The current institutional design of the National Press Council contains four structural issues that undermine the principles of effective, balanced, and diverse representation, as well as its connection to the will of the profession.
Executive Summary
This paper examines the architecture of representation and elections within the National Press Council in light of the law restructuring the Council. The paper identifies four structural issues shaping this situation: the overlap between the functional position of the publishers and the representation of journalists; the exclusion of unaffiliated publishers from participating in the selection of their sector’s representative; the absence of safeguards to ensure sectoral diversity within the journalists’ representation; and the absence of a minimum electoral threshold to secure a seat within the Council.
The paper argues that these shortcomings may affect the internal balance of the Council, the inclusivity of representation, the diversity of professional expertise, and lead to questioning the legitimate authority of those elected. It therefore proposes moving from a logic focused on meeting the compositional requirements to one focused on the quality of representation. This transition can be achieved by safeguarding an effective balance among the Council’s components, broadening the inclusivity and diversity of representation, and linking the securing of a seat and representative status to clear electoral support.
Introduction
On September 15, 2026, Moroccan journalists elected their representatives to the second National Press Council, in a process expected to restore press self-regulation to its normal institutional framework after four years of deadlock and interim arrangements. The elections toke place in parallel with the process through which publishers’ representatives are appointed by professional organizations, paving the way for the Council to regain its permanent composition. An electorate of 3,418 journalists [2] are eligible to cast their ballots at twelve regional polling stations [[1]. Out of this group, more than 72 percent are concentrated in the Rabat-Salé-Kénitra and Casablanca-Settat regions.
The Council’s first term ended in October 2022, followed by a six-month extension under a decree-law [3], after it proved impossible to organize the elections as scheduled. Subsequently, the authorities, by law, [4] established the Temporary Committee for the Management of the Affairs of the Press and Publishing Sector, to take over for the Council, for maximum duration of two years from the date of appointment. The Committee was also mandated to prepare for the election of the Council’s members. However, this transitional phase also came to an end without elections leaving the self-regulation of the press to continue under non-standard arrangements and prolonging the return to the normal institutional framework.
In parallel, efforts were launched to rebuild the Council’s legal and institutional framework, with the government submitting Bill No. 026.25 to the House of Representatives on July 7, 2025,[5] which was adopted on July 22,2025. The bill was then approved by the House of Councilors on December 24 for that same year. The bill was the subject of extensive professional and political debate, culminating in 96 members of the House of Representatives referring nine of its provisions to the Constitutional Court on January 7, 2026 [6]. On January 22, 2026, in its Decision No. 26/261 [7] the Court ruled that several of the provisions were unconstitutional, including those relating to the balance among the Council’s components, the pluralism of publishers’ representation, and safeguards for neutrality in some of the governing mechanisms.
In response to the Constitutional Court’s decision, the government prepared a new bill, Bill No. 09.26, and submitted it to the House of Representatives on February 27, 2026. The bill was approved by the House of Representatives on May 4, 2026,[8] before being approved by the House of Councilors on June 16, 2026 [9]. It was then published in the Official Gazette on July 6, 2026 [10].
To oversee the transition until the new Council takes office, the law provided for the establishment of a temporary committee, entrusted with exercising the Council’s functions on an interim basis. Their responsibilities included preparing for and organizing the election of professional journalists’ representatives and the appointment of publishers’ representatives and announcing their results. The committee was constituted on July 24, 2026 [11] and consists of a judge representing the High Council of the Judiciary, who serves as its chair; a representative of the National Human Rights Council; a representative of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council; and two members appointed by the Head of Government, one representing publishers and the other professional journalists [12]. Its mandate will end once the new Council takes office [13].
Unlike its previous composition [14], the Council now consists of seventeen members under the new law [15]: seven representatives of professional journalists, seven representatives of publishers, and three members representing national institutions and bodies [16]. Yet, restoring the Council to its permanent composition does not mean that the challenges facing press self-regulation have been resolved. Moving temporary arrangements back to the normal institutional framework involves more than simply holding elections and completing the Council’s composition. It also raises more fundamental questions about the kind of representation produced by the mechanisms which constitute the Council, the balance among its different components, the extent to which all the profession is represented, and whether the electoral system adequately reflects the diversity of the profession.
Against this backdrop, this paper examines four issues arising from the architecture of representation and elections as the new law is implemented. It proposes practical alternatives aimed at strengthening the Council’s legitimacy and representativeness, safeguarding the balance among its components, and enhancing the effectiveness of the press self-regulation model in Morocco.
Three Dimensions of Legitimacy in Press Self-Regulation
The success of the new National Press Council cannot be assessed solely based on whether elections are held or if the period of institutional deadlock is ended. The legitimacy of press self-regulation rests on three closely interconnected dimensions: the legitimacy of representation, the legitimacy of the rules and procedures, and the legitimacy of performance.
A properly conducted electoral process is not enough if it fails to produce balanced representation that reflects the diversity of the professional community. Nor is a legitimately constituted Council sufficient if its work is not governed by clear and impartial rules that ensure equality and transparency. Ultimately, neither can be fully established without independent and effective performance capable of strengthening the confidence of media professionals and the public in the institution.
The new Council will therefore face a dual challenge: restoring trust after years of institutional deadlock and legal and institutional controversy, while demonstrating its ability to exercise its powers independent of factional alignments and particularistic interests. Self-regulation derives its meaning not simply from entrusting the management of the profession’s affairs to its own members, but from their ability to govern the profession within a framework that safeguards pluralism,[17] ensures balance, prevents the concentration of decision-making power, and links autonomy to responsibility and accountability.
The Constitutional Court’s decision is particularly significant in this context, as it established principles directly relevant to press self-regulation. These include, above all, equality and balance in the representation of professional journalists and publishers, safeguards for pluralism in representation, and respect for the principle of neutrality in disciplinary procedures.
Yet, the real significance of these principles lies not simply in their enshrinement in law, but in the extent to which they are translated into rules, procedures, and institutional practices governing the Council’s composition and functioning, and helping to create an enabling environment for protecting freedom and independence of the press [18].
Four Structural Issues Requiring Attention
It is at this level that four structural issues emerge, which warrant closer examination. They are not intended to cast doubt in advance on the legitimacy of the new Council. Rather, they draw attention to aspects that have not been sufficiently resolved by the legal and regulatory framework and that may, in turn, affect the quality of representation and the balance within the Council, as well as the legitimacy of some of the mechanisms governing its work.
1. Limits of Effective Balance between Journalists and Publishers
The efficacy of press councils as self-regulatory mechanisms requires a balanced representation of the profession’s various components, to prevent the risk of an unequal concentration of power. This is particularly important because the Council’s mandate extends beyond a representative role to include the establishment of ethical standards, as well as disciplinary, mediation, and arbitration functions. Balance, therefore, should not be reduced to an equal number of seats but should also take into account the professional positions and interests represented by the Council’s members.
The Constitutional Court’s decision affirmed this principle, holding that increasing the number of publishers’ representatives to nine, compared with seven representatives of professional journalists, would undermine the principle of “equality and balance in the representation of the two professional groups,” which derives from the democratic foundations governing the organization of the press sector set out in Article 28 of the Constitution [19]. In response, the new law provides seven representatives of professional journalists and seven representatives of publishers, alongside three members representing national institutions and bodies.
However, restoring numerical parity does not necessarily resolve the question of effective balance, particularly given the overlap between the status of a professional journalist and the role of the publication director ( or publisher). Article 16 of the Press and Publishing Law[20] requires the publication director to hold the status of a professional journalist. The publication director may also be the owner of the media organization or a major shareholder in it, or may be a person appointed to assume this role when the owner does not hold the status of a professional journalist. In all cases, however, the position of a journalist remains functionally distinct from that of a publication director, who carries both the responsibility for, and the legal and professional power to, manage published content and ensure the organization’s regulatory compliance.
The concern stems from the eligibility rules established by the law restructuring the National Press Council. The electorate for the professional journalists’ representatives comprises all professional journalists who meet the statutory requirements [21], and any journalist who qualifies as an elector and fulfils the other conditions may stand for election [22]. The law does not, however, expressly exclude publication directors from either category. This means that, in principle, all seven seats allocated to professional journalists could be won by publication directors, while the publishers’ organizations could, for their part, designate representatives who also hold positions involving responsibility for publication management. This creates a potential overlap between the two categories of representation: individuals serving as publication directors could occupy seats designated for the representation of professional journalists, while other publication directors or media managers could simultaneously be represented through the publishers’ seats.
This reveals a structural weakness in the Council’s representational design. Numerical parity between journalists and publishers may be achieved, while the professional positions held by those representing them on the Council may overlap to such an extent that the substantive distinction underlying that balance is diminished. The issue, therefore, is not whether publication directors qualify as professional journalists, rather, it is the category they represent when serving on a self-regulatory body whose institutional design is based, from the outset, on distinct representation for journalists and publishers.
This does not, however, imply that publication directors are, in legal terms, publishers or owners of the press organizations they manage. Under the law restructuring the Council, the term “publisher” refers to the press organization itself [23]. The relevant distinction is therefore not between two legal statuses, but between a person’s legal status and the professional function they perform for the purposes of representation.
From this perspective, the representational framework could provide that, for as long as they serve as publication directors, they would not form part of the electorate for the election of the professional journalists’ representatives and would not be eligible to stand for election in that category. Where appropriate, their representation could instead be secured through the arrangements governing the representation of publishers. This would be a rule governing representational affiliation only and would in no way alter their legal status as professional journalists.
Protecting the underlying logic of self-regulation requires a clear distinction between two levels: legal status, which determines who qualifies as a professional journalist, and professional role, which determines the appropriate channel through which that person should be represented on the Council. Genuine balance cannot be reduced to a simple “seven-to-seven” formula. It also requires a meaningful distinction between the professional roles represented by the two groups, to prevent a functional imbalance from being reproduced within a numerically balanced structure.
- Exclusion of Publishers Not Affiliated with Professional Organizations from Representation
The system for representing publishers under the law restructuring the Council raises a question as to whether it adequately encompasses all segments of the publishers’ category, particularly press organizations that have chosen not to belong to any professional organization. Article 5 allocates seven seats to publishers but does not provide for their selection through a direct vote in which all press organizations would participate. Instead, their representatives are designated by professional organizations. Articles 43 to 48 reinforce this approach [24], by basing the calculation of representational entitlement on publishers affiliated with those organizations and making organizational affiliation the effective gateway to participation in determining the publishers’ representation within the Council.
This raises a fundamental question about the representational status of these publishers. Although they remain fully subject to the Council’s authority, rules, and obligations, they have no role in determining the representation of their professional category and no independent avenue through which to participate in its formation. This imbalance becomes particularly apparent in light of Article 62, which requires every publisher to pay an annual mandatory contribution [25]. The current framework therefore creates an asymmetry: publisher status is sufficient to place a publisher under the Council’s authority and subject to its obligations but does not confer any right to participate in determining who represents them. That right is effectively contingent upon membership in a professional organization.
The criticism is not directed at the role of professional organizations in representing their members’ interests. Rather, it concerns the fact that membership has become the sole gateway to representation, instead of serving simply as a means of collective representation. Affiliation is, in principle, a matter of choice, and opting out does not affect a publisher’s legal status. Although the two contexts are different, the rules governing political candidacy offer a useful parallel. Party membership is not an absolute condition for standing election; independent candidates may also stand, subject to requirements intended to ensure the seriousness of their candidacies. The underlying principle is that choosing to remain outside intermediary organizations should not lead to exclusion from representation.
It is true that the Constitutional Court found that the mechanism for designating representatives through professional organizations was not unconstitutional and considered it to fall within the legislature’s discretionary authority. However, its reasoning focused on ensuring that no legally established professional organization was entirely excluded, rather than on the position of publishers who do not belong to any organization. The issue, therefore, is less one of constitutionality than of the inclusiveness of the system and the fairness of the representation it produces. This could have been addressed by providing an avenue for independent publishers to participate, subject to objective requirements, such as securing a minimum number of professional endorsements. Such an arrangement would preserve the role and weight of professional organizations without making membership in them an exclusive condition for participating in the formation of the Council.
Pluralism within the publishers’ category is particularly important. The system should therefore allow for representation that is not confined to professional organizations and should leave room for independent publishers to be represented, thereby broadening the diversity of representation within the Council. This becomes even more important considering concerns expressed by some professional bodies about the possibility of representation becoming concentrated in the hands of a limited number of actors. The Moroccan Federation of Newspaper Publishers, for instance, warned against “seeking to dominate the institution responsible for press self-regulation and control its composition” [26], following the rejection of 69 applications submitted by publishers seeking to participate in the process of designating representatives to the Council. The Temporary Committee for the Management of the Affairs of the Press and Publishing Sector responded that its role was not to select or exclude publishers, but rather to “verify compliance with the legal and regulatory requirements” [27]. Regardless of the disagreement over the reasons for rejecting these applications, the episode underscores the importance of clear safeguards for pluralism and equal access to representation within the publishers’ category.
3. Absence of Sectoral Balance and the Risk of One Sector Dominating Journalists’ Representation
The election system for representatives of professional journalists raises a fundamental question as to whether the representation produced by the ballot can reflect the actual diversity of the profession. While the law provides for seven seats for professional journalists, it does not establish any mechanism to ensure that these seats are distributed across the different sectors of the profession, including print, electronic and audiovisual media, and news agencies. Under the system of a secret ballot in which candidates are elected by relative majority in a single round [28], with each voter entitled to cast votes for up to seven candidates [29], there is nothing in the law to prevent all seven seats from being won by journalists from a single sector.
The concern is not specific to any one sector. The elected representatives could all come from print, electronic, or audiovisual media, depending on the distribution of votes. The electoral system provides only one corrective mechanism, relating to women’s representation, while leaving sectoral diversity entirely to the dynamics of electoral and organizational strength. As a result, a professional group with a larger numerical base, stronger organization, or greater capacity to coordinate voting can translate its advantage into complete control of the seats.
The significance of this issue lies in the fact that the different sectors of the press are not merely distinct technical channels through which journalism is practiced. Print, electronic, and audiovisual media operate within different professional and regulatory environments and face distinct challenges relating to production models, immediacy, digital platforms, broadcasting, and responsibility for content. The audiovisual sector is also subject to a specific regulatory mandate exercised by the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA), while journalists working in that sector remain, provided they hold professional journalist status, within the jurisdiction of the National Press Council. This makes its regulatory environment more complex.
The significance of this issue lies in the fact that the absence of one or more sectors from the Council would not merely constitute a symbolic shortfall in representation; it could also deprive the institution of direct expertise in part of the professional reality it is mandated to regulate. This calls for a distinction between electoral legitimacy and pluralistic representation: the results may be valid under the applicable voting rules yet remain limited in representational terms if they lead to the exclusion of entire sectors of the profession. This is particularly important given the nature of the Council. It is not merely a representative body but a self-regulatory institution responsible for functions relating to professional ethics, disciplinary matters, mediation and arbitration, professional press cards, and giving opinions on the regulation of the profession. Pluralism within the Council is therefore essential to the quality and legitimacy of its professional decisions.
This does not necessarily require a rigid system of sectoral quotas that distribute seats equally among print, electronic and audiovisual media, and news agencies. More flexible mechanisms could instead be considered, such as requiring a minimum level of sectoral diversity, setting a maximum on the number of seats that may be held by journalists from any one sector, or adopting an electoral formula that balances the number of votes received with professional diversity. If the law has sought to ensure balance between journalists and publishers, maintaining balance within the journalists’ representation itself is equally necessary to prevent an electoral majority from becoming a sectoral monopoly over representation.
4. Absence of a Minimum Level of Electoral Support and the Possibility of Winning Without Actual Votes
The voting system used to elect representatives of professional journalists raises another issue concerning the relationship between securing a seat and obtaining a minimum level of electoral support. Regulatory Decision No. 03/2026 of the Temporary Committee allows voters to cast their ballot for one candidate or several candidates, up to a maximum of seven, under a single-round, nominal voting system based on relative majority.
Accordingly, voters are not required to use all seven of their choices; they may vote for a single candidate or for a limited number of candidates. In theory, this could result in votes being concentrated among fewer than seven candidates, for example, if only four candidates receive votes while the remaining candidates receive none. This raises a question : how are the remaining seats to be filled if fewer than seven candidates actually receive votes?
Article 38 of the law restructuring the Council [30] stipulates that candidates be ranked according to the number of votes they receive, followed by the election of the four candidates who obtain the highest number of votes, and then three women journalists who obtain the highest number of votes. It also establishes tie-breaking rules based on seniority in the profession and, where candidates have equal seniority, in a draw. However, it does not require a minimum number of votes to secure a seat.
This gives rise to a problematic scenario. If, for example, votes are concentrated among four candidates while the remaining candidates receive zero votes, a literal reading of Article 38 could treat those candidates as tied in terms of the number of votes they received, and the tie-breaking rules could then be applied to fill the remaining seats. This could result in a seat being awarded to a candidate who received no direct electoral support.
This should not, however, be taken as the only possible interpretation. It could be argued that the phrase “those who receive the highest number of votes” inherently presupposes that a candidate has received at least one vote. Nevertheless, the absence of an explicit provision addressing this situation reveals a regulatory ambiguity that warrants clarification. Seniority and drawing lots may serve to resolve a tie between candidates who have received votes; they should not, however, be understood as mechanisms for compensating for the complete absence of electoral support. If elections are the source of the representative legitimacy of journalists’ representatives, it is therefore reasonable for victory to be contingent upon a minimum level of positive support from the electorate for the candidate.
This issue could be addressed by requiring elected candidates to receive at least one vote, setting a minimum threshold of valid votes, or providing for a supplementary ballot where all seats cannot be filled by candidates who have received actual electoral support. The issue is not the voter’s freedom to select fewer than seven candidates, but rather the absence of a clear rule ensuring that elected status cannot become detached from an actual act of electoral support.
Conclusion
The end of the interim period and the return of the National Press Council to its permanent composition do not resolve the shortcomings of the self-regulatory framework. Although the new arrangements for representation and elections address some of the shortcomings identified by the Constitutional Court’s decision, they still leave room for potential imbalances within the Council, limited inclusiveness and diversity of representation, and a disconnect between winning a seat and securing a minimum level of electoral support. Protecting the legitimacy of self-regulation therefore requires moving beyond the mere legality of the Council’s composition toward the quality of representation, based on three principles:
- Preserving effective balance: by distinguishing, for representational purposes, between professional status and occupational position, thereby preserving differentiation and balance between the two constituencies of journalists and publishers.
- Ensuring inclusive and diverse representation: by providing a pathway for publishers who are not members of professional organizations and guaranteeing a minimum level of sectoral diversity within the journalists’ representation.
- Strengthening electoral legitimacy: by making the allocation of a seat contingent upon actual electoral support and closing loopholes that could allow a seat to be awarded without a genuine representative mandate from the electorate.
Footnotes:
[1] Regulatory Decision No. 03/2026 on the designation of polling station locations and the procedures and formalities to be followed during the voting process for the election of representatives of professional journalists to the National Press Council, National Press Council website, 3 September 2026, available at the following link (accessed 9 September 2026):
[2] The final electoral roll for the category of professional journalists, National Press Council website, 24 August 2026, available at the following link (accessed 9 September 2026):
[3] Decree-Law No. 2.22.770 of 9 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 1444 (6 October 2022), establishing special provisions concerning the National Press Council, Official Gazette, No. 7132, 9 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 1444 (6 October 2022), p. 6511.
[4] Royal Decree-Law No. 1.23.62 of 23 Muḥarram 1445 (10 August 2023), promulgating Law No. 15.23 establishing a temporary committee to manage the affairs of the press and publishing sector, Official Gazette, No. 7228, 21 Ṣafar 1445 (7 September 2023), pp. 7226–7227.
[5] Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Reorganization of the National Press Council, House of Representatives website, available at the following link (accessed 8 October 2025):
[6] Referral letter concerning Law No. 026.25 on the Reorganization of the National Press Council, submitted to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on its conformity with the Constitution.
[7] Constitutional Court Decision No. 261/26, Case No. 309/26, issued on 22 January 2026.
[8] House of Representatives Adopts by Majority Vote the Draft Law on the Reorganization of the National Press Council, House of Representatives website, 5 May 2026, available at the following link (accessed 9 September 2026):
https://www.chambredesrepresentants.ma/ar/CommuniqueSeanceL4526
[9] House of Councilors Adopts the Draft Law on the Reorganization of the National Press Council, House of Councilors website, 19 June 2026, available at the following link (accessed 9 September 2026):
[10] Royal Decree No. 1.26.23 of 9 Muḥarram 1448 (25 June 2026), promulgating Law No. 09.26 on the Reorganization of the National Press Council, Official Gazette, No. 7523, 20 Muḥarram 1448 (6 July 2026), pp. 4184–4200.
[11] Rabat: Inauguration of the Members of the Temporary Committee Entrusted with Exercising the Functions of the National Press Council, Ministry of Youth, Culture and Communication website, 24 July 2026, available at the following link (accessed 9 September 2026):
https://mjcc.gov.ma/ar/%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%b4%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%86-%d9%8a%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%82-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%85%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%b9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86/
[12] Article 96 of Royal Decree No. 1.26.23 of 9 Muḥarram 1448 (25 June 2026), Law No. 09.26 on the Reorganization of the National Press Council.
[13] Ibid
[14] The previous composition of the Council comprised 21 members: seven elected by professional journalists, seven elected by publishers, and seven other members, namely: a representative of the Superior Council of the Judicial Power; a representative of the National Human Rights Council; a representative of the National Council of Languages and Moroccan Culture; a representative of the Association of Bar Associations of Morocco; a representative of the Union of Moroccan Writers; a former publisher appointed by the most representative publishers’ body; and an honorary journalist appointed by the most representative journalists’ union.
[15] Article 5 of Royal Decree No. 1.26.23 of 9 Muḥarram 1448 (25 June 2026), promulgating Law No. 09.26 on the Reorganization of the National Press Council.
[16] The three members representing institutions and bodies are: a judge appointed by the Superior Council of the Judicial Power; a member appointed by the National Human Rights Council; and a member appointed by the Economic, Social and Environmental Council.
[17] Brownlees, N. (2016). Newes Also Came by Letters’: Functions and Features of Epistolary News in English News Publications of the Seventeenth Century. In J. Raymond and N. Moxham (Eds.), News Networks in Early Modern Europe (pp. 394–419). Brill. pp. 403-405.
[18] Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers. (2022, March 17). Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)4 on promoting a favorable environment for quality journalism in the digital age. Council of Europe.
[19] Royal Decree No. 1.11.91 of 27 Shaʿbān 1432 (29 July 2011), promulgating the Constitution, Official Gazette, No. 5964 bis, 28 Shaʿbān 1432 (30 July 2011), p. 3606.
[20] Royal Decree No. 1.16.122 of 6 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 1437 (10 August 2016), promulgating Law No. 88.13 on the Press and Publishing, Official Gazette, No. 6491, 11 Dhū al-Qaʿdah 1437 (15 August 2016), p. 5969.
[21] Article 23 of Royal Decree No. 1.26.23 of 9 Muḥarram 1448 (25 June 2026), promulgating Law No. 09.26 on the Reorganization of the National Press Council, pp. 4188–4189.
[22] Article 25 of the aforementioned reference, p. 4189.
[23] Article 1 of the aforementioned reference, p. 4185.
[24] The aforementioned reference, pp. 4192–4193.
[25] The aforementioned reference, p. 4196.
[26] The Moroccan Federation of Newspaper Publishers Condemns the Temporary Committee’s Exclusion of 69 Nomination Files for the National Press Council, Al Yaoum 24, 9 September 2026, available at the following link (accessed 10 September 2026):
https://alyaoum24.com/2042963.html
[27] Clarification Regarding the Statement Issued by the Moroccan Federation of Newspaper Publishers, National Press Council website, 9 September 2026, available at the following link (accessed 10 September 2026):
[28] Article 22 of the aforementioned reference, p. 4188.
[29] Article 3 of Regulatory Decision No. 03/2026 of the Temporary Committee.
[30] Royal Decree No. 1.26.23 of 9 Muḥarram 1448 (25 June 2026), promulgating Law No. 09.26 on the Reorganization of the National Press Council, p. 4191.
Mohammed Karim Boukhssass
A lecturer in journalism and media studies at Moulay Ismail University in Meknes, previously taught at the Higher Institute of Journalism and Communication in Casablanca. He holds a PhD in Media and Communication Sciences and worked as a professional journalist for 13 years in various media institutions, most recently with the Moroccan weekly newspaper "Al-Ayyam." Throughout his career, he produced numerous investigative reports that earned both national and international awards, including the "National Press Grand Prize" twice (2018 and 2022), the "European Union Migration Media Award" (2019), the "National Award for Young Journalists" (2018), and the "Prometheus Award for Best Public Finance Report" (2020). He was also nominated twice for the Arab media Award organized by the Dubai Press Club (2017–2019). He authored the book "Introductions to the Sociology of Events" and contributed to the publication of three collective works on "Communication in the Age of Digital Transformation," "Media Disinformation," and "Writing in the Media Context".
