Morocco has positioned itself as Europe’s migration gatekeeper and Africa’s humanitarian partner, but can it credibly serve both roles at once?

 

Introduction

Morocco sits in a unique geopolitical position at the interface between the African continent and the European Union. In recent years, Morocco has shifted from being primarily a country of origin to increasingly a transit and host nation. Emigrants still leave Morocco in hopes of reaching Europe, alongside increasing numbers of migrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa who also use Morocco as a transit country, many of whom are in an irregular situation. Data from 2024 indicate that Morocco hosts nearly 150,000 foreign nationals, many of whom were in an irregular administrative status. Of those migrants, 59.9% of them were from Sub-Saharan Africa.^[1] Registered with the UNHCR are more than 18,400 refugees and asylum seekers.^[2]

The current era of Moroccan migration policy is defined by the post-2011 constitutional changes, which inspired legislative reforms to Morocco’s migration policy through the Stratégie Nationale de l’immigration et de l’asile (SNIA). SNIA, spearheaded by King Mohammed VI in 2013 following the recommendations of the National Human Rights Council (CNDH), marked a significant shift toward a more humanitarian approach to Moroccan migration policy.^[3] It safeguards migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers’ rights to humanitarian treatment, and makes Morocco the first country in the MENA region to adopt a uniform migration policy.^[4] A formalized representation of Morocco’s strengthening relationship with the European Union (EU), SNIA was passed the same year that Morocco entered into a Migration and Mobility partnership (MMP) with the EU.

The Moroccan government’s motivations for reforming its migration policy are multifaceted. While Eurocentric accounts paint Morocco’s interests as being primarily driven by the need to satisfy its European neighbors, the reality is more complex.^[5] The Moroccan government crafts migration policy to balance its proximity to both Europe and the rest of Africa, seeking to uphold its own national interests while preserving its relationship with northern and southern neighbors.^[6] While reforming Morocco’s migration policy signaled to the Global North its intention to strengthen its relationship with the EU, it also signaled to the rest of Africa that the migrants seeking refuge in or transiting through Morocco would be treated with dignity and respect.

The government seeks to balance the interests of European and African partners but cannot reasonably appease all parties at every juncture. Morocco signed the MMP with the EU but did not accept all stipulations, refusing to sign a readmission agreement that would require irregular third-country nationals (TCN) to be returned to Morocco alongside returned Moroccans.^[7] This stipulation would have applied to those TCNs who were most recently in Morocco prior to being apprehended. Morocco’s refusal to accept all of the EU’s proposals emphasizes its autonomy to accept or reject policies that align with its national interests. Some accounts assert that the EU-Morocco relationship hasn’t necessarily progressed beyond the MMP, suggesting that the EU expects its Global South counterparts to bear a disproportionate burden of migration management.^[8]

This reality remains a primary critique of border externalization, a phenomenon whereby Global North countries endeavor to reduce irregular migration by externalizing border controls to Global South countries, where migrants can be processed before reaching European territory.^[9] These externalization policies see Morocco as a “buffer” between the EU and the rest of Africa, and the MMP is just one example of externalization in practice.^[10]

This article seeks to understand the reality which bore the Moroccan migration policy landscape, the extent to which it has been successful, and the improvements needed to ensure the policy is comprehensive and robust.

 Failings of the SNIA

The Casablanca bombings of 2003 thrust Morocco into a dire political atmosphere, whereby the securitization of borders was suddenly at the forefront of the policymaking agenda.^[11] Law 02-03, subsequently passed in the same year, was a security-based framework in which irregular migrants were criminalized and perceived as a threat to public safety and security; the legislation largely justified abuses against them.^[12] Under the law, all irregular migration became illegal, and allowed the state to impose heavy fines or other punitive measures against those found in violation.^[13] While the law remains in place to regulate the entry and stay of foreigners–and can be seen as an early border externalization policy–Morocco’s 2011 constitutional changes prompted a restructuring of immigration policy, leading to the creation of SNIA.

SNIA aims to limit irregular migration flows but is also presented as a human-rights framework committed to upholding the basic entitlements of all people, regardless of immigration status.^[14] Part of its mandate was launching two regularization campaigns in 2014 and 2017, which helped roughly 45,000 irregular migrants gain legal status in Morocco.^[15] However, despite the number of people helped by the campaigns, SNIA hasn’t spearheaded a regularization campaign since the latter, meaning migrants who weren’t absorbed by the two campaigns, or who migrated to Morocco post-2017, have severely limited access to pathways to legal status.

Because Law 02-03 is still intact, the dangers of falling into irregular status are significant, and a large number of migrants remain in legal limbo. SNIA effectively states that regularized migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers are owed the same rights to education, healthcare, and employment as their Moroccan counterparts, but this language leaves all migrants who were not regularized in 2017 or arrived in Morocco after the campaigns with severely limited options for access to legal pathways, as well as basic human services otherwise offered by SNIA. Furthermore, because Moroccan migration policy is primarily implemented through executive action, which SNIA is, instead of legally binding political measures, gaps in its implementation exist even for those who are protected by its mandate.^[16]

Education

Regular migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers face barriers in accessing the services they are entitled to under SNIA. The barriers are even higher for irregular status migrants. The Mixed Migration Centre conducted a study in April 2026 analyzing migrant children’s access to education, revealing that a large number of eligible children are unable to access available educational services.^[17] Many caregivers cite financial strife as a reason why their children are unable to attend school, as they face insurmountable transportation, food, and supply costs that impose a monetary burden on an otherwise free public service. 77% of respondents needed financial assistance upon completing the survey. Because large swaths of caregivers have no option but to care for their children, who have nowhere to be but home when school is inaccessible, they are more likely to experience unemployment. With limited to no income, the financial barriers that may have inhibited caregivers from sending their children to school are suddenly much worse. For older children, caregivers report lacking the information that would inform them of their rights to Moroccan public services.^[18] For irregular migrants, lack of information can also derive from language barriers, as many irregular migrants come from non-Arabic speaking countries, and not only face administrative barriers associated with language, but also whose children wouldn’t initially be able to understand classes that are taught in Arabic.^[19]

Employment

Most migrants arrive in Morocco with no higher education or vocational training, which restricts them from accessing formal, stable employment.^[20] Limited access to formal employment pushes regular and irregular migrants alike into informal labor sectors, leaving them without sufficient resources to meet their basic needs. In metropolitan areas, migrants are more likely to have sources of income than those in rural areas. Even amongst employed populations, barriers to stable employment meant that migrants relied on external support to navigate the labor market. When assistance was not available, and information about formal positions was far and few in between, migrants were much less likely to find stable work.^[21] With limited access to employment, financial burdens place undue strain on migrants, adversely impacting their physical and mental well-being.

Health

Migration is a social determinant of health, meaning that conditions during and after migration journeys can be highly determinative of a migrant’s overall quality of life. In the Moroccan context, free healthcare is a guaranteed right for both regular and irregular migrants, but it is frequently inaccessible to them. Less than 50 percent of migrants reported being aware of free services, highlighting how policies may exist but still not reach the populations they are designed to protect.^[22] Morocco’s migrant-inclusive health policy, set out in the Rabat Declaration in 2023, represents a growing awareness of the importance of safeguarding migrant health and a commitment to following the regulations of the Global Compact for Safe and Orderly Migration.^[23] However, limited access to health services persists, especially for irregular migrants.

Racism and Xenophobia

Sub-Saharan migrants living in Morocco have a particularly low quality of life.^[24] They are known to endure racist and xenophobic attacks by state officials, who detain and apprehend them at disproportionate rates, and civilians alike. Compounded with the verbal and physical abuse they are likely to encounter in their daily lives, they are more likely to inhabit old housing and peri-urban slums, which negatively contribute to their general safety.^[25] The UN Special Rapporteur on Racism emphasizes the need to reduce the racial profiling practices of Moroccan officials so that black migrants are not asymmetrically targeted, and their quality of life is not threatened due to discriminatory practices.^[26]

 

Current State of Human Rights

Morocco’s previous reforms signal a willingness to prioritize human rights, hopefully reflecting that migration reform can occur again in the future. But the increasing securitization of Europe’s borders and Morocco’s growing alignment with EU migration priorities reflect an incomplete human rights agenda, and data show that migrants continue to be victims of human rights abuses. Enforcement officials have carried out countless immigration raids against irregular migrants, and reports show that the EU funds and assists in clandestine operations in North Africa that prevent sub-Saharan migrants from transiting northwards to European shores.^[27] These operations include apprehending migrants, many of whom are from sub-Saharan African countries, and relocating them to remote areas, including desert terrain, to deter them from reaching European shores. Desert Dumps, published by Lighthouse Reports in 2024, exposes how EU funding supports clandestine operations in the Sahara whereby Moroccan enforcement officers “dump” suspected irregular migrants in the desert to prevent them from transiting to the EU.^[28] The report describes how senior EU officials claimed that it was impossible to trace the trajectory of each and every cent from the EU Trust Fund. Furthermore, the report states that the funding has directly supported Morocco’s paramilitary auxiliary force, which frequently carries out desert dumps of suspected irregular migrants.^[29] This reflects the dangerous realities of Europe’s tendency towards border securitization and reveals the extent to which they are willing to externalize control to Morocco for enforcement, often using Machiavellian tactics that disregard and violate human rights. In 2025, Moroccan officials intercepted 73,640 attempts at irregular migration.^[30] Immigration raids were designed to target irregular migrants and human trafficking rings, but reports have shown that refugees and asylum seekers have been caught in the crossfire.^[31]

It is also becoming clear that migration in Morocco is not as protected as SNIA would suggest. Irregular arrivals to Spain decreased by more than 40% in 2025, suggesting that the harsh externalized policies are decreasing arrivals to Europe but not increasing humanitarian protections for migrants, or addressing the root causes of their migration.^[32] In the first half of 2026, more than 1,300 migrants died in transit northwards to Spain, proving that limiting pathways to legal migration for migrants threatens their lives.^[33] This wave of restrictive migration policy in Morocco has forced migrants in transit towards Europe to depart from coasts farther south than Morocco.^[34] Many more people are departing from the shores of Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal, significantly increasing the danger of already life-threatening journeys. Morocco is not the only nation experiencing knock-on effects of restrictive border externalization policies–Spain has signed agreements with both Mauritania and the Gambia in attempts to reduce irregular migration.^[35] It goes to show that restrictive migration policies, which inherently instill fear into incoming migrants, do not reduce the number of migrants arriving on foreign soil, but rather force them to navigate away from formal ports of entry and altogether increase threats to their lives.

 

Current State of Migration after the European Pact on Migration and Asylum

Irregular migrants who are unable to return to their countries of origin face the pressing reality of immobility, as the likelihood of apprehension during irregular northward migration is extremely high. Following the passage of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, the consequences of this apprehension have increased. The pact, which took effect on June 12, 2026, is a set of ten pieces of binding legislation designed to “overhaul” the European immigration system, whereby border security, asylum claim processing, and responsibility sharing amongst member states became further securitized.^[36] The legislation makes it easier for the EU to rush asylum requests, limit the safeguards available throughout the process, and elongate detention sentences for expelled migrants–see hubs de retour.^[37] The pact also allows EU nations to reject asylum requests if they can reasonably claim large numbers of arrivals have been instrumentalized, or if too many nations from the same country of origin are requesting asylum.^[38]

Morocco has been designated a “safe country of origin,” which means that Moroccans attempting to cross into Europe experience a fast-tracked asylum process.^[39] Outside of the standard border procedure, these accelerated considerations apply to Moroccans who are seeking asylum in Europe, who are less likely to be classified as fleeing persecution, torture, or conflict. As a result, the EU imposes a 20% quota on asylum seekers from safe countries.^[40]While designating Morocco “safe” is good press for the Moroccan government, it overgeneralizes the myriad contexts migrants originate from and doesn’t inherently change the reality for Moroccans on the ground. It is still possible for Moroccans to leave Morocco due to claims of oppression and insecurity, but because of the accelerated border procedures, their cases for these instances are significantly less likely to be accepted.

Despite accommodating European migration priorities to some extent, Morocco has routinely refused to sign an agreement with the EU that would require it to take back TCNs caught crossing into Europe irregularly. It means that these TCNs risk refoulement upon arrival at an increasingly securitized border that prioritizes certain nationalities over others and uses an arbitrary threshold system to deny even the neediest cases once they exceed it. With the burden of proof higher for certain migrants, the risk that humanitarian considerations would become secondary to a streamlined asylum process is significant. Outside of the standard border procedure, these accelerated considerations are set to apply to migrants coming from safe countries of origin.

Earlier this year, the European Parliament also approved the establishment of  “hubs de retour” for migrants being returned from destination countries.^[41] Hubs de retour are detention centers that will be created outside of the EU to house rejected asylum seekers and deported irregular migrants. Many countries have already begun discussing where these centers will go, and in keeping with Global North traditions of haphazardly placing detention centers around the world, many returned migrants will be sent to centers that have nothing to do with their countries of origin.^[42] The new legislation incorporates a phenomenon known as “the fiction of non-entry,” which allows governments to refrain from treating migrants as “entrants” until the authorities permit them. Migrants may be present on European soil but still not be considered to have entered the country until they are formally processed by the government. The fiction of non-entry creates a liminal space, frequently existent in airports, where migrants are physically but not legally entered into the country.^[43] In tandem, hubs de retour and the fiction of non-entry reflect how South-North migration management is increasingly defined by prioritizing border securitization over upholding human rights.

 

Closing the Gaps: Recommendations to Improve SNIA’s Implementation

Migrants in Morocco have limited access to health, education, and employment opportunities compared with their Moroccan counterparts, as well as experiencing racism and xenophobia. These realities darken when legal status factors into the equation, as irregular migrants have an even more difficult time navigating the administrative system than regular migrants. While SNIA aims to ensure that migrants can access fundamental human services upon arrival in Morocco, gaps in its implementation signal a key failing of the policy.

1. Make SNIA legally binding
   1. It is essential that the Moroccan government make SNIA legally binding. Currently, the policy is an administrative framework that lacks the necessary enforcement mechanisms to ensure consistent implementation and to impose punitive measures when it is violated. As an unenforceable policy, the framework serves as a guideline instead of an instruction. SNIA currently operates under eleven cross-sectoral programs coordinating its mission.^[44] However, without the direct, overall enforcement associated with a legally binding policy, gaps will persist between the policy’s stated goals and the de facto realities of its implementation.
   2. Furthermore, making SNIA legally binding will help to reform Loi 02-03. Before SNIA, Loi 02-03 was Morocco’s principal migration policy, and was notoriously punitive against irregular migrants. By enacting SNIA, the Moroccan government signaled a shift away from the harsh measures of Loi 02-03; however, because SNIA is not legalized, Loi 02-03 remains in place, underscoring that the dangers of falling into irregular status remain pressing. The legalization of SNIA is essential to ensure that irregular migrants are not harshly punished for state failings.
2. Create facilitative integration policies to bridge the implementation gaps so that migrants receive all services guaranteed to them
   1. SNIA outlines integration policies for all migrants that fall under its administrative umbrella. However, based on the number of migrants who do not have access to services and the levels of racism and xenophobia experienced by sub-Saharan migrants, it is clear that these integration policies fall short. In 2022, the Forum on Integration and its relationship with the regularization of migrants in Mesoamerica directly highlighted the need for integration efforts by Mesoamerican states to promote a symbiotic incorporation of migrants into new host communities.^[45] While it pertains to a region facing distinct migration realities, its framework remains highly applicable to North Africa because it highlights that migration is not a burden borne solely by those arriving in new host communities, but is shared between migrants and those community members who receive them.
   2. Within Europe, integration efforts are underfunded and underprioritized.^[46] This gives Morocco an opportunity to be a regional pioneer in migration integration policies, signaling to both the EU and the rest of Africa Morocco’s capability to craft effective integration policies that strengthen societal cohesion and social stability.
3. Spearhead a single data collection entity so that migrants can be accounted for under one uniform ministry
   1. Morocco lacks comprehensive knowledge of the demographics of all foreign nationals residing in the country, largely because the Moroccan government lacks a single department that systematically monitors the presence of foreign nationals, both regular and irregular. Data collection responsibilities remain split between the Ministry Delegate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ministries of the Interior, Employment, and Education, and the National Human Rights Council.^[47] The data is also frequently used for surveillance instead of informing public policy, which contributes to the limitations in its collection.^[48] Establishing a single ministry or bureau to compile demographic data will enable the Moroccan government to better understand which populations are present, why they aren’t receiving services under SNIA, and how to close the gaps.

Lastly, it is important that the international community understands that migration policy operates on a two-way street. Morocco does not need to bear the disproportionate burden of irregular migration from Sub-Saharan Africa simply because of their geographic proximity. In an era of increased European securitization, it is imperative that European counterparts understand that bearing the burden of the world’s migration should not fall uniquely on Global South countries. It is Morocco’s responsibility to craft the most effective and efficient migration policy possible, but it is also the EU’s responsibility not to exhaust Morocco’s resources by operating under hyper surveillant, punitive measures that disincentivize migration to Europe.

 

Footnotes

^[1] Soufiane Elgoumri, “Sub-Saharan African Migrants in Morocco: Security Concerns and the Test of Human Rights,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 29, 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2026/01/sub-saharan-african-migrants-in-morocco-security-concerns-and-the-test-of-human-rights.

^[2] “Morocco and Western Sahara: Events of 2025,” Human Rights Watch, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/morocco-and-western-sahara#d4aedc.

^[3] “Foreigners and Human Rights in Morocco for a radically new asylum and migration policy,” Conseil national des droits de l’Homme (2013), https://archive.cndh.ma/sites/default/files/documents//CNDH_report_-_migration_in_Morocco.pdf.

^[4] Soumia Bouhdoud, “The Role of Morocco as a ‘Safe’ Country in Containing and Preventing Irregular Migration: A Façade of Solidarity,” Externalizing Asylum, April 15, 2026, https://externalizingasylum.info/the-role-of-morocco-as-a-safe-country-in-containing-and-preventing-irregular-migration-a-facade-of-solidarity/.

^[5] Leslie Gross-Wyrtzen and Lorena Gazzotti, “Telling Histories of the Present: Postcolonial Perspectives on Morocco’s ‘Radically New’ Migration Policy,” The Journal of North African Studies 26 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2020.1800204.

^[6] Anna Jacobs, “Morocco’s Migration Policy: Understanding the Contradiction between Policy and Reality,” Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, June 30, 2019, https://mipa.institute/?p=6872&lang=en.

^[7] Mehdi Lahlou, “Deadlock in Morocco and the European Union on Readmission and Alternative Forms of Cooperation,” GAPs (Decentering the Study of Migrant Returns and Readmission Policies), September 12, 2025, https://www.returnmigration.eu/gapsblog/deadlock-in-morocco-and-the-european-union-on-readmission.

^[8] Mehdi Lahlou, “Deadlock in Morocco and the European Union on Readmission and Alternative Forms of Cooperation.”

^[9] Kelsey Norman, “What Egypt’s New Asylum Law Means for Refugees,” Baker Institute, September 12, 2025, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/what-egypts-new-asylum-law-means-refugees.

^[10] Soumia Bouhdoud, “The Role of Morocco as a ‘Safe’ Country in Containing and Preventing Irregular Migration: A Façade of Solidarity,” Externalizing Asylum, April 15, 2026, https://externalizingasylum.info/the-role-of-morocco-as-a-safe-country-in-containing-and-preventing-irregular-migration-a-facade-of-solidarity/.

^[11] Abdeslam Maghraoui, “Morocco’s Reforms after the Casablanca Bombings,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 6, 2008, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2008/08/moroccos-reforms-after-the-casablanca-bombings.

^[12] Imane Bendra, “Sub-Saharan Migrants’ Life Conditions in Morocco in Light of Migration Policy Changes,” Institute of Development Policy Working Paper (2019), https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/oldcontent/container2673/files/Publications/WP/2019/wp-201901.pdf.

^[13] “Understanding the Mixed Migration Landscape in Morocco,” Mixed Migration Centre, February 2022, https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Understanding_the_mixed_migration_landscape_in_Morocco.pdf.

^[14] Ministère Chargé des Marocains Résidant à l’Étranger et des Affaires de la Migration, La Stratégie Nationale de l’Immigration et de l’Asile, 2013, https://www.oriental.ma/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/File_1_861.pdf

^[15] “Mission Overview,” International Organization for Migration Morocco, 2024, https://morocco.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl936/files/documents/2024-05/en-overview-oim-maroc.pdf.

^[16] Mercedes G. Jiménez-Alvarez, “Migration Policy and International Human Rights Frameworks in Morocco: Tensions and Contradictions,” The Journal of North African Studies 26 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2020.1800208.

^[17] “Access to Education and the Needs of Migrant Children in Morocco,” Mixed Migration Centre, April 2026, https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/EN_394_Educational-landscape-Morocco.pdf.

^[18] “Access to Education and the Needs of Migrant Children in Morocco.”

^[19] “Access to Education and the Needs of Migrant Children in Morocco.”

^[20] “Barriers to Employment and Education for Young Migrants in Morocco,” Mixed Migration Centre, April 2026, https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/EN_397_Barriers-to-employment-in-Morocco.pdf.

^[21] “Access to Education and the Needs of Migrant Children in Morocco.”

^[22] “Migration Health Strategy,” International Organization for Migration, 2024, https://morocco.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl936/files/documents/2024-08/migration-health-strategy-2024-2028-iom-morocco.pdf.

^[23]  High-level Segment of the 3rd Global Consultation on the Health of Refugees and Migrants, Rabat Declaration, June 13, 2023, https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/health-topics/refugee-and-migrant-health/rabat-declaration_final.pdf?sfvrsn=b62e87cf_9.

^[24] Yassin Nouar et al., “Health-Related Quality of Life Among Irregular Sub-Saharan Migrants in Northern Morocco,” Cureus 16 (2024), https://10.7759/cureus.67457.

^[25] Yassin Nouar et al., “Health-Related Quality of Life Among Irregular Sub-Saharan Migrants in Northern Morocco.”

^[26] “Morocco: Joint Submission to the Universal Periodic Review,” Global Detention Project, November 2022, https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/morocco-joint-submission-to-the-universal-periodic-review.

^[27] May Bulman et al., “Desert Dumps,” Lighthouse Reports, May 21, 2024, https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/desert-dumps/.

^[28] May Bulman et al., “Desert Dumps.”

^[29] May Bulman et al., “Desert Dumps.”

^[30] Emma Wallis, “Morocco Intercepted Fewer Irregular Migration Attempts in 2025,” InfoMigrants, April 8, 2026, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/70796/morocco-intercepted-fewer-irregular-migration-attempts-in-2025

^[31] “Morocco: Joint Submission to the Universal Periodic Review.”

^[32] Adil Faouzi, “Thanks to Morocco, Irregular Arrivals to Spain Drop 42.6% in 2025,” Morocco World News, January 3, 2026, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/01/273787/thanks-to-morocco-irregular-arrivals-to-spain-drop-42-6-in-2025/.

^[33] “Monitoring the Right To Life on the Western Euro-African Border,” Caminando Fronteras, https://caminandofronteras.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Report-DALV-5-months-2026-ENG.pdf.

^[34] “Maroc : Plus de 70 000 Interceptions de Migrants en 2025, en Baisse de 6 % sur un An,” InfoMigrants, July 4, 2026, https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/70762/maroc–plus-de-70-000-interceptions-de-migrants-en-2025-en-baisse-de-6–sur-un-an.

^[35] “L’Espagne Signe un Accord de Gestion des Flux Migratoires avec la Mauritanie et la Gambie,” InfoMigrants, August 29, 2024, https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/59465/lespagne-signe-un-accord-de-gestion-des-flux-migratoires-avec-la-mauritanie-et-la-gambie.

^[36] “Questions and Answers: The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum,” Human Rights Watch, June 10, 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/06/10/questions-and-answers-the-eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum.

^[37] “Questions and Answers: The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.”

^[38] “Questions and Answers: The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.”

^[39] Myriam Cherti and Michael Collyer, “Immigration and Pensée d’Etat: Moroccan Migration Policy Changes as Transformation of ‘Geopolitical Culture,’” The Journal of North African Studies 20 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1065043.

^[40] “Asylum in the EU,” European Commission, June 11, 2026, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/asylum-eu_en.

^[41] “Immigration : Le Parlement Européen Adopte une Réforme qui Ouvre la Voie à la Création de Centres de Rétention Hors de l’UE,” Le Monde, June 17, 2026, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/06/17/le-parlement-europeen-adopte-le-reglement-sur-les-retours-de-migrants-deboutes-du-droit-d-asile-ouvrant-la-voie-a-des-centres-de-retention-hors-de-l-ue_6704218_823448.html.

^[42]“Immigration : Le Parlement Européen Adopte une Réforme qui Ouvre la Voie à la Création de Centres de Rétention Hors de l’UE.”

^[43] Kelly Soderstrom, “ECRE Commentary: An Analysis of the Fiction of Non-entry as Appears in the Screening Regulation,” European Council on Refugees and Exiles, September 2022, https://ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ECRE-Commentary-Fiction-of-Non-Entry-September-2022.pdf.

^[44] “Morocco Fact Sheet,” International Organization for Migration, June 2025, https://morocco.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl936/files/documents/2025-09/iom_co-morocco.pdf.

^[45] “8 countries address key aspects of migrant integration at Regional Forum: regularization, economic and social participation,” International Organization for Migration, August 9, 2022, https://lac.iom.int/en/node/122196.

^[46] “Integration Policies in the EU: the State of Play,” Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2025, https://mipex.eu/key-findings-2025.

^[47] “Migration Governance Profile,” International Organization for Migration, October 2017,https://www.migrationdataportal.org/sites/g/files/tmzbdl251/files/2021-03/MGI%20Morocco%20EN.pdf.

^[48] Soufiane Elgoumri, “Sub-Saharan African Migrants in Morocco: Security Concerns and the Test of Human Rights.”