Press Self-Regulation: Another Step Backward

Following the government’s takeover of the National Press Council in its previous form and the subsequent rollback of several achievements, eight major challenges undermine press self-regulation in Morocco.

Executive Summary

The approval by the House of Representatives of a draft law restructuring the National Press Council marks a new setback in Morocco’s press self-regulation trajectory. Earlier government decisions had already placed the Council in a state of paralysis. First, the mandate of the previous Council was extended for six months. Then, a temporary committee was established for two years. The new legislative initiative has failed to achieve its primary objective, which is to organize elections to renew the Council. Instead of holding the government accountable for its failure to implement the laws accordingly, particularly since both the extension decree and the law establishing the temporary committee explicitly mandated elections, the newly adopted text retreats from the principle of electoral legitimacy. It also introduces new structural weaknesses that undermine both the philosophy and the core foundations of self-regulation.

Introduction

On 22 July 2025, nearly two and a half years after a transitional process that failed to hold elections for a new Council, the House of Representatives (the first chamber of Parliament) approved a draft law restructuring the National Press Council.[1] During this period, the mandate of the outgoing Council, which had expired in October 2022, was exceptionally extended for six months.[2] Subsequently, a temporary committee was established by law to oversee the press and publishing[3] sector in lieu of the Council, with a two-year mandate beginning on the date of its members’ appointment in September 2023.

These measures were intended to create the conditions necessary for organizing new elections after previous attempts had failed. The preamble of the extension decree explicitly stated that the decision was “dictated by the Council’s inability to organize elections on time,” as deliberated by the Council of Government at its meeting on 29 September 2022. Later, Article 4 of the law establishing the temporary committee specified that one of its responsibilities was “preparing and organizing the elections of the members of the National Press Council in accordance with the applicable legislative and regulatory provisions,”[4] while affirming that such elections must be held before the end of the committee’s two-year mandate.[5]

However, by the time the committee’s mandate expired, elections had not been organized-a clear violation of the provisions contained in the law establishing the National Press Council, the extension decree, and the law creating the temporary committee. As a result, the trajectory of press self-regulation in Morocco entered a new era, marked by exceptional arrangements that consumed two and a half years without activating the electoral mechanism, notably the central pillar of this process.

This negative trajectory was reinforced by the introduction of a draft law to restructure the National Press Council, which includes regressive provisions concerning the principle of elections. It reshapes the very identity of the National Press Council, which is entrusted with the mission of press self-regulation, widely recognized as the most effective means of safeguarding press freedom.[6] This mission requires both: the protection of journalistic independence; and the strict observance of the principle of non-interference by other authorities in the Council’s affairs.

 

Regression of Press Self-Regulation: From the Council to Its Restructuring

The National Press Council, established as the self-regulatory body of a sector with legal status and financial independence, came into being in October 2018. It represented one of the most significant innovations of the 2016 Press and Publishing Code and the culmination of professional mobilization efforts to institutionalize press self-regulation. The positive climate following the 2011 Constitution, which stipulates in Article 28 that “public authorities shall encourage the organization of the press sector in an independent manner, on democratic foundations, and on the establishment of its legal and ethical rules,” accelerated this process. Morocco, thus, became one of the pioneering Arab states to adopt and operationalize a mechanism for press self-regulation.

The establishment of the Council faced challenges from the very outset; foremost among them were delays in adopting the regulatory legal text. The parliamentary process of ratification took approximately nine months from when the government approved the bill on 29 July 2015 to its publication in the Official Gazette on 7 April 2016. Further delays occurred in the issuance of implementing decrees,[7] which were not promulgated until 2019. In addition, elections to constitute the Council were postponed for more than two years after the adoption of the founding law. They were eventually held on 22 June 2018, and the Council was not formally installed until 5 October 2018, following the election of its president and vice-president.

The Council is composed of 21 members,[8]19 of whom are elected and 2 are appointed. Elected members includes even journalists, seven newspaper publishers, and five individuals representing constitutional institutions (the High Council of the Judiciary, the National Human Rights Council, and the National Council for Moroccan Languages and Culture),as well as professional associations (the Association of Bar Associations and the Union of Moroccan Writers). The two appointed members are a former publisher designated by the most representative publishers’ association and an honorary journalist designated by the most representative journalists’ union. The mandate of Council members lasts four years, renewable once.[9]

The Council’s primary responsibilities[10]include self-regulating the press and publishing sector, drafting a Code of Ethics[11] (adopted in July 2019), issuing professional press cards, ensuring mediation and arbitration of disputes among professionals or between professionals and third parties, monitoring compliance with press freedom, and adjudicating disciplinary cases involving institutions or professionals who violate their professional obligations, the Code of Ethics, or the Council’s internal regulations. The Council is also mandated to issue advisory opinions on draft laws and decrees concerning the profession, propose measures to develop the sector, conduct relevant studies, contribute to training initiatives, and establish partnerships. Moreover, it is tasked with preparing an annual report which discusses indicators of press freedom, documents violations and infringements, and assesses the situation of the press and journalists. This annual report, along with other thematic reports on issues related to the sector, is published in the Official Gazette.[12]

To carry out its functions, the Council has established five standing committees:[13] the Committee on Ethics and Disciplinary Affairs; the Professional Press Card Committee (chaired by a professional journalist who is a Council member); the Committee on Training, Studies, and Cooperation; the Mediation and Arbitration Committee (chaired by a representative of the High Council of the Judiciary); and the Committee on Media Enterprises and Sector Development (chaired by a publisher who is a Council member). The Council may also establish additional ad hoc committees when necessary.

On 4 October 2022, the mandate of the sitting members of the National Press Council expired without organizing new elections and without publishing a comprehensive performance report to allow for evaluation. Nor were the lists of journalists who received professional press cards in the years when the Council was responsible for issuing them (2020-22) made public, despite the Council’s 2021 announcement that it had engaged in consultations with the Commission for the Protection of Personal Data to ensure “the conditions of integrity and transparency”[14] in publishing these lists. The Council subsequently provided no update on the outcome of these consultations, and the full lists were never published. Furthermore, throughout its four years of activity, the Council failed to produce the annual report on press freedom indicators and recorded violations, which would have been published in the Official Gazette.

In addition, no consistent or detailed information was provided regarding the Council’s handling of disciplinary cases that are essential to professional and ethical accountability.[15]Public announcements of complaints and their outcomes were rare. Between August 2019 and December 2020, the Council reported receiving 40 complaints[16] but did not share comprehensive details on actions taken, cases reviewed, or decisions issued, apart from a single report on breaches of the Code of Ethics during the COVID-19 period.[17] It also remains unclear whether the Council ever applied the mechanism for ex officio review[18]pursuant to the request of a majority of its members, as permitted by its founding law. Press releases rarely mentioned proactive interventions, even as ethical violations persisted with some newspapers specializing in defamatory reporting.[19] This raises concerns about procedural transparency and possible selectivity in addressing violations.

The most critical disruption to press self-regulation was the Council’s failure to hold renewal elections, despite the exceptional six-month extension of its mandate by government decree. This extension was intended solely to allow elections within that period, but disagreements among professional associations and trade unions within the Council over the renewal process resulted in an impasse. Conflict was compounded by a proposal to abolish elections altogether, presented in draft legislation to amend the regulatory framework[20] of the National Press Council.[21] Although later withdrawn, the proposal sought to replace elections with appointments by the two most representative organizations of journalists and publishers, alongside other measures that would have weakened the foundations of press self-regulation.

When the extension expired on 4 April 2023, the National Press Council entered a “legal vacuum.” A law was then adopted, transferring all the Council’s powers to a temporary committee to manage the press and publishing sector.[22]The committee was also mandated to: conduct a comprehensive assessment of the sector and propose measures to strengthen its regulatory foundations within nine months; reinforce cooperation among press stakeholders; and organize and hold Council elections.[23] Unlike the previous 21-member structure, the temporary committee was composed of 9 members: the outgoing Council president, who served as chair; three former Council members (the vice-president and the chairs of the Ethics and Press Card Committees); three appointees of the Prime Minister; a judge delegated by the High Council of the Judiciary; and a representative of the National Human Rights Council.[24]

The government’s creation of this temporary committee initially appeared to provide a pragmatic solution to institutional impasse. However, a closer examination reveals a shift towards governmental control and a retreat from key achievements in press self-regulation. This is evident in the reliance on appointments, inconsistent with the essence of self-regulation and tied directly to the executive branch. The selective inclusion of certain former Council members also functioned as a “disguised extension,” raising questions about the criteria for selection and whether they reflected prior positions on the renewal process. A central concern is delegating the responsibility of organizing elections to individuals who had already failed to do so during their earlier mandate.

These concerns were reinforced when the 2-year mandate of the temporary committee ended without the organization of elections and without the publication of the comprehensive assessment of the sector and proposed supporting measures, which the law required within 9 months of its appointment. This replicated the scenario that had occurred at the conclusion of the Council’s term: no performance report and no elections. In practice, two and a half years were lost without activating the electoral mechanism. For the third time, the government intervened legislatively. After the extension decree and the law establishing the temporary committee, a new draft law was introduced to restructure the Council.

 

Restructuring the Council: Another Setback for Self-Regulation

A few weeks before the end of the mandate of the temporary committee, and without organizing elections as required by its statutory law, the government once again intervened to seek a way forward. Rather than having the supervising ministry instruct the committee to implement the legal provisions related to elections, the government presented a draft law to restructure the National Press Council at its meeting on 3 July 2025. The draft was approved by the Council of Government and was then submitted to the House of Representatives on 7 July 2025, which ultimately adopted it by majority vote in a plenary session on 22 July 2025 (87 votes in favor and 25 opposed).[25] On the same day, the legislation was referred to the House of Councilors, where it is expected to be debated in the upcoming legislative session.

Ordinarily, draft laws concerning society and the press sector are preceded by broad consultations with professionals and civil society representatives, as practiced in earlier legislative processes. This draft law, however, departed from that practice. It was submitted for approval without involving key professional associations and trade unions that had participated in drafting previous press legislation, such as the National Union of the Moroccan Press and the Moroccan Federation of Newspaper Publishers. In response, 35 professional and human rights organizations[26] issued a statement affirming that the draft was submitted unilaterally and outside the framework of genuine participatory consultation.[27]By contrast, the Moroccan Association for Media and Publishers expressed a different view, describing the draft as a reflection of clear will to overcome past dysfunctions and the culmination of broad consultations involving the various components of the media field, thereby granting it a consensual character that should constitute a solid basis for effective implementation.[28]The Association emphasized that it represents a pivotal step towards rebuilding the National Press Council on stronger foundations, with a reformist spirit that takes into account the lessons of the previous phase.[29] This position emerged, however, in the absence of similar endorsements or evidence of direct involvement from other journalist unions or organizations.

The draft law, as approved by the House of Representatives, contains 98 articles, an increase from the 32 articles in the 2016 law that originally established the Council. Of these, 35 articles regulate the composition of the Council,[30]accounting for more than one-third of the text. These provisions depart from the principle of elections in the publishers’ category by replacing them with appointment mechanisms, whereby members are designated by professional organizations based on representativeness.[31] Elections remain in place only for professional journalists, conducted by a secret ballot and decided by the relative majority.[32]

The draft also introduces additional provisions. It strengthens the representation of publishers within the Council’s composition, providing that 7 elected journalist members will be matched by 7 appointed publishers, in addition to 2 “senior publishers” designated by the most representative professional organization.[33] It extends the membership term from 4 to 5 years[34] and reduces the seniority requirement for journalists running as candidates from 15 years to 10.[35]Moreover, it removes the stipulation that the Professional Press Card Committee must be chaired by a professional journalist, and codifies the disciplinary sanction of a temporary suspension of the Professional Press Card[36] in the event of repeat violations within 3 years.[37] Under the previous law, the Council determined the duration of such suspensions.

 

Eight Structural Challenges Threatening the Project of Self-Regulation

A close reading of the new provisions introduced by the draft law restructuring the National Press Council, coupled with an examination of the rapid process through which it was passed in the first chamber of Parliament, reveals a set of regressions that undermine the core philosophy of press self-regulation. These are reflected in eight principal challenges:

1. Absence of meaningful debate: Counter to the established legislative practices in Morocco regarding press regulation, the draft law restructuring the National Press Council was not subjected to sufficient consultation and was prepared in a unilateral process. This concern was raised in statements and communications by professional and human rights organizations after the draft was referred to the second chamber of Parliament. These actors stressed that building consensus around press legislation is a fundamental condition for ensuring its social legitimacy and effective implementation, and that states carry a positive obligation to create a suitable legislative framework to achieve this goal as guarantors of pluralism.[38] Comparative experience shows that self-regulation succeeds only when all professional stakeholders are fully engaged in consensus.[39]
2. Inequality in representation mechanisms: The draft establishes a clear imbalance between the two main components of the Council. It maintains the election of professional journalists through individual secret ballots while replacing elections for publishers with an appointment system, whereby representatives are designated by the most representative professional associations. This differentiation raises questions regarding its justification. The founding experience of the Council was based on elections for both categories, albeit with procedural differences where publishers were elected individually and journalists were elected through a list system. Abandoning elections for publishers undermines democratic guarantees and weakens both parity and the legitimacy of representation within a body that should operate on the principle of peer governance. Either a well-argued legislative rationale must be provided to explain this exception, with clear criteria and safeguards, or the election mechanism should be reinstated for publishers to restore procedural symmetry and representative legitimacy.
3. Overrepresentation of publishers: Press councils as self-regulatory mechanisms generally operate on the principle of parity between different components of the profession or on a carefully balanced arrangement reinforced by independent members representing the public, as to prevent collusion that might harm public interest. The draft law, however, grants publishers a numerical dominance, raising their representation to 9 members (7 appointed publishers plus 2 “senior publishers”) compared to 7 journalists. In the previous law, the two categories were equally represented. This shift introduces a structural imbalance in the representation of interests within the Council, increases the risk of conflicts of interest, and may limit the Council’s ability to carry out its disciplinary and ethical functions as a form of peer adjudication, especially in cases involving publishing institutions themselves. This imbalance risks undermining neutrality, legitimacy, and public trust in the Council’s decisions. International comparisons show press councils tend to maintain numerical parity and avoid dominance by any single group.
4. Representation by financial capacity rather than editorial impact: The weight of a media institution should be assessed by its influence, ethical standards, and editorial quality, not by its financial turnover. Yet, the draft law introduces an atypical model by international standards; it links publishers’ representation in the Council to quotas based on annual turnover and number of employees. This design privileges financially larger companies over those with greater readership, influence, or editorial reputation, raising fundamental questions about the relationship between capital and ethics. Since the Council’s mission is to safeguard journalistic ethics and press freedom, rather than evaluate corporate size, this approach risks entrenching financial power as the basis of representation.

In practice, the supervisory committee calculates each professional organization’s representativeness according to these financial quotas.[40] This incentivizes organizations to promote publishers with the largest financial turnover to secure Council seats. In effect, financial power is converted into representational influence within a body whose primary role should be professional accountability and the protection of the public. The imbalance deepens when considering how representativeness is determined: additional votes are allocated based on declared employees and turnover, with a ceiling of 20 votes per institution.[41] For example, a company with a turnover below 3 million dirhams receives one vote, while a company with a turnover above 9 million dirhams may receive up to 20 votes. Such disparities exacerbate risks of conflicts of interest and constrain the Council’s capacity to enforce disciplinary and ethical standards in cases involving powerful publishing houses.

A further consideration highlights a structural paradox: Does Morocco even have “large” media companies independent of state subsidies? Since the COVID-19 crisis, most outlets have relied heavily on public support to cover salaries and operating costs. Public funding for the press rose from 58 million dirhams in 2019[42] to 325 million dirhams in 2024,[43] with 10% of companies absorbing 80% of available funds.[44] In this context, classifying outlets as “large” depends less on market performance and more on public subsidy. This raises the question of legitimacy: Can disciplinary powers, such as suspending professional press cards, be entrusted to a Council whose representational balance is determined by financial criteria tied to state funding?

Finally, the distribution of public subsidies to cover salaries must be assessed against Article 7 of the Press and Publishing Code, which stipulates: “The press and publishing sectors benefit from public support based on principles of transparency, equal opportunity, and neutrality, to foster readership, promote pluralism, and support human resources.”[45] Tying representation in the Council to financial capacity risks concentrating power in heavily funded institutions. These institutions are also the most vulnerable to political bias or ethical breaches, which undermines pluralism and erodes public trust.

5. Opening membership to non-practicing media owners: The institutional logic of self-regulatory bodies rests on the principle of peer governance or adjudication by colleagues. This requires prioritizing the representation of practicing professionals, such as journalists and editors-in-chief, alongside representatives of the public and civil society institutions, to separate commercial interests from the functions of handling complaints and enforcing ethical codes. These functions earn legitimacy when they remain independent from government and financial influence, and when the profession itself is responsible for setting and applying the rules.

The draft law restructuring the National Press Council departs from this principle by opening membership to owners of media institutions who are not practicing professionals, such as investors without editorial or journalistic roles. The membership criteria in the draft law do not explicitly require direct professional practice or editorial responsibility. This undermines the principle of peer adjudication, considering a Council entrusted with receiving complaints, mediating disputes, and disciplining journalists should be composed of experts in journalistic practice and editorial work, not of business owners disconnected from the profession.

This marks a regression from the founding law of the National Press Council, which in Article 5 defined the publisher specifically as the person assuming the role of editor-in-chief within the publishing institution.[46] The same article required publishers to possess a minimum of 15 years of professional seniority.[47] The new draft law, however, does not explicitly require that a publisher be the editor-in-chief or have any professional experience. Instead, Article 44 defines eligibility in administrative and legal terms related to the publishing company, such as legal status, duration of establishment, and tax compliance, without requiring professional expertise or editorial responsibility.[48]

By removing the requirement that a publisher also be an editor-in-chief, the draft law opens the door for non-practicing media owners to hold Council membership, even if they lack an understanding of journalistic practice. In Morocco, many business figures invest in media companies as they would in industrial or commercial sectors. Some publishing companies are run by political party leaders who use them as news platforms for their party, which could allow a party’s secretary-general to obtain a seat on the Press Council. Similarly, certain private newspapers are owned by investment groups linked to large holding companies and chaired by influential businessmen with clear political affiliations. Under the new provisions, such actors could secure full membership in the Council, thereby threatening its independence.

Allowing business and political figures to hold membership in the National Press Council jeopardizes its ability to perform its core functions, which require professional expertise. The primary tasks of press councils worldwide include adjudicating complaints, mediating disputes, and enforcing ethical codes. These responsibilities presuppose the involvement of media professionals rather than financial investors. This principle is reinforced by the Alliance of Independent Press Councils of Europe (AIPCE), which brings together 32 councils, including two from Canada. The AIPCE underscores that press councils must remain independent from government,  and that drafting and enforcing codes of ethics should fall within the responsibility of journalists and publishers.[49]

6. Elections overseen by government appointees: Assigning the responsibility of supervising the upcoming elections to constitute a new National Press Council to the temporary committee created by government decree raises fundamental concerns about the independence of press self-regulation. According to Article 96 of the draft law, the committee is tasked with preparing the elections of professional journalists, appointing publisher representatives, organizing the electoral process, and announcing the results after the law is published in the Official Gazette.[50] The committee is chaired by the judge who serves as a member of the Council. Beyond its creation by government decision, its composition is largely shaped by appointments made by the Prime Minister,[51] who selected 3 of the 7 professional members. This raises concerns about neutrality and representational balance, particularly if one affiliation is favored. All publisher members belong to the same professional association where they hold leadership positions, despite that association’s participation in the electoral contest.

The article further stipulates that managing the elections and announcing the results remain in the hands of the members appointed by the Prime Minister, even if current members lose eligibility. The second paragraph requires any member who intends to stand for the new Council to recuse themselves from supervising elections or appointments and to notify the chair within 2 days of the law’s publication; failure to do so results in the disqualification of the member. The third paragraph requires at least 1 representative of professional journalists and 1 of publishers; if this is not feasible, the Prime Minister may appoint 2 members to meet this condition. The effect is to entrust preparation, supervision, and announcement of results to a committee dominated by government appointees, with some seats potentially filled directly by the Prime Minister. This arrangement conflicts with the philosophy of self-regulation, which is grounded in the independence of electoral processes.

7. Lack of public representation: International experience shows that press self-regulation is most effective when it incorporates direct public representation, which provides societal oversight and reduces the risk of “professional collusion.” Comparative models demonstrate that press councils can balance professional and public voices; for instance, the Swedish Press Council includes presiding judges, 16 representatives of professional organizations, and 12 members of the public with no direct ties to the media sector. By contrast, Morocco’s founding law for the National Press Council did not provide for direct public representation. Public participation was indirect, through a representative of the Moroccan Bar Association and a representative of the Union of Moroccan Writers,[52] both considered independent bodies whose mandates intersect with the press by defending rights and justice and with writers symbolizing society’s voice.

The new draft law goes further by removing these two representatives without introducing meaningful public participation through, for example, consumer protection associations, which are common in other countries. Instead, it adds a member appointed by the Economic, Social and Environmental Council,[53] a constitutional institution. The absence of a societal check risks enabling professional collusion. Introducing clear public representation or independent members selected according to criteria of integrity and impartiality would strengthen the Council’s independence and neutrality, in line with comparative models that balance professional and public representation.

8. Harsher disciplinary sanctions: The draft law restructuring the National Press Council moves towards stricter disciplinary sanctions against professional journalists and media institutions. It maintains the existing scale of penalties: warning, reprimand, censure, and temporary suspension of the Professional Press Card for up to 1 year. However, in cases of repeat violations, it removes the Council’s discretion over the suspension period and sets it at 3 years.[54] This raises concerns regarding proportionality and graduated sanctioning. The suspension of the press card has serious consequences, as it legally prevents the journalist from practicing. Article 4 of the 2016 Statute of Professional Journalists stipulates that professional status is proven by possession of a press card;[55] Article 6 specifies that the card is issued by the National Press Council;[56] and Article 11 prohibits a media institution from employing a journalist for more than 3 months without a valid press card for the current year.[57] Extending the suspension period, thus, places journalists at risk of being considered as “usurping the title” of journalist if they continue working.

Calls for stricter regulation of the press card originated within the profession to combat impostors. Yet, from a theoretical standpoint, such severity conflicts with the philosophy of press freedom, since journalism is an extension of freedom of expression, not an activity requiring prior authorization,[58] to borrow Jean-Claude Bertrand’s phrasing.

An additional restrictive tendency appeared in the earlier version of the draft law approved by the government, which included the sanction of suspending a newspaper for 1 month. The House of Representatives later removed this provision, as it contradicted Article 104 of the Press and Publishing Code,[59] which stipulated that the suspension of publications falls within the exclusive competence of the judiciary and not administrative bodies. Another new provision, however, allows for criminal proceedings if a journalist fails to comply with an issued decision to return a suspended press card. Article 91 of the draft law states that “the Council president must notify the competent public prosecutor if a journalist refuses to return the Professional Press Card after being informed of the disciplinary decision suspending it.”[60]

Positive Aspects Amid the “Darkness”

Despite the many structural deficiencies identified, a few positive features, though limited, can be observed and should be preserved. These can be summarized in four points:

Extending the mandate from four to five years: This can be considered a positive step from the perspective of institutional stability and the accumulation of expertise, provided it is accompanied by mechanisms of periodic accountability, such as a binding requirement to publish annual reports and other mandated evaluations.

Reducing the seniority requirement for journalist candidates from 15 to 10 years: This signals an effort to renew the profession generationally. It is supported by earlier data from the Professional Press Card Committee, which indicated that 50.3% of professional journalists have less than 10 years of experience.[61] The reform broadens the representational base and allows newer professional competencies to participate.

Advancing gender parity: The previous Council composition fell far short of parity — four women compared to 17 men. The new provisions move closer to parity by requiring the election of at least three women journalists among the seven journalist seats. The same logic should be extended to other categories of membership.

Preserving the principle of elections for professional journalists: Maintaining the individual secret ballot and relative majority system for journalists reinforces the democratic character of representation and enhances the legitimacy of delegation within this category.

Conclusion

This new legislative impasse, as an extension of earlier government decisions (the extension decree and the creation of the temporary committee), has diverted the trajectory of press self-regulation in Morocco towards exceptional arrangements that undermined its coherence and produced structural distortions inconsistent with its philosophy. Addressing these deficiencies is essential to restore progress rather than regression. In practice, this requires amending the draft law and revising several of its provisions in the House of Councilors, paving way for a second reading in the House of Representatives that restores coherence to the regulatory framework. Such revision should be grounded in three core principles:

1. Recognizing press self-regulation as a national achievement that must be protected: Press self-regulation should be treated as an unprecedented historical gain in the region, achieved in Morocco through professional struggle and constitutional development. This entails safeguarding the democratic option, upholding the principle of elections, ensuring the independence of professional representation, excluding appointment mechanisms, and preventing financial criteria from shaping the Council’s composition.
2. Ensuring broad debate and pluralism: Public deliberation on press laws has been one of the main achievements of Morocco’s political experience, alongside pluralism of opinion. All stakeholders should be empowered to contribute to safeguarding self-regulation, with the public given a meaningful role within the Council’s structure.
3. Preventing the transformation of the Council into a source of material gain: Representation is a responsibility, not a channel for enrichment, and should not contribute to stalled electoral processes. Compensation, including allowances for transport, accommodation, and participation in meetings and committees, must be capped and regulated, as current levels significantly exceed the average salaries of journalists.[62] The monthly allowance received by the Council president should also be made public, since withholding this information encourages speculation and undermines the right of journalists and citizens to access information.

Footnoes

[1]Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, as adopted by the House of Representatives on 22 July 2025.

[2]Decree-Law No. 2.22.770 of 6 October 2022 (9 Rabi I 1444) establishing special provisions concerning the National Press Council. Official Gazette, No. 7132, 6 October 2022, p. 6511.

[3]Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.23.62 of 10 August 2023 (23 Muharram 1445) enacting Law No. 15.23 establishing a temporary committee to manage the press and publishing sector. Official Gazette, No. 7228, 7 September 2023, pp. 7226–7227.

[4]Article 4 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.23.62 of 10 August 2023 enacting Law No. 15.23 establishing a temporary committee to manage the press and publishing sector, cited above, p. 7227.

[5]Article 2 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.23.62 of 10 August 2023 enacting Law No. 15.23 establishing a temporary committee to manage the press and publishing sector, cited above, p. 7227.

[6]The Swedish Press and Broadcasting Authority. Regulation of the Media and Media Subsidy. ITP, 19 January 2023, p. 16.

[7]Decree specifying the procedures for granting and renewing the professional press card, and the decree appointing the government delegate to the National Press Council.

[8]Article 4 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.24 of 10 March 2016 (30 Jumada I 1437) enacting Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council. Official Gazette, No. 6454, 7 April 2016, p. 2962.

[9]Article 6 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.24 of 10 March 2016 enacting Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council, cited above, p. 2963.

[10]Article 3 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.24 of 10 March 2016 enacting Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council, cited above, pp. 2961–2962.

[11]Decision of the President of the National Press Council concerning the publication of the Press Ethics Charter in the Official Gazette. Official Gazette, No. 6799, 29 July 2019, pp. 5326–5329.

[12]Article 3 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.24 of 10 March 2016 enacting Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council, cited above, p. 2962.

[13]Article 12 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.24 of 10 March 2016 enacting Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council, cited above, p. 2964.

[14]“Statistics and data on the distribution of professional press cards for 2021.” National Press Council website, 29 July 2021. Accessed 7 September 2025: https://h1.nu/1duK5

[15]Bertrand, Claude-Jean. La Déontologie des Médias. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1997, p. 10.

[16]“Communiqué on the occasion of National Media Day.” National Press Council website, 15 November 2020. Accessed 7 September 2025: https://h1.nu/1duHw

[17]Interim Report: “COVID-19, Monitoring Press Ethics.” National Press Council, 7 July 2020. Accessed 7 September 2025: https://h1.nu/1dus3/

[18]Article 39 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.24 of 10 March 2016 enacting Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council, cited above, p. 2967.

[19]One of the rare instances in which the National Press Council announced referring a case to the Ethics Committee concerned the “stigmatization” of national football team player Zakaria Aboukhlal by an online newspaper. The Council published a communiqué on 25 December 2022.

[20]Draft bill amending and supplementing Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council. Registration No. 204, House of Representatives, 18 January 2023. Withdrawn by a letter from the heads of parliamentary groups on 3 February 2023 before referral to committee.

[21]The draft bill was submitted by the National Rally of Independents, the Authenticity and Modernity Party, the Istiqlal Party for Unity and Egalitarianism, the Popular Movement, the Constitutional Democratic and Social Group, and the Party of Progress and Socialism.

[22]Article 3 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.23.62 of 10 August 2023 enacting Law No. 15.23 establishing a temporary committee to manage the press and publishing sector, cited above, p. 7227.

[23]Article 4 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.23.62 of 10 August 2023 enacting Law No. 15.23 establishing a temporary committee to manage the press and publishing sector, cited above, p. 7227.

[24]Article 5 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.23.62 of 10 August 2023 enacting Law No. 15.23 establishing a temporary committee to manage the press and publishing sector, cited above, p. 7227.

[25]Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council. House of Representatives website. Accessed 8 October 2025: https://www.chambredesrepresentants.ma/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9/mshrw-qanwn-rqm-02625-ytlq-baadt-tnzym-almjls-alwtny-llshaft

[26]The thirty-three organizations that signed the 9 August statement included trade unions, professional associations, and human rights groups. Listed in the statement were the National Union of the Moroccan Press, the Moroccan Federation of Newspaper Publishers, the National Federation of Journalism, Media, and Communication (UMT), the National Union of Media and Press (CDT), the Organization for Freedom of Media and Expression (Hatem), the Moroccan Press Club, the Forum of Honorary Journalists in Morocco, the Moroccan Confederation of Newspaper and Digital Media Publishers, the Moroccan Association of Young Journalists, and others.

[27]“Statement: Trade union, professional, and human rights organizations announce a national protest program against the draft law restructuring the National Press Council.” National Union of the Moroccan Press website, 9 August 2025. Accessed 8 September 2025: https://h1.nu/1dDhi

[28]“Publishers’ Association: The new draft law is a pivotal step toward rebuilding the CNP.” Zone 24, 10 July 2025. Accessed 8 September 2025: https://zone24.ma/8283.html

[29]Ibid.

[30]Articles 19–53 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council.

[31]Article 43 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, p. 8.

[32]Article 22 of the same source, p. 5.

[33]Article 5 of the same source, p. 2.

[34]Article 6 of the same source, p. 2.

[35]Article 25 of the same source, p. 5.

[36]Article 56 of the same source, p. 11.

[37]Article 89 of the same source, p. 16.

[38]Council of Europe. Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Media Pluralism and Transparency of Media Ownership. Adopted 7 March 2018 at the 1309th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, p. 5.

[39]Kirchner, Lauren. “Seven Lessons Scandinavian Media Can Teach the US: On topics ranging from job training to self-regulation.” Columbia Journalism Review, 2 July 2012. Available at: https://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/seven_lessons_scandinavian_med.php?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[40]Article 43 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, cited above, p. 8.

[41]Article 45 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, cited above, p. 9.

[42]“Full list of titles benefiting from public subsidies for 2019.” Ministry of Culture and Communication, Communication Department, 2020.

[43]Amouch, Abdellah. “Why does the government pay salaries of private media?” Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, 25 May 2025. Accessed 9 September 2025: https://2cm.es/1dOeO

[44]Meftah, Noureddine. “Editorial: The ‘Criminal’ Press Council.” Al-Ayyam, Issue 1137, 10 July 2025, p. 3.

[45]Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.122 of 10 August 2016 (6 Dhu al-Qa‘da 1437) enacting Law No. 88.13 on the Press and Publishing. Official Gazette, No. 6491, 15 August 2016, p. 5968.

[46]Article 5 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.24 of 10 March 2016 enacting Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council, cited above, p. 2962.

[47]Ibid., p. 2963.

[48]Article 46 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, as adopted by the House of Representatives on 22 July 2025, p. 10.

[49]Orme, Bill, with a group of authors. ITP Media Reference Book: State, Self- and Co-Regulation. Legal Frameworks and Professional Standards for Independent News Media. NIRAS; Fojo Media Institute (Linnaeus University); International Media Support (IMS); Global Reporting, 2022, p. 64.

[50]Article 96 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, as adopted by the House of Representatives on 22 July 2022 [sic], p. 17.

[51]Article 5 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.23.62 of 10 August 2023 enacting Law No. 15.23 establishing a temporary committee to manage the press and publishing sector, cited above, p. 7227.

[52]Article 4 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.24 of 10 March 2016 enacting Law No. 90.13 establishing the National Press Council, cited above, p. 2962.

[53]Article 5 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, as adopted by the House of Representatives on 22 July 2025, p. 2.

[54]Article 89 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, as adopted by the House of Representatives on 22 July 2025, p. 16

[55]Article 4 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.51 of 27 April 2016 (19 Rajab 1437) enacting Law No. 89.13 on the Statute of Professional Journalists. Official Gazette, No. 6466, 19 May 2016, p. 3850.

[56]Article 6 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.51 of 27 April 2016 enacting Law No. 89.13 on the Statute of Professional Journalists, cited above, p. 3850

[57]Article 11 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.51 of 27 April 2016 enacting Law No. 89.13 on the Statute of Professional Journalists, cited above, p. 3851.

[58]Bertrand, Claude-Jean. La Déontologie des Médias. Ibid., p. 32.

[59]Article 104 of Royal Decree (Dahir) No. 1.16.122 of 10 August 2016 enacting Law No. 88.13 on the Press and Publishing. Official Gazette, No. 6491, 15 August 2016, p. 5984.

[60]Article 91 of Draft Law No. 026.25 on the Restructuring of the National Press Council, as adopted by the House of Representatives on 22 July 2025, p. 16.

[61]Statistical Study on the Situation of Moroccan Journalists. National Press Council, May 2020, p. 14.

[62]Decree No. 2.19.896 of 11 May 2020 (17 Ramadan 1441) approving the Internal Regulations of the National Press Council. Official Gazette, No. 6885, 25 May 2020, p. 2834