How Can Morocco Move Beyond “Two Speeds”?

The new generation of territorial development programs is expected to address the structural challenges associated with “Two-Speed Morocco.” However, the adopted methodology risks institutionalizing a parallel governance framework that may undermine the constitutional architecture of territorial governance for development.

 

 

Executive Summary

This paper examines the contexts and underlying stakes that shape the public discourse surrounding “Two-Speed Morocco,” in light of the recurring and concerning indicators pointing to a widening development gap between urban and rural areas. These disparities generate political, social, and economic repercussions.

The paper also explores the anticipated pathways for modeling the new generation of territorial development programs. It concludes that unifying the pace of development across the national territory requires balancing a unified political vision regarding national development choices with the formulation of territorially grounded plans that reflect genuine local needs. It further requires the effective involvement of elected councils in supervising the new programs.

 

Introduction

In his speech marking the twenty-sixth anniversary of Throne Day, His Majesty King Mohammed VI highlighted the cumulative nature of territorial disparities that have produced a Morocco moving at two speeds. He underscored the economic and social consequences of these imbalances and called for integrating the territorial dimension into the design and implementation of programs aimed at reducing disparities. The speech emphasized four major priorities: employment, essential social services, territorial upgrading, and the sustainable and efficient management of water resources.

The disruptive effects of “Two-Speed Morocco” have made the adoption of a territorial approach imperative. This approach seeks to strengthen the articulation between social justice and spatial justice, and to establish positive discrimination in favor of what may be described as “low-speed regions.”

This vision is being implemented through the mobilization of new financial resources under the 2026 Finance Law, and through a governance framework overseen by the Ministry of Interior. Through its local branches, the ministry has initiated consultations with various territorial actors in preparation for the new generation of integrated territorial development programs.

Adopting a critical perspective, this paper seeks to interrogate the political and managerial foundations of the “Two-Speed Morocco” discourse. It employs a comparative method to identify points of convergence and divergence between the previous approach to combating territorial disparities and the new trajectory as framed in official texts. In addition to governmental sources, the study draws on data from the High Commission for Planning and the Court of Auditors.

The paper is structured around three main axes: the requirements for addressing territorial disparities; the pathways and mechanisms for implementation along with the opportunities they create for strengthening public action to reduce disparities; the implications for territorial governance and the potential contribution of new-generation territorial development programs to advancing spatial justice.

Interim Priorities for Addressing Territorial Disparities

In his speech marking the twenty-sixth anniversary of Throne Day,[1] His Majesty King Mohammed VI warned of the adverse effects of territorial disparities on the pursuit of social justice. The persistent  imbalance in the distribution of investments and public services between urban and rural areas has directly affected social conditions, particularly in light of ongoing disparities in human development indicators, as evidenced by the latest data published by the High Commission for Planning.

Figure 1: Divergence in Social Indicators Between Rural and Urban Areas (2014–2024)

Area	Year	Severity of Deprivation	Vulnerability Rate	Poverty Rate	Multidimensional Poverty Index
Rural	2014	41.1	17.8	13.1	5.1
	2024	39.1	22.4	23.6	9.7
	Change	-2.0	+4.6	+10.5	+4.6
Urban	2014	39.2	4.6	3.0	1.1
	2024	35.7	2.3	4.1	1.5
	Change	-3.5	-2.3	+1.1	+0.4

Source: Author’s compilation based on data from the High Commission for Planning.[2]

The data indicate an increasing ruralization of poverty and vulnerability. Between 2014 and 2024, the Multidimensional Poverty Index rose by 4.6 percentage points, primarily driven by a marked increase in poverty rates. Although vulnerability declined slightly in urban areas, it continued to rise in rural regions, increasing from 17.8 percent to 22.4 percent over the same period.

The same pattern is observed with respect to the unemployment rate. The decline in economic activity in rural areas led the unemployment rate in these regions to increase from 10.5 percent in 2014 to 21.4 percent in 2024.[3] Part of this structural dilemma is linked to the limited capacity of investment reception infrastructures, as well as weaknesses in transport and distribution routes and in logistical and marketing platforms. The fragility of basic infrastructure further entrenches a condition of economic isolation in many rural territories, despite their considerable potential and available opportunities.

Moreover, imbalances in the territorial distribution of social facilities and services have intensified. Disparities in educational provision continue to widen, not only due to limited educational supply and shortages in human resources, but also as a result of certain discriminatory public policies. Rural schools remain inadequately equipped with essential materials and suffer from limited connectivity to internet networks. This has contributed to the widening gap between an urban education system that is gradually improving and a secondary, structurally disadvantaged system in rural areas. One of the most recent manifestations of this divide is the predominantly urban-oriented implementation of the so-called “pioneer school” model.

In the health sector, disparities are even more pronounced. Significant gaps persist in the territorial distribution of healthcare infrastructure and human resources. The availability of medical services remains highly limited in rural areas. The density of physicians in rural regions does not exceed one doctor per 10,000 inhabitants, compared to approximately 8.7 per 10,000 at the national level. In addition, health isolation remains widespread, as more than 55 percent of the rural population must travel, on average, over five kilometers to reach the nearest basic health service. This situation affects the effective enjoyment of the constitutional right to health.

Figure 2: Divergence in Health Indicators Between Rural and Urban Areas

Indicator	Urban Areas	Rural Areas
Medical Density (per 10,000 inhabitants)	8.7	< 1
Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 live births)	44.6 deaths	111.1 deaths
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)	11.2 deaths	16.3 deaths
Average Distance to Access Basic Health Services	< 1.25 km	> 5 km

Source: Author’s compilation based on data from the High Commission for Planning and the Court of Auditors.[4]

 

In addition, water stress and climate change have weakened the functional position of rural territories in contributing to food security, with resulting economic and social repercussions. Social tensions linked to access to drinking water and irrigation have intensified in several regions, including areas historically endowed with significant surface and groundwater reserves that have rapidly declined. This trend reflects the reliance of agricultural policy on water-intensive production models that are misaligned with ongoing climatic transformations.[5]

At the same time, this situation contributes to the growth of “climate migration” flows, disrupting ecological and productive systems and placing additional pressure on urban networks.[6]

Taken together, these indicators have shifted interim spatial justice priorities toward addressing the depth of rural–urban disparities. This shift is reflected in targeted initiatives designed to improve the living conditions of rural populations affected by poverty and vulnerability resulting from deficits in infrastructure and social services.[7] Greater reliance is also being placed on proximity-based social approaches to enhance the effectiveness of measures envisaged under a new generation of spatial equity policies.

However, the identification of priorities has not been accompanied by a corresponding effort to assign responsibility for the shortcomings of several previous strategies and programs. These initiatives mobilized substantial budgets and exceptional mechanisms but did not succeed in addressing the profound structural and service deficits in rural areas. Among them is the Program for Reducing Territorial and Social Disparities in Rural Areas (2017–2023), which was allocated 50 billion dirhams yet has not been subject to a comprehensive and objective evaluation.[8]

 

The New Paradigm of Spatial Justice: Opportunities and Risks

The Throne Day speech was followed by a special government meeting convened to define the new agenda for spatial justice[9].The exceptional nature of this meeting lay not only in its timing and venue, but also in the fact that it was chaired by the Minister of the Interior. This carries political significance, particularly in light of the context surrounding preparations for the 2026 elections, whose oversight has been entrusted to the minister responsible for the sector rather than to the Head of Government.

This development suggests a reassertion of the central role of the Ministry of the Interior in leading territorial programs, similar to the period preceding the 2011 Constitution, when the Ministry directly supervised the design and implementation of rural upgrading programs[10] and major urban development projects.[11] It also builds on the Ministry’s experience in leading Integrated Development Plans (PDI) in their revised format following the First National Conference on Advanced Regionalization in 2019, through targeted interventions supervised by regional and provincial committees.

Further evidence of this orientation can be found in considerable attention devoted to social and spatial justice challenges during the Ministry of the Interior’s annual meeting held on 1 August and attended by central, territorial, and security officials. The discussions underscored the need to create the necessary conditions for a national mobilization to accompany the anticipated shift in the methodology for addressing territorial disparities and their implications for social cohesion.[12]

Taken together, these signals suggest that the Ministry of the Interior is being entrusted with an extra-governmental authority in leading spatial justice strategies. At the normative level, the Ministry’s circular issued on 15 August 2025 concerning the new generation of territorial development programs did not refer to the Government Program or sectoral strategies. Instead, it designates these initiatives primarily in the New Development Model as the primary reference framework that transcends political cycles and guides efforts to reduce territorial disparities.[13] At the structural level, the proposed institutional architecture indicates that the mechanisms for managing and monitoring the forthcoming programs are being detached from direct governmental oversight.

At the territorial level, provincial governors oversaw, between mid-October and the end of November 2025, a series of consultative meetings with territorial actors aimed at diagnosing development gaps and deficiencies within each province. In practice, however, these meetings were more communicative than participatory. The accelerated preparation timetable reduced the effective involvement of elected officials in determining orientations and priorities.

From a managerial perspective, this configuration may offer certain advantages. The Ministry of the Interior benefits from an extensive administrative network and holds the authority to mobilize a wide range of actors within an action plan structured around clearly defined financial and temporal benchmarks. It also draws on experience in coordinating major structuring interventions, such as the National Initiative for Human Development and state–region program contracts. However, this interventionist positioning may also generate implications for territorial democracy that could prove difficult to reverse.

• Regionalization vs. Provincialization: Despite official reaffirmations of commitment to the regionalization option, early indications point to a possible regression toward a logic of provincialization. The Ministry’s circular designates the province as the primary territorial framework for the allocation of resources and projects.[14] While the provincial level may enhance proximity in diagnosing needs and coordinating and monitoring operations, insufficient consideration of the regional perspective may contribute to reinforcing disparities between regional centers and their peripheral areas.
• Centralization / Territorialization: The arrangements associated with the new programs suggest a disruption of the territorial governance model of development as established by the 2011 Constitution. This is reflected in the adoption of a new type of territorial plans not framed by any specific legal text, and in the bypassing of normative principles governing relations between the central authority and elected councils, such as subsidiarity, free administration, and oversight.[15] Furthermore, the declared effort to shield territorial development programs from politicization has raised concerns among certain political parties that this may signal a broader tendency toward the depoliticization of public management and the weakening of the democratic stakes of decentralization.[16]
• Decentralization /Deconcentration: Contrary to the provisions of the 2015 organic laws and the 2018 Administrative Deconcentration Decree, the arrangements governing the formulation and implementation of the new generation of territorial development programs fall within a trajectory of the practical reallocation of development management competences from decentralized bodies to deconcentrated structures, particularly the territorial units of the Ministry of the Interior. These units are positioned to assume executive functions that go beyond coordination, support, and oversight to include the direct management of territorial development programs.[17] Such a shift risks disturbing the required balance between decentralized and deconcentrated levels.
• Planning / Experimentation: By the end of 2023, a situation of relative policy vacuum had emerged in the public response to spatial justice challenges. Although the Head of Government committed to upgrading the Rural Territorial and Social Disparities Reduction Program (PRDST), [18] efforts were largely limited to completing unfinished projects. In the new context, the texts and measures adopted following the Throne Day speech have not clarified the temporal horizon of the Integrated Territorial Development Programs (PDTI), namely whether they are intended to cover the transitional period leading up to the 2026 and 2027 elections, or to extend until 2030 in parallel with the territorial upgrading dynamics associated with World Cup host cities and their surrounding infrastructure and basic service projects.[19]

Pathways for the New Generation of Development Programs

The 2026 Finance Law identifies two principal sources of financing for the new projects aimed at addressing territorial disparities. First, appropriations for integrated territorial development programs were added to the expenditures of the special account relating to the share of value-added tax allocated to territorial collectivities. Second, the Rural and Mountainous Areas Development Fund (FDRZM) was transformed into an Integrated Territorial Development Fund, endowed with a total financial envelope of MAD 20 billion, including a spending ceiling of MAD 5 billion and commitment authorizations amounting to MAD 15 billion.[20] The role of authorizing officer was assigned to the Minister of the Interior rather than to the Head of Government, a decision that generated intra-governmental tensions during the preparation of the Finance Law.

In all cases, territorial collectivities are required to provide financial contributions to both mechanisms.[21] This effectively places them in a position of dual contribution to financing the new generation of development programs, with implications for their fiscal autonomy, their capacity to implement their own development plans, and the allocation of limited resources to projects that fall within ministerial competencies. These circumstances warrant recognizing territorial collectivities as essential partners in the planning, management, and monitoring of the new programs.

1. Integrated Territorial Planning

Given the nature of the four strategic priorities identified at the national level, primary responsibility lies with the central government, which must adopt interventionist policies to reduce inequalities and redirect economic growth toward disadvantaged populations in marginalized areas. However, several of these domains intersect with the competencies of territorial collectivities. Territorial upgrading and rural development fall within the remit of provincial and prefectural councils; economic development and employment-generating investment fall under regional councils; and proximity-based social facilities fall within the competencies of municipal councils.

This interconnection requires the formulation of regional and provincial plans that articulate projects contained in sectoral strategies and public institutional programs with those included in territorial planning instruments, such as Regional Spatial Plans, Regional Development Programs, Municipal Action Plans, and Provincial or Prefectural Development Programs. Effective planning must genuinely reflect the specific characteristics and needs of each territory, rather than merely introducing limited territorial adjustments to strategies designed with centralized tools and priorities.

2. Contractual Territorial Governance

Territorial contracting constitutes the most appropriate mechanism for reconciling central priorities with the requirements of territorial democracy. This involves the formulation of regional development contracts between the State and territorial actors to implement projects identified in both sectoral and territorial strategies responding to spatial disparities.

The institutional and functional governance framework for the new generation of territorial program contracts may be structured across three levels:

• National Level: Adoption of a contractual logic that replaces fragmented sectoral approaches with a cross-sectoral and participatory model of territorial governance for development. A national committee should be established to accompany the new generation of territorial disparity reduction programs. Its membership should include representatives of relevant ministerial departments and public institutions, alongside presidents of regional councils.
• Regional Level: Creation of a supervisory committee responsible for programming projects included in the Integrated Territorial Development Programs, ensuring coordination between the national level and lower territorial levels. This committee would be co-chaired by the wali and the president of the regional council, with participation from regional administrative services, elected councils, public institutions, and state-owned enterprises.
• Local Level: Establishment of provincial coordination committees comprising representatives of territorial authorities, deconcentrated services, public institutions, and substantial representation from municipal and provincial councils. These committees would be tasked with proposing priority local interventions, strengthening coordination among stakeholders, and supporting and monitoring the implementation of projects programmed under regional contracts.

However, the contractual approach should not obscure responsibility for territorial disparities. Interregional disparities fall within the responsibility of the central government. Intraregional disparities are shared between relevant ministerial departments, regional councils, development agencies, and specialized public institutions. Subregional disparities engage municipal and provincial councils with regard to their own competencies, alongside authorities responsible for shared and transferred competences.

3. Participatory, Impact-Centered Evaluation

The effectiveness of evaluation mechanisms depends on making them more participatory and centered on measurable social impact. At the central level, annual and periodic reports should assess the actual effects of implemented projects. At the territorial level, evaluation should follow a participatory approach consistent with the consultative meetings that enabled local associations to contribute to diagnosing needs and proposing alternatives.

Participatory evaluation may be operationalized through the inclusion of stakeholder representatives in monitoring committees and the design of a thematic platform to receive feedback and measure the impact of implemented projects on the basis of predefined criteria.

 

Conclusion

The new approach to overcoming “Two-Speed Morocco” promises the beginnings of a methodological renewal in the public response to territorial disparities. It may enhance coherence between sectoral strategies and territorial programs by relying on a programmatic framework that rises above electoral calculations and prioritizes projects with rapid territorial and social impact.

However, granting the territorial administration an executive role in the design and implementation of the new generation of territorial development programs threatens to entrench a form of “parallel territorial management” that treats elected councils merely as consultative forces and financial instruments. This situation calls for the adoption of a territorial approach rooted in local specificities and needs and aligned with the constitutional architecture governing territorial governance.

In light of the above, the paper advances the following recommendations:

• The formulation of Regional Spatial Justice Plans as reference documents to ensure alignment between sectoral strategies, public institutional programs, and the action plans of territorial collectivities.
• The establishment of a regional committee and provincial committees to supervise the new generation of development programs, ensuring balanced and effective representation of presidents of elected councils alongside administrative authorities, development agencies, and relevant public institutions.
• The issuance of periodic reports on the progress of project implementation, identifying obstacles and outlining mechanisms to address them, while strengthening the field-based and participatory dimensions of evaluation in order to maximize social impact.

Footnotes

[1] Royal Speech on the occasion of the Twenty-Sixth Anniversary of Throne Day, 29 July 2025. https://tinyurl.com/5fdspbhs

[2] Haut-Commissariat au Plan. Lutte contre la pauvreté, réduction des inégalités sociales et territoriales, développement humain et équité de genre au Maroc: Progrès et défis. Study Report. Rabat: Haut-Commissariat au Plan, September 2025.

[3] High Commission for Planning. General Population and Housing Census: Demographic, Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population. December 2024, p. 17.

[4] Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of Health and Social Protection. National Report on the Implementation of SDG 3 for the Year 2024. Rabat: Directorate of Planning and Financial Resources, 2024.

[5] National Human Rights Council. The Right to Water: Pathways to Addressing Water Stress in Morocco. October 2022, p. 20.

[6] Institut Royal des Études Stratégiques. Quel avenir de l’eau au Maroc?Rabat , 2022, p. 10.

[7] Prime Minister’s Orientation Note on the Preparation of the Draft Finance Law for Fiscal Year 2026. 8 August 2025, p. 63.

[8] Abdessalam Saddiki. “Plaidoyer pour un développement territorial, prélude à l’activation de l’ascenseur social.” ecoactu.ma, 4 September 2025. https://tinyurl.com/5xbddm2v

[9] Mohamed Jemâa. “Développement territorial: réunion de coordination à Tétouan.” Medias24, 2 August 2025. https://tinyurl.com/5f3jurs8

[10] This refers to a set of territorially oriented national programs launched since the mid-1990s, including the National Rural Roads Program (PNRR), the Global Rural Electrification Program (PERG), and the National Rural Drinking Water Supply Program (PAGER).

[11] Multiannual urban upgrading programs, including Tangier Metropolis (2013–2017), Rabat City of Lights (2014–2018), the Economic and Urban Development Program for Tetouan (2014–2018), and the Urban Development Program for Agadir (2018–2024).

[12] Mohamed Adel Altato. “Laftit convenes security and military leadership to implement the Throne Speech; security and elections among top priorities.” Al3omk, 1 August 2025.  https://al3omk.com/1089961.html

[13] Mohemmed Amine. “Développement territorial intégré: une nouvelle génération de programmes en vue.” Challenge, 18 August 2025. https://tinyurl.com/4ybuwjcz

[14] Circular No. 1300/CAB of the Minister of the Interior concerning the elaboration of a new generation of integrated territorial development programs, 15 August 2025, p. 2.

[15] Statement of the General Secretariat of the Justice and Development Party concerning the governmental approach to preparing a new generation of integrated territorial development programs, 18 August 2025. https://tinyurl.com/4jnhh3xw

[16] Memorandum of the Party of Progress and Socialism on the reform of the General Electoral Code, 28 August 2025. https://pps.ma/fr/9647/

[17] Ministry of Economy and Finance. Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Finance Law for 2026. October 2025, p. 63.

[18] House of Councillors. Legislative Year 2021–2022 Report. Book II: Oversight of Government Action and Evaluation of Public Policies. 2022, p. 42.

[19] Ministry of Economy and Finance. Regional Distribution of Investment, Draft Finance Law for 2026. October 2025, p. 2.

[20] Ministry of Economy and Finance, Directorate of Budget. Synthesis Note on the Budgetary Impact of Major Public Policies under the Draft Finance Law for 2026. December 2025, p. 8.

[21] Articles 15 and 16 of Finance Law No. 50.25 for Fiscal Year 2026. Official Gazette No. 7465 bis, 16 December 2025.