Institutional ReformsResearchThe Unified Social Registry: Enhancing Social Program Effectiveness or Paving the Way for a Minimal Welfare State?

The Unified Social Registry has shifted from serving as a tool to ensure the effectiveness of social programs to acting as a subtle mechanism for establishing a minimal welfare state model. This shift is driven by existing legal and methodological constraints, as well as the use of threshold mechanisms that narrow the pool of beneficiaries.

 

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Introduction

Despite Morocco’s numerous social programs implemented over past periods, their effectiveness remained limited, and their impact on social development indicators was weak. This shortcoming stemmed from the absence of a unified and coherent targeting system that ensures support reaches those who are genuinely eligible. The COVID-19 crisis further revealed the depth of existing social vulnerability and underscored the urgent need for accurate, up-to-date data on the households requiring social support. This situation led to a thorough overhaul of the social targeting methodology under Law No. 72.18 of 2020[1], which aimed to establish new targeting mechanisms that enable the precise determination of social support beneficiaries in a manner that enhances the effectiveness of social programs and ensures their complementarity and integration.

Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate the extent to which activating the Unified Social Registry can enhance the effectiveness of social programs and ensure their complementarity. It does so by posing the following question: To what degree can we rely on the Unified Social Registry to enhance the effectiveness of social programs? We will address this question through four main sections: the first section discusses the primary contexts and references that led to the adoption of the Unified Social Registry; the second outlines the measures the government has taken to operationalize this system; the third evaluates the initial gains achieved; and, finally, the fourth identifies the significant risks threatening the registry’s effectiveness and proposes solutions to overcome them. Our approach adopts a critical analytical perspective in light of international standards for the right to social protection through examining the legal and institutional framework governing the Unified Social Registry, referencing both official and parallel reports for relevant data, reviewing the organizational and technical measures taken to implement the program, and drawing on available international experiences in this field.

 

The Social Protection System: Weak Targeting and Limited Impact

Since gaining independence, Morocco has developed a suite of anti-poverty programs to ensure that underprivileged groups have access to social services. This effort resulted in the establishment of an extensive network comprising nearly 140 social programs, overseen by more than 50 institutional stakeholders [2]. Despite the tens of billions of dirhams allocated to these programs [3], official evaluations have shown limited effectiveness. Chief among the reasons is the diversity in mechanisms used to determine who qualifies for support [4], ranging from geographically targeted programs—such as “Tayssir”—to those targeting particular groups—such as literacy and anti-begging initiatives or “vulnerability” programs under the National Initiative for Human Development. In other cases, a household-based targeting system was adopted, as with the Medical Assistance Program, “RAMED” [5]. In addition to this multiplicity, the standards employed have lacked precision and transparency, as they were not grounded in a reliable, regularly updated database on individuals and households. Consequently, this contributed to a state of haphazard targeting [6], leading to serious errors that excluded qualifying recipients while including ineligible beneficiaries [7]. This, in turn, adversely affected these programs’ contributions to improving social development indicators [8].

Under these mounting pressures, Morocco accelerated its efforts to restructure social initiatives by adopting a new targeting methodology informed by royal directives, wherein the King called for establishing a national system to register households eligible for social support based on precise, objective criteria underpinned by modern technological tools [9]. Public reports echoed this call: the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council emphasized the need for an integrated, unified national system to gather information related to social protection [10]; likewise, the Commission on the New Development Model, in its general report, called for the creation of a Unified Social Registry as a mechanism to ensure effective governance of the social protection system [11]. Moreover, the First National Conference on Social Protection produced a set of recommendations, among them the need for Morocco to draw on international experiences in designing methods to target impoverished groups, transitioning from a category-based to a household-based approach [12].

In the same context, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the depth of accumulated social vulnerability, resulting in the loss of more than 700,000 jobs in the formal sector and nearly 4 million in the informal sector while pushing over 5 million people into poverty without any form of protection against illness or unemployment [13]. This was exacerbated by the government’s difficulties in pinpointing those eligible for support, as well as the challenges in distributing and monitoring benefits due to the absence of a reliable database of individuals and households [14].

In response to these challenges, the government promptly enacted Law No. 72.18 of 2020, establishing a new social targeting framework based on the National Population Registry and the Unified Social Registry under the supervision of the National Registry Agency [15]. The goal is to enhance the effectiveness of social programs by mandating pre-registration of all household members in the National Population Registry [16]. Each individual receives a digital and social identifier, thereby enabling the household to register in the Unified Social Registry. Registered households undergo a thorough assessment to determine eligibility for social programs based on specific numerical criteria. Each household is then assigned a numeric indicator that determines its eligibility to apply for a particular social program, contingent upon meeting the established threshold for that program [17].

Given these factors, the Unified Social Registry is expected to mark a pivotal turning point in the trajectory of social policies, facilitating the restructuring of social program management in line with principles of entitlement, effectiveness, and integration [18]. This comes at a time when Morocco, since 2021, has been rolling out a policy aimed at universalizing social protection by 2025 [19]. The successful execution of a significant portion of these policy initiatives hinges on establishing the Unified Social Registry as a new methodology for administering social programs.

Figure 1: Objectives of the Unified Social Registry

Source: Prepared by the researcher, based on the Interior Committee’s report in the House of Representatives regarding Bill No. 81.27

 

The Unified Social Registry as a New Methodology for Designing Social Programs

Since 2018, the government has introduced measures to develop and implement the Unified Social Registry (USR) to achieve full nationwide coverage by 2025. The objective is to more effectively target households eligible for social support while ensuring fairness and transparency in the distribution of public funds. The analytical table below provides an overview of the roadmap adopted for designing and rolling out the Registry.

Figure 2: The Process of Establishing the Unified Social Registry

Stage	Measures Taken	Results Achieved
Study Phase (2018–2019)	– Launch of analytical studies on implementing the Unified Social Registry. – Conduct a study on defining a household scoring formula. – Undertake strategic and technical studies for the National Population Registry.	– Identification of the technical, legal, and administrative requirements necessary for establishing the system.
Design Phase (2020–2022)	– Begin preparations of the digital infrastructure for the system. – Issue legal and regulatory texts governing the targeting framework.	– Creation of two digital platforms: the National Population Registry platform and the Unified Social Registry platform. – Establishment of the legal and regulatory basis for collecting and processing individual and household data.
Pilot Phase (2022)	– Conduct an initial pilot implementation in the Rabat administrative district and Kénitra province.	– Testing the effectiveness of the information system. – Resolving critical digital and administrative challenges to improve system efficiency.
Gradual Implementation (From January 2023 onward)	– Begin registering households nationwide in both registries. – Form an inter-ministerial committee to oversee the rollout of the targeting system. – Upgrade more than 1,630 local service centers for citizens. – Launch awareness campaigns targeting eligible groups and deploy mobile teams to facilitate registration in rural and remote areas.	– From January 2023 to the end of September 2024, over 5.2 million households (equivalent to about 18.9 million individuals) registered in the Unified Social Registry. – More than 20.6 million individuals registered in the National Population Registry.

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on data from various sources.

The data presented in the above table highlights the extended timeframe allocated to the study and design phase of the new targeting system, which spanned five years (2018–2022). This prolonged period was due to the complex legislative and technical processes required to develop an information system capable of securely and efficiently handling household data. Consequently, this delay affected the schedule for implementing the Unified Social Registry, which did not begin until early 2023—despite the initial plan for the targeting system to be in place before the launch of the new social protection programs set to roll out between 2021 and 2025.

This timing discrepancy negatively impacted efforts to ensure that beneficiary lists complied with standards of equity and eligibility [20]. An example is the Compulsory Basic Health Insurance (AMO) program, in which individuals previously covered by RAMED were automatically integrated into the National Social Security Fund by the end of December 2022 without reference to the Unified Social Registry (not yet fully operational at the time). Many of these beneficiaries were subsequently excluded once they were registered in the Social Registry, as their household social index exceeded the qualifying threshold (9.32) [21]. This transitional approach produced unintended consequences, mainly administrative confusion and increased pressure on the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) owing to the registration of households whose eligibility had not been verified. Moreover, excluding vulnerable groups—after having initially included them—led citizens to perceive the system as lacking transparency and fairness, thus undermining trust in the new system [22].

Regarding the rate of enrollment in the two registries, there was a notable increase toward the end of 2023, mainly due to the growing number of citizens hoping to benefit from the direct social support program [23]. Nevertheless, continuing at the current pace will not suffice to meet the goal of universal coverage by 2025. This shortfall is attributable to several factors, foremost among them a lack of public awareness about the importance of registration, obstacles preventing some citizens from accessing registration centers (whether due to distance or lack of resources), and the complexities involved in the enrollment process. Concerns over the potential misuse of personal information also dissuade many from registering. These challenges perpetuate gaps in the database, reduce targeting accuracy, and impede the system’s capacity to identify and reach households genuinely in need of support—ultimately constraining the Registry’s ability to enhance social programs’ effectiveness and hampering efforts to achieve a fairer, more rational distribution of social assistance.

 

Gains of the Unified Social Registry: A Preliminary Evaluation of Results

Preliminary outcomes of adopting the Unified Social Registry (USR) indicate some promising developments. The Registry has become the primary mechanism for selecting beneficiaries under the Compulsory Basic Health Insurance system funded by public solidarity, which the government supports with an annual budget of 9.5 billion dirhams [24]. Eligibility for this insurance scheme requires households to remain below the specified threshold of (9.32) [25], and thus far, around 4.05 million principal enrollees benefit from it [26]. Meanwhile, households whose index exceeds this threshold can join the Compulsory Basic Health Insurance for individuals able to pay subscription fees and who are neither wage earners nor self-employed (the “universal AMO”), which has recorded 133,000 enrollees [27]. Accordingly, the Registry’s criteria function as a sorting mechanism distinguishing free health insurance from coverage contingent on membership dues.

Moreover, the USR’s criteria serve as the central tool for identifying eligible households under the direct social support program for low-income families, which became operational in late 2023. Currently, approximately 3.9 million households benefit from this program, for which the government has allocated 22 billion dirhams in the 2024 budget [28]. Beneficiary households are selected based on an index that must not exceed the designated threshold of (9.74) [29]. Consequently, one million households were excluded for surpassing this threshold, even though many of these excluded households still experience significant social vulnerability [30].

At the institutional level, a National Registry Agency was established to manage the new targeting framework; however, legitimate questions arise regarding the delays in its operationalization, given that the decree authorizing its creation was issued in 2021 [31]. Currently, the Ministry of the Interior is temporarily carrying out some of the Agency’s functions, as stipulated in Article 43 of Law No. 72.18 [32]. Thanks to the Ministry’s longstanding experience in overseeing social programs and its substantial pool of human resources and household data, it is well positioned to assume this role. Yet, the protracted interim arrangement—whereby the Ministry of the Interior continues to fulfill the Agency’s tasks—may perpetuate its dominance over social programs and grant it control over inputs and outputs. This situation also risks undermining the Agency’s strategic objectives, potentially transforming it from a socially developmental institution into a security-focused regulatory body [33]. In turn, this would compromise the independence and impartiality necessary to improve the Agency’s performance and thus jeopardize the professionalism and transparency required for managing the targeting system effectively.

To promote transparency and good governance in administering social support programs, various information technology solutions have been employed. These include digitizing the registration process in the USR, automating data processing, communicating each household’s socioeconomic index via text messages, and disbursing monetary assistance through digital bank accounts. Such measures have simplified administrative procedures and streamlined the delivery of social support, thereby reducing human intervention, reinforcing oversight, and mitigating favoritism, corruption, or the political manipulation of assistance [34].

Within the broader effort to strengthen the governance of social programs, the government seeks to reorganize the social support system—transitioning from universal subsidies to direct support targeted at specific segments of the population according to USR criteria. Notable actions in this regard include the gradual reduction of the butane gas subsidy, beginning in May 2024, and the reallocation of funds from the Compensation Fund to finance direct social support initiatives [35]. The government has also eliminated specific existing programs, such as “RAMED” and “Widow Support,” merging their beneficiaries into a unified social support system. In a subsequent development, the “One Million Schoolbags” program was canceled and replaced by an exceptional financial subsidy to help disadvantaged families cover schooling costs [36]. This measure is expected to reduce the budget allocated to education support and efforts to curb school dropout rates from two billion dirhams to 600 million dirhams while cutting the number of beneficiaries from 4.5 million to 3 million [37]. Through these actions, the government aims to ensure that social programs are interlinked, enhance their governance, and direct resources only to deserving beneficiaries—central steps toward rationalizing state-level social initiatives and achieving more significant equity in distributing assistance [38].

Initial results from implementing the USR suggest an emerging shift toward more effective and equitable social programs reminiscent of certain international cases, such as that of Brazil [39]. Nonetheless, Morocco’s experience faces numerous risks rooted in the system’s complex administrative and financial framework and the political interests that shape the USR’s direction. These challenges hamper its ability to play a pivotal role in creating genuinely efficient and equitable social policies.

 

The Unified Social Registry: Risks That Outweigh Opportunities

Despite the initial advantages gained by adopting the Unified Social Registry (USR), its implementation process reveals numerous legal, procedural, and methodological shortcomings that hinder the effectiveness of its targeting approach. Moreover, in the short and medium term, these issues could push certain social groups deeper into poverty and vulnerability.

• Discriminatory Legal Provisions That Reproduce the Risk of Exclusion

Law No. 77.18 contains several discriminatory legal provisions, including the requirement, under Article 6, that applicants prove their residential address when registering in the National Population Registry and the reliance, under Article 2, on the High Commission for Planning’s definition of “family” eligible to register in the USR [40]. Such requirements effectively discriminate against vulnerable populations—such as homeless individuals, people without shelter, as well as households lacking proof of residence (e.g., those living in informal housing), and individuals who do not meet the legal definition of a family (including women in difficult circumstances and those without familial support) [41].

Additionally, the self-declaration mechanism on which USR registration relies may exclude families that struggle to express their need for support, whether due to the complexity of the registration procedure, distance from registration centers, lack of modern technological resources [42], or limited awareness of available social programs [43]. This exclusion contravenes the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination, both of which are foundational to international standards governing the right to social protection [44].

• Methodological Flaws in Selecting Target Households

The decree governing the USR outlines a technical framework for targeting [45], relying on digitally collected household data to determine eligibility based on a numerical score. This score draws on indicators such as demographic composition, housing characteristics, and expenditure patterns [46]. Critics, however, argue that this approach fails to capture households’ actual living conditions accurately; for instance, certain assets (such as cell phones or satellite dishes) are increasingly commonplace and no longer reflect real wealth or poverty levels [47]. As a result, the lists of qualifying households generated by the USR may not accurately pinpoint the most vulnerable groups truly in need of support.

• Digitalization and Poverty: A Data Gap

Complete reliance on digital technologies in the USR introduces dual challenges. Many intended beneficiaries lack both the digital skills and the tools needed for registration and application tracking, leading them to pay third parties for assistance—thereby risking the unauthorized disclosure of their personal information. Moreover, technical processing has limitations when assessing multifaceted household poverty; it relies on mathematical calculations that do not always reflect a family’s real-world situation. There are also delays in updating citizen data (such as revising household scores or removing individuals from the Registry), rendering eligibility contingent on the technological platform alone, and limiting the role of human oversight in verifying and correcting computational errors.

Methodologically, the USR’s scoring formula [48] excludes various types of households from meeting the threshold for program benefits, even when they face poverty or vulnerability—for example, single-person households, those comprising only elderly individuals, or divorced and widowed women without children. Other families may be disqualified if they own certain assets or have members with higher levels of education. In such instances, the USR assigns relatively high scores that block access to any form of support. Consequently, particular beneficiaries resort to fraud and manipulation—providing false data or removing/adding family members—to lower their calculated scores. Such practices jeopardize the Registry’s credibility and diminish its effectiveness in targeting those genuinely in need.

• Eligibility Thresholds That Narrow the Target Population

The government has set extremely low thresholds for access to AMO TADAMON—9.32 for the solidarity-based health insurance scheme and 9.74 for direct cash support—making it difficult for many poor households to qualify. In effect, the threshold serves as a technical instrument shaped by underlying political goals, namely restricting the number of beneficiaries in state-funded programs and thereby reducing government social expenditure. This approach reflects a neoliberal paradigm, which assumes that most citizens can provide for their own welfare, while state support should be limited and temporary, reserved only for the very poorest—an outlook endorsed by certain international donor agencies [49]. As a result, the USR shifts from a mechanism intended to enhance the impact of social programs into a tool for capping and curtailing the scope of state intervention [50].

• The Generalization of Direct Cash Transfers: Potential Benefits and Serious Pitfalls

While replacing universal subsidies with direct cash transfers can be beneficial, it may also reinforce economic dependence among beneficiaries [51]. Indicators of this tendency include people selling their assets, reducing essential expenses, closing bank accounts to avoid losing benefits, and moving into the informal sector—thereby hindering their participation in gainful employment or profitable ventures [52]. Eliminating universal subsidies without viable economic alternatives could worsen living conditions for certain groups, particularly the middle class, which faces higher prices for essential goods and an increased tax burden under so-called “solidarity taxes” [53]. Although poorer segments would gain access to social coverage, they could still see their overall economic situation deteriorate following the dismantling of the Compensation Fund and a rise in living costs, as cash support may not keep pace with inflation and economic fluctuations [54]. Algeria’s experience illustrates this concern: dismantling universal subsidies there eroded citizens’ purchasing power in the absence of effective economic alternatives [55]. Further, doubts persist about the government’s commitment to channeling savings from Compensation Fund reforms into targeted social programs; for instance, in Egypt, revenue from cutting fuel subsidies was diverted mainly to servicing foreign debt. Likewise, in Morocco, the 2015 fuel-price liberalization primarily benefited large fuel-market players rather than ordinary citizens [56]. Consequently, the policy of replacing universal subsidies with direct cash transfers appears more aligned with reducing social spending and servicing external debt than with fostering genuine developmental objectives [57].

In light of the risks threatening the effectiveness of the Unified Social Registry (USR), Morocco should seize this opportunity to advance toward the objective of comprehensive social protection. At the political level, this requires recognizing the broader political context in which social policies are implemented. Targeting effectiveness is not solely a technical matter; it also depends on a robust democratic environment. Brazil’s experience demonstrates how effective targeting systems can be in countries with strong democratic institutions [58]. Financially, social protection should be reframed from a budgetary burden to a guaranteed right for every individual and an investment that yields social and economic returns [59]. Achieving this goal demands breaking free from financial constraints and reliance on external financing while exploring sustainable and innovative funding sources [60]. Likewise, there is a need to rationalize solidarity-based funding mechanisms to reinforce the principle of equity in distributing social costs. Legally and institutionally, efforts should focus on remedying shortcomings in the targeting system by eliminating discriminatory provisions, revising the methodology for selecting eligible groups to minimize errors and transitioning from a fixed threshold to a flexible one. It is also crucial to expedite the establishment of the National Registry Agency and equip it with the necessary resources to manage the system effectively, independently of the Ministry of the Interior.

Conclusion

The Social Registry is considered a vital tool for ensuring good governance and effectiveness of social programs, as evidenced by experiences in some African and Asian contexts. However, Morocco’s case appears different. Due to discriminatory legal provisions within the Registry, a targeting methodology that fails to capture households’ actual social conditions thoroughly, and the use of thresholds that narrow the pool of beneficiaries, the Unified Social Registry has shifted from a tool aimed at enhancing social programs to a subtle mechanism for instituting a minimal welfare state model. Consequently, it has become imperative to mobilize national efforts to address the shortcomings revealed by the USR’s implementation through the following measures:

1. Amend the legal framework governing the targeting system to include strengthening personal data protection mechanisms, updating definitions of targeted groups, simplifying registration procedures, and refining mechanisms for leadership and coordination of social programs.
2. Undertake a comprehensive review of the targeting methodology, focusing on improving data collection and validation methods, conducting regular data updates, revising the scoring formula, and transitioning from a fixed threshold system to a flexible one.
3. Accelerate the establishment of the National Registry Agency, ensuring it receives adequate financial and human resources to fulfill its key roles in managing the new targeting system. Its independence from the Ministry of the Interior must be assured, with expanded responsibilities to include direct field-level interventions.
4. Improve the digital infrastructure of the Unified Social Registry (USR) to ensure swift and accurate processing of applications. This includes providing digital support tools to assist technically disadvantaged groups, facilitating easier registration and tracking of applications, and equipping the registry with intelligent systems to detect data manipulation.
5. Strengthen transparency in managing the Unified Social Registry by establishing independent mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating its operations, regularly publishing performance reports, and adopting a transparent grievance system.

These proposals would help enhance the transparency and governance of the USR, improve its effectiveness in targeting deserving beneficiaries, and ensure more equitable and efficient access to social support programs. Ultimately, such efforts would pave the way for more effective, equitable, and integrated social policies in Morocco.

References

1. Law No. 72.18 on the targeting system for beneficiaries of social support programs and on the establishment of the National Registry Agency, published in Official Gazette No. 6908 on 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1441 (August 13, 2020).
2. Ministère Délégué auprès du Chef du Gouvernement Chargé des Affaires Générales et de la Gouvernance, Mapping des programmes de protection sociale au Maroc, UNICEF, Rabat, 2018, pp. 61–63. Available at: https://goo.su/htaMe (accessed May 9, 2024).
3. Royal Speech of July 29, 2018 on the occasion of the 19th anniversary of the King’s accession to the throne.
4. Mohamed KHAYI, “Les subventions universelles et les aides financières directes au Maroc: vers un meilleur ciblage de la population pauvres et vulnérables,” Journal of Integrated Studies in Economics, Law, Technical Sciences & Communication, Vol. (1), No. (1), 2022, p. 13.
5. For further details regarding targeting methods (household, geographical, and categorical) and how they are deployed in Morocco’s social programs, see the study conducted by the House of Councillors on “Social Targeting: Concept, Mechanisms, and Implementation Obstacles,” published by the Center for Studies and Research in Parliamentary Affairs with the support of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, undated, pp. 20–21.
6. Abdelkhalek Touhami et Boccanfuso Dorothée, “Impact des programmes de protection sociale sur la pauvreté multidimensionnelle: nouvelles approches et application au cas du Maroc,” Revue d’économie du développement, 2021/3, Vol. 29, p. 7.
7. Abdessamad Afifi, Social Policies in Morocco: The Policy of Poverty Reduction as a Model, 1956–2015,PhD Thesis in Public Law and Political Science, Faculty of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences, Cadi Ayyad University, Marrakech, academic year 2016/2017, pp. 159–173.
8. Special Commission on the New Development Model, General Report on the New Development Model: Releasing Energies and Restoring Trust to Accelerate Progress and Achieve Well-Being for All,April 2021, p. 25. Accessed on 09/20/2024 via: https://www.csmd.ma/rapport
9. Royal Speech commemorating the 19th anniversary of the King’s accession to the throne, dated July 29, 2018.
10. Economic, Social, and Environmental Council, Social Protection in Morocco: Current Situation, Outcomes, and Ways to Strengthen Insurance and Social Assistance Systems, Self-Referral No. 34, 2018, p. 95.
11. General Report on the New Development Model, op. cit., p. 114.
12. Mapping des programmes de protection sociale au Maroc, op. cit., p. 65.
13. Haut-Commissariat au Plan, United Nations System in Morocco, and the World Bank, Impact social & économique de la crise du COVID-19 au Maroc, July 2020, p. 6.
14. Larabi Jaidi, “Le Registre social unique: Enjeux et défis,” Policy Paper, Policy Center for the New South,Rabat, Morocco, 2020, p. 07.
15. Article 1 of Law No. 72.18.
16. Article 13 of the same law.
17. Article 11 of the same law.
18. Mohamed Khayi, op. cit., p. 22.
19. This policy comprises an integrated package of programs, including:

• Extending compulsory health insurance coverage between 2021 and 2022.
• Rolling out family allowances between 2023 and 2024.
• Broadening access to pension systems and generalizing unemployment benefits by 2025 underFramework Law No. 09.21 on social protection, particularly Article 17 thereof.

1. Hassan Bouikhf, “The Largest Social Protection Initiative Held Hostage by Weak Targeting,” Policy Paper published on the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis website, February 5, 2022. Accessed on 10/22/2024 at: https://mipa.institute/9158
2. Khalid Fatihi, “Minister of Health Admits Excluding 1.2 Million Moroccans from Healthcare Coverage on the Grounds of the ‘Threshold,’” Madar 21, March 28, 2024, accessed on 10/20/2024 at: https://2u.pw/smuN7lxP
3. Adel Bouchareb, “Healthcare Coverage: Between Quantity and Quality,” in Morocco in 2022, Abdel Fattah Belkhal, Moroccan Center for Research and Policy Analysis, First Edition, November 2023, p. 110.
4. Ministry of Economy and Finance, Explanatory Memorandum to the 2025 Finance Bill, p. 38, accessed on 10/25/2024 at: https://2u.pw/JYKiaL2f
5. Kingdom of Morocco, Office of the Head of Government, “30 Months of Achievements: Mid-Term Report 2021–2024,” April 2, 2024, p. 69. Accessed on 06/26/2024 at: https://2u.pw/eKfLCQsh
6. Decree No. 2.22.923, dated 05 Jumada I 1444 (November 30, 2022), specifying the threshold for the Compulsory Basic Health Insurance scheme for persons who are unable to pay subscription fees; published in Official Gazette No. 7147 (Extra Issue), 05 Jumada I 1944 (November 30, 2022).
7. Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for 2023/2024, p. 30.
8. Ibid., same page.
9. Explanatory Memorandum to the 2025 Finance Bill, op. cit., p. 37.
10. Decree No. 2.23.1068, dated 17 Jumada I 1445 (December 1, 2023), specifying the threshold for benefiting from the direct social support scheme, Official Gazette No. 7253, 20 Jumada I 1445 (December 4, 2023).
11. Moad Bedhich, “Excluding One Million Moroccans from ‘Poverty Support’ Questions the Rollout of Social Protection,” Sawt Al Maghrib, June 14, 2024, accessed on 10/23/2024 at: https://2u.pw/J1Sk22Tn
12. Decree No. 2.20.792, dated 17 Ramadan 1442 (April 30, 2021), implementing Law No. 72.18 on the targeting system for beneficiaries of social support programs and the establishment of the National Registry Agency, concerning the National Registry Agency; published in Official Gazette No. 6985 on 27 Ramadan 1442 (May 10, 2021).
13. Press release from the Government Council meeting of April 20, 2021, accessed on 09/20/2024 at: https://2u.pw/UxqzXFtV
14. Rachid El Haboubi, “The National Registry Agency in Morocco: A Security Institution or a Developmental One?”, article published on the Al Omk Al Maghribi website, accessed on 12/01/2024 at: https://2u.pw/RetK12Mo
15. Larabi Jaidi, op. cit., p. 02.
16. The gradual reduction in butane gas subsidies for 2024 is set at 2.5 dirhams per 3kg cylinder and 10 dirhams per 12kg cylinder, as per a press release from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Directorate of Competition, Prices, and Compensation, Rabat, May 19, 2024, accessed on 05/20/2024 via:https://2u.pw/pgmJy57F
17. The “One Million Schoolbags” program was canceled and replaced by a special direct financial subsidy allocated exclusively to low-income families with school-aged children who already receive direct cash support. This subsidy is paid once each September, starting from the 2024/2025 school year, in accordance with Decree No. 2.24.706, supplementing the annex to Decree No. 2.23.1067, issued on December 1, 2023, implementing Law No. 58.23 concerning the direct social support scheme.
18. Khalid Essamadi, “A ‘Gift’ from the ‘Social Government’ to Poor Moroccan Families as the School Year Begins,” Hiba Press, September 12, 2024, accessed on 09/30/2024 at: https://2u.pw/SjndfXok
19. Explanatory Memorandum to the 2025 Finance Bill, op. cit., p. 39.
20. Brazil is among the Latin American countries that have achieved significant success with a unified social registry via its “CadÚnico” system, which covers a large segment of the population, enabling precise identification of the most vulnerable groups and targeted social program delivery. Key factors in Brazil’s success include substantial investment in digital infrastructure, strengthened mechanisms for cross-sector coordination, a focus on aiding the most vulnerable, and ongoing evaluations of the targeting system. See also Hicham Hafid, “Registre social unifié: analyse des enjeux et des défis dans le contexte marocain,” Critique économique, no. 41–42, Summer 2022, p. 156.
21. According to the High Commission for Planning, a family is defined as “a group of persons who live in the same dwelling and share the necessary expenses to meet their common needs; a person living alone is considered a family.”
22. Economic, Social, and Environmental Council, Bill No. 72.18 Concerning the Targeting System for Beneficiaries of Social Support Programs and the Establishment of the National Registry Agency, Self-Referral No. 44, 2020, p. 14.
23. National Human Rights Council, Bill No. 72.18 on the Targeting System for Beneficiaries of Social Support Programs and the Establishment of the National Registry Agency: Observations and Recommendations, July 2020, p. 10.
24. Nearly half of Moroccans (47.6%) are unaware of existing public programs aimed at assisting the poor. See: Abdelrahman Yassine, “Moroccans’ Perceptions of Social Protection: A Contribution to Enriching Debate on the New Development Model,” Summaries of the High Commission for Planning, Nos. 11–13, December 2019, p. 1.
25. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19 on the right to social security (Article 9), published during the 39th session of the UN General Assembly, November 23, 2008, paragraphs 29–31.
26. Decree No. 2.21.582, issued on 17 Dhu al-Hijjah 1442 (July 28, 2021), implementing Law No. 72.18 on the targeting system for beneficiaries of social support programs and on the establishment of the National Registry Agency, pertaining to the Unified Social Registry, Official Gazette No. 7011 – 29 Dhu al-Hijjah 1441 (August 9, 2021).
27. More details on these indicators are listed in Annexes 1 and 2 of Decree No. 2.21.582 on the Unified Social Registry, cited above.
28. Abdelhafid Mamouh, Policy Paper on “Morocco’s New Social Protection Policy: A Rights-Based Approach,” published by the Arab Association of Constitutional Law, 2022, p. 12.
29. Households are scored according to multiple factors, such as income, housing type, household status, number of family members, educational levels, availability of essential services, and geographic location. Each factor is given a specific weight, and the resulting points are combined to produce a final score that determines whether a household qualifies for social support.
30. Rana Jawad, “Will Social Protection Be More Solidarity-Oriented in the Middle East and North Africa?” Policy in Focus, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 2017, p. 16.
31. Abderrafi Zaanoun, “Capping the Welfare State,” Policy Paper published on the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis website, September 25, 2023, accessed on 02/01/2025 at: https://2u.pw/tR5SvK2y
32. John Hills and Julian Le Grand, Social Exclusion: A Comprehensive View, translated by Mohamed Al-Gohary, Alam Al-Maarefa series, National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters, Kuwait, Issue 344, October 2007, p. 379.
33. Abderrafi Zaanoun, “Conditional Cash Transfers in the Arab Region and the Dilemma of Social Justice,” Arab Window, 29(1), 2014, p. 108. Accessed on 09/13/2024 via: https://doi.org/10.53833/EJKQ2599
34. Abderrafi Zaanoun, “Capping the Welfare State,” op. Cit.
35. Miloud Arrahali, “The Project to ‘Universalize’ Social Protection Between the Weight of Reality and Official Recommendations,” in Social Protection and the Development Model: Comparative Critical Approaches and Studies, Ibrahim Bellouh and Younes El Majdoubi, Moroccan Center for Research and Policy Analysis, December 2022, p. 113.
36. Hassan Hami, “Social Subsidy Policies in Algeria: Economic Costs and the Inevitability of Reform,” Policy Paper published by the Arab Reform Initiative, p. 25. Accessed on 11/09/2024 at: https://bit.ly/41bCbs9
37. Salma Sidqi, “The Compensation System: An Unfinished Reform,” Policy Paper published on the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis website, July 1, 2021, available at: https://mipa.institute/8637
38. Bouthaina Elfalis and Jamal Elazouaoui, “Social Spending in Morocco: The Burden of IMF Conditions,” in No Cover: The Role of the IMF in Reducing Social Protection—A Case Study of Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco, Iman Cherif, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Tunis, 2022, p. 141.
39. Brazil has established a social registry to identify its poorest households, subjecting it to periodic evaluations by Parliament and continuously updating its legal and administrative frameworks to meet the needs of targeted populations. Civil society and NGOs also participate in overseeing social support programs, enhancing accountability and transparency, and ensuring the fairness and effectiveness of these programs. For more information, see Hicham Hafid, op. cit., p. 15.
40. Yvette Rose Rayssiguier, Gilles Huteau, “La protection sociale, fondement des politiques sociales,” in Politiques sociales et de santé: comprendre pour agir, Yvette Rose et Rayssiguier Gilles Huteau (dir.), Presses de l’EHESP, 3rd edition, France, 2018, p. 15.
41. Examples of such funding include Taxes on harmful products (such as tobacco, alcohol, and polluting industries) and allocating their revenue to finance social protection. Social contributions on high profits, through additional taxes on corporations and high-income individuals, to support more disadvantaged groups. Directing endowment-based investments (awqaf) to cover social protection expenses and reforming tax collection systems to enhance efficiency and minimize evasion, thereby boosting revenues earmarked for social protection.