The Sahara Conflict after UNSCR 2797: Between Opportunity and Challenges

Resolution 2797 opens a rare window of opportunity for political progress in the Sahara conflict, but it comes with complex regional challenges.

 

Dr. Said Saddiki

Dr. Mohammed Masbah

 

Introduction

In an unprecedented shift in the course of the Sahara conflict (the term “Sahara” in this article refers to the territory internationally known as Western Sahara, whereas Moroccan literature generally uses “Moroccan Sahara” or simply “the Sahara”), the United Nations Security Council adopted on October 31,  2025, Resolution 2797 , which marked a turning point in the international community’s approach to this conflict. The resolution explicitly endorsed Morocco’s autonomy initiative submitted to the UN in 2007 as a basis for negotiations to resolve the Sahara conflict. The resolution clearly stressed that autonomy is under Moroccan sovereignty, and that the Moroccan initiative is the basis for  a just and lasting solution to the conflict. Unlike in the past, the resolution ruled out other options, including not mentioning the Polisario’s proposal, which includes the option of a referendum.

Resolution 2797 opens a rare window of political opportunity to resolve the Sahara conflict, which could enable a realistic and sustainable solution to a conflict that has lasted more than five decades, while at the same time consolidating  the growing international recognition of the autonomy plan and imposing new responsibilities on the parties, including Algeria, which the resolution considers a key party to the conflict.

This resolution could also pave the way for a new phase in Morocco-Algeria relations, allowing for a transition to a “win-win” approach, if this historic opportunity is exploited to invent a consensual formula for autonomy that engages Algeria in developing through its involvement in the negotiation process.

This decision can also serve as a gateway to de-escalate  regional tensions, especially between Morocco and Algeria, through the development of long-term cooperation mechanisms that provide Algeria with the opportunity to participate in shaping the future of the region, with the possibility of obtaining long-term geopolitical privileges, within the framework of the  Atlantic Initiative launched by Morocco on November 6, 2023. This initiative may offer Algeria important geopolitical and economic advantages on the Atlantic coast, which King Mohammed VI confirmed in his Green March speech in 2024 by indicating that Morocco is ready to  grant concessions to Algeria on the Atlantic Ocean.

In this sense, Resolution 2797 is not just a linguistic amendment to Security Council resolutions on the Sahara conflict, but a historic political opportunity that expands the available options and lay the groundwork for a new negotiation track that could contribute to laying the foundations for resolving one of the world’s protracted conflicts.

Will the parties, particularly Algeria and Morocco, seize this opportunity to push for a pragmatic and sustainable solution to the Sahara conflict?

 

Context

The resolution received the support of 11 members of the Security Council, with Russia, China, and Pakistan abstaining, while Algeria chose not to participate in the vote. This result shows that the abstention of both Russia and China from vetoing the draft resolution submitted by the United States, the penholder of this resolution, is an implicit endorsement of its content. The support of the U.S., France, and Britain as permanent members of the UNSC with veto power has provided the resolution with an important political and symbolic weight and has made it an important milestone in reshaping international attitudes towards Morocco’s autonomy initiative.

The adoption of the resolution in its final version was not expected by most seasoned observers, given the sharp polarization between the U.S. on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other hands. In fact, it was unlikely that a consensual formula that would be accepted by all permanent members of the Security Council. In this regard, on November 1, 2025, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita revealed in an interview with the Moroccan Channel 2M, some of the challenges that preceded the voting process, noting that Russia was seriously considering the possibility of using the veto until the last moment, before reversing it following Morocco’s intense diplomatic efforts. According to Bourita, Moscow appears to have been seeking a certain concession from Washington, which has complicated the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the resolution.

 

Domestic and Regional Implications

At the domestic level, this resolution contributes to strengthening the legitimacy of the regime, especially since the Sahara issue – as one of the pillars of Moroccan foreign policy – is an exclusive prerogative of the king. This achievement is therefore mainly seen as a success of the monarchy. In the aforementioned dialogue,  the Moroccan Foreign Minister emphasized this by pointing to the careful follow-up and continuous guidance of the King Mohammed VI of the various stages of the advocacy on the resolution, and to the regular engagement in consultation with influential international and regional powers.

At the societal level, the resolution contributed to renewing national cohesion and reinforcing a sense of belonging, as it remobilized political and civil actors around an issue that is perceived as a cornerstone of Moroccan national identity. Immediately after the UN resolution, spontaneous celebrations took place in many cities, reflecting the symbolic place that the issue occupies in the collective consciousness of Moroccans. Furthermore the king’s decision to designate October 31 as a national holiday institutionalized this connection, placing this date in the ranks of the symbolism of the Green March.

This resolution constitutes an exceptional diplomatic breakthrough, strengthening Morocco’s regional standing and providing it with a negotiating advantage in the conflict settlement process. This is reinforced by the royal speech delivered immediately after the adoption of the resolution in the UNSC, which contained reassuring and balanced messages to Morocco’s allies and opponents alike, indicating Morocco’s desire to exploit the resolution to create an environment of regional stability.

Algeria, the main supporter of the Polisario Front, considered the resolution to be a shift in the Security Council’s approach to the Sahara conflict, and does not reflect the traditional UN doctrine on decolonization.  The Algerian representative to the UN criticized the text of the  resolution, claiming that it disregarded the Polisario’s proposals and favored the proposal of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty over other options. Algeria abstained from the vote, in a clear expression of its rejection of the resolution’s outcomes.

However, subsequent statements by the Algerian government showed a degree of flexibility, seeking to reinterpret the resolution by emphasizing that it also included elements of the Polisario’s proposals. This was evident in an interview by Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf, days after the Security Council resolution, in which he avoided the language of categorical rejection and offered a more measured reading of the resolution. Algeria also expressed its readiness to support  mediation between Morocco and the Polisariowithin  a UN framework. This fluctuation in Algerian official positions reflects an initial misreading of the resolution’s potential implications, before Algeria moved towards adopting a less severe rhetoric that reinterprets the resolution instead of rejecting it completely.

Algeria is likely to continue its support for the Polisario Front. In a meeting with the leader of the Polisario Front on November 13, 2015, Algerian President  Abdelmadjid Tebboune reiterated Algeria’s continued support to the Polisario. Algeria may also engage traditional allies – such as South Africa – to counter Morocco’s diplomatic advances and limit the impact of the 2797 resolution. However, the reluctance of both Russia and China to support Algeria’s position within the UNSC reflects the widening isolation of Algeria from its traditional allies on this issue.

The Polisario Front viewed the Security Council resolution a serious deviation, and declared its refusal to engage in any negotiations based on the Moroccan autonomy initiative adopted by the resolution. Although the resolution removed the option of a referendum on secession, as the Polisario has defended since 1975, the Polisario representative to the UN reiterated that, this resolution does not imply recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara.  The Polisario Front also issued  a statement saying that it would not participate in “any peace process or negotiations based on proposals aimed at legitimizing the Moroccan military occupation.”

Accordingly, the Polisario leadership launched an intensive diplomatic campaign, including visits to Algeria , Mauritania, and some African and Latin American countries, in an attempt to mitigate its loss in the Security Council by re-establishing old alliances, and mobilizing political and symbolic support to alleviate the isolation imposed by the resolution.

However, despite the rhetoric of rejection, it is unlikely that the Polisario Front will resort to the military escalation, given the imbalance of military power favoring Morocco. In its current position, the Polisario is unable to  change the status quo established by Morocco in recent years. Moreover,  The Front will also be wary of taking any action that would cause U.S. sanctions against it, especially in light of a bill submitted to the U.S. Congress in June 2025, which aims to classify the Polisario as a foreign terrorist organization, which may serve as an additional deterrent.

 

Why isn’t Resolution 2797 enough?  

This resolution marks a milestone in the course of the Sahara conflict, opening the door to a political and legal opportunity to establish the autonomy initiative as the only and realistic solution to the conflict. However, it does not mean the end of the process, but rather the beginning of a new phase, which requires intensive diplomatic work at many levels. The opportunities and challenges can be categorized into three main levels that interact with each other.

At the international level, Moroccan diplomacy bears the responsibility of consolidating this diplomatic achievement, while at the same time investing it to broaden the base of international recognition of the autonomy proposal within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. This milestone represents an opportunity for decision-makers in Rabat to confirm the effectiveness of the approach that Morocco has taken over the past few years in managing the Sahara issue, which relies mainly on strengthening relations with international powers and building supportive alliances, including successive international recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara territory.

 The U.S. decision in December 2020 to recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara territory, as well as the policy of “opening foreign consulates”  in Laayoune and Dakhla, played a key role in advancing this approach. Morocco is likely to use this momentum to persuade other countries, particularly Europeans, to recognize its sovereignty over the Sahara, as well as attract more foreign investment and open new consulates in the region.

Moreover, Morocco will likely reinforce gains on the ground by securing and expanding trans-Saharan trade crossings, making it one of the tools of Moroccan diplomacy, especially with European countries that benefit commercially from these crossings. Morocco will also seek to place the Sahara region at the center of international strategies, especially its Atlantic Initiative and its strategy towards the Sahel and Sahara region.

At the regional level, Morocco appears to continue to seek to open direct and indirect channels of communication with Algeria, as part of the mediation efforts of some countries, particularly the US. These efforts are likely to face difficulties, due to the complexity of bilateral relations between Morocco and Algeria as a result of accumulated historical and political complexities. However, these diplomatic efforts may lead to achieving some short-term goals, such as initiating preliminary arrangements for the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries which have been cut off since 2021, and to ease tensions through mutual messages of reassurance that may be enhanced by informal channels of dialogue aimed at gradually trust building.

However, full normalization of relations between the two countries remains a long-term objective, which could become attainable if the current window of opportunity turns into a gradual path of confidence-building, a path that requires sustained effort and long-term diplomatic patience. This is reflected in the Moroccan king’s repeated calls to the Algerian president for a “sincere fraternal dialogue” to build new relations between the two countries. The Moroccan foreign minister also emphasized the importance of direct negotiations between the two countries, noting that third-party mediation is not necessarily required. In the absence of any current indications of a full normalization of relations between the two countries, these statements and friendly gestures would ease the tension relatively and help maintain the status quo.

At the domestic level, Morocco has begun preparing an updated and detailed autonomy plan. On November 10, 2025, the king’s advisers met with the leaders of the political parties represented in parliament, to discuss the new version of the autonomy initiative. This meeting reflects an official realization that this political moment requires broad internal mobilization and institutional consensus on the detailed second version of the autonomy proposal, and how to bring it into force.

This UN resolution has contributed domestically to strengthening the national consensus on this issue. Since its adoption, a broad campaign has been launched to organize cultural and political events aimed at highlighting the significance of the resolution and shaping public opinion in support of the next phase. In this context, the importance of creating a political and psychological environment to receive the updated autonomy proposal and to promote public debate on possible models of governance is highlighted.

Comparative Models of Autonomy: Lessons for Morocco The first version of the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative notes in paragraph 11 that it draws inspiration from the constitutional provisions in force in countries that are geographically and culturally close to Morocco, and it appears that the Moroccan context aligns more closely to the Spanish experience, and it may also benefit partially from the Italian experience. Morocco can benefit from the Spanish model of autonomy, which is based on a negotiated approach within a unified state, reconciling the recognition of the specificities of the regions with the preservation of state unity. This model is also characterized by elected local institutions and the delegation of extensive powers in specific areas, while the central government retains sovereign authority. The  Spanish constitution  provides for an asymmetric system of autonomy, with some regions having broader powers than others according to their historical, cultural, and political specificities. In terms of the constitutional framework and the number of autonomous regions, the Italian experience provides a useful model. While the Spanish constitution is based on a state composed of autonomous regions, recognizing autonomy for all of them though with varying degrees of competence, the Italian constitution recognizes in article 116 the autonomy of only five regions. Morocco can benefit from this constitutional approach without assigning a specific region to autonomy. The phrase “and autonomous regions that can be established” could be added to article 135 of the Constitution, which states that “the territorial communities of the Kingdom are the regions, municipalities, regions and communities”, which allows a degree of flexibility that enables the possibility of expanding the scope of autonomy in the future according to the political, historical and cultural facts of each region.

Opportunities and Structural Constraints

Although Resolution 2797 strengthens Morocco’s political and negotiating position, it does not bring the conflict to an end, as it is linked to a complex regional structure, making the investment of this transformation contingent upon a conducive regional environment. However, the resolution opens up a time-limited window of opportunity that can be built upon, if it is approached realistically and with an understanding of the structural barriers that continue to dominate the dynamics of conflict. These barriers can be grouped into three main categories.

First, it is due to the legacy of the borders, as the roots of the structural crisis between Algeria and Morocco go back to the first years of the independence of the two countries, due to the dispute over the demarcation of the borders inherited from colonial era. This led to painful events between the two countries, most notably the Sand War in 1963, and then the expulsion of thousands of Moroccans from Algeria on the day of Eid al-Adha in 1975, in response to the Green March organized by Morocco in November of the same year to reclaim the territory of the Sahara.

Second, the Algerian regime has long invested heavily —financially and diplomatically— in the Sahara issue, making it a core pillar of its own legitimacy. Consequently, the regime finds it difficult to shift its position quickly and radically. This behavior can be explained through the concept of sunk costs, a notion from decision theory and behavioral economics, which highlights why actors—whether individuals or states—persist in pursuing costly or suboptimal courses of action due to prior investments. In this context, any radical shift could be perceived domestically as a concession or an acknowledgment of a historical failure, reinforcing the regime’s reluctance to alter its stance.

Third, mutual investment in fear is one of the most important obstacles to any progress on the Sahara issue. In Algeria, Morocco’s image has been entrenched as a “classic enemy” used to hold power internally. This confirms the series of official statements describing Morocco as a real threat to Algeria, whether militarily,  as a source of drugs, or as a backchannel for Israeli penetration of the region.

Morocco, on the other hand, views Algeria as the main and continuing supporter of the separatist movement, a country that uses its political, military, and financial capacities to disrupt any final solution to the Sahara conflict. Morocco also interprets Algeria’s positions as part of a broader regional doctrine that perceives Morocco’s rise regionally as a threat to its strategic position.

This situation reproduces a vicious circle of mutual fear, making building even the bare minimum trust one of the most complex challenges ahead.

Despite these obstacles, current regional and international developments may provide a window of political opportunity that can bring about limited, even gradual breakthroughs. This opportunity is based on several elements, most notably the apparent insistence of the current U.S. administration – for personal, economic, and geopolitical motives – to push the two countries towards a partial political reconciliation between the two countries, which may contribute to softening the positions, at least partially. This opportunity is further reinforced by the recent improvement in relations between Algiers and Washington in recent months, as well as a concurrent cooling of relations between Algiers and Moscow. Hence, the American mediation may achieve some expected results, foremost of which is the start of direct communication between the two countries and the initiation of procedures for restoring diplomatic relations.

Morocco’s vital interests — linked to the Sahara issue, as well as economic and security interests — will lead it to continue the same diplomatic approach under the “policy of the outstretched hand”.

 

Conclusion

Security Council Resolution 2797 marks a strategic turning point in the course of the Sahara conflict, carrying significant political implications that reorient the compass of this issue and strengthen Morocco’s regional positioning. The UNSC’s endorsement of the autonomy initiative under Moroccan sovereignty reflects the dynamics of power and influence in the international system and the current regional balances of power. It not only affirms the primacy of the Moroccan approach but also establishes a new negotiating framework that will have far-reaching implication— for the future of the Sahara issue, the restructuring the relations between the parties involved, and the broader regional system.

Morocco’s exploitation of this political moment, with a clear strategic vision, would further consolidate its position as a stable regional actor capable of influencing its immediate environment. Moreover, this decision provides an opportunity to rebuild bridges of trust at the Maghreb level, if the mediation efforts led by the Trump administration succeed. However, the weight of the history of Moroccan Algerian relations and Morocco’s internal political dynamics with some of its allies may slow down the achievement of this goal.

This shift is also important in that it opens up a new phase necessitating a transition from zero-sum frameworks to a win-win approach. In short, Resolution 2797 should be understood not as the end of a process but as the beginning of a new phase in developing a sustainable political solution to a protracted conflict.