Normalization: The Difficult Balancing Act Under Pressure

Morocco is progressing toward normalization driven by strategic reasons, but increasing societal rejection is widening the trust gap and challenging the state’s capacity to balance its external goals with internal unity.

 

Executive Summary

Since 2020, Morocco has advanced on the path of normalization with Israel, driven by strategic considerations related to its territorial integrity and geopolitical commitments, particularly in the areas of security and military cooperation. Conversely, waves of societal rejection of this trajectory are escalating, deepening the trust deficit and testing the state’s ability to manage the difficult balance between its external aspirations and internal cohesion.

 

Introduction

On June 4, 2025, a lecture delivered by the former Moroccan Head of Government, Saad Dine El Otmani, at the Faculty of Arts in Tetouan (northern Morocco) transformed into a protest arena, where a group of leftist students chanted slogans against normalization with Israel [1]. This incident reflects the ongoing societal debate surrounding Moroccan normalization with Israel, a debate that extends beyond university walls to reflect a state of societal tension, which has intensified since the signing of the normalization agreement with Israel in late 2020.

At the time, the Moroccan state presented the decision as a sovereign step aimed primarily at bolstering international recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara, alongside achieving strategic and economic gains. However, this geopolitical gamble has come to bear a high political and social cost, due to the increasing manifestations of rejection of the normalization process, especially after October 7, 2023, and the subsequent escalation of Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip [2]. Moroccan authorities are facing growing difficulties in managing this issue, within an international context that has witnessed widespread global solidarity with Palestinians, making the management of the domestic situation more complex.

The Moroccan authorities are currently confrontinga delicate equation, requiring them to reconcile contradictory imperatives [3]: maintaining the normalization path with its geopolitical stakes, while simultaneously containing the rejecting popular sentiment. Although Moroccan authorities have, to date, managed a delicate balancebetween these two options with minimal losses by allowing controlled margins for protest, coupled with security interventions when these expressions cross established lines, the continuous and growing resistance shown by civil society to this orientation requires the state to consider the political and social cost of normalization with the same degree of thought as it gives to geopolitical gains.

 

Normalization Policies and the Post-October 7 Dilemma

The normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel was announced at the end of 2020, at a pivotal regional moment characterized by a realignment of alliances in the Middle East and North Africa, within what was termed the “Abraham Accords.” In exchange for normalizing relations, Morocco gained American recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara, which was affirmed in a Royal Palace statement on December 10, 2020. This statement explicitly linked the American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara to the resumption of relations with Israel. The statement emphasized that this was not a new policy but rather a resumption of old relations [4].

A first reading of the statement gives the initial impression that it indicatedapartial normalization focused on three main areas:

1. Facilitating direct flights to transport Jews of Moroccan origin and Israeli tourists to and from Morocco;
2. Resuming official bilateral contacts and diplomatic relations as soon as possible;
3. Developing innovative relations in the economic and technological fields [5].

The reopening of liaison offices in both countrieswas adopted as a practical mechanism for this process. In a second Royal Palace statement on December 22 of the same year, the same pattern of relations was confirmed by referring to the “resumption of cooperation mechanisms with Israel” within the framework of a joint declaration between Morocco, America, and Israel, which was signed on behalf of the Kingdom of Morocco by the then Head of Government, Mr. Saad Dine El Otmani [6]. Thus, the context of normalization cannot be separated from its tripartite dimension, where the United States of America plays the direct patron of this agreement, within which Morocco undertakes a partial normalization with Israel.

However, the trajectory of Moroccan-Israeli normalization, rather than receding or decelerating with the rhythm of events, has witnessed a remarkable acceleration since the signing of the normalization agreement in December 2020, especially in the fields of security and military cooperation [7]. The steps began with intelligence-sharing agreements, culminating in the signing of an unprecedented defense agreement in November 2021 during Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz’s visit to Rabat. This agreement allows Morocco to acquire high-tech Israeli security equipment, in addition to cooperation in operational planning, research, and development [8]. This cooperation was materialized on the ground through reciprocal visits between military leaders and the participation of Israeli soldiers for the first time in the “African Lion” maneuvers in Morocco in the summer of 2023 [9]. The increasing military and security cooperation between Morocco and Israel reflects a shift in their relations from a level of declared intentions to actual policies, through which the Moroccan state seeks to rebalance its position in light of escalating tensions with Algeria and growing reliance on new alliances including the United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates.

Significantly, the events of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war of attrition in Gaza carried out by Israel, did not lead to the disruption or postponement of the implementation of some of the agreement’s commitments [10]. Instead, the implementation of the agreement continued in various civilian and military fields. For example, this cooperation continued through Israel’s ratification of the maritime navigation agreement on May 8, 2025 [11].Israeli soldiers also took part once again in the 2025 “African Lion” military exercises held in Morocco [12]. According to the report issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on April 10, 2025, Israeli military equipment accounted for about 11% of Morocco’s defense imports between 2020 and 2024, making Israel the third-largest arms supplier to the Kingdom [13]. Morocco also became one of the major clients of the Israeli defense industries, by signing a deal to purchase an intelligence satellite, and then completing in 2025 a deal to acquire advanced Atmos 2000 howitzers for $200 million [14].

The primary rationale for this policy lies in what the Moroccan state perceives as expected strategic gains, foremost among them the consolidation of American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, which was followed by support from veto-wielding states in the Security Council, such as France and Britain, in addition to other countries in the North and South. This orientation shows that the Moroccan authorities are focusing on the geopolitical returns of normalization, while disregardingits political and social cost, especially in light of the growing popular anger at Israeli crimes in Gaza, and what is understood as a contradiction with the official discourse emphasizing Morocco’s commitment to humanitarian efforts in the Strip. In this context, Israeli analyses believe that the continuation of the normalization process with Morocco after October 7 and the subsequent events in Gaza was a “major curse” that curbed a rapid normalization “that exceeded all expectations” in its scope and scale, but it did not stop this process [15].

 

Moroccans Stand with Gaza, Reject Normalization

In stark contrast tothe accelerated security and military cooperation between Morocco and Israel since the resumption of relations, the Moroccan public arena has witnessed a notable escalation in popular protests against the war in Gaza and normalization with Israel. This situation presents policymakers with a complex equation: balancing geopolitical commitments with responding to prevailing public sentiment.

Since the normalization announcement, political and civil entities have expressed their rejection of this decision. On December 10, 2025, approximately 35 civil society organizations, trade unions, and political groups signed a statement declaring the decision “inconsistent with the stance of the Moroccan people and its vibrant forces, encouraging the shedding of Palestinian blood, and violating the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination on their land” [16].

The Moroccan public’s stance on normalization with Israel underwent a significant shift between 2022 and 2024, as reflected in the results of the “Arab Barometer.” In 2022, 67% of Moroccans opposed recognizing the State of Israel, compared to 22% who supported such recognition [17]. However, these figures changed radically following the events of October 7, 2023, which marked a pivotal turning point in Moroccan public sentiment, as it did in many countries across the region. According to 2024 data, 86% of Moroccans considered the events of October 7 to be a “legitimate act of resistance,” while only 4% described them as “illegitimate.” This reframing of the events in the moral and political terms had a direct impact on Moroccan attitudes toward Israel: the percentage of those rejecting its recognition rose to 78%, while the proportion of supporters declined to just 7% [18].

This transformation reflects a sensitive popular mood, indicating a decline in public acceptance of the normalization process, accompanied bya clear escalation of discourse supporting the Palestinian cause. This shift can be interpreted as an initial reaction to the daily scenes of killing and violations against Palestinian civilians, which were widely broadcast across media and social media platforms. Overall, these data confirm that the Palestinian cause remains a cornerstone in shaping Moroccan public opinion on regional policies. Furthermore, major regional developments, such as the events of October 7, significantly influence the reshaping of popular attitudes. They may also convey political messages that transcend quantitative indicators.

A report by the Moshe Dayan Center indicates that Moroccan policy since October 7 has been governed by a three-dimensional logic: 1) minimal intervention in crisis issues; 2) managing time and hoping to “weather the storm” to resume scheduled but postponed dealings; and finally, 3) ignoring internal opposition to the normalization process and downplaying solidarity movements with Gaza [19]. However, underestimating the significance and quality of the Moroccan solidarity movement overlooks a deeper social reality. It disregards that this represents a fundamental and profound current within society, permeating all its components, rather than merely a politicized and elitist urban dynamic led by academics and activists [20].

Additionally, Israeli analyses largely focus on the position of the Justice and Development Party within the new normalization equation, often seeking to reduce anti-normalization movements to this party’s stance [21]. Nevertheless, attributing the solidarity movement solely to a specific ideological orientation overlooks that solidarity movements with Gazaand the rejection of normalization in the Moroccan context are deeply rooted in historical consciousness and the long-standing struggle of a broad segment of Moroccan society, its political and intellectual elites, and its partisan and ideological currents [22]. Moreover, these movements have now become part of a global solidarity effort with a humanitarian outlook.

In conclusion, the escalation of the solidarity movement with Palestine, across all its components, indicates that Moroccan citizens are becoming more concerned about understanding the implications and “costs” of the normalization decision on their present and future.

 

Policy of Precarious Balance: Weathering the Storm

Since October 7, the Moroccan state has adopted a nuanced dual policy, endeavoring to balance competing interests by allowing public opinion to express solidarity with Gaza while simultaneously maintaining the normalization trajectory. Morocco has witnessed the most robust popular demonstrations in support of Palestine compared to other Arab countries. Authorities have permitted those in solidarity with Gaza to express their support through popular marches, vigils, seminars, and other events that have continued uninterrupted since the announcement of normalization. Indeed, some of these activities have even received official media coverage [23].

However, this margin for expression has been met with authorities’ disregard for the demands of these movements. For instance, in February 2024, they refused to accept a petition submitted by the “National Action Group for Palestine,” bearing the signatures of over ten thousand Moroccan citizens, demanding the annulment of “normalization agreements with the Zionist occupying entity” and the “definitive closure of the Israeli Liaison Office in Rabat” [24]. Other instances have been recorded where the state has resorted to restricting freedom of expression due to anti-normalization stances, including trials and prison sentences, such as the cases of activists Abderrahmane Azenkad [25] and Redouane Kastit [26], in addition to other cases documented by human rights reports [27]. Such restrictions further exacerbate the issue of public liberties in Morocco [28].

While solidarity movements are often accused of exaggerating the extent of normalization, their demands have remained within legal and peaceful frameworks, making their disregard an additional source of tension. The Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ silence or delayed responses to several key developments related to the Palestinian issue, combined with its issuance of vague statements regarding Israeli transgressions, have reinforced perceptions of diminished independence in Morocco’s decision-making on this file. For example, the Moroccan Foreign Ministry remained silent on the assault on diplomats, including the Moroccan ambassador in Palestine, on May 20, 2025, despite popular and political demands for an official stance on this assault, as other countries did [29].

The escalation of the global solidarity movement has compelled governments of historically strategic allies of Israel, such as Britain, to alter their discourse and adopt sharper stances in their criticism of the Netanyahu government. In other European countries, parliaments have even made decisions to retract previous commitments with Israel [30].

Conversely, a political and media elite has emerged in Morocco, openly expressing support for Israel and presenting normalization as an indispensable policy for achieving Morocco’s strategic interests. This elite has contributed to creating a new discourse promoting the idea that Morocco’s stability, growth, and territorial integrity can only be achieved through normalization with Israel as a strategic choice. For example, voices such as “We Are All Israelis” [31] exemplify the current advocacy for relations with Israel, alongside several associative expressions that have appeared in the media and public sphere [32].

Proponents of this orientation focus on mobilization slogans such as “Taza Before Gaza” [33] and “Tamaghrabit.” These slogans reorder priorities in favor of internal issues and contribute to confining the debate on normalization within narrow confines of national identity. Therefore, these propositions reflect a perspective on priorities centered on domestic affairs. This discourse has contributed to creating a stark dichotomy between solidarity with Gaza and Palestine and concern for national affairs. These propositions have acquired a nationalist meaning among those advocating for normalization, where commitment to domestic issues is presented as an expression of national identity, while preoccupation with the affairs of other countries is seen as a dereliction of this commitment. This discourse is closely linked to the concept of nationalism, as nationalism is reduced to aligning with state choices, regardless of ethical and political considerations. This produces a hostile environment towards critical voices and criminalizes anti-normalization actors as “unpatriotic” or “agents of foreign agendas.”

One of the most significant repercussions of the normalization policy is its transformation into a disruptive factor within the broader political landscape. It has created tensions between civil and partisan actors and produced an exclusionary discourse that undermines possibilities for public debate. For instance, opponents of normalization are distorted by being labeled as unpatriotic, extremists, agents influenced by foreign agendas, and as threats to national unity. The discourse of criminalization and treason adopted by some elites advocating for normalization contributes to fostering a perception among a segment of public opinion that these elites have gained powerful influence, enabling them to affect state orientations and potentially mortgage public policies in favor of their choices and agendas, which may intersect with the strategies of a foreign state.

Conversely, the dynamicsof solidarity with Gaza also present a timely opportunity for actors to imbue previously apolitical issues with political salience in spaces beyond full state control.This dynamic often fosters the reaffirmation of political identity, facilitates continuous political learning through diverse expressions of political agency, and enables the acquisition of new spaces for active engagement in the public sphere and for demanding dignity and citizenship rights [34]. The struggle for Palestine does not, however, necessarily reflect mere “political exploitation” of popular solidarity, as perceived by elites advocating normalization policies. Instead, it constitutes a genuine manifestation of ideals of good governance and an expression of increasing political and strategic awareness among citizens.

Historically, the Moroccan political system has successfully confined solidarity with Palestine to the official political sphere. However, it has refrained from exerting excessive control over the issue’s dynamics and avoided imposing a redefinition among political and civil actors at both the discursive and ethical levels, as this would have placed it in direct confrontation with Moroccan public opinion. This tolerant approach has allowed the political system to avoid relations with Israel becoming a hindrance to freedom of expression in the Moroccan context. This demonstrates a pragmatism enabling the reversal of its decisions and preventing the mortgaging of all its geopolitical positions to align with the normalization decision [35].Thus, when the state withdrew from semi-official contact with Israel in 2000, leading to the closure of the liaison office, it created the belief in the independence of the Moroccan stance, acting on the premise that Israel needs normalization with Morocco, not the other way around.

 

Conclusion: The Cost of Silence in a Moment of Tension

The current wait-and-see policy, aimed at managing the political and social repercussions of the normalization decision, is widening the gap between the state’s geopolitical ambitions and the public’s rejection of this path. This places policymakers in a delicate situation where security and social considerations intersect. Instead of fostering stability and unity, this policy risks exacerbating internal division and tension.

The omission of political and social costs in the normalization calculus creates an indecisive atmosphere at times when clarity is crucial. It also reinforces the perception of uncertainty regarding the state’s independent sovereign decisions and limits the ability of local actors to form independent stances. This is particularly pertinent given that foreign policy decisions, especially during periods of transition or crisis, can evolve over time to acquire a structural character, thereby transforming from situational choices into fundamental determinants that shape domestic political decisions and influence the will of political actors, consciously or unconsciously. While the Moroccan state has managed to push through the normalization agreement without significant security disturbances, the domestic scene suggests that resentment is silently accumulating.

From this perspective, Moroccan political and partisan elites are urged to seriously engage with this shift. They should undertake a deep, critical analysis of the cost of normalization, not only from an ethical standpoint but also through a rational assessment of its impact on domestic legitimacy and democratic transition processes. This involves evaluating the political and symbolic cost of normalization and opening avenues for responsible dialogue between the state and society.

Ultimately, lasting internal stability cannot be maintained when public opinion is excluded from sovereign decisions and its right to expression and accountability is not upheld. Only a commitment to the democratic project, as a sphere for safeguarding independent domestic decision-making, can guarantee national cohesion in the face of pressing regional transformations.

Footnotes

1. “Morocco: The Curse of Normalization with Israel Haunts El Othmani and the PJD,” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, published on June 7, 2025, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics [36].
2. The International Court of Justice, Amnesty International, and other international organizations have previously considered Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip to amount to genocide. In this context, Israeli violence can also be linked to the nature of Israel as a state based on settler colonialism in Palestine. Ashraf Othman Badr suggests that the unifying logic of this description is “the pursuit of control and domination managed by a set of policies, most notably erasure, economic exploitation, and population management.” This semantic definition, from the perspective of the unifying logic of settler colonial dynamics, converges with the works of Israeli historian Ilan Pappé and Egyptian thinker Abdel-Wahhab El-Messiri. For more on this concept, see: Ashraf Othman Badr, “Settler Colonialism in Palestine Between Structure and Process: Erasure and Removal or Control and Domination?”, Omran Journal, Issue 39 – Volume 10, Winter 2022, pp. 11 and also p. 13 [37].
3. Said Saddiki discussed this issue within the framework of Morocco’s international relations, suggesting that Morocco would face a challenge in finding a “balance between the principled commitment to supporting Palestinian rights, its interests resulting from the tripartite declaration, and widespread sympathy for the Palestinian cause, should the war continue for longer.” See: Said Saddiki: Morocco and the War in Gaza: The Dilemma of Principles and Interests, published November 15, 2023, Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, publishedon June 28, 2025: https://mipa.institute [38].
4. The Royal Palace statement dated October 10, 2020, mentions that “these measures do not in any way affect Morocco’s permanent and continuous commitment to defending the just Palestinian cause, and its constructive engagement for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East region.” For details, see: https://shorturl.at/E19Ac [39].
5. Ibid. [40].
6. Royal Palace Statement, Tuesday, December 22, 2020: https://shorturl.at/sKsRs [41].
7. There are many indicators of increasing cooperation in the cultural field, especially in relation to some universities, and also a kind of influence on the educational field. In this regard, one can review the report “The Moroccan Curriculum: Education in the Service of Tolerance” (February 2023), published by the Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-se). The report was prepared by three Israeli experts, who refer, concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the importance of “deleting some negative phrases towards Israel in the updated versions of the curricula, such as deleting the phrase ‘horrific Zionist crimes’ and deleting a poem from the curriculum that criticizes the Israeli settler occupation.” See: Education in the Service of Tolerance: The Moroccan Curriculum 2013–2022, Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-se), 2023, https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Education-in-the-Service-of-Tolerance-The-Moroccan-Curriculum-2013-2022-IMPACT-se-Report.pdf [42].
8. “Normalization: Gantz to Sign ‘Unprecedented’ Security Agreement Between Morocco and Israel in Rabat,” BBC NEWS Arabic, November 24, 2021: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-59401649 [43].
9. “For the First Time… Israeli Soldiers Participate in Military Maneuvers in Morocco,” DW Arabic, May 6, 2023: https://www.dw.com/ar/ [44].
10. Alexandre Kateb: “The Abraham Accords After Gaza: A Change of Context,” Carnegie Endowment, April 25, 2025: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/04/the-abraham-accords-after-gaza-a-change-of-context?lang=en [45].
11. “Israel Approves 2023 Maritime Trade Cooperation Agreement with Morocco,” Big News Network, February 11, 2025, https://www.bignewsnetwork.com/news/278211114/israel-approves-2023-maritime-trade-cooperation-agreement-with-morocco [46].
12. Israël participe à un exercice militaire d’envergure au Maroc aux côtés de pays arabe, May 13, 2025 https://www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/israel/diplomatie-defense/artc-israel-participe-a-un-exercice-militaire-d-envergure-au-maroc-aux-cotes-de-pays-arabes#google_vignette [47].
13. Zain Hussain and Alaa Tartir, Recent Trends in International Arms Transfers in the Middle East and North Africa, April 10, 2025 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) www.sipri.org [48].
14. Ibid. [49].
15. The report was co-authored by Israeli expert specializing in Moroccan affairs, Daniel Zisenwine. See: Joshua Krasna, ed., “The Struggle for Stability: Arab Reactions to the Hamas-Israel War,” Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, May 15, 2024 https://dayan.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/kas-mdc-the-struggle-for-stability-reactions-to-the-hamas-israel-war_0.pdf [50].
16. “Moroccan-Israeli Normalization: The Silent, the Absent, the Winner, and the Loser,” TRT Arabic, published on December 14, 2020: https://trt.global/arabi/article/3839697 [51].
17. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “Arab Opinion Index 2022 Report,” published December 2022: https://arabindex.dohainstitute.org/AR/Pages/Arab-Opinion-Index-2022.aspx [52].
18. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “Arab Opinion Index Report on the War on Gaza,” published January 2024: https://arabindex.dohainstitute.org/AR/Pages/APOIsWarOnGaza.aspx [53].
19. Ibid. [54].
20. A report by the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies suggests that “opposition to the King’s move to normalize relations with Israel would most likely have meant that the Justice and Development Party would have had to sacrifice its place in government.” See: Moshe Dayan Center, “Morocco’s Normalization with Israel: The Justice and Development Party’s Reaction,” May 05, 2021, https://dayan.org/content/moroccos-normalization-israel-party-justice-and-development-pjds-reaction[55].
21. In 2013, the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) adopted a draft law in the Moroccan Parliament criminalizing normalization with Israel. The proposal was prepared by the Moroccan Observatory Against Normalization and supported by the then-governing Justice and Development Party (PJD) and Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), as well as the then-opposition parties Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) and Istiqlal Party. Later, the Authenticity and Modernity Party would disavow the proposal. Shimon Samuels, the leader of American Jews and head of the Simon Wiesenthal Center for International Relations, had called in an open letter to King Mohammed VI to intervene to cancel this draft law, considering that its approval would “affect Morocco’s image as a country of tolerance, known for its distinguished relations with the Jewish community around the world.” For more on the subject, see: https://www.chambredesrepresentants.ma/sites/default/files/loi/lect_194.pdf [56].
22. “Rabat.. Massive Popular March in Solidarity with Gaza Calls for an End to Israeli Occupation Crimes,” Medi1 TV, April 7, 2025: https://www.youtube.com/watch [57].
23. “Once Again… Government Refuses to Receive ‘Overthrow Normalization’ Petition,” The Voice, February 4, 2024, https://thevoice.ma [58].
24. “Five Years Imprisonment for Blogger Abdelrahman Zenkad Due to Gaza Posts,” Lakome, April 8, 2024, lakome2.com [59].
25. “Tangier Court Sentences Redouane El Kstit to Two Years in Prison,” The Voice, March 10, 2025: https://www.thevoice.ma/ [60].
26. “Morocco: 13 Anti-Normalization Activists Convicted After Participating in Unauthorized Demonstration,” France 24 Arabic, December 26, 2024, https://shorturl.at/Hqm6Z. See also: Middle East Eye, “Morocco pro-Palestine activists denounce increased state repression,” Middle East Eye, [April 28, 2025], https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/morocco-pro-palestine-activists-denounce-increased-state-repression [61].
27. Dana El Kurd’s study raises conclusions regarding the impact of relations with Israel on the restriction of public freedoms in comparative contexts. El Kurd concludes that peace, in the absence of a genuine addressing of the roots of the conflict, does not promote democracy but rather fosters patterns of “illiberal peace,” where authoritarianism is reproduced through security partnerships and surveillance systems. Here, she places Israel in the position of “exporter of authoritarian expertise in the region.” According to her comparative analysis, in Jordan and Egypt, peace agreements contributed to weakening political institutions, marginalizing opposition elites, and restricting civil space. Qatar was the only Arab state that did not have official relations, but it maintained a relationship with Israel during the Second Intifada, arguing the necessity of playing mediating roles in regional conflicts. This often contributed to tension between the state and some pro-Palestine actors, leading to a narrowing of the space for direct solidarity action. As for Bahrain and the UAE, they used normalization to expand surveillance tools and restrict anti-normalization voices, while employing political and media discourse to reshape public opinion and justify these policies as necessary for stability and prosperity. The case of the UAE shows a more advanced model in the use of soft repression and precise surveillance, reflecting the transformation of normalization into a tool for dismantling social movements and containing political expression. See: Dana El Kurd, “The Paradox of Peace: The Impact of Normalization with Israel on the Arab World,” Global Studies Quarterly 3, no. 3 (July 2023), pp.16-18 [62].
28. “Anger Over Moroccan Ambassador to Palestine Being Subjected to Israeli Occupation Army Bullet Barrage,” Al-Quds Al-Arabi, May 22, 2025: https://www.alquds.co.uk/ [63].
29. Transformations in European Attitudes toward the Genocidal War on Gaza, Arab Center Washington DC (The Unit for Political Studies), June 4, 2025 https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/transformations-in-european-attitudes-toward-the-genocidal-war-on-gaza/ [64].
30. This phrase is now used by anti-normalization activists to refer to the elite that defends and supports the option of normalization. Its origin is the title of an article published by Ahmed Charai, owner of one of the largest media groups in Morocco, on the “Jerusalem Tribune” website: Ahmed Charai, “We Are All Israelis,” Jerusalem Tribune, October 2023 https://jstribune.com/charai-we-are-all-israelis/ [65].
31. A proposal by a Moroccan association in May 2025, calling for naming public facilities in Agadir, including a museum and main streets, after Israeli Jewish figures, sparked widespread controversy, especially for its demand to replace street names bearing national symbols with Jewish and Jewish-Israeli ones. See: “Call for ‘Symbolic Judaization’ of Agadir Streets Causes Controversy in Morocco,” Madar 21, June 2, 2025: madar21.com [66].
32. Taza is one of the ancient Moroccan cities in the northeast of the country, suffering, like other “forgotten cities,” from poverty, marginalization, poor infrastructure, unemployment, and lack of job opportunities. The phrase “Taza before Gaza” came in the context of the narrative told by Royal Advisor Fouad Ali El Himma to François Soudan, editor-in-chief of Jeune Afrique magazine. For the full story in which this phrase appeared, see: François Soudan: “Le roi, les islamistes et le Sahara” Jeune Afrique, July 4, 2006, www.jeuneafrique.com [67].
33. For a comparative historical perspective on the Palestinian issue as a matter of oppositional politics in other Arab contexts, see: Dana El Kurd, “Arab–Israeli Normalization, Repression, and Impunity,” Current History, Volume 123, Issue 857, December 2024 [68].
34. In this regard, King Mohammed VI had previously apologized for not receiving Israeli President Shimon Peres, who was expected to participate in the World Economic Forum held in Morocco in October 2010, confirming that “under current political circumstances, and in light of the stalemate in talks between Israel and the Palestinians, he would not be able to receive him.” See: “King of Morocco Refuses to Receive Peres,” Al Jazeera Net, October 18, 2010, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2010/10/18 [69].