point difference), indicating no substantial impact of the dimension of the city in the trust in neighbors.

Graph5: Trust in neighbours depending on area of provenance

Second, the fact that trust in neighbors of popular neighborhoods is higher due to the persistence of former practices of solidarity and mutual support is only a part of a more nuanced story. Two graphs, the distribution of trust in neighbors and the feeling of safety in one's neighborhood depending of the average household income, are particularly helpful:

Graph6: Trust in neighbours depending on average monthly household income

	I trust comlpetely	I trust somehow	I don't trust	I don't trust at all

Graph7: Feeling of safety in the neighbourhood depending on average monthly household income

	Not feeling safe at all	Feeling relatively not safe	Feeling relatively safe	Feeling safe at a large extent

The distribution of trust in neighbors depending on the average household income only partially reflects the trend highlighted in qualitative interviews – as respondents with an average household income between 3,000 and 8,000 dirhams show relatively high levels of trust in their neighbors, while those with an average income ranging

between 15,001 and 30,000 dirhams reported relatively low levels of trust. Nevertheless, the most interesting result is that the highest level of trust in neighbors comes from the respondents with the highest average income, while the lowest levels of trust come from the ones with the lowest income. We see a reflection of this trend in the graph correlating the household's financial situation to the feeling of safety in the neighborhood. Here, the vast majority (82%) of respondents with the highest income feel safe in their neighborhoods, while only the 55% of respondents with the lowest income feel safe in their neighborhoods. These considerations lead us to the recognition of the fact that the living conditions of the popular neighborhoods have a substantial impact on the feeling of safety, and therefore in the trust in neighbors, while the living conditions of wealthier neighborhoods may result in high levels of safety and, in turn, higher levels of trust. If these reflections do not discard the hypothesis that solidarity is higher in popular neighborhoods, they do bring forward the fact that income inequalities in Morocco also have a spatial dimension, where popular and wealthier neighborhoods – and neighbors – live very different social realities.

Ultimately, the fact that there was an 8 points difference in the feeling of safety in the neighborhoods between male (67% of which felt partially or completely safe) and female (of which 59% felt partially or completely safe) prompts the attention to the reasons for such differentiated levels of trust. They may be related to the greater exposure of women to issues such as harassment and/or catcalling in Morocco.

Trust in others and in strangers

Survey data shows that a small majority of respondents (54%) thinks that Moroccans either trust each other partially or a lot, and that a slightly higher percentage of respondents (57%) trusts most people. Yet, the respondents in the qualitative research said that they do not

trust others at all, and that they do not believe that Moroccans are trustworthy, nor do they believe that Moroccans trust each other.

Graph8: In your opinion, do Moroccans trust each other?

Trust each other a lot — 8,04%

11,46% — Don't trust each other at all

Partially trust each other — 46,33%

34,17% — Don't trust each other

Graph9: Do you trust most people?

I trust a lot — 9,23%

13,24% — I don't trust at all

I trust somehow — 47,74%

29,79% — I don't trust

These mild levels of trust in strangers are reduced even further when referring to foreigners, as only 28% of survey respondents said they trust (either partially or completely) people from other nationalities and 32% do not trust foreigners at all.

In fact, participants expressed two contrasting points of view in regards of the trust in strangers. While both were based on personal experiences and the surrounding environment, the first one stressed

the importance of trust in general including trust in strangers, while the second one takes the opposite stance.

On one hand, the interviewees who expressed the importance of social trust thought it is important to ensure the social progress, asserting that in the absence of social trust in strangers, people would not be able to leave their homes and go through the daily life. Some gave the example of the relationship between the grocer in the neighborhood ("**Moul Lhanut**") with the people of the neighborhood. Based on trusting the prices declared by the grocer, purchasing the needs and paying later, trusting the expiration date and quality of the products automatically, and trusting the change returned by the grocer without re–checking it, this relationship is considered as a reflection of social trust. It is a mutual trust between the two parties, which has no safeguards other than it being a custom, recalling the notion of trust being the glue of society as expressed in the introduction.

On the other hand, other research participants were supporting an opposite point of view that considers trust to be dependent on the narrow relationship circle surrounding the individual, and therefore it is by no means necessary when it comes to strangers. These individuals in particular had a negative perception of the rest of the Moroccans and described them with critical and uncomplimentary features. Further, they consider that "absolute" trust in general is nothing but naivety, and that cheating is a daily practice not only financially beneficial but also in interpersonal relationships – where it has been described as a **survival mechanism**.

Overall, social trust is seen as a "hard currency": it is rare, it can be sold and bought, it can be subject to bids, it has a balance which increases and decreases, and is almost nonexistent when consumed. The interviewees constantly expressed that they do not act spontaneously regarding the issue of trust. Trust relationships are built with great caution, embodied in the continuous estimation – and subsequent verification – of the degree of trust that can be granted. One of the interviewees said:

> "I trust but I give myself 70% trust and 30% caution. Life and experience taught me not to give full trust, because you might get a painful blow."[17]

These subjective and continuous evaluations, sometimes translated into actual percentages, represent the main way in which individuals assess trust in their daily life.

Conclusion

The respondents' concept of trust has been dominated by a kind of rationality to contextualize the gains and losses that result in any knowledge, whether the relationship is with friends, co-workers or the social environment. The pursuit of self-assertion and success in the age of speed has become subject to immoral and unlawful behaviors. It is noted in this regard that the examples provided by the research sample were not related to economic dealings or money in particular, but rather to daily practices, such as cheating in exams, for example, or using friends to fulfill personal needs.

There is a correlation in the foundational principles of social trust that individuals who are cautious about others tend to be untrustworthy as well, and vice versa. Although this data is not verifiable in this research, there are a number of indicators that almost make mention of this analysis. For instance, some interviewees who have a high level of trust even towards strangers, indicated that the reason for granting this trust is that they expect to encounter honest people like themselves; contrarily, those who disagree with them and have low trust, show caution and presume that others will misbehave, perhaps base these assumptions on their personal behavior.

17   Interview with M., Marrakech, October 2019.

Chapter II : Political Trust

Results snapshot:

- Moroccans' trust in non-elected institutions (public administration, justice system, but also army and police) is largely felt unavoidable, but trust in security apparatus seems the highest, despite some suspicions about impartiality in the law enforcement.

- The malfunctioning of public services (healthcare and education) is at the core of the distrust of Morocco's political system. The increased monetization of these sectors increased feelings of segregations among social classes and resulted in less trust among the lower social classes.

- Not only the Government and political parties scored the lowest levels of trust, but the prevalence of corruption, poor performance of main sectors (health and education) and lack of political will are creating a vicious circle of distrust that can hardly be broken.

- The perception of pervasive corruption, especially within political parties, together with the dissatisfaction towards Government's efforts to curb corruption, has a substantial negative effect on the intentions to vote in future elections.

- Forms of political participation are varied and decidedly differentiated in terms of age, gender, and provenance. However, new forms of political participations are more linked to younger generations.

Introduction

Political trust, as stated in the introductory section, is fundamentally different from social trust. Its main characteristic is that political trust is anonymous. It does not reflect a direct relationship between individuals, but rather the level of confidence towards institutions. Political trust has been recognized as an essential indicator of legitimacy in democratic rule.[18] Such confidence is based on three pillars: the knowledge of roles of the trustee, the knowledge of his/her motivations (from which stems trustworthiness) and the sanctions that keep the trustee accountable. Hence, it is imperative to operate a distinction between elected and non–elected institutions. Surely, both categories of institutions significantly shape the political system of a state, but only the former is held accountable through electoral processes.

MIPA's Trust Index surveyed the trust of Moroccans in a variety of institutions and this section aims at discussing the main findings related to how and why Moroccans trust — and do not trust — institutions. It will start by examining trust in non–elected institutions, such as private and public service providers, administration, as well as the institutions related to the security apparatus. It will move on to analyzing trust in mediators (such as civil society organizations and labor unions) and finally, it will discuss trust in elected institutions. Examining how trust is distributed amongst institutions, as well as understanding the factors that lead to trust and distrust, will serve as the basis for presenting key recommendations on how to strengthen the cohesion of Moroccan society.

Trust in Non–Elected Institutions

One of the main outcomes of the research conducted by MIPA is that respondents felt that the trust in non–elected institution is "**necessary**" and something that they are not able to control per se. Indeed, non–

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18 Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, 'Political Trust and Trustworthiness', Annual Review of Political Science, 3.1 (2000), 475—507, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.475>.

elected institutions are not directly accountable through electoral processes and therefore trustors cannot simply withdraw their support for one institution or another — as happens through electoral processes. If sometimes a decline in trust can be sanctioned in alternatives way, in other cases it is more complicated to hold the trustee accountable. For instance, it is possible that a loss of trust for public healthcare institutions entails a shift to the private sector, or vice versa, but a similar change cannot happen for other non-elected institutions, such as security apparatus.

Moreover, people that have a higher household income were more trusting of non-elected institutions than people who have lower household incomes. This may be related to the fact that their income allows them to access better services (be it schooling, healthcare, or judiciary) and therefore to have a better relationship with non-elected institutions.

During the course of the research, research participants referred to a wide variety of non-elected institutions that can be dissected into four main areas: public administrations, justice system, service providers, and security apparatus.

Public Administrations

In this section, we discuss the trust that the respondents showed for public administrations. These institutions were seen by interviewees as having an important role, being close to citizens and providing the most essential services to them.

Trust levels in public administrations varied depending on the experience people had, the type of institution and the perceived performance of the institution. As one interviewee stated:

"In the Administration, when people treat me well, I trust them"[19]

19 Interview with R., Sales representative, Marrakech, October 2019

Several factors influence the citizens' perception of public administration. One of which is the how performant is the administration. In fact, most respondents felt that the negative performances of public administrations depend on human resources in the administrations and lack of organization and transparency of the procedures. Similarly, local administrations were criticized for not having a proper queuing system, and the turns were not specifically respected. Moreover, a majority of respondents did not show outright trust in the local administrations: the **moqaddem** in particular is perceived as a security tool controlled by the state, who has to report people's affairs and their whereabouts.

Yet, one of the most elements that influence the level of trust in the public administration is the perceptions of lack of transparency in the administrations, which are generally seen as corrupt. **"Corruption is the solution"**[20] has been described as the motto when dealing with public administrations. This is surely related to the highly personalized character of the interactions with public administrations which has been broadly reported by the research participants. Relying on personal interactions increases the possibility for corrupt practices to arise and be established as the current state of affairs within administrations.

"You need to give in order to receive in administrations"[21]

None of the research participants mentioned mitigation tools, despite the creation of the figure of the Ombudsman (also known as "**le mediateur**" in French and "وسيط المملكة - ديوان المظالم" in Arabic) in 2001, who serves as a mechanism for citizens to express their grievances against the abuses of public administration, and the ability to sue an administration for not providing a public service. Even if not all citizens may have the resources to resort to these mechanisms, this gave the impression that the interviewees were not aware of the legal arsenal at their disposal to counter the administration in any way.

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20   Interview with Z., Marrakech, October 2019.
21   Interview with A., Law student, Marrakech, October 2019

Justice system

This section will discuss the trust that Moroccans showed towards the judiciary institutions. Rule of law is a fundamental element of any democratic society, where every person is deemed equal, and must be treated as such, before the law. The concrete perception of the trust in the justice system is composed of trust in courts, judges, lawyers and judiciary processes in general.

Indeed, trust in the justice system is seen in a different light in respect to other institutions. In this case, most interviewees felt that trust in this institution was not a choice and that they were bound by its rules, existence and its applications.

> "If we do not believe in justice, it is a catastrophe. There's an obligation to believe and trust judiciary."[22]

One of the respondents said that the distrust in the judiciary was 'a catastrophe', because it is an obligation, not a choice, and it lays the basis of rules in society. In other words, citizens were under the impression that they had "no choice" but to trust the judiciary.

Nonetheless, the overall levels of trust in the judiciary system are relatively medium–low. The average level of trust in the judiciary is 42%. The respondents aged between 18–29 have reported the lower levels of trust in the justice system, with only 40% of the respondents that trust it. The respondents aged between 30–49 have showed a higher level of trust, reporting 50% of trust by the segment between 30–39 and 51% of trust by the segment between 40–49.

Yet, the issue of independence of the judiciary is one key theme that has been highlighted by the participants. In theory, the judiciary system in Morocco is independent and the Constitution provides stipulation to guarantee this independence, however, interviewees have different opinions. For instance, one of the interviewees mentioned the difficulty to trust the judiciary, given the strength of the Ministry of Interior that

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22 Interview with A., October, Rabat.

may influence the independence of judiciary. While it is difficult to prove such interference, it is nonetheless a perception that citizens hold.

Moreover, the issues of impartiality and transparency have been also evoked. One participant mentioned that the judiciary was not fair and that there was no equality in terms of treatment by the justice system. In essence, nepotism and corruption have a huge influence on the outcome of a process in the justice system. The majority of respondents that said they outright distrusted the judiciary mentioned that judges were corrupt. Indeed, the importance of informal ties and connections has already been highlighted in another survey that reports that 82% of respondents believe citizens with connections (**Wasta**) in courthouses are more likely to receive favorable judgment.[23]

Generally speaking, respondents felt compelled to trust the judiciary albeit it lacks transparency and accountability mechanisms. However, in short, none of them felt they could do anything about it. If we correlate the responses on the general perception of corruption with the trust in the justice system, we can observe the same situation from another perspective.

Graph10: Perception of corruption and trust in the justice system

	Highly prevalent	Prevalent	Not prevalent	Not prevalent at all
I trust completely	11,81%	21,94%	21,28%	28,57%
I trust somehow	29,62%	31,61%	24,47%	21,43%
I don't trust	36,08%	32,26%	39,36%	35,71%
I don't trust at all	22,49%	14,19%	14,89%	14,29%

23   Matt Buehler, 'Do You Have "Connections" at the Courthouse? An Original Survey on Informal Influence and Judicial Rulings in Morocco', Political Research Quarterly, 69.4 (2016), 760–72, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916662358>.

This graph shows that levels of trust in the justice system remain fairly constant, ranging between 41% and 54%. Even in the case in which corruption is perceived as a pervasive element of Moroccan society, trust in the justice system is still quite high and, most importantly, does not vary significantly among those who believe that corruption is pervasive in Morocco and those who think that it is not. This observation further sustains what has been observed in the qualitative interviews: an important part of Moroccans still feels that they have to trust the justice system no matter what.

Nonetheless, there was a clear demand for the justice system to be independent, without specifically indicating how that could be achieved. Moreover, most of the respondents were under the impression that the justice system worked in favor of the rich and powerful, rather than the underprivileged. Paraphrasing the words of the interviewees, people with money are believed to have preferential access to justice, and there appears to be a social class that had access to justice, while the others didn't. The following graph reports the distribution of trust in the justice system depending on the income:

Graph11: Trust in justice system depending on average monthly household income

Unsurprisingly, the segment of respondents that trusts justice the most is the one with an average household income above 30.000 dirhams per month — of which 57% shows trust in the justice system. This may be explained by the fact that these households may have a higher propensity to resort to the judiciary in their lives or that they are able to afford the services of the highest calibre of lawyers. Moreover, this segment of Morocco's society is also more likely to have reached higher levels of education, and therefore have a better understanding of both the functioning of the justice system and their rights and responsibilities. The lowest level of trust has been reported by the citizens with a monthly income between 3.000 and 8.000 dirhams, of which only 41% has confidence in the justice system. The apparent outlier of these observations is the segment of respondents with the lowest average monthly income (below 3.000 dirhams), of which 47% trusts in the judiciary.

"Achieving justice depends on money. Lawyers do not defend a simple, ignorantcitizen."[24]

These results sustain the observations made during the other qualitative interviews, describing a situation in which a portion of the population is aware of the fact that the access and quality of the justice system depend on one's status and resources, and there is another portion that is compelled to trust the rulings of the judiciary — since they are not in the position to question the integrity of the justice system.

From a gender perspective, there is a slight difference between the level of confidence of women and men towards the institutions of the justice system. In specific terms, the justice system is trusted by 48% of female respondents and by 43% of male respondents.

In conclusion, if many of the interviewees highly ranked justice amongst the non–elected institutions, then it is unclear whether such trust depends on the supposed (impartial) nature of the institution

24   Interview with B., attendant in a catering company. Casablanca, October 2019.

and its fundamental role for society or if it depends on their direct experiences in the justice system. Moreover, people feel compelled to trust the judiciary, regardless of corruption, because they lack the means to take direct action. However, one of the interviewees noted that in the eventuality of perceived injustice, people that are more aware of their rights and duties were able to challenge the court, either directly in the judicial process or in a broader social and political sense.

Service providers

In this section, we will discuss the trust that Moroccans have in the education and healthcare systems. The analysis involved both the public and the private sector, as both healthcare and education services are increasingly being delivered by private entities. Therefore, we will also look at the differences between trust in the public and private sectors.

Education

Education institutions were trusted slightly more than healthcare. Nevertheless, many of the respondents were wary of schooling quality; and some spoke of schools as a sort of 'failing project'. Regardless of the accessing public or private institutions, the majority of the respondents did not feel that the quality of education was in line with their expectations. Nonetheless, the survey conducted by MIPA showed that there is a staggering difference between the trust in public and private schooling systems, where the private sector scores considerably better than the public one. Indeed, the level of trust in the private schooling system does not fall below 83%, while the trust in the public system floats between 46% and 53%.

Graph12: Trust in private schools depending on the age

Graph13: Trust in public schools depending on the age

In both the private and public sectors, the people with lower trust in the education system are the ones between 18–29. With a level of distrust of 17% for the private sector and a shocking 54% for the public sector, Moroccan youth gives a strong message to these institutions, especially given its direct and recent experience with the education institutions. In the specific case of universities, the perception is

that they do not provide an even playing field. On one hand, some respondents mentioned the discriminatory practices of some teachers vis–à–vis some students, for instance, students with a specific "**Fassi**" background or last name are privileged. On the other hand, respondents felt that in order to go ahead and advance in university, students have to cheat, and not cheating is seen as a sign of naivety.

Similarly, the trust that parents showed in the education sector depended on their experience and that of their children as well. Parents need to devote a great deal of trust to those who are in charge of looking after their children. This was the case for a father, who trusted his daughter's school because of the fact that they were responsible for her. However, respondents in the focus group mentioned that schools sometimes do not act in the best interest of one's child, and that schooling no longer teaches the right values anymore.

Sometimes, parents do not have much choice over which school to trust with their children. In this respect, the analysis of the differences between trust in the public and private education sector depending on the household income adds interesting points to the debate.

Graph14: Trust in private schools depending on average monthly household income

	Less than 3000MAD	3000–8000 MAD	8001–15000 MAD	15001 – 30000 MAD	More than 30000 MAD
I trust completely	45,27%	35,39%	30,72%	43,61%	49,23%
I trust somehow	40,72%	45,68%	54,25%	44,36%	46,15%
I don't trust	10,75%	14,40%	11,76%	10,53%	3,08%
I don't trust at all	3,26%	4,53%	3,27%	1,50%	1,54%

Graph15: Trust in public schools depending on average monthly household income

The first element that captures attention, perhaps unsurprisingly, is that the highest trust in the private sector comes from those who have the highest income. The segment of respondents with the highest income (above 30.000 dirhams per month) responded with a level of trust of 95% in private education institutions. Followed by the next segment in terms of income (between 15.001 and 30.000 dirhams per month) with a level of trust in private education institutions of up to 88%. It has also been noted elsewhere that private universities in Morocco often have the explicit aim of being an exclusive environment for the elites.[25] However, the respondents with the lowest income (below 3.000 dirhams per month) gave a surprising signal, with 45% of respondents saying they trust private education. This may not necessarily depend on the actual access of this segment to private schools (which may be very difficult given their income), but rather on their aspiration to access a better system in comparison to the public one.

25 Elizabeth Buckner, 'The Growth of Private Higher Education in North Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Morocco and Tunisia', Studies in Higher Education, 43.7 (2018), 1295–1306,<https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2016.1250075>.

The lowest level of trust in private education institutions comes from the respondents with an income between 3.001 and 8.000 dirhams — of which 19% do not trust private schools. As one interviewee said:

"when financial aspects come in, [they] decrease trust, because [school] becomes a commercial trade"[26]

This may be attributed to the fact that with such income, families may access private schools, but not top-quality ones. Thus, the quality of education hardly matches both their expectations and the substantial budgetary effort they made. This element is significant because it shows that the private education sector is not a unique bloc. Rather, it is very differentiated in terms of the quality of education and the fees that one has to pay for it.

Correspondingly, the segment that trusts public education the most is the one with a household income between 3.001 and 8.000 dirhams per month — where 54% of respondents say they trust public schooling. At this level of resources, public education may be chosen because they do not have access to the best levels of private education, and therefore they have to trust public education more. Furthermore, only 37% of respondents with a household income between 8.001 and 15.000 dirhams per month said that they trust public education, making it the lowest level of trust for educational establishments. Such a low level of trust for public education institutions may be due to the fact that this segment of the population has the possibility to access high-quality private education and the choice to do so, often with a substantial effort.

From a gender perspective, no substantial differences have been noted between respondents' trust in public or private institutions. Private schooling is trusted by 85% of women and by 86% of men, while public schooling is trusted by 55% of women and by 42% of men.

Therefore, schooling is felt to be a heavy burden for families. Education institutions are not only meant to provide proper education, but are also considered to be the main source for learning ethics and

26   Interview with A., Rabat, October 2019

values. However, the progressive monetization of the system has put economic pressure on families in order to get a better education for their children. At the same time, families are not satisfied with the overall quality of education. Positive feedbacks in relation to the education system derived mainly from the relative security and the responsibility of such institutions towards children. The general feeling, however, is that people are not in control of neither the quality nor the cost of education – even in private education institutions.

In conclusion, substantial inequalities remain a key feature of the educational sector, both between the public and private sectors, and also within the private sector.

Graph 16: Level of education depending on average monthly household income

This graph clearly shows that under the current educational system income inequalities have a clear reflection in the levels of education, creating (and nurturing at the same time) a division between wealthy and educated citizens, and unprivileged and uneducated citizens.

Healthcare

The cleavage that has been observed between public and private sector in education is even more remarkable in healthcare institutions. Among the main issues that have been highlighted is the access to the healthcare services, as several interviewees mentioned that without adequate financial resources it is difficult to access proper healthcare services. Public healthcare facilities are usually free, or at least cheaper compared to the private sector. However, people feel that they are no longer able to rely on free services, since public hospitals lack both human and material resources and the overall quality is deemed poor. The interviewees reported that the personnel are scarce, sometimes medications are not provided, and people may be asked to get themselves the medicines that the doctors need to carry out their work. This may probably explain the high level of distrust in healthcare institutions in general, but mainly in the public healthcare system.

It should be noted also that the difference between the public and private sector is even greater than the case of educational institutions. On one hand, the private healthcare sector records generally high levels of trust, as it is trusted by at least 71% of all respondents. On the other hand, trust in public healthcare institutions records dramatic levels ranging between 20% by respondents aged 18–29 and 29% by respondents aged 30–39. It is dramatic to record that 80% do not trust public healthcare institutions, and 49% of them do not trust them at all.

Graph17: Trust in private healthcare depending on the age

Legend:
- I trust completely
- I trust somehow
- I don't trust
- I don't trust at all

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50+
I trust completely	26,79%	26,02%	27,02%	32,02%
I trust somehow	47,39%	49,32%	44,25%	45,32%
I don't trust	15,69%	15,98%	20,11%	15,11%
I don't trust at all	10,13%	8,68%	8,62%	7,55%

Graph18: Trust in public healthcare depending on the age

Legend:
- I trust completely
- I trust somehow
- I don't trust
- I don't trust at all

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50+
I trust completely	5,47%	5,88%	6,90%	6,31%
I trust somehow	14,47%	23,53%	14,94%	22,46%
I don't trust	31,19%	30,77%	33,91%	34,74%
I don't trust at all	48,87%	39,82%	44,25%	36,49%

These ratios reflect the picture described by many interviewees who say that choosing private healthcare over public healthcare is often due to the fact that the pauperized state of public health infrastructures leaves no choice.

> "We have bad health (sector) in Morocco. If you have money you can get treated. Public health facilities are bad."[27]

The alarming state of public health infrastructure is also quoted as a reason for people to leave the country, as the availability of free and effective healthcare in other countries provides a strong stimulus to emigrate.

From a gender perspective, no substantial differences have been noted between respondents' trust in public or private healthcare sector. Private institutions are trusted by 75% of women and men (with a difference of less than 0,5% of men trusting private institutions more than women), while public institutions are trusted by 28% of women and by 21% of men.

The distribution of trust in healthcare institutions depending on household incomes shows a trend which is analogous to the one observed in the educational sector – reaffirming the important inequalities that mark service providers in Morocco.

Graph19: Trust in private healthcare depending on average monthly household income

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
27   Interview with A, Housewife, Marrakech, October 2019.

Graph20: Trust in public healthcare depending on average monthly household income

	I trust completely
	I trust somehow
	I don't trust
	I don't trust at all

|	Less than 3000MAD	3000–8000 MAD	8001–15000 MAD	15001 – 30000 MAD	More than 30000 MAD
I trust completely	8,20%	6,78%	3,90%	3,75%	4,61%
I trust somehow	22,71%	17,93%	17,53%	18,05%	9,23%
I don't trust	33,44%	33,86%	27,27%	30,83%	41,54%
I don't trust at all	35,65%	41,43%	51,30%	47,37%	44,62%

Starting from the public healthcare system, we can observe that the respondents with the highest level of income (above 30.000 dirhams per month) distrust the public healthcare institutions the most – with the 86% of respondents that do not trust public health and, within this percentage, an impressive 45% that do not trust public healthcare at all. The highest level of trust in these institutions is given by the respondents with the lowest income (less than 3.000 dirhams per month), of which 31% trust public health infrastructures – most probably because they have no other choice.

In relation to the private sector, we observe once again that the respondents that rely the most on the private healthcare institutions are the wealthiest, with the trust of 80% of the respondents with an income above 30.000 dirhams per month and the trust of 77% of the respondents with an income between 15.001 and 30.000 dirhams per month. The respondents that reported the lowest income (below 3.000 dirhams per month) have shown a surprisingly high level of trust in the private sector, with 78% that trust private healthcare institutions. Such high confidence follows the same dynamic observed in the educational system, where higher levels of trust from the respondents who are

unlikely to have the resources to access the private sector reflect their aspiration rather than an actual usage of such services. In the case of private healthcare, the users of public healthcare may project their hopes for better healthcare on the trust in the private sector. Albeit still being relatively high, the lower trust in the private healthcare system is showed by those with an income between 8.000 and 15.000 dirhams — of which only 73% trust the private sector. These people may have resorted to private healthcare, but the concrete quality of the services (also in respect of the financial resources they had to allocate to access private institutions) may have failed to meet their expectations. Indeed, some of the interviewees said that they trust private healthcare, however, some behaviors (like being asked to pay prior to the treatment) made them suspicious about these institutions. They were not sure whether private healthcare institutions were actually providing a service that was necessary or if they were engaging in strategies that aimed at getting the maximum benefits (i.e.: money) from them.

The resources that are invested in private healthcare have a direct correlation with the trust that is attributed to the health sector. Interviewees felt safer when they spent more on their treatment, and they trusted more the institution that was costlier. Albeit free and public institutions exist, participants in this research do not perceive healthcare as a right but rather a luxury for which one needs to pay.

Like other public administration services, healthcare institutions are also afflicted by the phenomenon of corruption: a large pool of interviewees said that when accessing treatments in private healthcare they either experienced corruption directly or they observed it.

"Receiving health services depends on people's connections and money."[28]

Interviewees also noted that those with the least financial resources are the most exposed to corruption within healthcare services. The distrust in the public sector brings those with the least income,

28   Interview with B., attendant in a catering company. Casablanca, October 2019.

who sometimes need to travel long distances to access healthcare infrastructures, to the conclusion that it is better to pay someone than not receiving a treatment they need.

Graph21: Relation between the perception of corruption and trust in public healthcare

The chart correlating the perception of corruption in Morocco and the trust in the public healthcare system shows that between 77% and 78% of respondents that do not trust public healthcare institutions also believe that corruption is either prevalent or highly prevalent. This sustains the observation on the relation between the perception of corruption and the trust in healthcare systems – the public one in particular. Corruption often represents the last resort of the underprivileged to be sure they receive the minimum assistance from the healthcare sector.

On a final note, interviewees often mentioned the lack of good public policies on education and healthcare as a central reason for the lack of trust in the Parliament. There is a general belief that the negative performance of these sectors is related to the failure of MPs (and to the Parliament in general) in dealing with the issues of education and healthcare. None of the respondents blamed the local municipality for a non–working, or non–efficient hospital or school, as **communes**

are mostly concerned with issues such as the management of roads, electricity and local facilities. This contributes to the establishment of a link between the quality of the education and healthcare on one hand, and the performance of the ruling government coalition on the other.

Security apparatus

This section will discuss the findings related to the institutions belonging to the security apparatus, namely the army and police forces. These two institutions reported the highest level of confidence, with the army being the most trusted institution and the police the second–most trusted institution.

The army had an outstanding level of confidence, ranging from the trust of 87% of respondents aged 18–29 and the trust of the 92% of the respondents aged 40–49. Likewise, the high level of trust in police forces are distributed between 77% of the respondents aged 18–29 and 88% of the respondents aged 40–49.

An interesting remark is that none of the respondents discussed their perceptions of the army or mentioned 'positively or negatively' the role of army. This may be attributed to the fact that the civil–military relations in Morocco are well defined with the armed forces being kept far away from the citizens' day–to–day activities. This lack of daily encounter makes citizens indecisive about this institution and hence wary of having a definite opinion about it.

However, the situation is different when it comes to the police, which is an institution that has direct and daily interactions with citizens. Some respondents claimed that the police could be trusted because generally they do not come from the elites of the country. Coming from a popular and/or underprivileged background has been related to the capacity of the police to represent people's interests. Plus, they are recognised as an important and trustworthy institution due to their role in the safeguard of the interest of the country at the state level. However, some respondents claimed that the police were likely to push

a person away if he/she turns to them for a personal issue (such as robbery, minor crimes, etc.).

The geographical distribution of trust in security apparatus institutions also provides interesting insights. The lowest levels of confidence have been recorded in the Atlantic region, where 76% of the respondents trust the police and 84% of respondents trust the army. Differently, the highest levels of trust are reported in the North, where 87% of respondents have confidence in the police and 94% of respondents have confidence in the army, and in the South, where 83% of respondents have confidence in the police and 92% of respondents have confidence in the army. The two following graphs show this distribution:

Graph22: Trust in armed forces divided by Morocco's regions

Graph23: Trust in police forces divided by Morocco's regions

For instance, in Marrakech most respondents had a positive view of the police, in terms of both performance and efficiency: they said police officers were clearly present, especially in touristic sites, and had a prompt reaction when an issue arises. People praised the police in a way that showed pride in having a security force so present, so ubiquitous and on standby when in need. On the contrary, the interviewees in Casablanca stated that they did not feel that police forces were close to the citizens at all, and that sometimes police do not even respond to emergency calls.

From a gender perspective, there is a slight difference between the level of confidence of women and men towards the institutions of the security apparatus. Particularly, the army is trusted by 90% of female respondents and by 88% of male respondents, while police forces are trusted by 83% of female respondents and 78% of male respondents.

Even if police forces reported a very high level of confidence, some of the interviewees did mention some of the main issues that undermine trust in the police. In this regard some respondents mentioned nepotism, as they expressed displeasure with the fact that some people are able

to leverage their social status in order to avoid a bad situation with the police.

> "The police are not completely enforcing their own laws. Especially with people who can leverage them out of situations"[29]

Some others mentioned that the police do not treat people fairly, and sometimes they act in an oppressive way.

However, the main issue that affected respondents' trust in police forces is related to corruption. Specifically, respondents recognized that police forces may be prone to be influenced by money and that those who have an absolute trust in police are the ones that have money, power and/or the right connections. The graphs that show the distribution of trust in police forces depending on the income further sustain this point:

Graph24: Trust in police depending on average monthly household income

Those with the highest income showed the highest level of trust in the police. In this matter, it has to be noted that no respondent with an income above 30.000 dirhams per month completely distrusts the police. Moreover, the segment of respondents with a monthly income

29   Interview with M, works in a sewing laboratory. Casablanca, October 2019.

between 8.001 and 15.000 dirhams is the one that reported the least trust in police forces — with only 73% of respondents who trust the police. People with a medium–high income, may be the most exposed to the discretionary power that is sometimes exercised by the police. They may be the ones who most frequently observe, directly or indirectly, episodes of corruption of police forces. Inversely, the segment of the respondents with a monthly income below 3.000 dirhams showed relatively high confidence in the police — with 82% of respondents who trusts police forces. This may be related to the fact that this segment of respondent's experiences corruption less often, since these people do not have the income that may influence police's behavior. Moreover, this may be related to the fact that becoming part of police forces (as well as of the army) is often perceived as a social elevator from this sector of Moroccan society: joining the police (or the army) would entail both economic stability as well as amelioration of the reputation of the family, resulting in increased overall respect.

In sum, citizens trust police forces based on the fact that police officers themselves are not privileged or rich: they represent a popular segment of the population, having the same grievances, and burdened with the inability to refuse orders when requested. Plus, police forces, as a whole, are not perceived as a corrupt institution, but rather, corruption depends on police officers (as individuals) that one encounters. This creates a particularly nuanced picture of the institution, in which police forces manage to maintain high levels of trust in spite of negative personal encounters with members of the force. This particular assessment of police forces is also clear when looking at the correlation between the perception of the prevalence of corruption and the trust that respondents demonstrated for police forces.

Graph25: Perception of corruption and trust in police forces

Legend:
- I trust completely
- I trust somehow
- I don't trust
- I don't trust at all

	Highly prevalent	Prevalent	Not prevalent	Not prevalent at all
I trust completely	24,90%	32,63%	46,40%	50,00%
I trust somehow	50,83%	50,30%	37,11%	37,50%
I don't trust	18,88%	14,97%	14,43%	6,25%
I don't trust at all	5,39%	2,10%	2,06%	6,25%

Indeed, trust in police forces seems to be only partially influenced by the perception of corruption, reporting very good results with rates of trust between 76% and 87%. An interesting signal is given by looking at the column showing the level of trust in the police by respondents who believe that corruption is highly prevalent: this segment reports the least absolute trust in police and, at the same time, the highest levels of general trust in police forces. Even those who believe that corruption is a pervasive issue, and accordingly showed low rates of complete trust in the police, still maintain a general confidence in this security apparatus.

Last but not least, one of the interviewees also made a clear differentiation between the work of police forces at the national level and their work for citizens' security. If this person claimed that at the level of the citizens police officers are less active (and more exposed to the issues —outlined above, especially corruption), then police forces are perceived as being highly professional in their work for state security; especially through the interventions against the spread of terrorism, which is granted high visibility in mainstream media. Police forces display very good performances and give the impression that they are actively working for the security of Moroccan society as a whole. The police were seen as one of the best performing institutions, because

they are visible to people, they are actively pursuing terrorists, and they are the ring that keeps the society held together in some way, yet when it comes to daily confrontation with people, individual police agents are not always perceived as positive.

Trust in Mediators

In this section, we will discuss the results of MIPA's research concerning trust in a very specific category of Morocco's society: mediators. The research conducted by MIPA for the Trust Index also included civil society organizations (CSOs) and labor unions as a part of this analysis. The role of both CSOs and labor unions has consistently evolved over time, but their actions as institutions working in the space "in between" state and society are still of importance in Morocco. In the following sections we will look at the way in which these mediator institutions are trusted by Moroccans.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Before engaging in the analysis of the trust in CSOs, it is important to remember that the civil society environment in morocco is composed of a wide variety of actors. Indeed, the definition of civil society actors has the effect of including and/or excluding a series of actors — ultimately influencing our perception of this part of the society. Therefore, in the assessment of the trust of Moroccans in CSOs we have to remember that these institutions are extremely diversified.

A general remark is that CSOs are relatively trusted by the respondents to MIPA's survey, with an average of 52.5% of answers that indicated trust in CSOs.

Graph26: Trust in CSOs depending on the age

The different age groups of the respondents also reported quite similar levels of trust, with small variations between the respondents aged between 40–49, of which 65% trust CSOs, and the respondents aged between 30–39, of which only 57% trust CSOs. The age group that is most suspicious about the role of CSOs in society is the youth, reporting only 13% of absolute trust in CSOs. Since the same group also reported the highest level of general trust in CSOs (46% of respondents between 18–29 said they "somehow trust" CSOs), we could assume that the youth have an overall positive view of civil society organizations but, at the same time, are aware that the environment is highly diversified and not all CSOs can be trusted completely.

The participants in the interviews identified the direct and personal contact with a CSO as the main variable that could influence both the trust and the distrust in these institutions. On one hand, some interviewees reported that their trust in CSOs is due to their work for the population, whether due to their general philanthropic or in some specific instances (such as in healthcare).

"CSOs are trustworthy, they give you the information, they are honest andhelpful"[30]

Some of the respondents said that they could probably trust a CSO if they had to deal with them. On the other hand, negative personal experiences resulted in the absolute distrust in such institutions. Only one of the interviewees said that some organizations are serious and aim at making an impact on society, but the majority does not pursue such objective.

A quite widespread idea is that CSOs are not to be trusted because they do not always follow a non-profit logic. Indeed, a recurrent reason for distrust in these institutions was the manner they manage finances. When CSOs are perceived to work for financial profit rather than social benefit, citizens tend to trust them less. Furthermore, a perceived lack of transparency in the management of funds from donors was also mentioned as a reason for the great distrust in NGOs.

Another interesting element is the distribution of trust in CSOs by the geographical dimension. Indeed, there are almost no differences in the way respondents from rural and urban areas said they trust CSOs.

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30   Interview with R., Sales representative, Marrakech, October 2019.

Graph27: Trust in CSOs divided in rural and urban municipalities

As showed in the graph above, both the percentages of respondents that trust and distrust CSOs are very similar. One would expect a variation since both the typology of actors and the work that CSOs do in rural and urban areas vary greatly. However, the fact that these variables do not seem to influence the trust in CSOs supports the conclusion that levels of trust in these institutions depend primarily on the actual encounters between citizens and CSOs, rather than on the type of actor or of their work.

From a gender perspective, the difference in the levels of trust attributed to CSOs by male and female respondents is not substantial. However, the difference of 12 points between the trust of females and males in CSOs (66% for female and 54% for males) has been one of the highest recorded in MIPA's study. This may be due to the numerous CSOs that devote their work to the improvement of women's livelihoods, from the perspective of economic empowerment, increasing access to health services, and/or fighting gender–based violence and discrimination.

Labor Unions

While CSOs are relatively perceived as trustworthy, the case is different for labor unions. One of the main observations is that interviewees expressed their lack of knowledge of the work of syndicates. They knew that their main goal was somehow to represent workers' rights, but many respondents felt that the action of labor unions in favor of workers was replaced by their seizure for personal benefits of union representatives.

> "They only care about their interests"[31]

When labor unions were distrusted, they were described as a nepotistic club serving its own interests or the interests of the people ascribed to it, rather than the general population.

Nonetheless, one of the interviewees mentioned that syndicates still play a key role in defending workers' rights, and organizing concrete activities like protests or boycotts. This has been mentioned as a reason why labor unions are more trustworthy than civil society organizations. Plus, the fact that labor unions are elected institutions also represents a positive element to build trust in them. Voting for syndicates reflects the trust that people have in them as an institution, as it was highlighted by one of the interviewees. Others did mention that they trusted them in comparison to other institutions, as they still felt they represent the workers and people. For these people, syndicates were always ranked in the top 3 or top 4 of institutions they trusted.

If the trust in labor union is quite low across all ages, we can nevertheless note some important traits. The respondents with lower trust in syndicates are the respondents aged between 18–29, of which only 28% trust labor unions, and the respondents aged between 30–39, of which only 27% trust these institutions. Such low levels of trust may be explained by the fact that the younger generation did not directly experience the time in which labor unions were key player for workers' rights. Plus, labor unions hardly adapted to the current evolutions in

31   Interview with Y. Marrakech, October 2019.

the job market and the new economies (such as the gig economy), and thus these institutions did not play a key role in safeguarding these generations of workers. This may be corroborated by the fact that the older generations trust syndicates more, with 34% of the respondents aged between 40–49 and 32% of the respondents aged above 50. Indeed, these generations directly experienced the great struggles for workers' rights and the tangible improvements in the conditions of the working classes. On top of trusting syndicates more than the youth do, older segments of the population were also more aware of their prerogatives. Their relatively higher trust may stem from these experiences.

From a gender perspective, there are almost no differences in terms of trust in labor unions; they were trusted by 31% of female respondents and by 29% of male respondents. However, we are not in the position to draw conclusions about such difference.

However, the distribution of trust depending on the average household income also provides a clear picture of the situation:

Graph28: Trust in labour unions depending on average monthly household income

The two segments that trust syndicates the least are the ones that report the lower incomes. Namely, only 26% of those with a monthly income below 3.000 and only 25% of those with a monthly income between 3.000– and 8.000–dirhams trust syndicates. These segments represent the most vulnerable parts of the workers, the ones that are supposed to be at the center of the work of the syndicates. Thus, the fact that they showed the least trust to the syndicates sends an important signal to these institutions.

Trust in elected institutions

As presented in the beginning of this chapter, the main difference between elected and non–elected institutions lies in the way in which these institutions can be held accountable. Indeed, distrust in elected institutions can be directly sanctioned through electoral processes. Changes in voting trends, and perhaps more importantly disaffection and abstention from participation in elections, are in this respect important signals that the citizens can send to their elected institutions to show them that their trust in them is deteriorating.

In general, Moroccans feel a great deal of distrust in elected institutions.

> "The Parliament, the government and political parties, no one trusts them"[32]

Two main issues have been highlighted throughout the survey conducted by MIPA. The first one is the issue of representation, since elected institutions are perceived as if they lack the ability to effectively represent the interests of the trustees. Second, there is the issue of knowledge. Indeed, the limited knowledge of the roles and functions of elected institutions, as well as of the wider context in which these institutions operate, fail to provide a concrete framework for citizens to

32   Interview with Z., Marrakech, October 2019.

effectively assess the performances and the shortcomings of elected institutions.

Concretely, these issues translated into very low levels of trust in the elected institutions, which will be discussed in the following pages. Specifically, about 69% of the respondents said they did not trust political parties, and only 23% of respondents have confidence in their government. Ranking among the least trusted institutions in this study, the trust in these institutions will be thoroughly explored in the following sections.

Government

Trust in government is amongst the lowest from all the surveyed institutions. It is acutely distrusted amongst the youngest segment of the survey with only 23% of respondents showing confidence in their government. Even if the difference is not significant, the 40–49 age cohort reports a slightly higher level of trust in the government, with 30% of the respondents reporting trust in this institution. From a gender perspective, there is once again a slight difference in the trust of men and women in the government. Specifically, 28% of female respondents and 22% of male respondents affirmed that they trust the government.

Generally speaking, the distrust in the government has often been related to the perceived lack of action to solve the most pressing issues of the country. This element is clear when looking at the correlation between the satisfaction of the general direction of the country and the trust in the government. As the main executive body of the country, it is particularly interesting to note that the distrust in the government is higher among respondents who are either not satisfied (75%) or not satisfied at all – where distrust reaches a staggering 91%.

Graph29: Trust in Government and satisfaction of the direction
of the country

Amongst the respondents of MIPA's survey, there does not seem to be a significant difference between the ways in which the inhabitants of the different regions trust the government. With an average of 27% of respondents that trust either partially or completely the government in the North, Centre and South, the only region that stands out is the Atlantic — where levels of trust in the government only reach 21%. However, the respondents of MIPA's survey coming from rural areas have showed significantly less trust in the government (22%) in comparison to the respondents coming from urban areas (32%). This difference of 10 points may be attributed to the fact that in rural areas the actions of the government (development of infrastructures, fight against marginalization and the implementation of economic projects) are seen as even less effective, thereby enhancing the perception of the government as a trustworthy institution.

Ultimately, the trust in the government is also strictly correlated with the satisfaction with the government's efforts to fight corruption.

Graph30: Trust in Government by satisfaction with efforts to fight corruption

Among the respondents who believed that the government's efforts to fight corruption are satisfying at a large extent, the levels of trust in government reached 76% — with an impressive share of absolute trust of 41%, Unsurprisingly, among the respondents that deem that the government's efforts to fight corruption are far from being satisfying, the high levels of trust are the least possible — as trust in those efforts is hardly reaching 10%. This result implies that concrete action to tackle corruption may have a substantial impact in the trust in government.

Finally, we could draw some further observation from the relation between the trust in the government and the declared intentions to vote in next elections.

> "The people have lost faith in the government and the upcoming elections will prove that."[33]

Even if the formation of the government is not a direct result of elections, voting is seen as a mechanism to hold the government accountable — as it stems from the political party, or the coalition of party, that is able to ensure a majority in the houses of the Parliament.

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33   Interview with A., attendant in a catering company. Casablanca, October 2019.

Graph31: Intention to vote in next elections and trust in Government

The relationship between the trust in the government and voting intentions shows that lack of trust in the government is related to a broad disaffection for electoral participation. Therefore, it appears clear that ameliorating the trust in the government will also have a substantial effect on voter turnout.

Given the tight relationship between the government and political parties, further considerations on the trust in this institution may be extrapolated by the analysis of trust in political parties.

Political parties

Trust in political parties is amongst the lowest levels of trust throughout the Trust Index survey with an average of 22%. The general perception is that political parties are concerned mainly with the accumulation of power and financial resources rather than the representation of the population. For instance, the interviewees felt that political parties are prone to nominate people that can contribute financially to political campaigns instead of candidates that have better levels of education. The impression of parties not choosing the candidates based on their

performance, capabilities and honesty ultimately perpetuates the perception of low quality of the MPs in the Parliament.

Youth in particular express a distressing level of distrust in political parties: 81% of the respondents do not trust political parties, of which there is a worrying 42% that do not trust them at all. The percentage of youth who have a complete trust for political parties is lower than 1%. The highest levels of trust in an overall distrustful population is shown by the 40–49 age cohort and those above 50, which have reached a maximum of 30% of respondents that said they either trusted somewhat or completely the political parties. We can perhaps attribute the higher level of trust amongst this segment to the time when political parties in Morocco had higher standing, more credibility and substantial influence. The lower levels of trust as you go down in age also support the idea that the perception of political parties has progressively waned. Indeed, the population above 50 is the only segment that had 6% of respondents saying they completely trusted political parties, thereby substantiating the importance and relevance of political parties to this age cohort.

The distribution of trust in political parties by gender is once again very similar, with women trusting political parties a little more than men. Female respondents reported a rate of 27% of trust in political parties, while only 22% of male respondents reported trust in such institution.

Graph32: Following politics and trust in political parties

There appears to be a relationship between the extent to which citizens follow politics and the trust they allocate to political parties. Higher levels of trust are not necessarily associated with a seldom follow–up of politics, but they seem to be related with a thorough update with the political life of the country. Indeed, 48% of the respondents who follow politics assiduously also trust political parties. If it is unsurprising that the respondents who either do not follow or do not follow politics at all showed lower levels of trust (between 22% and 26%), the fact that "only" 27% of respondents who follow politics and somehow showed trust in political parties, raises further questions. This result may be related to the fact that close attention to politics also entails a greater exposure to the negative image with which political parties are portrayed – which is nurtured by the many issues of party politics in Morocco. Through the amplification of both positive and negative features and behaviours of party politics, an increased knowledge and awareness about politics have the potential to bolster both trust and distrust in political parties. Ultimately, the effect on increased awareness will depend on the performance of political parties themselves.

Furthermore, corruption and fraud in elections are also recurrent elements that lead to the discrediting of political parties in the eyes

of the interviewees. Corruption is almost perceived as an endemic trait, which is also a key feature of new political parties — since their inception, perhaps solely on the basis of being a political party. Political parties were also perceived to increase nepotism and favoritism, and that parliament was mainly constituted of the same political families. The correlation between the perception of corruption and trust in political parties provided by survey data clearly sustains the observations of the interviewees: it shows that the highest level of trust can be found amongst those respondents who do not believe corruption is a problem, whilst those respondents with the lowest levels of trust have the opposite perception in respect to the prevalence of corruption in Morocco.

Graph33: Perception of corruption and trust in political parties

Concerning the levels of trust in relation to the average household income, we observed a clear correlation between the level of income and the trust that is allocated to political parties. The highest levels of trust come from the wealthiest respondents, reaching a 43% of trust by the respondents with a monthly income above 30.000 dirhams. Unsurprisingly, the least levels of trust come from those with the lowest income, ranging between 22% (monthly income between 3.000 and 8.000 dirhams) and 24% (monthly income below 3.000 dirhams).

Furthermore, interviews demonstrated that there is a widespread perception that political parties are exploiting the underprivileged for their own electoral benefits: the success in elections is attributed to the votes from the lowest strata of society. This part of the population is in dire need of more resources and better access to services, and the impression one gets is that they — as well as their grievances — are exploited by political parties to gain votes. The other aspect of this issue is that underprivileged categories of society are unaware of the consequences of their vote, because of their lack of education and awareness, and the consequent lack of interest in the medium and long–term repercussions of their vote.

A small number of interviewees expressed the idea that the Justice and Development Party (PJD) had their trust at first, but then lost it because of the non–advancement of issues in the country. As the education and healthcare sectors became more privatized and things overall in the country went in the wrong direction, the party had lost their trust.

" I am the kind of person who takes part in elections even if sometimes I can be busy or my time is short, I find time to vote. Last time I asked women in a popular area about the party they voted for, and they told me they voted for the PJD. I asked why? And one of them told me: we tried all of them and we want to try this party and give them a chance to see what they can do. It was the only party that we trusted, but in the end, they were actually the worst. Today, trust is absent. In the next elections, I will vote but not for the PJD. I will vote for any other party; I have no preference anymore »[34].

Even those who have not participated in the electoral process felt that when the party was in the opposition, it used to deliver convincing speeches and arguments, but once in power it sought the self–interest of its own MPs and party, and started disregarding the actual needs of the people who voted for them. For some interviewees, a major source of distrust was that they believed that religion had been used to achieve political gains. It has been noted that trust in these people used

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34   Interview, Y, Businesswoman, Casablanca, October 2019.

to be higher than it is now. There is the idea that time contributed to the decline of trust in the political party, the opposition, or the MPs, because time revealed the lack of initiative, and policies that were detrimental for the country.

Participation and political trust

The survey data also collected some information regarding the tendencies of political participation of the respondents, that provide both relevant insights for the study of trust and other general elements that help understand how political participation is configured in Morocco.

We can start by noticing that levels of participation are overall quite low. The economic boycott has resulted in the most used form of participation in our survey (58% of respondents), followed by voting in elections (38% of respondents), the participation in a protest or sit-in (36% of respondents), and in the last three positions there are the electoral boycott (27% of respondents), participating in online activism (17% of respondents), and finally signing a petition (13% of respondents).

Graph34: Forms of political participation

Plus, the different modes of participation of respondents vary greatly depending on the age of the respondents.

Graph35: Modes of participation depending on the age

The youth privileged either the resort to forms of boycott (both electoral and economic) or the engagement in online activism to express their political views. They also scored the lowest rate of participation in election, showing great disaffection for the participation in the so–called "formal politics". Nonetheless, it appears clear that Moroccan youth is politically active and participates in different arenas of political engagement. Furthermore, we can observe that the respondents aged between 40–49 privileged the participation in election, rather than other forms of participation. Notably, they scored the lowest in almost all other forms of participation excluding the economic boycott and online activism. In the latter, unsurprisingly, the least active age segment is the one of the respondents aged over 50. However, this group has reported the highest level of participation in a petition. Due to the very low rate of engagement in online activism, we could further assume that the respondents aged over 50 are the ones that are engaging the most with legal petitions.

The data on participation also showed great differences in terms of gender and depending on whether respondents came from a rural or urban municipality. A general result that emerges from the survey data collected by MIPA is that women tend to participate less often than men.

Graph 36: Gender differences for people who answered "yes" to the question: have you ever participated in one of these?

However, the difference in participation between male and female respondents is also related to the modes of participation. Specifically, we can observe that the greatest differences in participation rates among the respondents appear in the participation in election (12 points difference) and in signing a petition (16 points difference). The fact that women engaged less with institutionalized mechanisms for participation may be related to the increased difficulty for women to participate in the institutional political game, perhaps due to societal issues which render women's access to politics "constantly blocked by ideological, cultural, economic and social factors." [35]

The existence of a quota system for women and youth was known only to 13% of the respondents to MIPA's survey, and the large majority of the respondents who knew about the quota system came from urban

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35 Moha Ennaji, 'Multiculturalism, Gender and Political Participation in Morocco', Diogenes, 57.1 (2010), 46–57 (p. 50), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0392192110374247>.

municipalities (95% against 13%). The quota system has also been thoroughly discussed in the interviews and in the focus groups, which were generally supportive of this system — whether they already knew about it or they were introduced to the concept during the interview.

"If there is no mechanism to force change and integrate women and youth, parliament will be exclusively for older men"[36]

However, such support was diversified. Some interviewees expressed more trust in the youth rather than in women, claiming that women may be focused only on women's rights issues, while the youth is deemed to have a more creative and inclusive vision of change that allows them to transcend classic politics. The interviewees that favored women over youth justified their perspective on the basis of assumption that women work more than man in general. In parallel, the quota system was criticized for two main reasons. On one hand, a group of critics claimed that efficiency and integrity should be the two criteria that grant access to the Parliament, and that they should not be overlooked only because of a person's age or gender. On the other hand, the quota system has sometimes been identified as "restrictive", in the sense that it is considered as a limitation to the representation of women and youth in politics instead of a tool to promote their representation. In one of the focus groups, the quota system has been criticized on the basis that it should only be a temporary mechanism to stimulate a dynamic of inclusion of women and youth and that it should be removed once the presence of these categories in the Parliament was established. To conclude, we can recall that even if the participation of women in formal politics due to the quota system helped raising awareness on the importance of their inclusion in the political arena, "this gendered distribution of tasks and spaces clearly reproduces gendered representations that highlight men's capacity to act in the name of all citizens while denying women's ability to do so."[37]

36   Interview with Y., Businesswoman, Casablanca, October 2019.
37   Yasmine Berriane, 'The Micropolitics of Reform: Gender Quota, Grassroots Associations and the Renewal of Local Elites in Morocco', The Journal of North African Studies, 20.3 (2015), 432–49 (p. 445), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1017815>.

Finally, the distribution between participation in rural and urban municipalities also draws a stark picture of Morocco's reality.

Graph 37: Rural–urban differences for people who answered "yes" to the question: have you ever participated in one of these?

Enormous differences have been noted between the modes and levels of participation of respondents depending on whether they came from a rural or urban municipality. The most significant differences have been found in online activism (78 points of difference) and in the engagement with petitionary initiatives (73 points of difference). If the former may be due to the lack of access to the infrastructure and the resources needed to engage in online activism, the non–participation in petitions may be related either to a limited resort to petitions in rural municipalities, or to the lack of knowledge of this mechanism. Nevertheless, the profound disengagement of rural municipalities should be urgently tackled with actions to close this substantial divide.

Corruption and political trust

Throughout the analysis of different political institutions, we have seen that corruption often represent a key variable in determining the trust – or lack thereof – in a political institution. Corruption is a pervasive

issue in the eyes of Moroccans, and indeed 88% of respondents said that it is either prevalent or highly prevalent in the country. This prompts the need to develop some further considerations on the data on corruption that has been collected during this research.

Graph38: Perception of corruption depending on the age

The perception of corruption in Morocco varies with age. Our research showed that the Moroccan youth believe that there is more corruption in comparison with the older segments of the respondents — reaching a troubling 95% among the respondents aged 18–29 and a lower, but still worrying, 82% among the respondents aged over 50. Albeit being unsettling, these observations are in line with other survey data on corruption in Morocco. For instance, the 2019 Arab Barometer Survey on Morocco also reports high levels of perception of corruption and a similar generational divide.[38]

In addition to the overall very high perception of corruption, respondents to MIPA's survey do not believe that the government is taking serious steps to crack down corruption. Specifically, 80% of respondents are not satisfied with government actions against corruption — and of these respondents the majority (45%) is not satisfied at all. It is worth noticing that the segment of the respondents

38   Arab Barometer, Arab Barometer V – Morocco Country Report, 2019. Op cit.

who are most satisfied with government's efforts to tackle corruption is the one with no formal education.

Graph39: Satisfaction with Government's efforts to fight corruption depending on the level of education

Since the respondents' perception of corruption varied between 85% and 92%, this information does not seem necessarily related to a lack of awareness of the issue of corruption. However, a difference of 15 points with all the other segments may indicate a lack of awareness of what can be done to fight corruption.

Finally, we will look at the way in which corruption has an impact on voting behavior.

Graph40: Participation in last election depending on the perception of corruption

	Yes	No
Highly prevalent	48,90%	53,56%
Prevalent	39,78%	34,24%
Not prevalent	10,50%	10,00%
Not prevalent at all	0,82%	2,20%

Graph41: Intention to vote in next election depending on the perception of corruption

	Yes	No	No opinion
Highly prevalent	44,21%	64,54%	43,60%
Prevalent	43,68%	25,21%	42,18%
Not prevalent	11,32%	8,03%	11,85%
Not prevalent at all	0,79%	2,22%	2,37%

From the data collected by MIPA it became clear that corruption not only affects the way people vote, but has an even greater impact on future voting intentions. As anticipated above, this implies that concrete action to tackle corruption could substantially increase voter turnout.

Conclusion

The most evident consideration on political trust is that non–elected institutions are more trusted than elected ones. This may be due to different elements, like the fact that some non–elected institutions are trusted by respondents because it seems that they do not have another choice, or the fact that some institutions manage to maintain an overall positive image despite some negative behaviours of their agents. It may also be possible that elected institutions entered a vicious circle in which the decline in trust worsens their effectiveness, which in turn further deteriorates the levels of trust in them.

For each institution, we outlined the differences in how trust was allocated in terms of gender. The differences specific to each institution have been limited, as the trust was distributed quite evenly amongst genders varying only of few points. However, the small and constant higher level of female respondents' trust in political institutions may indicate an interesting insight for future analyses. Women are generally less represented by such institutions, and the apparent paradox of their increased trust definitely deserves more research. Discussions over the quota system, and particularly the ones around systemic limitations of women's role in Moroccan politics, may serve as a first direction for future research on the topic. Nonetheless, the gender divide in the strategies of political participation calls for more attention to the reasons why women tend to resort less to institutional mechanisms rather than informal ones.

A clear element is that inequalities in income influence levels of trust substantially. In almost all the institutions that have been surveyed, the wealthiest categories of Moroccan society demonstrated higher levels of trust. The only differences can be found in the service providers, as the respondents with higher income showed a great distrust of public institutions, in favour of an exclusive trust for the private sector. Relying on the possibility of accessing the private sector granted by their income, the wealthiest segments of Moroccan society are aware of the declining quality of public service providers and this has been

proven by the lowest levels of trust. Always in the realm of service providers, the respondents with a middle range income often showed a lower level of trust and that has been attributed to the fact that their expectations for the quality of private services is betrayed by the fact that their income does not allow them to access the best services. Specifically, the segment of respondents with an average household income between 8.001 and 15.000 dirhams scored the least levels of trust in all the surveyed political institutions. The great distrust that Morocco's middle-class shows for its political institutions calls for greater attention to the underlying causes of this distrust. This shows that income inequalities are a determining influence of trust between, but also within, private and public sector. Access to education and healthcare is broadly considered a privilege rather than a right.

Corruption is, unfortunately, a keyword when discussing political institutions. It is troubling that practices of corruption, in different forms, have been noted by the respondents in all the surveyed institutions. Corruption has a direct effect on trust, undermining the relationship between citizens and institutions. However, such relation has been stronger in elected rather than in non-elected institutions. In non-elected institutions, and especially in police forces and the justice system, corrupted behaviours of agents had a limited impact on the institution as a whole — to which trust has often been understood as an **obligation**. Differently, in elected institutions, corruption is perceived as a pervasive element that undeniably affects the quality of all agents within them. For instance, positive behaviours by a party (or any of its members) are understood as exceptions rather than a rule, and they hardly entail an improvement of the overall perception of corruption within the institution of political parties. Due to the recognized importance of public administration in providing essential services to citizens, corruption in these institutions is a key issue to be tackled in order to raise trust in them.

In the next chapter, we will complement the analysis of political institutions with a thematic in-depth analysis of the trust in the Parliament.

Chapter III : Trust in Parliament

Results snapshot:

- The Parliament is perceived as a rent–based institution. This perception is nurtured by both the privileges that benefit MPs while serving their mandate and by the entitlements for their retirement, outstandingly eroding trust in Parliament.
- Trust in Parliament is positively correlated with the level of knowledge of its prerogatives, even if some respondents remain wary of trusting the Parliament due to the low levels of education of some MPs. This implies that the more people know the role of the Parliament, the more they are likely to trust it.
- The inadequate performance in the sectors of healthcare and education are the central elements that nurture the perception of the Parliament as a non–functioning institution.
- The absence of tangible evidence to judge the performance of MPs, together with the lack of responsive instruments to hold them accountable, are pivotal reasons for increasing the distance between citizens and the Parliament.
- Communication activities limited to electoral campaigns play a significant role in deteriorating the trust in MPs and the Parliament, while social media principally disseminates detrimental information that further increases distrust.
- MPs admit the negative perceptions of the parliament, but they interpret the latter's weakness as a result of the non–cooperation of the government, the lack of appropriate human and financial resources available to them and the negative 'buzz' on social media.

Introduction

This section of the report comprehensively discusses the particular features of the trust — and the distrust — of Moroccans in an institution which is central for the functioning of the democratic life of a country: The Parliament. The choice to target the Parliament in particular is due to multiple considerations, related to the institution itself and to the way in which it is situated in the political system in Morocco. In theory, the Parliament is a fundamental representative institution in a country: Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected by citizens in order to represent them and voice their grievances at the legislative level. The fact that individuals believe that they are represented in the Parliament is positively correlated with their trust in the institutions,[39] and thus low levels of confidence may be related to the fact that citizens do not feel that they have a voice in the political life of the country.

When looking at the case of Morocco, the Parliament has been one of the least trusted institutions — both in the qualitative exploration and the quantitative survey. It is perceived as a non–functioning institution, in which MPs do not have a clear agenda and cannot be held accountable by the citizenry. In order to assess the multiple reasons

39 Kris Dunn, 'Voice, Representation and Trust in Parliament', Acta Politica, 50.2 (2015), 171–92 <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2014.15>.voice is provided to the citizenry via political representation. In this article, I apply the procedural jus–tice argument to trust in parliament, equating representation with voice: if individuals believe they are represented in parliament, they will trust par–liament more than if they believe otherwise. Analyses of data from three of four countries find support for this argument: those individuals who believe that a party with at least one seat in parliament represents their views trust parliament more than those who do not. This relationship holds even when accounting for political self–interest. For those who wish to promote trust in parliament, a suggested normative good with a host of politically import–ant consequences, one potential pathway is to facilitate individuals' belief that there is a party in parliament that represents them.»,»author»:[{«–dropping–particle»:»»,»family»:»Dunn»,»given»:»Kris»,»non–dropping–par–ticle»:»»,»parse–names»:false,»suffix»:»»}],»container–title»:»Acta   Politi–ca»,»id»:»ITEM–1»,»issue»:»2»,»issued»:{«date–parts»:[[«2015»]]},»page»:»171–192»,»title»:»Voice, representation and trust in parliament»,»type»:»ar–ticle–journal»,»volume»:»50»},»uris»:[«http://www.mendeley.com/docu–ments/?uuid=679dbefb–90d0–47d9–9889–2c5a07e53687»]}],»mende–ley»:{«formattedCitation»:»Kris Dunn, 'Voice, Representation and Trust in Parliament', <i>Acta Politica</i>, 50.2 (2015

that ground such low levels of trust, we will rely on four categories: trustworthiness, capability, performance and communication. These analytical categories guided our exploration of the data collected during the research, serving as a pathway to study the allocation and withdrawal of trust in the Parliament.

Furthermore, two sub–themes have emerged from our analysis. On one hand, the lack of civic education, specifically the lack of knowledge of the actual role of the parliament and the scope of its work that has been identified as a major reason for the distrust in the Parliament. On the other, despite the short surge in trust in early 2011, there is an increasing suspicion towards the Parliament in the recent years. This is attributed to the unfulfilled promises by the political class, including the Justice and Development Party, as several citizens expressed the feeling of having been betrayed by the non–delivery of promises made during electoral campaigns.

The chart below shows some major concerns about the Moroccan Parliament, which have been translated into particularly low levels of trust.

Graph42: Trust in Parliament depending on age

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50+
I trust completely	6,03%	10,00%	11,80%	10,81%
I trust somehow	24,47%	29,50%	30,43%	25,48%
I don't trust	28,37%	24,50%	27,33%	25,48%
I don't trust at all	41,13%	36,00%	30,43%	38,22%

Graph43: Trust in Parliament depending on gender

The distribution of trust in Parliament by different age groups already provides interesting insights. Mainly, the main result is that two thirds of the surveyed population do not trust the Parliament (64% either do not somehow or completely trust the Parliament). If it is quite low on average, there are some differences in the trust in Parliament between the ages. Similarly, to the considerations regarding political parties, youth seem to trust Parliament the least. Indeed, only 31% of respondents to MIPA's survey aged between 18–29 said they trust the Parliament. This result is in line with the general lack of interest and participation in elections showed by this segment of Moroccan society. Older generations tend to participate more in elections, but their levels of trust in the Parliament also differ. The respondents aged between 30–49 trust the Parliament the most, reaching 40% of trust for the segment 30–39 and 42% of trust for the segment 40–49.

One can also note that women trust the Parliament more than men, with 38% of female respondents who trust it against 34% of male respondents. Since women are less represented in the Parliament compared to men, this may come as a surprise worth exploring in further research.

In the next sections, we will see in detail how each component contributed to such negative result, and we will draw some lessons that could open pathways for the rebuilding of trust in the Parliament. Our results will be presented following the four components that define political trust in an institution: trustworthiness, capabilities, performance and communication; for each component we will explore in–depth some crucial factors that emerged from the qualitative and quantitative research and are determining in influencing the trust in the Parliament.

Trustworthiness

In the next paragraphs, we will explore in detail some of the main issues that impact Moroccans' trustworthiness towards the MPs. Specifically, we will focus on the issues of MPs privileges (retirement and salaries), as well as the perception of the scope of the function and powers of the Parliament.

Trustworthiness is derived from knowledge of the trustee's motivation. In the case of the Parliament, it represents the trust that citizens have in MPs to carry out their functions. In terms of trustworthiness, Moroccans surveyed displayed numerous reservations about the Moroccan Parliament. Predominantly, respondents feel that MPs are either self–interested or driven by the interest of their party. Lack of trustworthiness was described as a reflection of the unwillingness to trust MPs, since respondents have the impression that most of them have neither specifically tailored programs nor an ideological reference that they seek to implement within their circumscription. In turn, this reduces the possibilities of holding them accountable for their negative or absent performance – ultimately eroding trust.

Most interviewed citizens feel that parliamentarians are running for office to gain personal benefits, and not to represent and serve the interest of the people they are deemed to represent. The reason for this negative perception has been identified in the recurrent failure of MPs

to uphold promises made during electoral campaigns, as well as their presence only during the electoral campaigns and their disappearance after the election. Therefore, causing the citizens to feel that they are heard only during the electoral campaign, which further exacerbates the already low levels of trust that citizens have for their MPs. Such loss of credibility is reinforced by the behavior of MPs during parliamentary sessions, where they often appear to be negligent and, in some extreme cases, some of them were seen sleeping during the sessions. This does not only impact the trust in the single politician, but also the credibility of the whole Parliament as an institution.

Another element is that citizens expect MPs to promote their welfare. So, the perceived absence of changes to the livelihoods of the citizens reinforces the idea that MPs do not deliver on the promises made during the electoral campaigns. In fact, some MPs contribute to this image, as during the campaign they make promises that cannot be fulfilled, which in turn makes citizens suspicious about the MPs. The respondents felt that MPs rely on slogans and rhetorical messages without being able to provide the evidence to prove neither their claims nor the supposed changes they brought to communities. This kind of communication in particular is perceived to target directly least–educated voters, who are especially exposed to the practice of exchanging their votes for a financial reward. Indeed, interviewees often felt that MPs did not value citizens, seeing people as mere voters rather than people with needs and aspirations. Furthermore, the lack of trust is deteriorated by the fact that respondents feel that the electoral programs and political agendas of MPs are obscure, poorly articulated, and often voided of any substance.

In some cases, the distrust in the Parliament may be rooted even deeper. One of the interviewees stated that MPs could not be trusted even if they had seen their work directly.[40] Such distrust is so profound that it seems that it cannot be ameliorated even after a positive performance. In this scenario, the limited political participation, and a low voter turnout in particular, are both the cause and the result of the

40   Interview with M, works in a sewing laboratory. Casablanca, October 2019.

lack of trust in the Parliament. The distrust for whoever is in power is nurtured by the feeling that the MPs are not making relevant changes for the average voter. Ultimately, this contributes to the vicious circle in which citizens who did not vote because they distrust the Parliament will not change their mind, and their unwillingness to vote will be further reinforced, due to the perceived poor performance of the Parliament.

Nonetheless, when trust is given to MPs, respondents reported that they trust a specific individual and not an entire party or the institution itself. When citizens vote for a party during the elections, it may be more related to the trust that they have for a candidate, for his or her values and perceived selflessness, rather than the trust for the party as a whole. This validates the assumption that the trust (and distrust) in political parties is strictly correlated with the levels of trust in the Parliament. Furthermore, some of the interviewees said that they can trust the MPs but not the Parliament as an institution, given its history of inefficiency and of political irrelevance in the political system in Morocco.

The trustworthiness of MPs is not only affected by their behavior prior to the election or by their performance in Parliament, but also by the benefits to which they are entitled during and after their mandate. A number of interviewees felt that the salaries of MPs are too high and not in line with the country's financial capacity. In fact, the monthly salary of a member of parliament is around 36000 MAD (around 3300 Euro) and its tax exempt, together with additional benefits, such as per diems or travel expenses and they can use the train for free. These benefits are justified as factors that decrease trust because citizens see that this remuneration is quite excessive and that their role should be carried out as a civic duty and thus not paid as much. The perception of an excessive remuneration reinforces the idea that individuals are running for seats in Parliament predominantly because they want to ensure a good salary. However, it is the benefits to which MPs are entitled at the end of their mandate that represent the main causes for lack of trustworthiness. There is a widespread perception that being a member of parliament is a rent–based occupation, which is sought by individuals not to serve the community, but rather to enjoy the

benefits that come with this position – especially after the end of their mandate.

Indeed, the topic of retirement is recurrent when discussing trust in the Parliament, seemingly being the most pressing issue after the improvement of the performance of the healthcare and education sector. Indeed, almost all of the interviewees showed that this perception of the retirement prospects of MPs was a major reason for the distrust in the Parliament. Until recently, MPs were entitled to a retirement pension after they finish their term. It was based on the number of years served in parliament. For instance, a 25–year–old MP can get a 5000 MAD pension right after she/he finished the term and not until she/he reached 60 years old. This situation has been changed recently because of pressure emanating from the public who heavily criticized this retirement fund but also because the parliament retirement fund was bankrupted as the state could no longer sustain it.

Despite this, it seems that the lack of communication on the side of MPs has created a lot of misconceptions among citizens and damaged the image of the parliament. If the MPs communicated better and took concrete actions to end the rent–based retirement and salaries, levels of trust in Parliament could significantly improve: respondents reported that working to shift their perception of the Parliament as being a rent–based institution, as well as making an adjustment of MPs' privileges namely salaries and pension, would significantly increase their trust in the Parliament.

Capabilities

There is a direct link between capabilities and trust, as the level of trust in the Parliament is related to MPs' perceived capability to cover their roles and carry out their functions.

First and foremost, comprehensive civic education about the Parliament as a democratic institution was quite limited amongst the participants of MIPA's study. Indeed, in terms of capabilities or roles,

most respondents were overall confused as to what is the actual role of the Parliament and the MPs. This confusion related to both the prerogatives of the Parliament in respect to the ones of municipalities, and to the different roles of the two Chambers of the Parliament. Another important element was the absolute lack of knowledge of the roles and functions of parliamentary committees – which do cover a crucial role within the Parliament. Finally, respondents felt that the low levels of education of some MPs substantially affected their capability to engage in their functions.

Nonetheless, if participants were quite disenchanted in terms of the capabilities of the Parliament, they also demonstrated a solid understanding of the relationship – that we could refer to as the social contract – that bounds the Parliament to its citizenry. In the following sections, we will provide more details in relation to the way in which the lack of awareness of the capabilities of the Parliament and the MPs affect trust in the institution overall.

Roles and capabilities of the Parliament

In respect to the role and capabilities of the Parliament as a whole, a number of respondents brought forward the Parliament as the legitimate source for solutions to public issues. They felt that the Parliament was the only organ of the state which was actually capable of bringing into being positive changes and solutions to citizens' problems – due to the fact that it is the direct result of elections.

However, the difference between the various institutions within the Moroccan political system caused confusion. For instance, the composition of the Parliament was quite unclear for some of the respondents, who thought that the presidents of the municipalities and the ministries were also part of the Parliament. Such confusion related also to the two Chambers of the Parliament, as some respondents thought that the House of Representatives and the Parliament were two different institutions. Plus, the different roles of the two chambers

were not understood, people either considered both of them advisory bodies, or that the House of Councilors proposes the laws and the House of Representatives either accepts or refuses those suggestions. Among all of the interviewees, only two said that the Parliament was a legislator and it was mentioned – rightfully, but only in one case – as having power over the government and the capacity to hold it accountable.

Moreover, there appears to be a correlation between realizing the role of the Parliament and the trust allocated to it. Among the respondents of MIPA's survey, there was a substantial difference (16 points) in the levels of trust between those who know the role of the Parliament and the ones who do not, as showed by the graph below.

Graph44: Knowledge about the role of the Parliament and trust in it

Indeed, the central mission of the Parliament was the object of a series of misunderstandings. Some respondents thought that the Parliament had the sole purpose of fixing housing, education and the healthcare sector, whereas some others thought that the Parliament had the objective of "protecting" the nation from illegal migration. Interestingly, another part of the respondents thought that the role of the Parliament is to defend the national interest of the country, including the protection of minorities and all social groups, and to create a better future nation–

wide. These overlapping conceptions of the Parliament within the State created confusion and hindered a proper comprehension of whether the Parliament was actually carrying out its functions.

Another misconception that deteriorates the trust in the Parliament is the idea that it does not possess the means to implement policies and develop solutions to popular issues. Respondents perceive it as an essentially weak and thus useless institution precisely due to their apparent lack of enforcement mechanisms.

As discussed above, people's knowledge of the Parliament was often limited to MPs' role as representatives of the citizenry, with the mission of voicing their concerns and speaking on their behalf. In the discussions, people often referred to MPs' duty as the "power" to talk about people's issues. However, the roles of the MPs and the presidents of the municipalities were often confused, and sometimes even assimilated as the same role.

Furthermore, the interviewees had a broad understanding of the role of the MP, which went beyond the representative function and saw them as mediators. Specifically, they are the ones that are supposed to "deliver the message" (i.e.: present people's claims) to the highest spheres of the State. In this scenario, the lack of trust comes from the fact that MPs do not manage to present people's claims in a proper fashion — if they manage to do so at all. Sometimes, they are seen to pursue a "strategic plan" that does not go beyond the Parliament's walls, while some other times it seems that their role is limited to being members of a party who only serve their interests.

Social contract and institutional limitations

When asked what the role of the Parliament is, most interviewees answered by referring to the representative role of MPs, saying that the Parliament is the place in which citizens' concerns are discussed and solutions to their issues are found. The majority of the interviewees felt that the Parliament is the only really representative institution. However,

in very few instances the interviewees mentioned in concrete the actual functions that the Parliament is supposed to carry out (for instance, to legislate, to follow–up on public policies, to develop parliamentary diplomacy). The data from the qualitative research indicated that, generally, people are aware of the social contract of the Parliament but are less familiar with its actual legal prerogatives. In other words, the respondents demonstrated a very democratic conception of the social and legal relation that binds them to the Parliament, while being less aware of the concrete actions of the institution.

The fact that the social contract binding citizens and Parliament is known, but that the way in which it operates was not, may contribute to the idea that the general understanding of the Parliament that Moroccans have is not due to the observation of the work of the MPs in Morocco, but rather to the fact that Moroccans know that in other countries the Parliament performs such duties. Even if in some cases the interviewees affirmed that they trusted a specific MP because they saw the direct and concrete exercise of their functions (for example, bringing forward issues that concern them on television or in the plenary session), however, these cases remain only an exception.

Overall, citizens have a better idea of the social contract that binds the Parliament to represent them instead of performing its actual duties, functions and prerogatives. As the respondents could not observe whether the Parliament is in the position to properly cover its role and execute its functions, the trust in it as an institution has been further eroded.

Indeed, different interviewees pointed out that the lack of power as a factor contributing to the distrust in Parliament. Such lack of trust is due to the perception that decisions are taken at higher levels of the Government, or even by the Monarchy, and thus the Parliament was devoid of any real power. Starting from this perspective, interviewees felt that they were unable to trust an institution that lacked the means to make a tangible and effective change – a power often seen as exclusive to the Monarchy.

"Parliamentarians do nothing unless the King pressures them. They simply wait for their mandate to end and their salary to be cashed in."[41]

Indeed, the important influence that the monarchy has on the Parliament was largely recognized by the respondents and the issues and legislative proposals that received the Monarch's attention are the absolute priority. Furthermore, some of the interviewees felt that it is the King that enables an efficient Parliament, reaching the point that sometimes MPs await the King's blessing to take action.

Education

One of the reasons that contributes to the citizens' distrust in the Parliament is the perceived low level of education (sometimes seemingly close to illiteracy) of some MPs. Citizens believe that they should not be represented by people who do not have an adequate education, who lack expertise, and therefore are not fit to govern the country or to discuss issues relevant to the citizenry. This perception is based on the fact that around 25% of MPs do not possess a high school diploma and 7% did not complete primary education.[42] Once again, the distrust in some MPs due to the low levels of education is directly translated into lower levels of trust for the Parliament as an institution.

These considerations do not imply that no member of the Parliament has the tools to represent the citizens. However, they demonstrate that the MPs who are educated and have the means to represent the citizenry through legislative work either lack the possibility to present policy or recommendations or they do not have the ability to effectively communicate their work. This implies that better visibility of parliamentary work would considerably improve trust in Parliament.

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41   Interview with M., Accountant, Casablanca, October 2019
42   Mohammed Boudarham and Youssef El Harrak, 'Infographies. Ces Parlementaires Qui n'ont (Même) Pas Le Bac', Le360.Ma, 2019, <https://fr.le360.ma/politique/infographies-ces-parlementaires-qui-nont-meme-pas-le-bac-197017> [accessed 15 June 2020].

We have observed how the confusion and lack of awareness of the overall capabilities of both the MPs and the Parliament as an institution, combined with low levels of education of MPs, remarkably influence citizens' in the Parliament. On top of the capabilities, it is through an appreciation of the actual performances of the Parliament (and of the MPs) that citizens will decide whether to trust the Parliament or not. The plural dynamics interrelating performance and trust will be explored in the next section.

Performance

The section of the performance is particularly relevant for MIPA's study of trust in the Parliament, since the distrust that Moroccans showed towards the Parliament largely emanated from the perception of a negative performance, or even a non-performance, of the Parliament. Generally speaking, we can see that there is a negative correlation between the levels of trust in the Parliament and the satisfaction with the country's direction, as showed by the graph below:

Graph45: Satisfaction with the direction of the country and trust in Parliament

More concretely, the first reaction of interviewees when asked if the Parliament was trusted was constantly related to their perception of the performance of the healthcare and education sectors. The dedicated section above already explained how these two sectors are crucial to determine the trust of Moroccans in political institutions. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of respondents said that the improvement of both the healthcare and education sectors should be the two most prioritized sectors for policy action in the next 10 years. The failures to systematically improve these areas are seen as a reflection of the fact that people's demands are not being met by the work done in the Parliament. The performance of these two sectors served as a sort of barometer of the performance of the Parliament, as if it was the sole responsible institution for the decay or the improvement of the healthcare and education sectors.

On top of these two main indicators, healthcare and education, the performance of the Parliament was also judged because of the overall quality of the economy, the lack of job opportunities, the increasing inequalities in the access of public services.

Graph46: Satisfaction with the current economic situation of the country and trust in Parliament

	Not satisfied at all	Not satisfied	Satisfied somehow	Satisfied at a large extent
I trust completely	2,36%	5,28%	9,91%	27,15%
I trust somehow	4,74%	27,82%	39,29%	38,57%
I don't trust	15,17%	32,04%	31,75%	22,14%
I don't trust at all	77,73%	34,86%	19,05%	12,14%

The assumption that the satisfaction of the current economic situation impacts the trust in the Parliament is also sustained by the graph above. Specifically, among the respondents that are not satisfied at all with the situation, only 7% trust the parliament. Contrarily, among the respondents with a more positive perception of the economic situation we find higher levels of trust, reaching 66% of the respondents that are broadly satisfied with the economic situation. In addition to this, the 2019 Arab Barometer noted that only 30% of Moroccans expect the economic situation to improve in the future, which represents a dramatic inversion of previous years' trends of hope for the economy.[43] It is also important to report that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the respondents with the highest household income were substantially more satisfied with the current economic situation compared to the respondents with the lowest level of income. The fact that 55% of the respondents with an income above 30.000 MAD were satisfied with the current economic situation, compared to only 38% of those with an income below 3.000 MAD points out the attention to the relation between the household income and the trust in the Parliament. Indeed, the graph showing this relation also provides elements for reflection:

Graph47: Trust in Parliament depending on average monthly household income

43   Arab Barometer. Op Cit.

The quantitative data collected by MIPA shows that there are important differences between the different levels of income and the levels of trust in the Parliament. Thus, this corroborates the idea that in Morocco the actual levels of trust are more related to the financial situation of every household — as it has been showed in similar studies on trust elsewhere.[44] Only between 32% and 33% of the respondents

44 Tom van der Meer, 'In What We Trust? A Multi–Level Study into Trust in Parliament as an Evaluation of State Characteristics', International Review of Administrative Sciences, 76.3 (2010), 517—36 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852310372450>.scholars and politicians have been concerned with low or declining levels of trust in political institutions. This article focuses on trust in parliament. Many theories have been offered to explain cross–national differences or longitudinal changes in trust, but they have not been subject to systematic empirical tests. This article aims to fill that theoretical and empirical gap. I conceptualize trust in parliament as citizens? rather rational evaluations of the state?citizen relationship along four dimensions: competence, intrinsic care, accountability, and reliability. Next, I relate state characteristics to each of these four aspects, and hypothesize how they might affect political trust. These hypotheses are tested simultaneously by multi–level analysis on stapled data from the European Social Survey 2002?06. The tests show that three factors explain very well the cross–national differences in trust: corruption, the electoral system, and former regime type. Somewhat surprisingly, economic performance is not related to trust in parliament. Although the analyses do not explain changes in trust across time very well, they at least dismiss some of the existing explanations.Points for practitionersThis article describes to what extent levels of trust in parliament differ across countries and change across time, and tests several explanations for comparatively low or longitudinally declining levels of trust. It offers practitioners a theoretical approach to make sense of trust issues by distinguishing four trust aspects. Moreover, it shows that objective state characteristics are crucial in explaining cross–national differences. Widespread perceptions of corruption are most harmful to trust in parliament, while democratic rule and a proportional electoral system are beneficial. Equally important, actual economic performance is unrelated to trust. Institutional designs that emphasize care and integrity appear to be more beneficial than ones that emphasize competence and performance.»,»author»:[{«dropping–particle»:»»,»family»:»Meer»,»given»:»Tom»,»non–dropping–particle»:»van der»,»parse–names»:false,»suffix»:»»}],»container–title»:»International Review of Administrative Sciences»,»id»:»ITEM–1»,»issue»:»3»,»issued»:{«date–parts»:[[«2010»,»9»,»1»]]},»note»:»doi: 10.1177/0020852310372450»,»page»:»517–536»,»publisher»:»SAGE Publications Ltd»,»title»:»In what we trust? A multi–level study into trust in parliament as an evaluation of state characteristics»,»type»:»article–journal»,»volume»:»76»},»uris»:[«http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=69330073–820e–46ad–9dfe–d7fb0ad21c27»]}],»mendeley»:{«formattedCitation»:»Tom van der Meer, 'In What We Trust? A Multi–Level Study into Trust in Parliament as an Evaluation of State Characteristics', <i>International Review of Administrative Sciences</i>, 76.3 [2010

with a monthly income up to 8,000 dirhams trust the Parliament, compared to 49% of the respondents with a monthly income between 15,001 and 30,000 dirhams, and 46% of the respondents with a monthly income above 30,000 dirhams that trust the Parliament. Even if the overall state of the economy is used as an indicator to decide whether to trust the Parliament or not, the strong income inequalities still affect concretely the levels of trust in the Parliament.

As reported in the previous section, the trust in Morocco's Parliament is being deteriorated by its perceived lack of potential to bring about change. The majority of the interviewees made it clear that they would trust the parliament if it could be effective in carrying out its duties, but unfortunately that is not the case. Five of them reached the point of affirming that the Parliament was an overall useless institution. The general perception is that even if complaints are made, things do not change through the work of the Parliament. For instance, even when MPs do present their queries to the relevant ministers, respondents felt that parliamentary interrogations are not taken into consideration by ministries. This was due to both the short period of time allocated to present parliamentary questions, and the lack of transparency in the follow–up of a question raised by a MP. This example proves the fact that even if citizens might manage to voice their concerns through the questions asked by MPs, they do not have the tools to follow–up on the procedure, actions and even less on the concrete policy solutions that may (or may not) have been taken to address the issue at stake. Moreover, citizens' lack of knowledge of the MPs performance was also strictly related to the fact that the information to measure MPs' performance are extremely scarce, and often inexistent. This sort of opaqueness, coupled with inadequate performances, increases distrust in the effectiveness of the institution.

In the next paragraphs, we will explore in detail some of the main issues that impact the perceived performance of the Parliament and their relationship with increased or decreased trust in this institution. Specifically, we will look at the confusion of roles (of both the MPs and

the two Chambers), the lack of means to assess their performance, and accountability issues.

Confusion of roles

As highlighted in the section on capabilities, Moroccans tend to confuse the roles of the various institutions and of their members. Moreover, the understanding of the role of the MPs has been identified as a major factor that affects the way in which citizens measure their performance. Sometimes, interviewees felt that they could not judge the performance of a MP because they did not know what an MP is supposed to do. Some other interviewees thought that Ministers were part of the Parliament, since they are part of televised debates and sit in the chamber during the plenary session. Further, the majority of the interviewees thought that the MPs were supposed to deal with issues that actually belong to the competencies of the municipalities (for instance, fixing roads, electrification and dealing with insects and/or animals).

The lack of action to resolve proximity issues further deteriorated the perceived performance of MPs as interviewees felt that, when local problems are solved, it is thanks to the work of the municipality. Overall, most citizens felt that the municipality (and its president) were closer to people's needs, more reachable and more effective in carrying out their functions. Similarly, local administrations (the mouqataa and mqadem in particular) were given the same attributes, as being closer and more in line with what people need or want, and more effective in serving citizens in general. The simple idea that the municipality is a building that people could access, in order to voice their concerns, and even offer them the possibility of meeting and talking to the president of the municipality, substantially contributed to the trust in municipalities.

Another central finding of this study is that respondents did not have a clear understanding of the role of the House of Representatives, and they were completely unaware of the role of the House of Councilors.

Only the focus group with elected officials had some knowledge of the prerogatives/competencies of the House of Councilors. If research participants had some information that could base their judgment of the performance of the first chamber, the second chamber was a complete mystery to most respondents — who were neither aware of its role nor of the way in which the members of the House of Councilors were elected. Both chambers are perceived as rent-based institutions, but the fact that the second chamber does not receive the same media attention, its members and its electoral process are not well known, and its prerogatives are not clear (if known at all), contributes to producing an even worse image of the House of Councilors. Due to the impression given by its name, a substantial part of the interviewees thought that the role of the House of Councilors was limited to provide advice on law projects, or in some other cases, approves them.

Not even the participants of the focus group with representatives of businesses knew that the House of Councilors is supposed to represent their interests: none of them knew that it represents artisans, companies or other sectors elected through chamber internal electoral processes. If the social contract of the House of Representatives was known, there was a complete confusion regarding the role, responsibility and concrete function of the House of Councilors. If a smaller part of the participants of MIPA's study felt that there was no need of a Parliament altogether, even among those who advocated for the importance of the institution, there was the widespread opinion that it was useless to have a second, "extra", chamber, which only contributed to providing more rent-based positions within the Parliament.

Elements to judge performance

It has been already noted how the lack of trust in Parliament is largely attributed to the dissonance between the promises made during speeches and their effective implementation. Respondents felt that even if there are texts, laws and other written documents, they are not

applied during Parliament's work. Even if MPs may propose a solution, it will hardly be implemented.

"we only see oral questions, and no actual results."[45]

Altogether, all the different facets of the perceived unwillingness and/ or inability of transforming words into action further reduce citizens' means to evaluate the performance of MPs.

Amongst the research participants, there was a widespread awareness that citizens are not in a position to judge the performance of MPs solely on the basis of parliamentary interrogations, and are only able to observe Parliament's theatrics without having the means to appreciate the substance of its action. Citizens are not in a position to see what MPs voted, and therefore cannot exact accountability from this particular part of MPs' mandate. Participants of MIPA's study were under the impression that MPs act as if they were actually taking actions, giving good and emotional speeches, but that in practice those were barely related to issues important for the livelihoods of citizens. Plus, even in the case that speeches actually dealt with real–life issues, the perception is that MPs have a limited power of following–up the concerns they raised, and even less power to enforce concrete policy action to solve citizens' issues. Nonetheless, a recent study showed that indeed parliamentary questions may be used by MPs to look for electoral rewards, since the effective transmission of citizens' demands may entail positive turnout in future elections.[46]

This limited appreciation of the role of MPs is also due to the fact that some respondents felt that they are out of the reach of MPs. For instance, it seems that MPs do not reach out to seek an active appreciation of people's concerns, that they have no office to which you could go to voice your concerns, that there is not an official phone number, and that in general there are no information on how to contact the MP that represents a voter — if citizens actually know him/her. On a

45   Interview with A., Rabat, October 2019.
46   Tafra, 'Pourquoi Pose–t–on Des Questions [] La Chambre Des Repr[]sentants ?', 2019.

positive note, interviewees indicated that if MPs strive to be more aware of the concerns of the people, the people would trust them considerably more.

Ultimately, the only element that citizens seem to have in hand in order to evaluate MPs' performance is whether they speak or not during parliamentary sessions, through information (mainly videos) that circulate on social media. In this framework, MPs' performance is individualized and media–based, often assuming the features of a lynching process.

Accountability

The issue of the lack of accountability persists when addressing the performances of the MPs. As it has been noted in the section on trustworthiness, respondents mentioned that they cannot trust the Parliament because they have no means to hold the MPs accountable. The issue of accountability relates also to the performance of the MPs since citizens are under the impression that negative performances (such as corruption, not upholding promises or ignoring electoral programs, and general insincerity) are not met with actions that aim at holding the MPs accountable. Moreover, interviewees felt that they did not have the means to effectively evaluate two other aspects related to the performance: the lengthiness of MPs' actions and the effective ownership of initiatives and policy priorities. On one hand, citizens are not in a position to assess how long a MP has worked to produce a result, and therefore they do not possess all the means to understand if an MP is performing its duties efficiently or not. On the other hand, the fact that MPs do not provide localized and dedicated programs for the citizens of their constituency makes it hard for citizens to understand if successes (as well as failures) have to be attributed to one single MP or to the party's policies.

Generally speaking, respondents felt that MPs manage to avoid any type of sanction that should hold them to account for a negative

performance. The idea that the Parliament is not an accountable institution stems from these conceptions, building the belief that it cannot be trusted. The problems with accountability are directly correlated with elections, since changing voting trends is one of the main tools that citizens have to hold MPs to account.

Amongst the participants in MIPA's study, however, those who voted and those who did not largely felt the same way about electoral processes. Often, those who vote felt deceived by the fact that a change in the voting pattern did not result in an actual change — as the alternative candidate they voted for also proved to be a disappointment. Similarly, those who do not vote mentioned the disenchantment of the people who voted (and felt deceived) as the main reason that perpetrates their unwillingness to vote.

The general feeling is that MPs show up and behave as good candidates only during electoral campaigns, but as they get elected, they "drop the act" and disappear. These perceptions emanate from two main sources of information: television but mostly social media. Voting and electoral processes do not seem to be recognized as opportunities for citizens to express the disappointment for the MPs' performances, since the process of voting itself seems to not have much of an impact on the Parliament as an institution. Not only this dynamic contributes to the vicious circle that discourages voting, further deteriorating citizens' trust in the Parliament, but the lack of trust in the parliament is also related to future voting intentions.

Graph48: Intention to vote in next elections and trust in the Parliament

The graph above clearly shows that those who are unwilling to vote in next elections also distrust the Parliament (only 20% of respondents who do not plan to vote in next elections trust the Parliament), but also that concrete actions to increase trust in Parliament may have a positive effect on participation in the next elections.

Communication

Last but not least, communication (or lack thereof) was seen as a major source of distrust in MPs, consequently deteriorating trust in the Parliament as an institution. Lack of communication on MPs activities is seen as one of the structural issues of the Parliament, which obstructs the citizens' access to proper information to assess the trustworthiness, the performance and the capabilities of MPs and the Parliament overall.

Conversely, discussing the communication problems of the Parliament and studying ways in which they can be overcome could significantly bolster the trust in in this institution. Better communicating the role and the functioning of the Parliament, as well as providing more

information on the performances of the MPs, are seen as fundamental steps to ameliorate the trust in the Parliament.

Lack of communication?

During interviews and focus groups, the Parliament has been mentioned very often as simply being 'theatrical', and that aggressive communication and internal conflict are the main ways in which MPs show their interest for an issue and demonstrate that they are working. Of course, this type of communication is not trusted, and citizens often referred to these behaviors as a strategy to fake MPs interest in a topic. In this sense, 86% of the respondents of MIPA's survey affirmed that they were either not satisfied (51%) or not satisfied at all (35%) with MPs' communication within their district.

Graph49: Satisfaction of MPs' communication within your district and trust in Parliament

Such low levels of satisfaction are also reflected in lower levels of trust in the Parliament: only 25% of respondents that are not satisfied at all with MPs' communication demonstrated trust in the Parliament. Conversely, higher levels of trust in this institution are related to

higher levels of satisfaction in MPs' communication, corroborating the assumption that better communication entails more trust.

The main issue with showing only the moment when MPs discuss and argue during parliamentary sessions is that people think that this is their only function, and that they do not possess any legal prerogative (such as proposing and voting on legislations). Most of the participants felt that the only contact they had with MPs' work was while watching the plenary sessions held on Mondays and broadcasted on television. And even in that case, most respondents felt that parliamentary sessions are hard to follow. This is due to both the language that is used and the unappealing format of discussions: sometimes people would stumble upon the Parliament's session, but would only watch it for a few minutes and not actively listen to it, because the format was boring, inappropriate or simply because the discussions were perceived to be out of touch with people's issues.

Another major cause of distrust that has been quoted different times throughout the report is the fact that MPs' communication with citizens only happens between one electoral cycle and the next, rather than throughout their tenure in Parliament. It is clear that such limited and strategic communication substantially impacts citizens' trust in the MPs. Specifically, actively listening to citizens' concerns, but also offering solutions and promises (in spite of how void these may be), is a practice which only happens during electoral appointments. This cycle of presence and absence of MPs has been mentioned broadly as one of the main causes why respondents did not trust the Parliament as an institution.

Other than that, citizens neither know what MPs do, nor have the means to get in touch with them. This observation is also grounded by looking at the quantitative data collected by MIPA:

Graph50: Attempt to contact a MP (for a personal or public issue) and trust in the Parliament

Those who do not know how to get in touch with MPs trust the Parliament substantially less than the other respondents: more than half of the respondents who do not know how to contact MPs also demonstrated an absolute distrust for the Parliament. Most respondents never tried, or even thought of contacting their MP, either because of the perceived uselessness of the act, or because they did not know how to. None of the respondents felt that they could reach out to their MP because they had no information whatsoever about their whereabouts, where they lived, what was the right way to reach, or even if there was any use at all in reaching out to them. Moreover, these issues depend greatly on the different age groups:

Graph51: Attempts to contact a MP (for a personal or public issue) depending on age

The youngest respondents showed the least interest, but also demonstrated the least awareness on the ways by which they could get in touch with the MPs. The respondents aged over 50 were the ones that least considered getting in touch with an MP, as 31% of them did not think about this possibility. However, when they did try to do so, they were the ones that failed with the highest percentage (40%), indicating that the ways of engaging with MPs are not necessarily adapted to all the segments of the population.

In respect to the issue of not knowing what the MPs do, a number of interviewees complained about the fact that there is no information on where a certain **dossier** stands in terms of progress and/or solution. Citizens expressed their will to be informed on the advancements of parliamentary work, especially when issues are being solved. Similarly, interviewees also reported that there are no sources of information regarding projects, laws or policies that are being enacted. Only one interviewee mentioned that information on the work of the Parliament was available online and could be found through a proactive research. They also noted that they often obtained information on a specific project or policy from social media, but that such communications rarely have

the aim of engaging in a process of monitoring and evaluation, being mostly a tool for direct protest. The lack of transparent communication is especially perceived with regard to financial decisions. The fact that MPs' initiatives and results are not being showcased contributes to the perception that the Parliament is useless and ineffective. If MPs fail to demonstrate the results they have achieved, respondents feel that they have no means to see the results of their work – ultimately questioning the very foundation of their existence as political actors.

Nevertheless, the general feeling of respondents is that MPs are not interested in their concerns: they belong to an elite that is distant from, and not interested in, the grievances of ordinary people. Moreover, they felt that the only case in which an MP is actually acting upon a specific issue is when this issue receives a lot of media attention. However, even in this case, MPs are not seen to be taking an initiative, but are rather simply reacting to a pressing public opinion issue that is circulating on social media.

Social Media

A large majority of interviewees reported that social media is the main way to know what is happening in the Parliament. Plus, the fact that some respondents suggested that MPs should be available offline rather than online, sheds light on the issues of this relatively new form of communication. On one hand, social media is perceived as a new source of information that is contributing to raise awareness on the workings of the Parliament. Facebook and YouTube have been described as the most used platforms for receiving news about the Parliament.

> "You cannot sit through the whole assembly but you can do it through Facebooklater"[47]

The increased awareness may entail a decrease in the trust in the Parliament as citizens are more exposed to its problems – which may have been hidden behind the lack of information in the past. On the

47   Interview with I., housewife and fashion designer. Casablanca, October 2019.

other, it seems that the information about the Parliament on social media do not contribute positively to its image. This has been noted because people tend to share media content (mostly videos) that is in line with their opinions, thus creating a bias in the content, and also because the viral content is often related to negative episodes (for instance, what is known as the incident of parliamentarians stealing sweets/cookies, or videos of MPs who are unable to speak properly).

Nonetheless, interviewees also noted that MPs tend to react quickly on social media.

> "You can air your frustrations or problems on social media. This is what brings you closer to parliamentarians."[48]

Therefore, social media presents an unprecedented occasion to voice concerns about MPs' work, performance, and even to advocate for other claims. This has been possible due to the fact that MPs use social media as a barometer of public opinion and popularity. At the same time, MPs are sometimes only seen through satirical content on social media. Satire has been frequently employed as a strategy to air the frustration with the political system in Morocco.[49] Furthermore, interviewees felt that social media may highlight MPs' secrets and corrupt practices. Some, more skeptical, interviewees said that MPs decide what issues to take into consideration depending on the opinion of social media.

In conclusion, social media is a double-edged sword, which brings people's concerns to the MPs, thus potentially reducing the gap between them and increasing trust, but it also exposes the weaknesses

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48 Interview with M, works in a sewing laboratory. Casablanca, October 2019.

49 Mohamed El Marzouki, 'Satire as Counter-Discourse: Dissent, Cultural Citizenship, and Youth Culture in Morocco', International Communication Gazette, 77.3 (2015), 282–96, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048514568762>.participatory cultural production in the context of post-protest Morocco. Using a combined method of textual and critical discourse analysis, I map out the issues most satirized in these alternative cultural forms, then examine their counter-discursive ideological positions, and last explore the consequences of online satire on political culture in Morocco. I argue that the emergence of the web as a participatory medium and a competing cultural form is giving rise to new articulations of dissenting political culture through the enabling of (counter

of MPs and their poor performance, hence reducing trust in their ability to solve problems. If communication in general has the potential of both increasing and reducing trust, communication on social media is capable of amplifying exponentially the effects of communication in both ways.

The confusion on the role of the Parliament and of the MPs that we outlined above is also closely related to the way in which the work of the Parliament and of the MPs is communicated. Since the work outside the plenary sessions is not shown on television or social media, none of the respondents mentioned the work that is done outside the debate (especially in parliamentary committees, which represent a substantial part of MPs' work). Thus, the lack of good communication entails a faulty perception of the work of the Parliament — ultimately deteriorating its image and lowering overall trust in it. Plus, the fact that people saw certain ministers, or the Head of the Government, in the Parliament with the MPs caused ulterior confusion about the roles.

Communication differences between Parliament and Municipalities

Municipalities were constantly brought forward as a comparative element to assess how the MPs could improve their action — and so it was the case for the communication. Indeed, respondents overall felt that municipalities manage to communicate better than the MPs, that they were more reachable to ordinary citizens, and that in general they managed to develop a sort of institutional communication. The difference with the MPs is especially stark since they are considered to be completely out of reach, with no physical presence in their vicinity/ neighborhood and no proper communication channels to get in touch with them.

The physical aspect of the presence was also central: people did not know whether they had the right to enter and/or visit the Parliament, or even simply observe the proceedings of a plenary session, further

contributing to the idea that the Parliament was an inaccessible and distant institution. Once again, the comparison with the municipality is striking as respondents are very aware that they can simply walk into its building.

Sometimes, the overlapping roles of the president of the municipality and the MP have caused increased distrust. Furthermore, some of the respondents thought that one had to be president of the municipality to be able to become an MP, and even that individuals sought the role of president of the municipality in order for them to be able to access the Parliament.

The division of labor between the municipality and the Parliament was also quite unclear, mainly limited to the understanding of the municipality as the entity dealing with local issues and the Parliament as the institution acting at the national level. Connected to such division of labor, it was also unclear to which extent these two institutions collaborated on a political level. For instance, it was unclear whether municipalities (or other local administrations) had a role in the communications of local concerns to the MPs.

MPs' perspective on (dis)trust in the Parliament

As stated above, MIPA's research also included Members of the Parliament. Their voices will be included in the report to add a point of view on the question of trust (and distrust), thereby adding complementary elements to the perceptions of the citizens. They also provided some recommendations on how such shortcomings may be overcome, aiming at the amelioration of their work and the consequent increase in trust in them.

Overall, the MPs who took part in MIPA's research considered that the lack of confidence is a complex issue and there is no ready solution to this problem, especially since it is linked to systemic obstacles as well as to the broader historical context. MPs are aware that the issues they face in conducting their work are reinforcing the negative appreciation

that citizens have — and thereby increment distrust. If the MPs believe that some perceptions are linked to a bias that citizens have towards them, they also recognized that there are concrete limitations to their work and that these have an important impact on trust. In this respect, MPs' assessment mainly related to the relation between the Parliament and the Government, and to the lack of the resources (both human and material) to effectively conduct their work. Moreover, they are aware of the important role that communication has in their work and the effect that social media has on the way in which their conduct is perceived. In the following sections, we will explore these dynamics in detail.

Perceptions of the Parliament

If the Parliament did not enjoy a positive image for the vast majority of respondents, surveyed MPs admitted being aware of such negative image to the point that they affirmed that they believe the Parliament is the most criticized institution by the public. For instance, it has been mentioned that popular protests in Morocco are often held in front of the Parliament (and rarely in front of the Ministries' headquarters, for example). Nonetheless, all the interviewed MPs considered that there is an underestimation of parliamentary work and that many of the assumptions grounding the negative perception of the Parliament are emotional and often unsubstantiated by facts.

The issues related to retirement benefits are exemplary of this apparent bias. While citizens considered that the compensation that MPs receive is a rent that mainly consumes the nation's budget, MPs considered that the money they receive was not commensurate with the amount of work they performed, and that they were even financially better off with their previous jobs. A deputy remarked that citizens rarely know the actual amount of this compensation, but they are prone to exaggerate. To compensate this tendency, this MP suggested that their salaries should be transparently communicated to the citizens.[50] It is worth remembering that the MPs' benefits, and

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50   Interview with MP A, Rabat, October 2019.

specifically the retirement system currently in place, are one of the most prominent reasons for the distrust in the Parliament. Therefore, action on these issues may contribute to restoring confidence. Another example of this underestimation mentioned by one of the MPs is the great amount of work behind Law 13.09 on Renewable Energies; citizens do not know how much effort is being made in order for this law to be promulgated, from the development of studies, to holding multiple rounds of consultations with experts, and studying various reports.[51]

At the same time, MPs generally understand the reasons behind criticism towards their work and link it to a number of factors and obstacles to parliamentary work. First, the fact that the current political context does not allow for the establishment of an independent and effective parliamentary system was recognised by many of the interviewed MPs — but also by a number of interviewees and in the focus groups. Furthermore, many of the MPs considered that ideological affiliations (and resulting political balances) are a concrete obstacle to their action within the Parliament. Specifically, ideological difference and diverging political agendas (of their respective political parties) contribute to the inability to efficiently work towards a general consensus that serves the interest of citizens and the state. Linked to this, the specific prerogatives of the Parliament within the Moroccan system were perceived to further hinder the MPs work: they considered that they lack the power, mechanisms and tools to perform their duties effectively, especially to hold government accountable.

Parliament–Government relations

Even if the revision of the Constitution of 2011 expanded the role and functions of the Parliament, MPs still consider that they have very limited powers "on the ground". Concretely, this is reflected by the dominance of the executive branch over the legislative, its lack of cooperation, and the lack of coordination and flexibility. All interviewed MPs agreed that such dominance and lack of cooperation with Parliament demonstrated

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51   Interview with MP D, Rabat, October 2019.

by the Government is the most prominent obstacle undermining their parliamentary functions. For instance, MPs brought attention to the fact that many sectors of the Government answer after long delay (in case they answer at all) to the written questions presented by the MPs, making this accountability mechanisms ineffective. Moreover, there was a wide agreement amongst the MPs that the mechanisms that are used to keep track of the actions of the government, to exercise effective oversight and ultimately to hold them to account are inadequate. Failing to oversee government's action leads to ignoring the directives given by the Parliament, leaving MPs in a vulnerable position and reinforcing citizens' mistrust in them. They reaffirmed that the poor coordination and cooperation between the executive and legislative authority ultimately impede the legislative process. One of the interviewed MPs also remarked that some amendments proposed by the Parliament to contribute to legislative productivity were rejected or withdrawn by the Government.[52]

Some MPs underlined the need for cooperation and complementarity amongst all institution governing Morocco, since the impairment of one (elected or non-elected) institution affects the performance of the rest of the institutions too. Specifically, the importance of implementing a balance between the legislative and executive branches was broadly mentioned by the MPs interviewed as a crucial way to establish the Parliament's role as the legislative body.

Human and material resources

Contrarily to the popular image of the Parliament as a bountiful institution, all the interviewed MPs criticized the fact that the budget allocated to their functions is not sufficient and that they are forced to exhaust their personal resources to carry out the tasks entrusted to them. Be it for transportation at the local and/or national level, for hiring experts to carry out studies and conducting research, or to remunerate support personnel (staff for the parliamentary groups in particular), MPs

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52   Interview with MP B, Rabat, October 2019.

believe that the resources that are allocated to them are insufficient to do their jobs.

Deputies compared their situation with other countries, quoting Western countries in particular, where advisers and dedicated staff are often provided to MPs to assist them in research and coordination with citizens. In contrast, in Morocco there is a limited number of administrative assistants who are employed by the Parliament as a whole and not for the MPs themselves. Many MPs expressed the difficulty of performing their legislative work without the support of external resources, such as ministries' experts and/or research institutions. A high–level employee of the Parliament told MIPA that the House of Councillors has created a research centre, but its limited budget negatively affects its performance. Furthermore, its administrative staff (which amounts to one employee for approximately 5 or 6 deputies) complained that they are carrying research in addition to their already assigned tasks, and that they should be appropriately remunerated for the additional work.[53]

Moreover, the fact that they are not allocated an office within the Parliament also contributes to increase the distance between the citizens and the MPs, as it is very hard for citizens to physically situate the MPs and especially get in touch with them to present their demands. This element has been often mentioned by interviewees during our research, remarking the substantial difference in availability between MPs and other elected (and non–elected) local officials. Indeed, MPs are aware that local officials (for instance, the elected councillors of the municipality) are closer to the problems of the citizenry and often cover the role of "mediators" between the citizens and the MPs – who then should address citizens' demands at the national level. The interviewed deputies also recognized the great role of local authorities (especially qaids, pashas and governors) in local governance.

When parliamentarians were asked about the possibility of demanding logistical and human resources to help them perform their tasks, they considered that such demand would backfire in a

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53   Interview with M, high level employee of the Parliament, Rabat, October 2019.

great media attack, reinforcing popular discontent. Moreover, one MP considered that there are some mechanisms that can be employed without the need for additional funds and that could help overcome these organizational obstacles.[54] Among these solutions, there is the possibility of recurring to legal consultancies and expertise in various government sectors through party relations. Another deputy reminded that taking into account the recommendations and report presented by other state institution could significantly improve their work.[55] The resources of political parties should be used as well, as they have broad experience in many fields and wide networks of experts constantly willing to contribute to the draft laws related to their field of expertise. Moreover, an interviewed MP suggested that civil society actors and organizations should be allowed to integrate the legislative process by presenting their proposals, involving them in the legislative cycle in a more organic and permanent manner.[56] Notably, the reports prepared by research centres play a very important role in enhancing the work of the Parliament. As remarked by an interviewed MP, think tanks can provide objective and impartial research that enhances the productivity of MPs.[57]

Communication and social media

MPs are aware that there are concrete issues with the communication with the citizens and that overall the Parliament enjoys a quite negative image. As highlighted above, such a negative image is mainly due to a negative behaviour in the plenary sessions, including poor quality of the discussion, and an overall limited performance of the institution as a whole. Arguably, the institutional communication channels of the Parliament are weak and unable to change the negative perception on the parliament. Further, MPs believe that the actual amount of work that is carried out by the deputies is not evident from the institutional communication channels of the Parliament – thereby fostering the

54 Interview with MP C, Rabat, October 2019.
55 Interview with MP E, Rabat, October 2019.
56 Interview with MP G, Rabat, October 2019.
57 Interview with MP F, Rabat, October 2019.

perception of the Parliament as a rent–based institution where nothing gets done.

Accordingly, the role of social media has increased over the last years as an alternative through which the MPs can communicate with their constituencies and beyond. Consistently with what has been highlighted in our report, MPs considered that social media is a double–edged sword: it contributes to the increase of communication with citizens and to the follow–up to people's issues; however, it has been the main source for the decline in confidence. The interviewed MPs unanimously agree that social media has made the parliamentary work a subject of ridicule. With citizens being more interested in following the "buzz", social media has substantially damaged parliamentary work and corrupted the reputation of political actors.

Nonetheless, MPs are aware that social media does not often represent the complete picture of society's reality. On one hand, wide support and/or discreditation on social media does not necessarily entail negative results during elections. For example, one of the MPs remarked that the huge popular support demonstrated on social media for the Federation of the Democratic Left [Fédération de la gauche démocratique, or FGD] for the 2016 legislative elections did not match the final result for that party — which received "only" 2,83% of votes. On the other, those citizens who have access to social media are not necessarily the majority of voters. Two deputies observed that the popular classes are the true determinants of the political future of the country: they often do not have access to social media and are busy with their daily struggles.

Conclusions

The low levels of trust in the Moroccan Parliament are due to a plurality of factors. Firstly, citizens are wary of MPs' motivations to carry out their functions. The research remarked a broad perception that MPs' work in the Parliament follows an agenda dictated by the party,

or even worse, an agenda of special interest, instead of their duty of serving the citizens and the country. This perception is based on both the failure to uphold the promises made during election campaigns and the perceived disproportionality in MPs' salaries and retirement benefits for their work.

Salary and retirement privileges have been identified as major issues that negatively affect the trustworthiness of MPs, given their disproportionality in terms of both the overall economic situation of the country and the actual work that gets done by the Parliament.

Furthermore, a partial and sometimes distorted understanding the role – and the prerogatives – of both the Parliament and the MPs also contributes to an increase in distrust. A specific understanding of the capabilities of the Parliament greatly affects citizens' perception of both the trustworthiness and of the performance of the institution and its agents.

Chiefly, lack of effective action in the fields of education and healthcare has substantively decreased the trust in the parliament. Action in these sectors is a central priority for Moroccans and inaction has been constantly reported as a key source of distrusts in the Parliament. Income inequalities are also central in the perception of the Parliament's performance, as levels of trust have been correlated to the satisfaction of the overall economic situation and, more importantly, to the particular level of average household income.

Poor performances of MPs also damage their trustworthiness, further eroding trust in the Parliament. Furthermore, citizens feel they lack elements to judge the performances of MPs. Obstacles to understand and assess MPs' work beyond oral questions, as well as the absence of evidence–based mechanisms to showcase MPs' actions, work and results, are deteriorating the citizens' perception of the Parliament's performance – thereby considerably eroding trust in this institution.

Citizens also feel that they lack concrete means to hold the MPs to account. Elections are seen as the only strategy provided to

achieve accountability, but the feeling that changing voting patterns will not affect the situation produces substantial disaffection and disengagement — simultaneously as the answer to and the cause of loss of trust.

Finally, lack of proper communication between the MPs and the citizens serves as an echo chamber for all the issues outlined above. Citizens neither feel that they can understand what the MPs actually do, nor believe that they could get in touch with a MP to find a solution to a problem. Issues with communication have also been highlighted by the MPs themselves, who believe that the citizens do not realize what is the actual work of an MP. In this framework, social media exponentially exposed MPs' work to the citizens. On one hand, information technologies multiply the potential for contact between citizens and MPs, and on the other hand they also amplify the resonance of negative conducts of MPs. The way in which communication mechanisms and social media in particular, affect trust will ultimately depend on MPs' behaviors.

Gaining Trust : Recommendations

The extensive research conducted by MIPA on trust in Morocco can also be translated in some concrete recommendations that may serve as a basis to improve trust. Our work aimed at the description and the exploration of the dynamics that affect **social institutions** (like the family, the neighbors, etc.), and may be useful to deepen the understanding of some social dynamics in Morocco. However, the considerations made on the institutions studied in the chapters on Political Trust and Trust in Parliament present an opportunity to suggest some directions to stimulate the reflection on how to ameliorate trust in Morocco. Indeed, the aim of this section is to provide some recommendations to restore trust in Morocco's institutions.

First of all, the section on political trust brought forward the colossal damage of widespread corruption on Moroccans' trust. **Tangible actions to tackle corruption need to be swift and meaningful.** These actions should sanction individual behaviors on one hand, and target corruption in (private and public) service delivery on the other. Eradicating corruption in service delivery, especially in the education and healthcare sectors, has to be aimed at the establishment of these services as citizens' rights – and not as a privilege to which only the most affluent parts of society can access.

Essentially, citizens crave to be heard. Therefore, **citizens should be provided with effective and substantial means to exact accountability to all political institutions**. Especially for non–elected institutions, creating new accountability mechanisms has the objective of providing citizens with concrete tools that enable them to ensure the realization of their rights. Citizens must be in a position to have their rights fulfilled: in the case of a malfunctioning of political institutions, the responsible has to be held to account. Even in the case of elected political institutions, accountability mechanisms must assure the citizen that action will be taken. As the lack of trust in political parties

entails a disproportionate lack of trust in all other elected political institutions, actions of political parties should be primordial.

While attempting to boost confidence, it is important to activate mechanisms that guarantee democratic practices **within** the parties — notably by holding to account their representatives in case of poor performances and by avoiding re-nominations in cases of misconduct.

An improvement in the levels of trust in the Parliament is strictly connected with a series of public policies that aim at the overall improvement of the situation in Morocco. The interviewees provided a wide spectrum of sectors of Moroccan society which are in dire need of action. First and foremost, they made it clear that **it is paramount to take action to radically improve the healthcare and education sectors**. Then, concrete steps to increase the average income of Moroccans (also through the reduction of income taxes) and to give a sense of security in terms of livelihood are deemed to be crucial to increase trust. Other recommendations include offering more job opportunities and reducing the suffering of the middle class in terms of quality of services provided to them, raising the quality of strategic sectors. It is also imperative to take action to reduce the profound inequalities existing in present-day Morocco, since they represent an underlying cause for the incessant decrease in trust.

On top of policy change, citizens strongly felt that one of the main and most pressing issues had to do with **retirement benefits of MPs, which, if removed, would substantially increase trust in the Parliament**. If a complete elimination of the benefits seems an arduous policy goal, it would be at least appropriate to consider a substantial cutback of such benefits in a potential reform of the retirement scheme of MPs — which would also contribute to the increase in trust in the Parliament.

Another central pathway to improve trust in the Parliament is to deliver on the promises of the MPs. **Showing more genuine interest in their constituency, delivering on promises and solving concrete societal issues are key elements to build MPs trustworthiness**,

and thus increasing trust in the Parliament. The overall feeling of respondents was that MPs should avoid making promises that they may not be able to stick to in reality. The interviewees felt that they should rather focus on a specific set of citizens' demands, work on them and communicating the evidence on the achievements in order to mark a clear distinction from their predecessors. This is crucial for the element of the trustworthiness, as better delivering on the promises made throughout the work of MPs contributes to building citizens' trust in the motivation that MPs have in order to do their work.

An improvement in communication strategies of the MPs should entail **an amelioration in** both **the quantity and quality of the information**. From a quantitative side, citizens need to be better informed of the way in which MPs work, of the way in which parliamentary work is done and of results they achieve. Fundamentally, citizens need to see tangible change. The broad disaffection for political processes (and institutions) is reinforced by the feeling that no matter what they do, nothing will change. Evidence–based policies and communications would play a substantial role in the amelioration of trust in political institutions. From a qualitative side, citizens feel that the presence of the MPs should be more concrete, in terms of both continuity (i.e.: not only during elections but throughout their mandate) and presence (i.e.: increasing their physical proximity with the citizens they represent). For instance, MPs should take the initiative to introduce themselves to the citizens and seek other proactive ways to directly engage with the citizenry and be more attentive to their demands and ambitions. Ultimately, this should also be translated into better organized, adapted, inclusive, and more transparent mechanisms to contact MPs. It is vital to recall the fundamental role of interpersonal relations in all types of trust, and reduce the distance between the MPs and the citizens.

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Appendixes

Annex 1: Social and Political trust between theory and practice

Prior to engaging with the research, MIPA has conducted an extensive review of literature on the subject of trust. Such endeavor supported the development of our research by better situating it in the current debates on trust, as well as by ensuring that it was conducted with academic rigor. The literature review should be an ongoing process of an academic research, as it unfolds following the evolving understanding of the object of the study.[58] By situating our findings in the landscape of academic scholarship, the literature review provides new pathways for future iterations of the research process.

If by no means this review can substitute the appreciation of the studies themselves, it provides a wide and detailed summary of the current discussions and a useful starting point for the study of trust.

What is Trust?

In Arabic, "Trust "or (Thiqa ثقـة) comes from the verb (wathiqa وَثِـقَ) which refers to different meanings such as depending on someone, being certain, and trustworthy.[59] The Merriam–Webster English dictionary provides similar definition of the word "trust" as follows: **1a**: assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone

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58 Kathryn Herr and Gary L Anderson, 'Designing the Plane While Flying It: Pro–posing and Doing the   Dissertation', in The Action Research Dissertation: A Guide for Students and Faculty, ed. by Kathryn Herr and Gary L Anderson (2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publi–cations, Inc., 2005), pp. 70–88 <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452226644.n5>.

59 Almaany Arabic dictionary:https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/arar/%D9%88 %D8%AB%D9%90%D9%82%D9%8E/

or something. **b**: one in which confidence is placed. **2a**: dependence on something future or contingent: HOPE.[60]

The definition features the variables of ability, character, strength and truth as well as the dependence on the future. This showcases that trust is a concept that stretches out in time and has a component of belief in the ability of something or someone.

In psychology, interpersonal trust is defined as "confidence that [one] will find what is desired [from another] rather than what is feared".[61] According to such interpersonal perspective, trust is a psychological state or orientation of an actor (the trustor) toward a specific partner (the trustee) with whom the actor is in some way interdependent (that is, the trustor needs the trustee's cooperation to attain valued outcomes or resources).[62] On one hand, a psychological understanding of trust assumes that trust is a core personality trait, as trusting individuals tends to be optimistic and distrusting individuals tends to be pessimistic.

On the other hand, from a sociological perspective, trust is often a social construct associated with social causes – such as levels of education and income.[63] Within the study of trust, the element of trustworthiness stands out: as there is a distinction between an individual's appraisal of the situation (trust) and their appraisal of others (trustworthiness). Indeed, "if an individual sense of trust is based on accumulated experience, then it is based on how we feel about the trustworthiness of others according to how they have acted in the past or how they might be expected to react in the future."[64]

60   Merriam–Webster English dictionary: https://www.merriam–webster.com/dictionary/trust

61   M Deutsch, 'Trust and Suspicion: Theoretical Notes', The Resolution of Conflict, 1973, 143–76 (p. 148).

62   Jeffry A Simpson, 'Psychological Foundations of Trust', Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16.5 (2007), 264–68 (p. 264).

63   Eric M Uslaner, The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), I, p. 37 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.001.0001>.

64   Kenneth Newton, Dietlind Stolle, and Sonja Zmerli, Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), I, p. 40 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.20>.

The prominence of trust in social and political life has been recognized by philosophers throughout history. In one of the earliest examinations of the concept, Confucius wrote that the crucial requisites for government are weapons, food, and trust. If a leader could not keep all three, however, they should let go of the weapons and the food first — trust is paramount. In his **Analects,** he discussed the concept of **xin,** the idea of being true to one's word as the starting point for any fruitful relationship with another.[65]

In the 14th century, Maghrebi historian Ibn Khaldun expanded on this horizontal dimension of trust in a larger sense with his explanation of the **asabiyyah,** which translates loosely to "group feeling" or the strong social ties and sense of solidarity within a group, which create social cohesion. He believes that the anarchy that characterizes the life of a sedentary group creates social cohesion and enhances trust, while urbanization destroys it[66]. He found the interaction between the **asabiyyah** and the royal authority to be the essence of social change,

65 Cecilia Wee, '"Xin", Trust, and Confucious' Ethics', Philosophy East and West, 61.3 (2011), 516–33 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23015356>.however, one needs first to understand what Confucius encompasses within his notion of xin. The article begins by delineating the Confucian conception of xin, as presented in the Analects. The notion of xin is often taken to be isomorphic with the notion of trust. I argue that Confucius› notion of xin does not quite map onto the notion of trust as usually understood in contemporary Western contexts. To understand better what Confucian xin amounts to, I compare and contrast the Confucian conception of xin with contemporary Western accounts of trust by Baier, McLeod, and Mullin. This comparison helps elucidate what xin is as well as how xin relates to morality. With this in hand, the roles that Confucius ascribes to xin in social and political contexts are then delineated.»,»author»:[{«dropping–particle»:»»,»family»:»Wee»,»given»:»Cecilia»,»non–dropping–particle»:»»,»parse–names»:false,»suffix»:»»}],»container–title»:»Philosophy East and West»,»id»:»ITEM–1»,»issue»:»3»,»issued»:{«date–parts»:[[«2011»]]},»page»:»516–533»,»publisher»:»University of Hawai›i Press»,»title»:»\»Xin\», Trust, and Confucious› Ethics»,»type»:»article–journal»,»volume»:»61»},»uris»:[«http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=992a5ec1–16a2–41bf–a590–88675b2e3a98»]}],»mendeley»:{«formattedCitation»:»Cecilia Wee, '"Xin", Trust, and Confucious' Ethics', <i>Philosophy East and West</i>, 61.3 (2011

66 Gellner, Ernest (2000) 'Trust, Cohesion, and the Social Order', in Gambetta, Diego (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, electronic edition, Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, chapter 9, pp. 142–157.

and he explained the rise and fall of civilizations on the basis of this shifting relationship.[67]

Few centuries later, French philosopher Jean–Jacques Rousseau further outlined the political aspects of trust in his treaties on the social contract. When citizens consent to be governed, they put implicit trust in their representatives, which forms the basis of a legitimate government.[68] Alexis de Tocqueville took the idea of trust and representation further in discussing the relationship between associational activity, political participation, and democracy. He illustrated the importance of associations in creating a network of relationships that helps establish the basis for generalized social trust. This kind of "associative trust" is now studied in the domain of "social capital."[69]

Trust became a more explicit field of study in academic research after World War II. Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond were among the first to explain Tocqueville's social context for trust as it relates to political culture. In their seminal work **The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations** (1963), they analyzed general surveys of the socialization of citizens across five states (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico) to gather baseline data regarding citizens' relationships to the state and each other. They contend that social trust and cooperativeness are a core component of a country's civic culture (the norms and attitudes of both the ordinary citizen and the political elite) and are thus critical components of democracy.[70] They found, for example, that the lower levels of trust in Germany, Italy, and Mexico limit citizens' respective abilities to cooperate with each other and influence their governments, whereas the higher levels of trust in the United States and United Kingdom facilitate a more

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67   Mark Muhannad Ayyash, 'Rethinking the Social–Political through Ibn Khaldūn and Aristotle', Interventions, 19.8 (2017), 1193–1209 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2017.1347054>.

68   Matthew Simpson, Rousseau: A Guide for the Perplexed (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007).

69   Mark Warren, 'Trust and Democracy', in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), I, p. 83 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.5>.

70   Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

responsive democracy. On top of the findings, Verba and Almond's work was perhaps most influential in bringing systematic, cross–national analysis into the study of comparative politics: such large–scale multi–state surveys have proven to be instrumental in expanding the dimensions of the study of trust.

Later, Robert Putnam famously illustrated on the idea of trust in the context of "social capital" which he defines as "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit."[71] His work **Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community** (2000) posits that the weakening of social ties since the 1960s relates to a decline in associational membership, a category broadly defined as participation in social organizations.[72] This concept is characterized by "networks of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity" and is closely correlated with levels of interpersonal trust. Putnam analyzes a plethora of public opinion and social science surveys and believes that the recent trend of distrust has stern implications for the future of democratic institutions. Critics of his work contend that the institutions he analyzes — everything from book clubs to the Red Cross, passing through bowling leagues — are arbitrary and insufficient as indicators of social participation. Some argue that there are other factors that more substantially influence and determine historical change, notably the role of corporations in everyday life.[73] Others dispute his methodology, fearing that Putnam's heavy reliance on statistical analysis can operationalize the concept of social capital, adding moral and ethical value to what should be a neutral term.[74] Nevertheless, Putnam's work has been critical in illustrating the complexity of social capital and bringing it to the forefront of intellectual debate.

71 Robert D. Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal of Democracy, 6.1 (1995), 65–78 (p. 67) <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1995.0002>.

72 Robert D Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Com– munity (Simon and schuster, 2000).

73 Carl Boggs, 'Social Capital and Political Fantasy: Robert Putnam's" Bowling Alone'", Theory and Society, 30.2 (2001), 281–97.

74 Bob Edwards and Michael W Foley, 'Civil Society and Social Capital beyond Putnam', American Behavioral Scientist, 42.1 (1998), 124–39.

A more recent academic debate tried to integrate the notions of social and political trust. In his edited volume **Oxford Handbook on Social and Political Trust**, Eric Uslaner makes a fundamental distinction between particularized trust and generalized trust. Particularized trust is the faith in the 'in–group' (to whom we feel associated or belonging) while generalized (or social, **horizontal**) trust is the trust that does not depend on any specific group or purpose[75]. Thus, **social trust** relates to the the belief that most people can be trusted. Moreover, trust is an 'expectation' rather than a behaviour, and social trust encompasses the idea that we can expect others to operate with our best interests in mind. In this respect, Barber defines trust as a set of "socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of the organizations and institutions in which they live, and of the natural and moral social orders that set the fundamental understandings for their lives."[76]

Moreover, generalized and particularized trust have to be distinguished from **political trust**, which is defined as the trust in institutions or systems of government – **specific ability and willingness** – to either do what is right or to serve your interests.[77] Furthermore, political (or vertical) trust has also been conceptualized as "the degree to which people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent with their expectations"[78] and as "people's acknowledgement of the government's authority and their willingness to accept the outcomes of the government's decision making as they believe politicians generally act fairly".[79] These definitions consolidate the key elements

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75   Eric M. Uslaner, 'The Study of Trust', ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), ı<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.39>.

76   Bernard Barber, 'The Logic and Limits of Trust', 1983, p. 149.

77   Eric M. Uslaner, ı, p. 4.

78   Marc J Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism (Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 9.

79   Marc Hooghe and Sonja Zmerli, Political Trust: Why Context Matters (ECPR Press, 2011), p. 3; Niels Spierings, 'Trust and Tolerance across the Middle East and North Africa: A Comparative Perspective on the Impact of the Arab Uprisings', Politics and Governance, 5.2 (2017), 4–15, <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.750>.

of political trust as "the belief that the political system or some part of it will produce preferred outcomes even if left untended."[80]

Within the concept of political trust, we can identify four major variables to assess people's trust in government: their confidence in government's **competence, trustworthiness, performance, and communication.** In essence, the government's ability to increase its competence, trustworthiness, and performance is bolstered by its ability to communicate effectively. To judge the work of a governmental institution – and specifically the amount of trust a community or society attributes to it – one should be able to understand the differences between **confidence** (representing the belief in the capacity of an agency to perform effectively), **trust** (reflecting a rational or affective belief in the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of another party), **skepticism** (suspended judgment), and **cynicism** (jaded negativity).[81]

These foundational works have been followed by a proliferation of research into both social and political trust. The factors underlying these trust relationships have been explained through numerous studies, ranging from genetic variation to income inequality, but they all have a common denominator: attempting to understand the root causes of disconnect in our society. Yet, it seems that despite the development of literature of political trust, there are still disagreements on how we study trust.

Measuring Trust: Methodological Challenges

Another recent academic literature discusses a core challenge in measuring trust: how to isolate the causes and effects of trust, as social

80   Tianjian Shi, 'Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan', Comparative Politics, 33.4 (2001), 401, <https://doi.org/10.2307/422441>.

81   Pippa Norris, 'The Conceptual Framework of Political Support', in Handbook on Political Trust, ed. by Sonja Zmerli and Tom W G van der Meer (Edward Elgar Publishing), pp. 19–32 (p. 19), <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782545118.00012>.

and political trust are tied with several interdependent variables, making it difficult to attribute any single factor as the cause of another.[82] It is impossible to determine which shapes what: is the trust in institutions shapes social trust? Or is it the other way around? While some scholars noted that trust in neutral and impartial institutions does shape social trust,[83] others argue that such institutions also depend upon it.[84]

This begs the fundamental question: **is trust a lived experience or a mere perception?**

Social Trust is a multi–dimensional and context–specific concept. The common sociological approach in defining it is a "person's disposition or general belief that other people – regardless of who they are – are willing to behave in ways that are not detrimental to the first person."[85] This is in contrast to particularized trust, which is the trust one holds for someone close to them.[86] Some researchers argue that particularized trust is less important to the general economic growth of a country, social cohesion, and it is often referred to as the "dark side" of social capital.[87]

In the literature some argue that trust is contingent upon people and circumstances, therefore only questions that specify exactly the object and circumstances of trust make sense, however social scientists themselves are unable to agree on what exactly constitutes trust or its definition, therefore respondent's perception cannot be faulted for

82 Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, I, p. 41.
83 Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, 'The State and Social Capital: An Institution–al Theory of Generalized Trust', Comparative Politics, 40.4 (2008), 441–59, <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041508X12911362383354>.
84 Eric M Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 42.
85 Niels Spierings, 'Social Trust in the Middle East and North Africa: The Con–text–Dependent Impact of Citizens' Socio–Economic and Religious Char–acteristics', European Sociological Review, 35.6 (2019), 894–911 (p. 895), <https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcz038>.
86 Spierings, 'Social Trust in the Middle East and North Africa: The Context–Dependent Impact of Citizens' Socio–Economic and Religious Characteristics', p. 895.
87 Spierings, 'Social Trust in the Middle East and North Africa: The Context–Dependent Impact of Citizens' Socio–Economic and Religious Characteristics', p. 895.

their vagueness or irrelevance.[88] In measurement of trust, usually the Rosenberg scale is considered a reliable and valid measure of trust.[89] Trust also has a time component: it can change depending on the circumstances and events within a specific timeframe.

Contrarily, political (or institutional) trust can be dissected in two different clusters: trust in elected institutions such as parliament, heads of state, cabinets, and syndicates, and trust in non-elected institutions such as police, courts, administrations, and civil service.

Without trust in institutions, democracy and all its facets would become unworkable, resulting in lack of personal safety and freedom, welfare supports, protections, banking and pensions, economic division of labor that creates wealth. In essence, when one refers to trust of an institution, it is equivalent to trusting a person who holds an office, defined by the rules that comprise the institution.[90]

The essential difference between institutional trust and social trust is that the former is anonymous.[91] When a citizen is deciding whether to trust an institution, they are basing that decision on three factors: the normative definition of roles; the knowledge of trustee's motivation (to derive trustworthiness); and the sanctions to keep the trustee accountable (given the lack of knowledge on trustee's commitment to office). In other words, warranted trust judgments on institutions depend on a congruence of (a) the knowledge of institutional norms shared between trustor and trustee and (b) the trustor's knowledge of the trustee's motivations, which can be inferred from (c) professional role identity combined with sanctions that render office-holders accountable to the norms of office. Generally speaking, when these

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88   Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Citizens and Political Behavior', in The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, ed. by Russel J Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 4, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270125.003.0001>.

89   Dalton and Klingemann, p. 5.

90   Claus Offe, 'How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?', in Democracy and Trust, ed. by Mark E Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 42–87 (pp. 65–76), <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511659959.003>.

91   Warren, I, p. 88.

elements of warranted trust judgments are publicly available and knowable, institutional trust will be supporting the democratic polity.[92]

Frameworks to study Trust

Generally speaking, there are two ways to study trust, namely the so called "bottom–up" and "top–down" approaches. On the individual "bottom–up" level trust can take on a scientific dimension through **biological and psychological theories**. A person's biological and psychological composition does not vary depending on the situation, which means that these traits can be understood as a sort of "anchor" for attitudes and behavior. Trust must be a transmissible trait in order to be influenced by biology; to assess whether this is the case, researchers have used twin studies to test if genetic similarities in trust levels can be found between sets of twins.[93] In terms of psychology, trust is seen as a core personality characteristic. In measuring the psychology of trust, scholars often refer to the "Big Five Personality Framework" that summarizes an individual's trait structure through the following five dimensions: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability. Each of the five factors' associated characteristics has implications for likely levels of both social and political trust.[94] Scholars synthesize this framework with surveys on trust to measure correlation between trust and personality.

While biological and psychological theories are grounded in valid empirical research, they are fundamentally limited in scope by not addressing the impact of the environment on the individual. To fully comprehend trust, psychological and biological factors must be viewed as an anchor that can be influenced by the broader social contexts of the situation.

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92 Warren, I, p. 88.
93 Matthew Cawvey and others, 'Biological and Psychological Influences on In–terpersonal and Political Trust', in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), I, p. 120 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.11>.
94 Cawvey and others, I, p. 127.

An individual's trust can also be analyzed technically through the **Rational Choice Theory (RCT).** This theory assumes that an individual's rationality and decisions are determined based on cognitive calculations of the costs and benefits of an action. Applied to trust, RCT asserts that trust is a cognitive process; trustworthiness is more likely to occur when the interests of the "trustee" are linked to those of the "trustor." While this theory shares many premises with neoclassical economics and game theory, proponents of the RCT argue that a person's interests can be derived from not only individual but also social gains, which means that people can be motivated to trust by both intrinsic and extrinsic values.[95] Critics of the theory, however, maintain that the RCT neglects "social embeddedness," or the institutional, social, or cultural context of the situation.

These individual–based theories are contrasted with the **"top–down" approach** that focuses on societies or communities as a whole. This idea finds "a strong association between trust and homogeneity, national wealth, income equality, lack of corruption, and various levels of democratic government"[96] and assigns more responsibility to the national institutions' and policies' role influencing circumstances in which social and political trust develop. Essentially, trust is more related to the collective properties of whole communities rather than the sum of individual experiences. This theory can be perceived as too broad and imprecise, as it does not account for the diversity of individual experiences.

Politics of Trust

As highlighted in the sections above, trust is a central element in politics. Generally speaking, "political trust thus functions as the glue that keeps the system together and as the oil that lubricates the policy

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95   Karen S. Cook and Jessica J. Santana, 'Trust and Rational Choice', in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), ɪ<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.4>.

96   Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, ɪ, p. 39.

machine."[97] Indeed, the study of the connections between politics and trust does provide meaningful insights on their reciprocal influences. For instance, Hetherington argued that the impact of trust varies depending on whether political support is diffused (as for an institution or a polity as a whole) or specific (as for politicians individually).[98] On one hand, his findings show that better economic performances and higher levels of policy effectiveness and specific support can bolster political trust. On the other hand, a decline in political trust, which may be both the reflection of and the cause for wider dissatisfaction for a government, hinders the possibility to successfully pass legislation.

More recently, Citrin and Stoker discussed the literature on the continuous decline in political trust and found that policy dissatisfaction, amongst other issues, seems to be a central cause for distrust.[99] Such decline in political trust also has consequences at the individual level, which influence political participation, electoral choices and general compliance. Notably, if an individual lacks political trust, he or she will be less likely to support policies that may involve personal risk or sacrifice.

Partisan logics also influence political trust significantly. It has been observed how an increase in party polarization is not necessarily related to ideological reasons, but rather in active distrust of other partisan forces.[100] The effect of an increase in partisan polarization is not limited to electoral dynamics, since policy makers will equally be less inclined to cooperate with oppositions to achieve compromises — thus limiting governments' policy responsiveness and, in turn, further obstructing trust. In a context of increased partisan polarization, we can find Miller's study **Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970**, in which he posits that "discontent can be functional for a political system if it

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97 Tom W.G. van der Meer and Sonja Zmerli, 'The Deeply Rooted Concern with Political Trust', in Handbook on Political Trust, ed. by Sonja Zmerli and Tom W.G. van der Meer, 2017, p. 1.

98 Marc J Hetherington, 'The Political Relevance of Political Trust', American Political Science Review, 92.4 (1998), 791–808.

99 Jack Citrin and Laura Stoker, 'Political Trust in a Cynical Age', Annual Review of Political Science, 21 (2018), 49–70.

100 Marc Hetherington, 'Why Polarized Trust Matters', in The Forum (De Gruyter, 2015), XIII, 445–58.

acts as a catalyst for orderly change, but when the normal channels are perceived as ineffective, the probability that the conflict may burst forth in the form of extra–legal behavior increase."[101]

Therefore, it seems that an increase in partisan polarization might affect trust only if normal policy channels are deemed as ineffective. In this context, Miller claims that centrist policies will only foster dissatisfaction with government and will inhibit the restoration of political trust in it. Hence, political cynicism seems to be the antithesis of political trust. However, some have argued that this vision lacks a clear distinction between disillusionment with government as a whole and mistrust of specific politicians, and that a decrease in political trust is also due to an increase in political sophistication and realism.[102] Anyhow, the relationship between trust and politics is not simply univocal. On the contrary, there has to be a clear distinction between trust, distrust/cynicism and skepticism. Specifically, Cook & Gronke argue that low confidence in government and in institutions does not necessarily mean distrust, but rather means that individuals are skeptic, this is understood as the "unwillingness to presume that political authorities should be given the benefit of the doubt."[103] Therefore, they suggest to methodically distinguish the measurement of trust and of confidence.

Finally, the establishment of democracy as a predominant political system has also fostered the questions on whether levels of political trust differ between new and established democracies. Catterberg and Moreno found out that new democracies have experienced an important drop in political trust due to what they call a "post–honeymoon period of political disaffection".[104] Specifically, they uphold the relationship

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101   Arthur H Miller, 'Political Issues and Trust in Government : 1964–1970', The American Political Science Review, 68.3 (1974), 951–72 (p. 970).

102   Jack Citrin, 'Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government', American Political Science Review, 68.3 (1974), 973–88, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1959141>.

103   Timothy E. Cook and Paul Gronke, 'The Skeptical American: Revisiting the Meanings of Trust in Government and Confidence in Institutions', The Journal of Politics, 67.3 (2005), 784–803 (p. 785), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468–2508.2005.00339.x>.

104   Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno, 'The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies', International Journal of

between the level of trust and the capacity of a system to maintain or increase well–being. Nevertheless, they observe that the weight of both the elements that may foster trust (such as financial satisfaction, government responsiveness, and democratic attitudes) and the ones that might hinder it (such as political radicalism, post materialist values, and corruption permissiveness) also are highly dependent on the broader context.

Economic Performance and Trust

Economic performance — and inequalities specifically — is one of the most evident indicators of trust and has a direct correlation with levels of political trust. This substantiates the theory known as the "trust–as–evaluation approach", which posits that trust is an object that stems from the evaluation of the object's performance. Levels of trust (results) are influenced by the mediation of macro and microeconomic factors: perceived changes in economic growth, prior expectations and values of citizens (anticipation), and citizens' attributions of responsibility (as governments are not always held responsible for macroeconomic outcomes).[105] Nonetheless, not all studies converge on a univocal correlation between economic inequality and political trust. Multilevel governance makes it hard to determine who exactly was responsible for the current state of economic affairs, as the responsibility can be attributed to local, national, or supranational levels of government.[106] Overall, however, confidence and trust in government generally tend to be lower during times of negative economic performance.

In the following illustration, one can clearly see that GDP per capita correlates directly with social trust, indicating a very strong positive relationship:

Public Opinion Research, 18.1 (2005), 31—48, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edh081>.

105 Tom W.G. van der Meer, 'Economic Performance and Political Trust', in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), I, p. 599, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.16>.

106 van der Meer, I, p. 606.

Country by country: Trust vs. GDP per capita

Shown is the share of people agreeing with the statement "most people can be trusted".
For each country the latest available data is shown.

Our World in Data

Data source: World Value Survey for data on trust and Penn World Table for data on GDP per capita
This visualization is available at OurWorldInData.org. There you find the raw data and more visualizations on this topic.

Licensed under CC·BY·SA
by the author Max Roser.

In terms of income inequality, conversely, the correlation is strongly negative, as inequality directly affects trust levels as shown below:

Interpersonal trust vs. income inequality, 1998

Interpersonal trust (share of people reporting that "most people can be trusted" in the World Value Survey) against income inequality by Gini index (higher values reflect more inequality). Data from 2000 (or closest year available).

Our World in Data

Legend:
- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- North America
- Oceania
- South America

Countries plotted (Trust in others vs. Gini coefficient): Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, Peru, Chile, El Salvador, Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico, Philippines, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Uganda, Uruguay, United States, China, Turkey, Georgia, Tanzania, Russia, Algeria, Armenia, Jordan, Vietnam, Pakistan, Latvia, Canada, Romania, Serbia, India, Belarus, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Ukraine, Indonesia, Hungary, Czech Republic

Y-axis: Gini coefficient (25–55+)
X-axis: Trust in others (10%–50%+)

Source: Trust (World Values Survey (2014)), World Bank, Population (Gapminder, HYDE(2016) & UN (2019))   OurWorldInData.org/trust • CC BY

The reasons for such correlation are attributed to both the fact that people feel closer (and thus trust more) to those who are from a closer socio–economic level, and the fact that higher inequality increases the fight for resources. If this is remarked when comparing countries on a macro perspective, the same patterns can be found at the micro level as well. To put it differently, the negative relationship between economic inequalities and levels of trust is visible not only between countries, but also within the same country. Even within low inequality countries, such as Sweden, imbalances in income negatively affect interpersonal trust.[107] Furthermore, economic crisis do not impact all citizens in the

107   Fabian Stephany, 'Who Are Your Joneses? Socio–Specific Income Inequali–ty and Trust', Social Indicators Research, 134.3 (2017), 877–98, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205–016–1460–9>.institutions or society as a whole. It is a key element in almost every commercial transaction over time and might be one of the main explanations of economic success and development. Trust diminishes the more we perceive others to have economically dif–ferent living realities. In most of the relevant contributions, scholars have taken a macro perspective on the inequality–trust linkage, with an aggre–gation of both trust and inequality on a country level. However, patterns of

same way, and therefore we can expect that the influence of economic crises on citizens will also be diversified. A study of trust in the European Parliament after the 2008 economic crisis shows that the countries that were most affected in terms of decline of trust were also the ones that were hit harder by the crisis.[108] Going further, the same study demonstrates that such fall in levels of trust was more pronounced in those citizens with lower social status, potentially perpetuating the divide amongst citizens of the same country.

The Welfare state and Trust

Trust in government is also shaped by the government's redistributive policies and outcomes, what we call the **welfare state**. Generally speaking, higher income inequality and poverty levels are related to lower levels of political trust.[109] In other words, states that redistribute income more equitably are more trusted. This might explain the recent surge of protest movements denouncing economic elites across the world as well as the appearance of political outsiders across the electoral spectrum who promise to deliver on economic equality.

The root causes of these movements may be attributed to the distrust of governmental institutions (especially elected ones) in redistributing wealth and addressing inequality. Accountability is difficult to establish in the welfare state domain: as politicians are skilled at masking retrenchment policies to avoid blame, citizens tend to distrust the government as a whole rather than punish the representatives in elections.[110] This idea that inequality leads to lower

within—country inequality and possibly influential determinants, such as perception and socioeconomic reference, remained undetected. This paper offers the opportunity to look at the interplay between inequality and trust at a more refined level. A measure of (generalized

108 Giulia M Dotti Sani and Beatrice Magistro, 'Increasingly Unequal? The Economic Crisis, Social Inequalities and Trust in the European Parliament in 20 European Countries', European Journal of Political Research, 55.2 (2016), 246—64,   <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12126>.

109 Staffan Kumlin and Atle Haugsgjerd, 'The Welfatre State and Political Trust: Bringing Performance Back In', in Handbook on Political Trust, ed. by Sonja Zmerli and Tom W G van der Meer, 2017, pp. 285—86.

110 Kumlin and Haugsgjerd, p. 289.

levels of trust could ostensibly be explained through theories of self–interest, but research has found that "welfare generosity variables seem to exercise largely similar effects on democratic satisfaction across different socioeconomic groups"[111] and even ideological values as well.

Some theories advance that a more equal welfare state encourages the perception of a level playing field for political participation, which could instill a feeling of equal recognition by the state. As such, theories of trust advance that a limited welfare state, high inequality, and subsequent low trust form a self–feeding vicious cycle.[112] Conversely, others argue that social capital is harmed by a generous welfare system because civic engagement and social trust are eroded by the increasing role of the state for those in need. The idea of causality is also extensively debated. While strong welfare states can decrease inequality, inequality may not have a causal influence on social trust. However, in order to form a strong welfare state, societal groups must cooperate, which means that social trust is a prerequisite for the formation of the larger welfare states.

Trust in welfare systems also significantly fluctuates depending on whether the economy is in crisis. In normal times, citizens tend to perceive the welfare state differently than they do in crisis: they are aware of the costs of generous social protection and increasing unemployment may reduce its support.[113] However, large welfare states are even more strongly correlated with political trust during the economic crises of 1930s, 1970s, and the latest one in 2008. The low political trust in smaller welfare states could be explained by the "crisis–retrenchment hypothesis," where crises hurt political trust because they threaten the welfare state (in terms of retrenchment policies) just when it is needed the most. Moreover, political trust is directly

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111 Staffan Kumlin, Isabelle Stadelmann–Steffen, and Atle Haugsgjerd, 'Trust and the Welfare State', in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), I, p. 289, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.8>.

112 Kumlin, Stadelmann–Steffen, and Haugsgjerd, I, p. 390.

113 Kumlin and Haugsgjerd, p. 295.

influenced by public perception of the welfare state, which is based on information learned through the media and personal experiences with the welfare state.[114] This validates the importance of the welfare state in the levels of political trust, as well as the prerequisite in terms of cultural and societal trust needed to build large and effective welfare states.[115]

Democracy and Trust

Trust holds a complicated relationship with democracy. It is necessary for a democracy to function, meanwhile democracy also works to "institutionalize distrust" and put healthy checks on institutional power. This means that not all kinds of trust are advantageous for democracy — as a misplaced trust can lead to authoritarian regimes. Trust must be **warranted**; the trustor needs a reason to believe that their interests converge with those of the trustee.[116] The issue is further complicated, as warrants derive from a variety of sources with various motivations, including the media, institutions, and interpersonal connections. Modern democracies work to strike this balance by drawing clear distinctions between areas designed for conflict and distrust, such as elections and the partisan legislature, as well as areas for trustworthy institutions, such as non-partisan bureaucratic agencies and the judiciary system.

To assess how trust works in a democratic polity, a further distinction needs to be done: "first-order," public trust, and "second-order," representative trust. "First-order" trust, is that given to basic needed services, with impartiality, meaning that electoral politics are not part of the decision making process.[117] For public trust, the warrants are institutional in nature; the norms of public entities are understood by the people they affect, and those who hold public offices must be subject to sanctions if they depart from those norms.[118] Therefore,

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114   Kumlin and Haugsgjerd, p. 290.
115   Kumlin, Stadelmann-Steffen, and Haugsgjerd, i, p. 393.
116   Mark Warren, 'What Kinds of Trust Does a Democracy Need? Trust from the Perspective of Democratic   Theory', in Handbook on Political Trust, ed. by Sonja Zmerli and Tom W.G. van der Meer, 2017, pp. 33–52 (p. 40).
117   Warren, i, p. 89.
118   Warren, i, p. 90.

public trust is betrayed in the presence of corruption and clientelism in particular. Institutions can be attacked by 'political entrepreneurs' for the aforementioned reasons because the information within them is strategic and their function is sophisticated. When the larger public finds it difficult to understand institutional information due to its technicality, it becomes attacked. Leading to distrust by the general public (for example attacks by the far right on institutional trust).[119] Secondly, "second–order" trust stems from elected institutions such as parliament. Parliaments are dependent on second order trust to channel conflict into democratic voting and media.[120] As such, media not only needs to be a trusted and reliable medium, but parliaments also need to be effective in dealing with conflicting views within society, whether those are ideologies, visions of the future, public policy proposals, or general societal trends.

In conclusion, there are five general classifications of trust needed to support a democracy:

- **Generalized trust in society**: this type of trust exists among the citizens of the democracy; it is highly correlated with the performance of a democracy because it is closely tied with social capital, the network of relationships in a society. According to Warren's analysis, "low levels of generalized trust undermine democracy by providing opportunities for political entrepreneurs to organize politics of resentment, religious division, nativism, and racism that feed distrust of any collective provision."[121]

- **Trust in experts and professionals**: legitimizing the work of experts and professionals allows for the division of labor and enables specialization. This trust is especially apparent in the medical field; an extensive review process for every proposed medical policy is needed for people to have confidence in the safety of their medicine.

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119   Warren, I, p. 90.
120   Warren, I, p. 90.
121   Warren, p. 47.

- **Trust in offices that hold a public trust:** these agencies must be insulated from electoral policies and interest group pressures in order to serve the needs of the citizenry in an unbiased manner. Democracy cannot function without a strong, neutral bureaucratic backbone.

- **Second–order trust in political institutions:** this trust is "second–order" because it depends not on trusting that the institution will produce the desired result, but rather that the institution will produce the legal and fair result.

- **Selective trust in representatives:** Similarly, trust in political representation is a kind of modified trust. While most citizens do not trust politicians in general, they have more trust in their particular representatives to serve their personal interests.[122]

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122   Warren, p. 49.

Annex 2: Global and Local perceptions of Trust

This section is dedicated to providing a summary of different researches, studies and reports that aimed at evaluating the perception of trust. Looking at globalized perspective on trust and at more local focus of analysis, this section will review some key assessments of trust.

Global perspectives

There are a number of surveys that, under various perspectives, have attempted to assess the level of trust from a global viewpoint. For instance, the "World Value Survey" published results of a 2014 study which gauges interpersonal (or social) trust in all countries of the world. The results of that study can be quickly glanced at through the following map:

Interpersonal trust attitudes, 2014
Share of people agreeing with the statement "most people can be trusted" (World Value Survey).

Source: Trust – World Value Survey
Note: See source for further details regarding specific survey question.
OurWorldInData.org/trust • CC BY-SA

This map shows higher levels of social trust in the Scandinavian countries, China, Northern America, Australia, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it highlights that levels of social trust plummet in the MENA region, as well as Latin America and Western Europe. Other examples of global surveys that tackle trust in governments in particular. For instance, a 2017 research poll from PEW Research Centre provides a comprehensive picture of the levels of trust in government all over the world:

Few worldwide have a lot of trust in their government

How much do you trust the national government to do what is right for our country?

	A lot	Somewhat	Total
Canada	20%	47%	67%
U.S.	15	36	51
Netherlands	24	47	71
Germany	26	43	69
Sweden	15	52	67
Hungary	9	48	57
UK	14	35	49
Poland	14	28	42
Italy	1	25	26
France	3	17	20
Spain	5	12	17
Greece	1	12	13
Russia	20	47	67
India	39	46	85
Indonesia	30	53	83
Vietnam	31	51	82
Philippines	36	44	80
Japan	6	51	57
Australia	7	41	48
South Korea	2	21	23

Note: Question not asked in Turkey.
Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey. Q4.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Again, countries in Latin American as well as in the MENA region demonstrate low levels of trust that their governments will do the right thing for them. In parallel, those countries that display higher trust in the government are close to the ones that have high social trust (like North America and Scandinavian countries). This may corroborate a sort of correlation between interpersonal trust and trust in the governments in these countries — as highlighted by a part of the literature. However, these correlations need to be nuanced, since other data may show different trends. For instance, such tendencies can be glanced in following graph, from Forbes and Statista:[123]

123 Niall McCarthy, 'The Countries That Trust Their Government Most And Least [Infographic]', Forbes, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/01/22/the-countries-that-trust-their-government-most-and-least-infographic> [accessed 28 April 2020].

Where Trust In Government Is Highest and Lowest

% trusting the government and change from 2017 to 2018 (selected countries)

|	Percentage trust in government (2018)	pp change since 2017
China 🇨🇳	84%	↗ +8%
India 🇮🇳	70%	↘ -5%
Turkey 🇹🇷	51%	→ 0
Canada 🇨🇦	46%	↗ +3%
South Korea 🇰🇷	45%	↗ +17%
Russia 🇷🇺	44%	→ 0
Germany 🇩🇪	43%	↗ +5%
Japan 🇯🇵	37%	→ 0
United Kingdom 🇬🇧	36%	→ 0
Spain 🇪🇸	34%	↗ +9%
United States 🇺🇸	33%	↘ -14%
France 🇫🇷	33%	↗ +9%

@StatistaCharts   Source: Edelman Trust Barometer

statista

On one hand, this data partially confirms the positive correlation between high social trust and high political trust in some countries (such as China and Canada), but it also shows that trust in government is fairly low in some countries where social trust is high (such as the United States). These considerations do not invalidate the data presented in these surveys, but rather demand increased attention in cross-use of statistical data, ultimately showing the need for empirical qualitative research to ground these surveys.

Another dynamic that has been noted in European countries specifically is that people usually trust non-elected institutions more than they trust each other or their political system. This can be visualized in the graph below, based on a study of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):

Note: Response options range from 0 ("No trust at all") to 10 ("Complete trust"). The OECD EU average is the population-weighted average of the values included in the chart.

Source: Eurostat (2015), European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show. do?dataset=ilc_pw03&lang=en.

The fact that all European countries display higher level of trust in police and the legal system in respect of the political system is an important element to take into account.

In general, we can notice a downward trend of public trust in institutions or governments all over the world. For example, data on the United States in particular shows that between 1958 and 2015 public trust in the national government went from a staggering 78 % to a mere 19 %.

Public trust in government, United States, 1958 to 2015
Public trust in government (% who **trust** government in Washington **always or most** of the time)

Our World
in Data

Source: Trust – PEW Research Center (2017)   OurWorldInData.org/trust • CC BY

A similar trend has been observed in interpersonal trust, which also decreased drastically in the last 40 years going from 45.78 % in 1972 to 30.78 % in 2014.[124]

Some final insights can be drawn from the Edelman Trust Barometer, which is a comprehensive source for trust levels in the world. Its latest 2019 edition reveals that trust in CSOs is high and constantly increasing, scoring amongst the highest in institutions all over the world (equated only by financial institutions). Plus, it also shows that trust in media scores the lowest amongst all institutions. Finally, a slight increase in trust in governments has been noted in few countries of the world. As showed above, China remains the country where citizens trust their government the most.[125]

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124 Esteban Ortiz–Ospina and Mx Roser, 'Trust', OurWorldInData.Org, 2020.
125 Edelman, 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer, 2019.

Trust in the MENA region

In order to grasp the specific characteristics of trust in the MENA region, we analyzed recent studies on social and political trust in this region and drawn a few broad notable trends.[126] Generally speaking, social, interpersonal trust has been generally low throughout the region with a tendency of gradual decline. The percentage of people who believe that "most people are trustworthy" generally falls between 10% and 20% in each study. The only exceptions are Egypt and Yemen, which tend to score overall higher percentages, usually between 30% and 40%.

Political trust surveys are distinguished into different facets of the political system and politics. Overall, parliament is the institution with the lowest levels of trust. Especially high levels of distrust in parliament were recorded in Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia. Similar results were found for the council of ministers and local governments. The highest levels of trust were recorded in bureaucratic institutions, including the police and especially the armed forces. Notably, Jordan scored exceptionally high level of trust in these areas, while Palestine scored exceptionally low. The highest levels of distrust, however, were generally found in ideological organizations. Specifically, distrust in political parties is generally high – especially in Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia –, peaking for the main Islamist movements. Notable exceptions are the cases of Morocco, Palestine and Yemen. Religious leaders and presidents (or prime ministers) recorded a tendency of levels of trust around the average, perhaps slightly leaning toward distrust. In this area, higher levels of trust were recorded in Egypt, whilst low levels of trust were recorded in Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. Geographically, both political and social trust tended to be the lowest for Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia and the highest for Egypt and Yemen. Once again, this supports the suggestion on the general positive correlation between social and political trust. The most notable longitudinal trend was the slight spike in

126 The following observations were extrapolated from the Arab Barometer, World Value Survey, Arab Transformations, and Afro–barometer surveys conducted between 2007 and 2019.

trust in 2011 in most countries, particularly those impacted by the Arab Spring, suggesting a general hope for more trustworthy governments throughout the MENA region.

Political Trust in the MENA region has also been linked to the stability of authoritarian regimes. In an authoritarian context, political trust encompasses the confidence people have in state institutions, such as the executive, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the police and the state's ability to respond to short term evaluations of social and economic life changing across a specific time and space.[127] Since most of the literature on political trust derives from samples of democratic countries, case studies of trust in some countries of the MENA region can provide original insights on the study on political trust within repressive or autocratic regimes. For example, in the cases of Tunisia and Turkey the state's reliance on police forces and oppressive means entailed a fall in the trust for the security apparatus — therefore fostering protest activity and activism against them. Both countries reported high levels of trust in police forces (58 % for Tunisia and 62 % for Turkey), but the fact that the security apparatus is mobilized in a repressive way by the state reduces trust in police forces, and increases the likelihood of contentious activism.

Social and Political Trust in Morocco

To conclude this section, we will look at the data on trust that has been reported by different studies specifically in Morocco. Fundamentally, we can refer to the Arab Barometer report on Morocco, which concluded 2400 qualitative face–to–face interviews between October and December 2018, with a response rate of 55%. Although the Royal Institute of Strategic Studies (**Institut Royale des Etudes Strategiques**, or IRES) has revealed that Moroccans judge their institutions very differently, the Arab Barometer reveals a number of important indicators about how Moroccans feel about their institutions.[128]

127   Nadine Sika, 'Trust and Activism in the MENA', MENA Politics Newsletter Vol–ume 2 Issue 2, 2019.

128   Arab Barometer. For more information on the study conducted by

A first general finding of the Arab Barometer report on Morocco is that older Moroccan generations still hold reasonable confidence in the institutions of the country, while the younger generations are increasingly frustrated by the state of affairs, specifically because of the lack of economic and political opportunities.[129] Only 17% of respondents aged between 18–29 affirmed that they trust their government, reaching a level of trust that is three times lower than the trust of those who are 60 and older. Also, in terms of trust in the Parliament, only 21% of youth respondents have a lot of, or some, trust in the institution. A slightly lower percentage of trust (18%) is attributed to political parties.[130] Contrarily, institutions charged with ensuring law and order enjoy higher levels of trust. For example, 78 % of respondents trust the army, and two thirds of them trust police forces. Additionally, 6 in 10 respondents trust the Judiciary apparatus. Notably, a leap in the confidence in the judiciary system has to be highlighted, increasing from 37% in 2006to 45% in 2016.

Furthermore, the overall trust of Moroccans in their government has been declining over the years. In 2006, 39% of Moroccans trusted their government, in comparison to its current standing at 29%. A staggering 64% of Moroccans think that it is necessary to give bribes to get things done, and another 30% think that it is essential to bribe to receive better health services. In relation to corruption, only 36% of respondents think that the government is taking substantial steps in fighting corruption – with youth being once again the category that is least likely to think that government is tackling corruption. In such context, it comes with no surprise that 26% of the respondents think that the economy is the biggest challenge the country has to face.

The most visible element that arises from these numbers is a clear pattern of distrust in government due to corruption, an inefficient and badly perceived parliament and a lack of economic and political opportunities. This pushes citizens (especially the youth) to think of

the IRES, please refer to https://www.ires.ma/forums/degre-de-confi-ance-dans-les-institutions/

129 Arab Barometer, p. 2.
130 Arab Barometer, p. 9.

migrating and increases their distrust in the ability of their government to provide for them. The only institutions which are perceived to be efficient are the ones relating the security apparatus (the army and police forces) and, to a lesser extent, the judiciary. In this situation, Moroccan youth do not feel that their concerns can be canalized through the formal political institutions, especially political parties or parliament, and the job market is not able to absorb the gap of unemployment. All these factors have significantly lowered the trust in Morocco's political system overall, thus sustaining its systematic crisis.

The Trust in Institutions Index demonstrates that the relationship between citizens and their institutions, especially the elected ones, is characterized by suspicion and low levels of trust. Most citizens have little knowledge about their institutions, showing difficulties in understanding their roles, functions and utility. This weak knowledge is coupled with poor quality of public services, such as healthcare and education, and inadequate job opportunities: these constitute the most important priorities that citizens believe the government should address in the next five to ten years. In fact, the poor delivery of public services increases the sense of prevalence of corruption, and hence strengthens citizens' eagerness in seeking other (informal) alternatives to get better public services, such as bribes or Wasta (cronies or political connections). Consequently, this leads to the disengagement of citizens from formal channels of political expression and to resort to new forms of political contestations, such as the economic boycott and street protests.

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